GHSA-9PG5-8C7X-5HFX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 14:54 – Updated: 2026-10-30 14:54
VLAI
Summary
joserfc: Compact JWS size guard allocates attacker-controlled segments before rejection
Details

Summary

joserfc 1.7.4 defines compact-JWS header, payload, and signature limits, but calls value.split(b".") before validating them. Python bytes.split() copies the attacker-controlled segments, so the current guard allocates roughly one complete payload before rejecting it.

Reproduction

.venv-research/bin/python 06-practical-testing/preauth-memory-profile.py

The input is resident before a fork-isolated verifier runs, and every signature is invalid.

Input Peak RSS delta Amplification Result
1 MiB 1.11 MiB 1.11× size rejected
4 MiB 4.04 MiB 1.01× size rejected
8 MiB 8.04 MiB 1.01× size rejected
16 MiB 16.04 MiB 1.00× size rejected
32 MiB 31.74 MiB 0.99× size rejected
64 MiB 63.80 MiB 1.00× size rejected

The unconstrained profile is the primary evidence: joserfc allocates an additional attacker-sized object before producing its intended ExceededSizeError. A separate baseline-plus-headroom stress test raises MemoryError when that copy cannot fit, but this report does not characterize an absolute RLIMIT_AS value as a realistic worker memory budget.

Security Argument

The issue is not that joserfc can prevent the transport layer from receiving a large header. The issue is narrower: once bytes reach deserialize_compact(), the library's existing size guard cannot fulfill its allocation-limiting purpose because attacker-controlled segment copies are created first.

This differs from GHSA-frfh-8v73-gjg4, which concerned embedding already-loaded oversized segments in exception and log messages. Here, the current implementation itself creates an additional payload-sized allocation before its fixed size exception.

Recommended Fix

Check len(value) against a maximum compact-serialization size before split(). If per-segment diagnostics are needed, locate delimiters with bounded find() operations or memory views, validate offsets and lengths, and only then materialize acceptable segments.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "joserfc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-119284"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T14:54:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T22:17:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\njoserfc 1.7.4 defines compact-JWS header, payload, and signature limits, but\ncalls `value.split(b\".\")` before validating them. Python `bytes.split()` copies\nthe attacker-controlled segments, so the current guard allocates roughly one\ncomplete payload before rejecting it.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```bash\n.venv-research/bin/python 06-practical-testing/preauth-memory-profile.py\n```\n\nThe input is resident before a fork-isolated verifier runs, and every signature\nis invalid.\n\n| Input | Peak RSS delta | Amplification | Result |\n|---:|---:|---:|---|\n| 1 MiB | 1.11 MiB | 1.11\u00d7 | size rejected |\n| 4 MiB | 4.04 MiB | 1.01\u00d7 | size rejected |\n| 8 MiB | 8.04 MiB | 1.01\u00d7 | size rejected |\n| 16 MiB | 16.04 MiB | 1.00\u00d7 | size rejected |\n| 32 MiB | 31.74 MiB | 0.99\u00d7 | size rejected |\n| 64 MiB | 63.80 MiB | 1.00\u00d7 | size rejected |\n\nThe unconstrained profile is the primary evidence: joserfc allocates an\nadditional attacker-sized object before producing its intended\n`ExceededSizeError`. A separate baseline-plus-headroom stress test raises\n`MemoryError` when that copy cannot fit, but this report does not characterize\nan absolute `RLIMIT_AS` value as a realistic worker memory budget.\n\n## Security Argument\n\nThe issue is not that joserfc can prevent the transport layer from receiving a\nlarge header. The issue is narrower: once bytes reach `deserialize_compact()`,\nthe library\u0027s existing size guard cannot fulfill its allocation-limiting purpose\nbecause attacker-controlled segment copies are created first.\n\nThis differs from\n[GHSA-frfh-8v73-gjg4](https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/security/advisories/GHSA-frfh-8v73-gjg4),\nwhich concerned embedding already-loaded oversized segments in exception and log\nmessages. Here, the current implementation itself creates an additional\npayload-sized allocation before its fixed size exception.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nCheck `len(value)` against a maximum compact-serialization size before\n`split()`. If per-segment diagnostics are needed, locate delimiters with bounded\n`find()` operations or memory views, validate offsets and lengths, and only then\nmaterialize acceptable segments.",
  "id": "GHSA-9pg5-8c7x-5hfx",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T14:54:25Z",
  "published": "2026-10-30T14:54:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/security/advisories/GHSA-9pg5-8c7x-5hfx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-119284"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/commit/397e04f4bbce0b94d86e31c1c003f4640af8fb39"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/joserfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/releases/tag/1.7.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "joserfc: Compact JWS size guard allocates attacker-controlled segments before rejection"
}



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