MAL-2026-4661
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (eeb24dfdd4a970dc44c017056c2a39bed6aa5973a7ec7e94b20c70d90114726c)
react-tracked-tony impersonates the popular react-tracked package: package.json sets name: react-tracked-tony, author: Daishi Kato, and homepage: https://react-tracked.js.org (the real project's site), while the repository URL points at an unrelated user account (github.com/daltonchristiano060-gif/react-tracked-tony.git). The package re-exports the real react-tracked API to appear functional. On require/import in Node, endex.js fetches a JavaScript payload from https://almondco.online/api/droppers/38jmkse over HTTPS with TLS verification explicitly disabled (rejectUnauthorized: false) and executes the response body in-process via new Function('require', text + tail)(require), handing the remote code full Node require access. Before fetching, endex.js enumerates ~20 cloud/CI/sandbox indicators (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, Travis, Vercel, Netlify, Kubernetes, AWS Lambda/ECS/Batch, Azure, GCP Cloud Run/App Engine) and reads /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor to detect Amazon/Google/Microsoft/QEMU/OpenStack hypervisors, aborting on match — a deliberate anti-analysis gate so the payload only fires on real developer/operator machines. Combination of typosquat + impersonated author metadata + import-time remote-code-exec from a non-publisher domain + TLS verification disabled + sandbox evasion is an unambiguous supply-chain attack.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "dist/endex.js",
"sha256": "9dfd6663c1a1d8a452cb356580a060542777b173393f7626b789c15ae10baa99",
"tlsh": "9fb111d8b9f763390397f1bc464fa50af7ab64032229c511bd5d83603f9127483b2ae9"
},
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "49e43b79771ba9064c26dcb8efa298695a45fa988fc3ba151e4ac2d39d0733f8",
"tlsh": "e9b1ee08c9d38ca31aa6a56c3ea970965519d147cd48bc1c73d9c22e0f0e67f62f4bad"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "react-tracked-tony-2.0.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "3945adc077663ded35fdaf6b22c77586d5d6a73e",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-NckhKcQJOWZ+sDXp35SaigIg5WtdkDi8B8NUPtJlUe9aQF/2kC7cYDyT0Oom2TAKmq82q2mMy49N6oezfb9yEg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "react-tracked-tony"
},
"versions": [
"2.0.1"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-003473",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T05:50:42.641834809Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-20T05:46:00Z",
"sha256": "eeb24dfdd4a970dc44c017056c2a39bed6aa5973a7ec7e94b20c70d90114726c",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"2.0.1"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (eeb24dfdd4a970dc44c017056c2a39bed6aa5973a7ec7e94b20c70d90114726c)\nreact-tracked-tony impersonates the popular react-tracked package: package.json sets `name: react-tracked-tony`, `author: Daishi Kato`, and `homepage: https://react-tracked.js.org` (the real project\u0027s site), while the repository URL points at an unrelated user account (github.com/daltonchristiano060-gif/react-tracked-tony.git). The package re-exports the real react-tracked API to appear functional. On require/import in Node, endex.js fetches a JavaScript payload from https://almondco.online/api/droppers/38jmkse over HTTPS with TLS verification explicitly disabled (`rejectUnauthorized: false`) and executes the response body in-process via `new Function(\u0027require\u0027, text + tail)(require)`, handing the remote code full Node `require` access. Before fetching, endex.js enumerates ~20 cloud/CI/sandbox indicators (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, CircleCI, Travis, Vercel, Netlify, Kubernetes, AWS Lambda/ECS/Batch, Azure, GCP Cloud Run/App Engine) and reads /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor to detect Amazon/Google/Microsoft/QEMU/OpenStack hypervisors, aborting on match \u2014 a deliberate anti-analysis gate so the payload only fires on real developer/operator machines. Combination of typosquat + impersonated author metadata + import-time remote-code-exec from a non-publisher domain + TLS verification disabled + sandbox evasion is an unambiguous supply-chain attack.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-4661",
"modified": "2026-05-20T05:46:00Z",
"published": "2026-05-20T05:46:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/react-tracked-tony/v/2.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in react-tracked-tony (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.