{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.0-alpha-2021-09-21"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/taurusgroup/multi-party-sig"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-25T15:11:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Coinbase researchers reported 2 security issues in our implementation of the oblivious transfer (OT) based protocol [DKLS](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/499.pdf):\n\n### 1. Secret share recovery attack\n\nIf the base OT setup of the protocol is reused for another execution of the OT extension, then a malicious participant can extract a bit of the secret of another participant. By repeating the execution they can eventually recover the whole secret.\n\nTherefore, unlike our comments suggested, you **must not reuse an OT setup** for multiple protocol executions. \n\nWe\u0027re adding a warning in the code:\n\nhttps://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/blob/9e4400fccee89be6195d0a12dd0ed052288d5040/internal/ot/extended.go#L114\n\n### 2. Invalid security proof due to incorrect operator\n\nThe original 2018 version of the DKLS had a typo in the OT extension protocol when computing the check value in the OT extension: the paper noted a XOR whereas it should be a field multiplication. This erroneous behavior was implemented [in our code](https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/blob/4d84aafb57b437da1b933db9a265fb7ce4e7c138/internal/ot/extended.go#L188). \n\nThe proof of security fails in this case. No concrete attack is known, however.\n\nThe [2023 update](https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/499.pdf) of the DKLS paper reported that typo and updated the protocol definition.\n\n~As of 20241124, patching is in progress (branch [otfix](https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/tree/otfix)), but not merged to the main branch yes as the tests fail to pass. We\u0027re troubleshooting the issue and will merge into the main branch when it\u0027s resolved.~\n\nAs of 20250128, a patched version is available in https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/releases/tag/v0.7.0-alpha-2025-01-28, thanks to https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/pull/119.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDo not reuse an OT setup in the event that an abort is detected, to eliminate the secret recovery attack.\n  \n\n### Credits\n\nThanks to the Coinbase researchers Yi-Hsiu Chen and Samuel Ranellucci for discovering these issues and providing a comprehensive write-up. Thank you to Yehuda Lindell for coordinating the disclosure.\nThanks to Jay Prakash for clarifying the risk of the base setup reuse.\nThanks to @cronokirby for writing the corrected code.\n\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253",
  "modified": "2025-01-28T18:06:15Z",
  "published": "2024-11-25T15:11:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/security/advisories/GHSA-7f6p-phw2-8253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/499.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/blob/4d84aafb57b437da1b933db9a265fb7ce4e7c138/internal/ot/extended.go#L188"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/blob/9e4400fccee89be6195d0a12dd0ed052288d5040/internal/ot/extended.go#L114"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/taurushq-io/multi-party-sig/tree/otfix"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Taurus multi-party-sig has OT-based ECDSA protocol implementation flaws"
}