GHSA-X3R2-FJ3R-G5MV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 15:09 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:24
VLAI?
Summary
sealed-env: TOTP secret embedded in unseal token payload (enterprise mode)
Details

In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator's literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.

An attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.

Patched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || "epoch-v1")). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator's machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible — files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.

Reported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator's .env.local TOTP secret.

Severity ?
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sealed-env"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.github.davidalmeidac:sealed-env-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.0-alpha.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-522"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-12T15:09:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T14:17:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In sealed-env enterprise mode, versions 0.1.0-alpha.1 through 0.1.0-alpha.3 embedded the operator\u0027s literal TOTP secret in the JWS payload of every minted unseal token. JWS payload is base64-encoded JSON, NOT encrypted. Any party who could observe a minted token (CI build logs, container env dumps, kubectl describe pod, Sentry/Rollbar stack traces, log aggregators) could decode the payload and extract the TOTP secret in plaintext.\n\nAn attacker with (a) the master key (e.g. from a separate compromise such as a leaked CI secret) and (b) any single leaked unseal token can use the extracted TOTP secret to mint new valid unseal tokens for any future deploy indefinitely, breaking the second-factor property the library claimed.\n\nPatched in 0.1.0-alpha.4 by replacing the embedded secret with a salt-bound HMAC derivative (`enterprise_epoch = HMAC(totpSecret, salt || \"epoch-v1\")`). The TOTP secret never leaves the operator\u0027s machine in the new design. The wire format change is incompatible \u2014 files sealed by affected versions must be re-sealed and the TOTP secret rotated. Full migration playbook in CHANGELOG.md.\n\nReported by an external reviewer who decoded the payload of a real minted token and confirmed bit-for-bit equality with the operator\u0027s .env.local TOTP secret.",
  "id": "GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T16:24:37Z",
  "published": "2026-05-12T15:09:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env/security/advisories/GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45091"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/davidalmeidac/sealed-env"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "sealed-env: TOTP secret embedded in unseal token payload (enterprise mode)"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.