MAL-2026-4347
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
A campaign of npm packages sharing a common dropper (clob.js) that downloads and persistently installs a Windows executable from IPFS on postinstall. The dropper fetches the binary from IPFS CID bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa via multiple public gateways (Pinata, Cloudflare, ipfs.io), drops it to %LOCALAPPDATA%, registers Windows Registry persistence under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run using a hidden VBScript wrapper (window style 0, no taskbar entry), launches the payload immediately, and reports the victim's public IP address to a hardcoded C2 server via HTTP POST. macOS and Linux stubs are present but not yet configured. Developer artifacts bundled in config/meta_data.json leak the attacker's build path: E:\getting IP and check list\clob-downloader\.
@devcarron/clob is a scoped package identical in behavior to clob.api and likely published by the same actor as a distribution variant. It bundles clob2.0.exe (≈4 MB) directly in the tarball and also fetches from IPFS. Its postinstall script runs clob.js, which drops the executable to %LOCALAPPDATA%\clob2.0.exe. The C2 beacon transmits the victim's public IP to http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls.
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (7a672e1412ca3d2af83bcf7772d7cf6b1803b8987a43e4a2abc359112f34aea1)
@devcarron/clob ships a malicious postinstall dropper. package.json declares postinstall: node clob.js, which on npm install downloads an opaque Windows executable (clob2.0.exe) from IPFS via gateways including violet-tricky-quelea-562.mypinata.cloud, cloudflare-ipfs.com, and gateway.pinata.cloud (CID bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa), writes it under %LOCALAPPDATA%, generates a VBS launcher, and registers HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to silently launch the binary via wscript.exe with windowsHide. Equivalent persistence is installed on macOS via ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clob.agent.plist + launchctl load, and on Linux via ~/.config/autostart/clob.desktop. clob.js then resolves the installer's public IP through api.ipify.org and POSTs it to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls over plain HTTP — an install-time beacon notifying the operator of each successful infection. The tarball additionally ships a 4 MB Windows PE clob2.0.exe at the root, and README.md is copied verbatim from @img/sharp-win32-x64 (Prebuilt sharp for use with Windows x64) to disguise the package's true purpose. None of these behaviors relate to any legitimate library function: no source code, no advertised API, no relation to libvips/sharp.
- CWE-506 - The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "clob.js",
"sha256": "954728b16738a4b44696a599eecde211ece2ccfcc9eb47bfaf4ba5c3ab6715be",
"tlsh": "7412857a9af2612139b3d58dab0b441a6417b4073109ec54fa5cb35e6fcf02cc5a16fe"
},
{
"path": "README.md",
"sha256": "c416cd0af88256407c36a0613f189ac4257221c7206d0324f7ef5563c66f1125",
"tlsh": "fba1c0fe2c045a632ff1c9c67e0fad4fef19914c668e2d8874de9050632122969ec160"
},
{
"path": "clob2.0.exe",
"sha256": "300a7dea05c2a588757010ad314fa55cb8ef3acebaa284f58a5cd0fd39bce478",
"tlsh": "e9168d43f68592e9c0aec074c25b5237e376fc894a20679b73985b212f66b601f5f39c"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "clob-2.73.0.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "40d17c4e886bca64d773cea6d25672323313ebc4",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-3RD7rZLwC2tq8XAJqH4cvvcfbDjA4vUXVFPl+rUdz6N5t0CRc/pzEX0ZpppstTezEFofVnaaGh4PTkvmkCOWYA=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@devcarron/clob"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "SEMVER"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.73.0"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
},
{
"contact": [
"https://safedep.io"
],
"name": "SafeDep",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-004635",
"import_time": "2026-05-26T05:52:59.538162961Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-25T12:00:48Z",
"sha256": "7a672e1412ca3d2af83bcf7772d7cf6b1803b8987a43e4a2abc359112f34aea1",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"2.73.0"
]
}
]
},
"details": "A campaign of npm packages sharing a common dropper (`clob.js`) that downloads and persistently installs a Windows executable from IPFS on `postinstall`. The dropper fetches the binary from IPFS CID `bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa` via multiple public gateways (Pinata, Cloudflare, ipfs.io), drops it to `%LOCALAPPDATA%`, registers Windows Registry persistence under `HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run` using a hidden VBScript wrapper (window style 0, no taskbar entry), launches the payload immediately, and reports the victim\u0027s public IP address to a hardcoded C2 server via HTTP POST. macOS and Linux stubs are present but not yet configured. Developer artifacts bundled in `config/meta_data.json` leak the attacker\u0027s build path: `E:\\getting IP and check list\\clob-downloader\\`.\n\n`@devcarron/clob` is a scoped package identical in behavior to `clob.api` and likely published by the same actor as a distribution variant. It bundles `clob2.0.exe` (\u22484 MB) directly in the tarball and also fetches from IPFS. Its `postinstall` script runs `clob.js`, which drops the executable to `%LOCALAPPDATA%\\clob2.0.exe`. The C2 beacon transmits the victim\u0027s public IP to `http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls`.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (7a672e1412ca3d2af83bcf7772d7cf6b1803b8987a43e4a2abc359112f34aea1)\n@devcarron/clob ships a malicious postinstall dropper. package.json declares `postinstall: node clob.js`, which on `npm install` downloads an opaque Windows executable (clob2.0.exe) from IPFS via gateways including violet-tricky-quelea-562.mypinata.cloud, cloudflare-ipfs.com, and gateway.pinata.cloud (CID bafybeif3zkapj364ofnrvbty7oj5h5ufpxlp4s62usk3ulxrru35e3gssa), writes it under %LOCALAPPDATA%, generates a VBS launcher, and registers HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run to silently launch the binary via wscript.exe with windowsHide. Equivalent persistence is installed on macOS via ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.clob.agent.plist + launchctl load, and on Linux via ~/.config/autostart/clob.desktop. clob.js then resolves the installer\u0027s public IP through api.ipify.org and POSTs it to the hardcoded bare-IP endpoint http://45.8.22.112:2026/api/urls over plain HTTP \u2014 an install-time beacon notifying the operator of each successful infection. The tarball additionally ships a 4 MB Windows PE clob2.0.exe at the root, and README.md is copied verbatim from @img/sharp-win32-x64 (`Prebuilt sharp for use with Windows x64`) to disguise the package\u0027s true purpose. None of these behaviors relate to any legitimate library function: no source code, no advertised API, no relation to libvips/sharp.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-4347",
"modified": "2026-05-26T05:55:01Z",
"published": "2026-05-25T12:00:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@devcarron/clob/v/2.73.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @devcarron/clob (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.