Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-X3R2-FJ3R-G5MV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:09 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:24

Summary

sealed-env: TOTP secret embedded in unseal token payload (enterprise mode)

Details

In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator's literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.

An attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.

Patched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || "epoch-v1")). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator's machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible — files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.

Reported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator's .env.local TOTP secret.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sealed-env"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.github.davidalmeidac:sealed-env-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:09:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T14:17:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator\u0027s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.\n\nAn attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.\n\nPatched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (`enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || \"epoch-v1\")`). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator\u0027s machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible \u2014 files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.\n\nReported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator\u0027s .env.local TOTP secret.",
  "id": "GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T16:24:37Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:09:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env/security/advisories/GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45091"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "sealed-env: TOTP secret embedded in unseal token payload (enterprise mode)"
}

CVE-2026-45091 (GCVE-0-2026-45091)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-12 13:20 – Updated: 2026-05-12 14:39

Title

sealed-env: TOTP secret embedded in unseal token payload (enterprise mode)

Summary

sealed-env is a cross-stack, zero-trust secret management library for Node.js and Java/Spring Boot. In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator's literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.0-alpha.4.

Severity

9.1 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-05-12 14:38 UTC

CWE

CWE-200 - Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
CWE-522 - Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7752 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env/secur…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
davidalmeidac	sealed-env	Affected: < 0.1.0-alpha.4

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-45091",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-12T14:38:56.109361Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
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        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-12T14:39:10.904Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "sealed-env",
          "vendor": "davidalmeidac",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.1.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "sealed-env is a cross-stack, zero-trust secret management library for Node.js and Java/Spring Boot. In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator\u0027s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.1.0-alpha.4."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 9.1,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
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          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-200",
              "description": "CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-522",
              "description": "CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-12T13:20:21.560Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env/security/advisories/GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env/security/advisories/GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "sealed-env: TOTP secret embedded in unseal token payload (enterprise mode)"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-45091",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-12T13:20:21.560Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-08T19:27:26.698Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-12T14:39:10.904Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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