GHSA-GJ6X-Q8RH-WJ6X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:48 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:48Summary
Multiple HTTP handlers in Curio passed raw database error messages to HTTP clients via http.Error(). When the PostgreSQL/YugabyteDB driver (pgx) returned errors, these could contain the database connection string — including hostname, port, username, and password. Additionally, the internal connection string was constructed with the plaintext password embedded in the URL, which was also included in startup error messages and could surface in logs.
Details
Three components were affected:
-
PDP handlers (
pdp/handlers.go) — 18+ HTTP error paths passederr.Error()directly to HTTP responses. While these endpoints require ECDSA JWT authentication, an authenticated client (e.g., a FilPay service) that triggered a database error would receive the raw pgx error in the HTTP response body. Present since PDP was introduced in v1.25.1. -
Market mk12 deal status (
market/mk12/mk12_utils.go) — TheGetDealStatushandler includederr.Error()in error responses:"failed to query the db for deal status: %s". Present since v1.24.3. -
Market mk20 auth middleware (
market/mk20/http/http.go) — Authentication error responses includederr.Error(), potentially leaking database error details during auth flows. Present since v1.27.2.
Root Cause
The database connection string was constructed as:
postgresql://username:password@host:port/database?...
The plaintext password was embedded directly in the URL. When pgx returned connection or query errors, the error text could contain fragments of this connection string. HTTP handlers forwarded these errors verbatim to clients.
Impact
An attacker with network access to Curio's PDP or Market HTTP endpoints and valid authentication credentials could intentionally trigger database errors (e.g., by sending malformed requests that cause SQL failures) and extract the YugabyteDB connection credentials from the error response. With these credentials, the attacker could directly access the database, which serves as Curio's control plane.
Per Curio's security boundary documentation, these endpoints are expected to be on a trusted network. However, defense-in-depth requires that credentials are never exposed through HTTP responses regardless of network trust assumptions.
Remediation (PR #919)
-
Connection string password masking: The password in the connection string is replaced with
********. The real password is set separately viacfg.ConnConfig.Password, so it never appears in error messages or logs. -
HTTP handler sanitization: All affected handlers now log the detailed error server-side and return a generic error message to the HTTP client.
-
Error filter (
errFilter): A new function in the database layer detects and redacts any error messages containing keywords like "password", "host", "port", or "://" before they can propagate. -
Prometheus metrics cleanup: Database connection metrics that could expose connection details were removed from the metrics endpoint.
-
Security boundary documentation: A new section documents what Curio expects operators to secure.
Resources
- Fix: https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/pull/919
- Patched release: v1.27.3-rc2
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.27.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filecoin-project/curio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.24.3"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.3-rc2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-209",
"CWE-532"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:48:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMultiple HTTP handlers in Curio passed raw database error messages to HTTP clients via `http.Error()`. When the PostgreSQL/YugabyteDB driver (pgx) returned errors, these could contain the database connection string \u2014 including hostname, port, username, and password. Additionally, the internal connection string was constructed with the plaintext password embedded in the URL, which was also included in startup error messages and could surface in logs.\n\n## Details\n\nThree components were affected:\n\n1. **PDP handlers** (`pdp/handlers.go`) \u2014 18+ HTTP error paths passed `err.Error()` directly to HTTP responses. While these endpoints require ECDSA JWT authentication, an authenticated client (e.g., a FilPay service) that triggered a database error would receive the raw pgx error in the HTTP response body. Present since PDP was introduced in v1.25.1.\n\n2. **Market mk12 deal status** (`market/mk12/mk12_utils.go`) \u2014 The `GetDealStatus` handler included `err.Error()` in error responses: `\"failed to query the db for deal status: %s\"`. Present since v1.24.3.\n\n3. **Market mk20 auth middleware** (`market/mk20/http/http.go`) \u2014 Authentication error responses included `err.Error()`, potentially leaking database error details during auth flows. Present since v1.27.2.\n\n### Root Cause\n\nThe database connection string was constructed as:\n```\npostgresql://username:password@host:port/database?...\n```\nThe plaintext password was embedded directly in the URL. When pgx returned connection or query errors, the error text could contain fragments of this connection string. HTTP handlers forwarded these errors verbatim to clients.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to Curio\u0027s PDP or Market HTTP endpoints and valid authentication credentials could intentionally trigger database errors (e.g., by sending malformed requests that cause SQL failures) and extract the YugabyteDB connection credentials from the error response. With these credentials, the attacker could directly access the database, which serves as Curio\u0027s control plane.\n\nPer Curio\u0027s [security boundary documentation](https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/blob/main/documentation/en/design/README.md#security-boundary), these endpoints are expected to be on a trusted network. However, defense-in-depth requires that credentials are never exposed through HTTP responses regardless of network trust assumptions.\n\n## Remediation (PR #919)\n\n1. **Connection string password masking:** The password in the connection string is replaced with `********`. The real password is set separately via `cfg.ConnConfig.Password`, so it never appears in error messages or logs.\n\n2. **HTTP handler sanitization:** All affected handlers now log the detailed error server-side and return a generic error message to the HTTP client.\n\n3. **Error filter (`errFilter`):** A new function in the database layer detects and redacts any error messages containing keywords like \"password\", \"host\", \"port\", or \"://\" before they can propagate.\n\n4. **Prometheus metrics cleanup:** Database connection metrics that could expose connection details were removed from the metrics endpoint.\n\n5. **Security boundary documentation:** A new section documents what Curio expects operators to secure.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Fix: https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/pull/919\n- Patched release: v1.27.3-rc2",
"id": "GHSA-gj6x-q8rh-wj6x",
"modified": "2026-02-26T22:48:00Z",
"published": "2026-02-26T22:48:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/security/advisories/GHSA-gj6x-q8rh-wj6x"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/pull/919"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/commit/551da78e0123892600d8e6dfe9de7a579055d80b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filecoin-project/curio/blob/main/documentation/en/design/README.md#security-boundary"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Curio exposes database credentials to users with network access through verbose HTTP error responses"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.