GHSA-MCPH-M25J-8J63

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-02 16:41 – Updated: 2024-01-02 16:41
VLAI
Summary
tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)
Details

Summary

The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.

Details

The changed-files action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.

This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.

Proof of Concept

  1. Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example $(whoami).txt which is a valid filename.
  2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the List all changed files step below.
      - name: List all changed files
        run: |
          for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
            echo "$file was changed"
          done

Example output:

##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
    for file in $(whoami).txt; do
        echo "$file was changed"
    done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed

Impact

This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.

Resolution

  • A new safe_output input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.

  • A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.

- name: List all changed files
  env:
    ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
  run: |
    for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
      echo "$file was changed"
    done

Resources

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "GitHub Actions",
        "name": "tj-actions/changed-files"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "41"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-51664"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-77"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-02T16:41:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-27T17:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe `tj-actions/changed-files` workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.\n\n### Details\nThe [`changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files) action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an `escape_json` input [enabled by default](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/blob/94549999469dbfa032becf298d95c87a14c34394/action.yml#L136), only escapes `\"` for JSON values. \n\nThis could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \\` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.\n\n#### Proof of Concept\n\n1. Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` which is a valid filename.\n2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files` step below.\n\n```yaml\n      - name: List all changed files\n        run: |\n          for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do\n            echo \"$file was changed\"\n          done\n```\n\nExample output:\n\n```yaml\n##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do\n    for file in $(whoami).txt; do\n        echo \"$file was changed\"\n    done\nshell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}\n##[endgroup]\nrunner.txt was changed\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.\n\n### Resolution\n- A new `safe_output` input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.\n\n- A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.\n\n```yaml\n- name: List all changed files\n  env:\n    ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}\n  run: |\n    for file in \"$ALL_CHANGED_FILES\"; do\n      echo \"$file was changed\"\n    done\n```\n\n### Resources\n\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)",
  "id": "GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63",
  "modified": "2024-01-02T16:41:27Z",
  "published": "2024-01-02T16:41:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51664"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/0102c07446a3cad972f4afcbd0ee4dbc4b6d2d1b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/716b1e13042866565e00e85fd4ec490e186c4a2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/commit/ff2f6e6b91913a7be42be1b5917330fe442f2ede"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.