MAL-2026-3679
Vulnerability from ossf_malicious_packages
-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-
Source: amazon-inspector (1c3af30011dcf54950f270463028270d732fce20b5cd5da44342a0748922e6df)
The package is advertised as a neutral CLI/MCP wrapper for Hyperliquid, but its distributed code silently routes value from the installer to an author-controlled address. In dist/index.js and dist/mcp.js, the constants BUILDER_ADDRESS = 0xa6f967d47c6f85a5ba4fc43543e5e1c171cccf98, BUILDER_FEE = 1 (0.01%), and REFERRAL_CODE = '2OOLKIT' are hardcoded. On config init / config set --private-key..., a fire-and-forget silentAutoSetup(env, privateKey, walletAddress) signs and submits (a) a setReferrer('2OOLKIT') transaction and (b) an approveBuilderFee(0xa6f9...cf98, '0.1%') transaction on the user's Hyperliquid account, with errors swallowed so the user sees no indication. Additionally, HyperliquidClient.placeOrder unconditionally injects action.builder = { b: BUILDER_ADDRESS, f: BUILDER_FEE } into every order, so every trade routed through the CLI pays a builder fee to the hardcoded address in perpetuity. None of this is disclosed in the README or command output, there is no opt-out, and the behavior is triggered by the documented setup flow. This is a silent-relay pattern causing direct, ongoing financial harm to anyone who installs and uses the package with a funded wallet. The repeated POSTs flagged in dist/index.js:610 and dist/mcp.js:466 correspond to the Hyperliquid exchange submissions carrying these hardcoded builder/referrer fields.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"cwes": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-506",
"description": "The product contains code that appears to be malicious in nature.",
"name": "Embedded Malicious Code"
}
],
"indicators": {
"evidence_files": [
{
"path": "dist/index.js",
"sha256": "73cd6941832c612aca22f77edd9c5da8e3bea943be2ba77d3a11538523080292",
"tlsh": "6653a52075fa212114a3b6ae6b6b81042035f653350cec957becfbd11f9e42689b7f78"
}
],
"package_integrity": [
{
"filename": "hyperliquid-cli-0.2.1.tgz",
"hashes": {
"sha1": "1a139c96cec462bcf72c21e399097100fb7d6369",
"sha512_sri": "sha512-4NbhUFbpf6OoGv8cYFr3hOsNgMkwp1QFnHp3hChfiLBAKCRFU9zLN+coacxfyiW7PJN9xjkpm+9MD0z8DQkrHw=="
}
}
]
}
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli"
},
"versions": [
"0.2.1",
"0.2.2"
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"contact": [
"actran@amazon.com"
],
"name": "Amazon Inspector",
"type": "FINDER"
}
],
"database_specific": {
"malicious-packages-origins": [
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-002224",
"import_time": "2026-05-13T20:10:54.006616674Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-12T19:03:07Z",
"sha256": "1c3af30011dcf54950f270463028270d732fce20b5cd5da44342a0748922e6df",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.2.1"
]
},
{
"id": "IN-MAL-2026-002225",
"import_time": "2026-05-13T20:10:54.072521104Z",
"modified_time": "2026-05-12T19:03:07Z",
"sha256": "66215e5cdec4c1ec4dfa5fb21237998c57bfbfd96a0bcb9792b92e4c88be3f17",
"source": "amazon-inspector",
"versions": [
"0.2.2"
]
}
]
},
"details": "\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1c3af30011dcf54950f270463028270d732fce20b5cd5da44342a0748922e6df)\nThe package is advertised as a neutral CLI/MCP wrapper for Hyperliquid, but its distributed code silently routes value from the installer to an author-controlled address. In dist/index.js and dist/mcp.js, the constants BUILDER_ADDRESS = 0xa6f967d47c6f85a5ba4fc43543e5e1c171cccf98, BUILDER_FEE = 1 (0.01%), and REFERRAL_CODE = \u00272OOLKIT\u0027 are hardcoded. On `config init` / `config set --private-key...`, a fire-and-forget `silentAutoSetup(env, privateKey, walletAddress)` signs and submits (a) a `setReferrer(\u00272OOLKIT\u0027)` transaction and (b) an `approveBuilderFee(0xa6f9...cf98, \u00270.1%\u0027)` transaction on the user\u0027s Hyperliquid account, with errors swallowed so the user sees no indication. Additionally, `HyperliquidClient.placeOrder` unconditionally injects `action.builder = { b: BUILDER_ADDRESS, f: BUILDER_FEE }` into every order, so every trade routed through the CLI pays a builder fee to the hardcoded address in perpetuity. None of this is disclosed in the README or command output, there is no opt-out, and the behavior is triggered by the documented setup flow. This is a silent-relay pattern causing direct, ongoing financial harm to anyone who installs and uses the package with a funded wallet. The repeated POSTs flagged in dist/index.js:610 and dist/mcp.js:466 correspond to the Hyperliquid exchange submissions carrying these hardcoded builder/referrer fields.\n",
"id": "MAL-2026-3679",
"modified": "2026-05-13T20:13:32Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T07:42:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli/v/0.2.1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/@2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli/v/0.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.4",
"summary": "Malicious code in @2oolkit/hyperliquid-cli (npm)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.