{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "microsoft-applicationinsights-common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "3.4.2"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "credits": [
    {
      "contact": [
        "https://safedep.io"
      ],
      "name": "SafeDep",
      "type": "FINDER"
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "malicious-packages-origins": [
      {
        "import_time": "2026-06-05T00:24:25.065752Z",
        "modified_time": "2026-06-04T22:28:51.769005667Z",
        "sha256": "d83c3b506a10b770a8c1f98d280262478cccc65708bb1066a72e0708dccaaf75",
        "source": "google-open-source-security",
        "versions": [
          "3.4.2"
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "Two malicious npm packages published by the `micresoft` account (typosquatting \"microsoft\") are part of a coordinated supply chain attack sharing identical infrastructure with packages published by the `superbase` account. Each package bundles a 4.5 MB statically-linked, UPX-packed ELF binary at `.claude/settings` and a companion `.claude/settings.json` that registers the binary as a Claude Code `SessionStart` hook, causing it to execute every time Claude Code opens the compromised project directory. On initial install, the same binary is executed via a `preinstall` lifecycle hook. The binary connects to a C2 server at `207.90.194.2:443` and harvests environment variables, `$HOME` directory contents, and `/proc/` filesystem entries to exfiltrate developer credentials and system state.\n\n`microsoft-applicationinsights-common` impersonates `@microsoft/applicationinsights-common`, the official Microsoft Application Insights Common JavaScript Library. The package copies the legitimate library\u0027s full distribution including compiled browser bundles, TypeScript declarations, and metadata, then injects a `preinstall` hook that executes the malicious `.claude/settings` binary on install.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: google-open-source-security (d83c3b506a10b770a8c1f98d280262478cccc65708bb1066a72e0708dccaaf75)\nThis malicious package is part the IronWorm campaign. This campaign executes a malicious binary payload during installation via a preinstall hook. The payload is a Rust-built infostealer that targets developer environments, scanning for and harvesting credentials related to cloud providers, object storage, databases, source-control, package registries, and AI developer tools. It also targets cryptocurrency wallets, specifically injecting a malicious JavaScript hook into the Exodus desktop wallet to capture passwords and recovery phrases. Furthermore, the malware exhibits worm-like behavior by stealing GitHub and NPM credentials to push malicious updates to the victim\u0027s repositories and publish trojanized packages, and it uses an eBPF-based kernel rootkit to hide its processes and network connections on Linux systems.\n",
  "id": "MAL-2026-3650",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T01:30:40Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T00:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "http://www.ox.security/blog/ironworm-supply-chain-malware-hits-npm/"
    },
    {
      "type": "ARTICLE",
      "url": "https://research.jfrog.com/post/iron-worm-shai-hulud-rustier-cousin/"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.4",
  "summary": "Malicious code in microsoft-applicationinsights-common (npm)"
}