GHSA-7XG2-83F8-39MR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-03 20:06 – Updated: 2024-01-03 20:06Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
The Karmada components deployed with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476#issuecomment-694914728, the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this security advisory.
The components affected are: - karmada-apiserver - karmada-aggregated-apiserver - karmada-search - karmada-metrics-adapter - etcd
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
From Karmada v1.8.0, when deploying Karmada with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart, the default minimum TLS version of components(include karmada-apiserver, karmada-aggregated-apiserver, karmada-search, and karmada-metrics-adapter) would be set to TLS1.3 to get rid of the insecure algorithm, and set default cipher suites(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305) for etcd.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
By setting the --tls-min-version for the affected components to TLS 1.3, or explicitly setting the --cipher-suites to secure algorithms.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/issues/4191
- Impact discussions from the Golang community: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/karmada-io/karmada"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-03T20:06:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nThe Karmada components deployed with `karmadactl`, `karma-operator`, and `helm chart` take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476#issuecomment-694914728, the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this security advisory.\n\nThe components affected are\uff1a\n- karmada-apiserver\n- karmada-aggregated-apiserver\n- karmada-search\n- karmada-metrics-adapter\n- etcd\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nFrom Karmada v1.8.0, when deploying Karmada with `karmadactl`, `karma-operator`, and `helm chart`, the default minimum TLS version of components(include `karmada-apiserver`, `karmada-aggregated-apiserver`, `karmada-search`, and `karmada-metrics-adapter`) would be set to `TLS1.3` to get rid of the insecure algorithm, and set default cipher suites(`TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305`) for `etcd`.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nBy setting the `--tls-min-version` for the affected components to TLS 1.3, or explicitly setting the `--cipher-suites` to secure algorithms.\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n1. Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/issues/4191\n2. Impact discussions from the Golang community: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476",
"id": "GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr",
"modified": "2024-01-03T20:06:51Z",
"published": "2024-01-03T20:06:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/security/advisories/GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/issues/4191"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/98e655fc552b2987c3f2d2a061007889ce8be536"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/c3c376605403e07ca0ed2dc39c9e0f3c38f8e29d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "The DES/3DES cipher was used as part of the TLS protocol by installation tools"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.