MAL-2026-4572
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (383f22ab2e1e8bbb44a44fa3828710f476947837d0b38aa9266eafcbf9959261)
Package name typosquats the popular get-package-type and reuses its README/exports verbatim, but adds "postinstall": "node utils.cjs" in package.json. utils.cjs is a 263 KB obfuscator.io-protected blob (string-array rotation with anti-debug debugger loops, RegExp toString fingerprint, and Function('return this') sandbox checks) that on npm install: (1) decodes a hardcoded base64+XOR-obfuscated URL and bearer token (HF_TOKEN), (2) HTTPS-GETs a platform-specific binary (linux-x64 / darwin-arm64 / win32-x64 selected via DOWNLOAD_MAP), (3) writes it under the user's local data directory, chmod 0755 on POSIX, and spawns it detached, (4) installs OS-level persistence: on Windows via reg add HKCU\...\CurrentVersion\Run, on macOS via a LaunchAgent plist under ~/Library/LaunchAgents, on Linux via a systemd user unit at ~/.config/systemd/user/<unit>.service followed by systemctl --user daemon-reload && enable && start. The script also self-detaches by re-spawning itself with a child argv via {detached:true, stdio:'ignore'} and calling process.exit(0) so npm sees success while the dropper continues asynchronously. The fetched bytes are opaque, unverified (no hash/signature), and the source domain is not the package's publisher. This is an unambiguous binary-runner-dropper plus backdoor persistence triggered on every install.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "package.json",
"sha256": "744cbafafa0d8cb8aee9db2d520943ee9409a8c517f75a5b4f315a632b7e8061",
"tlsh": "ec01d313da51bff323c52b9d792cc0d3a6bd004a7448d4cc4de36260c1d92702b1a18a"
},
{
"path": "utils.cjs",
"sha256": "b42ccbc86e06451f2aae3b865765280e6d3ec7611b5d4e81c0c06d39f3889623",
"tlsh": "e544b58477c67c8212075777731ab2e5e93add94b08c449df540bc68f0ada2bfae0a71"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "get-package-lint-0.1.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "3f8237e4a742c5f473f3eb78e25f082e89c82506",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-k+wYqmq4noyDPm7RwINxe4DQOJDA/MZfOqgD4JLatullKd7/z6FCbcNHfqD20d+n3HW+iEDBSagcsOv/cE+csg=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "get-package-lint"
},
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-004161",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T05:52:03.258471076Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-22T07:15:19Z",
"sha256": "383f22ab2e1e8bbb44a44fa3828710f476947837d0b38aa9266eafcbf9959261",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.1.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (383f22ab2e1e8bbb44a44fa3828710f476947837d0b38aa9266eafcbf9959261)\nPackage name typosquats the popular `get-package-type` and reuses its README/exports verbatim, but adds `\"postinstall\": \"node utils.cjs\"` in package.json. utils.cjs is a 263 KB obfuscator.io-protected blob (string-array rotation with anti-debug `debugger` loops, RegExp toString fingerprint, and `Function(\u0027return this\u0027)` sandbox checks) that on `npm install`: (1) decodes a hardcoded base64+XOR-obfuscated URL and bearer token (HF_TOKEN), (2) HTTPS-GETs a platform-specific binary (linux-x64 / darwin-arm64 / win32-x64 selected via DOWNLOAD_MAP), (3) writes it under the user\u0027s local data directory, `chmod 0755` on POSIX, and spawns it detached, (4) installs OS-level persistence: on Windows via `reg add HKCU\\...\\CurrentVersion\\Run`, on macOS via a LaunchAgent plist under `~/Library/LaunchAgents`, on Linux via a systemd user unit at `~/.config/systemd/user/\u003cunit\u003e.service` followed by `systemctl --user daemon-reload \u0026\u0026 enable \u0026\u0026 start`. The script also self-detaches by re-spawning itself with a `child` argv via `{detached:true, stdio:\u0027ignore\u0027}` and calling `process.exit(0)` so npm sees success while the dropper continues asynchronously. The fetched bytes are opaque, unverified (no hash/signature), and the source domain is not the package\u0027s publisher. This is an unambiguous binary-runner-dropper plus backdoor persistence triggered on every install.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-4572",
"modified": "2026-05-22T07:15:19Z",
"published": "2026-05-22T07:15:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/get-package-lint/v/0.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in get-package-lint (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.