{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.1-20260311144920-9eb2d33064b7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32245"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T16:38:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T19:16:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe OIDC token endpoint does not verify that the client exchanging an authorization code is the same client the code was issued to. A malicious OIDC client operator can exchange another client\u0027s authorization code using their own client credentials, obtaining tokens for users who never authorized their application. This violates RFC 6749 Section 4.1.3.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen an authorization code is created, `StoreCode` at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:305-322` correctly stores the `ClientID` alongside the code hash in the database (line 316).\n\nDuring token exchange at `internal/controller/oidc_controller.go:267-309`, the handler retrieves the code entry at line 268 and validates the `redirect_uri` at line 291, but never compares `entry.ClientID` against the requesting client\u0027s ID (`creds.ClientID`). The code proceeds directly to `GenerateAccessToken` at line 299.\n\nThe developers clearly intended this check to exist, the refresh token flow at `internal/service/oidc_service.go:508-510` has the exact guard: `if entry.ClientID != reqClientId { return TokenResponse{}, ErrInvalidClient }`. It was simply omitted from the authorization code grant.\n\nThe `entry.ClientID` field is stored in the database but never read during authorization code exchange.\n\n### PoC\n\nPrerequisites: a tinyauth instance with two OIDC clients configured (Client A and Client B). Both clients must have at least one overlapping redirect URI, or the attacker must be able to intercept the authorization code from Client A\u0027s redirect (via referrer leak, browser history, log access, etc.).\n\nStep 1 \u2014 Log in as a normal user:\n\n```\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/user/login \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"admin123\"}\u0027\n```\n\nStep 2 \u2014 Authorize with Client A:\n\n```\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/authorize \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"client_id\":\"client-a-id\",\"redirect_uri\":\"http://localhost:8080/callback\",\"response_type\":\"code\",\"scope\":\"openid\",\"state\":\"test\"}\u0027\n```\n\nExtract the `code` parameter from the `redirect_uri` in the response.\n\nStep 3 \u2014 Exchange Client A\u0027s code using Client B\u0027s credentials:\n\n```\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/oidc/token \\\n  -u \"client-b-id:client-b-secret\" \\\n  -d \"grant_type=authorization_code\u0026code=\u003cCODE_FROM_STEP_2\u003e\u0026redirect_uri=http://localhost:8080/callback\"\n```\n\nThe server returns a valid `access_token`, `id_token`, and `refresh_token`. Client B has obtained tokens for a user who only authorized Client A.\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious OIDC relying party operator who can intercept or observe an authorization code issued to a different client can exchange it for tokens under their own client identity. This enables user impersonation across OIDC clients on the same tinyauth instance. The attack requires a multi-client deployment and a way to obtain the victim client\u0027s authorization code (which is passed as a URL query parameter and can leak through referrer headers, browser history, or server logs). Single-client deployments are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-xg2q-62g2-cvcm",
  "modified": "2026-03-24T21:11:30Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T16:38:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/security/advisories/GHSA-xg2q-62g2-cvcm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/commit/b2a1bfb1f532e87f205fa3afa3fc9f148c53ab89"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveiliop56/tinyauth/releases/tag/v5.0.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4689"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Tinyauth\u0027s OIDC authorization codes are not bound to client on token exchange"
}