GHSA-4JQP-9QJV-57M2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-06 22:34 – Updated: 2026-02-06 22:34
VLAI?
Summary
Keylime Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Authentication
Details
Impact
The Keylime registrar does not enforce mutual TLS (mTLS) client certificate authentication since version 7.12.0. The registrar's TLS context is configured with ssl.CERT_OPTIONAL instead of ssl.CERT_REQUIRED, allowing any client to connect to protected API endpoints without presenting a valid client certificate.
Who is impacted: - All Keylime deployments running versions 7.12.0 through 7.13.0 - Environments where the registrar HTTPS port (default 8891) is network-accessible to untrusted clients
What an attacker can do:
- List all registered agents (GET /v2/agents/) - enumerate the entire agent inventory
- Retrieve agent details (GET /v2/agents/{uuid}) - obtain public TPM keys, certificates, and network locations (IP/port) of any agent
- Delete any agent (DELETE /v2/agents/{uuid}) - remove agents from the registry, disrupting attestation services
Note: The exposed TPM data (EK, AK, certificates) consists of public keys and certificates. Private keys remain protected within TPM hardware. The HMAC secret used for challenge-response validation is stored in the database but is not exposed via the API.
Affected versions: >= 7.12.0, <= 7.13.0
Fixed versions: 7.12.2, >= 7.13.1
Patches
A patch for the affected released versions is available. It removes the line that override the configuration of ssl.verify_mode, leaving the CERT_REQUIRED value set by web_util.init_mtls():
diff --git a/keylime/web/base/server.py b/keylime/web/base/server.py
index 1d9a9c2..859b23a 100644
--- a/keylime/web/base/server.py
+++ b/keylime/web/base/server.py
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import asyncio
import multiprocessing
from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from functools import wraps
-from ssl import CERT_OPTIONAL
from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Callable, Optional
import tornado
@@ -252,7 +251,6 @@ class Server(ABC):
self._https_port = config.getint(component, "tls_port", fallback=0)
self._max_upload_size = config.getint(component, "max_upload_size", fallback=104857600)
self._ssl_ctx = web_util.init_mtls(component)
- self._ssl_ctx.verify_mode = CERT_OPTIONAL
def _get(self, pattern: str, controller: type["Controller"], action: str, allow_insecure: bool = False) -> None:
"""Creates a new route to handle incoming GET requests issued for paths which match the given
Users should upgrade to the patched version once it is released.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, apply one of the following mitigations:
1. Network isolation (Recommended)
Restrict access to the registrar HTTPS port (default 8891) using firewall rules to allow only trusted hosts (verifier, tenant):
Example using iptables
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8891 -s <verifier_ip> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8891 -s <tenant_ip> -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8891 -j DROP
2. Reverse proxy with mTLS enforcement
Deploy a reverse proxy (nginx, HAProxy) in front of the registrar that enforces client certificate authentication:
Example nginx configuration
server {
listen 8891 ssl;
ssl_certificate /path/to/server.crt;
ssl_certificate_key /path/to/server.key;
ssl_client_certificate /path/to/ca.crt;
ssl_verify_client on; # Enforce client certificates
location / {
proxy_pass https://localhost:8892; # Internal registrar port
}
}
Severity ?
9.4 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "keylime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.12.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "keylime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.13.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"7.13.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1709"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295",
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-06T22:34:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe Keylime registrar does not enforce mutual TLS (mTLS) client certificate authentication since version 7.12.0. The registrar\u0027s TLS context is configured with `ssl.CERT_OPTIONAL` instead of `ssl.CERT_REQUIRED`, allowing any client to connect to protected API endpoints without presenting a valid client certificate.\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n - All Keylime deployments running versions 7.12.0 through 7.13.0\n - Environments where the registrar HTTPS port (default 8891) is network-accessible to untrusted clients\n\n**What an attacker can do:**\n - **List all registered agents** (`GET /v2/agents/`) - enumerate the entire agent inventory\n - **Retrieve agent details** (`GET /v2/agents/{uuid}`) - obtain public TPM keys, certificates, and network locations (IP/port) of any agent\n - **Delete any agent** (`DELETE /v2/agents/{uuid}`) - remove agents from the registry, disrupting attestation services\n\nNote: The exposed TPM data (EK, AK, certificates) consists of public keys and certificates. Private keys remain protected within TPM hardware. The HMAC secret used for challenge-response validation is stored in the database but is not exposed via the API.\n\n**Affected versions:** \u003e= 7.12.0, \u003c= 7.13.0\n\n**Fixed versions:** 7.12.2, \u003e= 7.13.1\n\n### Patches\n\nA patch for the affected released versions is available. It removes the line that override the configuration of `ssl.verify_mode`, leaving the `CERT_REQUIRED` value set by `web_util.init_mtls()`:\n\n```diff\ndiff --git a/keylime/web/base/server.py b/keylime/web/base/server.py\nindex 1d9a9c2..859b23a 100644\n--- a/keylime/web/base/server.py\n+++ b/keylime/web/base/server.py\n@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import asyncio\n import multiprocessing\n from abc import ABC, abstractmethod\n from functools import wraps\n-from ssl import CERT_OPTIONAL\n from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Callable, Optional\n\n import tornado\n@@ -252,7 +251,6 @@ class Server(ABC):\n self._https_port = config.getint(component, \"tls_port\", fallback=0)\n self._max_upload_size = config.getint(component, \"max_upload_size\", fallback=104857600)\n self._ssl_ctx = web_util.init_mtls(component)\n- self._ssl_ctx.verify_mode = CERT_OPTIONAL\n\n def _get(self, pattern: str, controller: type[\"Controller\"], action: str, allow_insecure: bool = False) -\u003e None:\n \"\"\"Creates a new route to handle incoming GET requests issued for paths which match the given\n```\n\nUsers should upgrade to the patched version once it is released.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, apply one of the following mitigations:\n\n#### 1. Network isolation (Recommended)\n\nRestrict access to the registrar HTTPS port (default 8891) using firewall rules\nto allow only trusted hosts (verifier, tenant):\n\n##### Example using iptables\n```\niptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8891 -s \u003cverifier_ip\u003e -j ACCEPT\niptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8891 -s \u003ctenant_ip\u003e -j ACCEPT\niptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 8891 -j DROP\n```\n\n#### 2. Reverse proxy with mTLS enforcement\n\nDeploy a reverse proxy (nginx, HAProxy) in front of the registrar that enforces client certificate authentication:\n\n##### Example nginx configuration\n```\nserver {\n listen 8891 ssl;\n ssl_certificate /path/to/server.crt;\n ssl_certificate_key /path/to/server.key;\n ssl_client_certificate /path/to/ca.crt;\n ssl_verify_client on; # Enforce client certificates\n\n location / {\n proxy_pass https://localhost:8892; # Internal registrar port\n }\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-4jqp-9qjv-57m2",
"modified": "2026-02-06T22:34:44Z",
"published": "2026-02-06T22:34:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keylime/keylime/security/advisories/GHSA-4jqp-9qjv-57m2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1709"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-1709"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2435514"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/keylime/keylime"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Keylime Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Authentication"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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