GHSA-68C2-4MPX-QH95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-01 16:57 – Updated: 2024-03-01 16:57Impact
SDK versions between and including 5.16.0 and 5.19.0 allowed Sentry auth tokens to be set in the optional authToken configuration parameter, for debugging purposes. Doing so would result in the auth token being built into the application bundle, and therefore the auth token could be potentially exposed in case the application bundle is subsequently published.
You may ignore this notification if you are not using authToken configuration parameter in your React Native SDK configuration or did not publish apps using this way of configuring the authToken.
If you had set the authToken in the plugin config previously, and built and published an app with that config, you should rotate your token.
Patches
The behavior that allowed setting an authToken parameter was fixed in SDK version 5.19.1 where, if this parameter was set, you will see a warning and the authToken would be removed before bundling the application.
Workarounds
- Remove
authTokenfrom the plugin configuration. - If you had set the
authTokenin the plugin config previously, and built and published an app with that config, you should rotate your token.
References
- sentry-react-native 5.19.1 release notes
- https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-docs/pull/9244
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.19.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@sentry/react-native"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.19.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-03-01T16:57:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\nSDK versions between and including 5.16.0 and 5.19.0 allowed Sentry auth tokens to be set in the optional authToken configuration parameter, for debugging purposes. Doing so would result in the auth token being built into the application bundle, and therefore the auth token could be potentially exposed in case the application bundle is subsequently published.\n\nYou may ignore this notification if you are not using `authToken` configuration parameter in your React Native SDK configuration or did not publish apps using this way of configuring the `authToken`.\n\nIf you had set the `authToken` in the plugin config previously, and built and published an app with that config, you should [rotate your token](https://docs.sentry.io/product/accounts/auth-tokens/).\n\n### Patches\nThe behavior that allowed setting an `authToken` parameter was fixed in SDK version 5.19.1 where, if this parameter was set, you will see a warning and the `authToken` would be removed before bundling the application.\n\n### Workarounds\n1. Remove `authToken` from the plugin configuration.\n2. If you had set the `authToken` in the plugin config previously, and built and published an app with that config, you should [rotate your token](https://docs.sentry.io/product/accounts/auth-tokens/).\n\n### References\n* [sentry-react-native 5.19.1 release notes](https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-react-native/releases/tag/5.19.1)\n* https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-docs/pull/9244",
"id": "GHSA-68c2-4mpx-qh95",
"modified": "2024-03-01T16:57:56Z",
"published": "2024-03-01T16:57:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-react-native/security/advisories/GHSA-68c2-4mpx-qh95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-react-native/commit/9148964a50d2ea1de830854c95f3649f6cb94b1b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-react-native"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getsentry/sentry-react-native/releases/tag/5.19.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Potential leakage of Sentry auth tokens by React Native SDK with Expo plugin"
}
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