GHSA-42CR-W2GR-M54Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:15 – Updated: 2026-02-27 21:59Summary
Five routine detail action endpoints check a cache before calling self.get_object(). Cache keys are scoped only by pk — no user ID is included. When a victim has previously accessed their routine via the API, an attacker can retrieve the cached response for the same PK without any ownership check.
Details
wger/manager/api/views.py — five actions follow this pattern (lines 134–201):
@action(detail=True)
def date_sequence_display_mode(self, request, pk=None):
cache_key = make_routine_api_date_sequence_display_cache_key(pk)
cached = cache.get(cache_key)
if cached:
return Response(cached) # returned WITHOUT calling self.get_object()
# only reaches ownership check on cache miss
routine = self.get_object()
...
Cache key construction in wger/utils/cache.py:89–106:
def make_routine_api_date_sequence_display_cache_key(routine_id):
return f"routine-api-date-sequence-display-{routine_id}"
# No user ID in key
Cache TTL: 1 month (4 * 604800 seconds, settings_global.py:461).
Affected endpoints:
GET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/date-sequence-display/
GET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/date-sequence-gym/
GET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/structure/
GET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/logs/
GET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/stats/
PoC
1. Victim (user A) visits GET /api/v2/routine/5/structure/ → response cached under key "routine-api-structure-5"
2. Attacker (user B) visits GET /api/v2/routine/5/structure/ → cache hit → returns user A's routine structure without any ownership check
Requires the victim to have previously accessed the endpoint (cache must be populated). Once populated, the cache entry is valid for 1 month.
Impact
An attacker with a registered account can retrieve another user's routine details — workout day sequences, exercise structure, training logs, and statistics — from cache without ownership verification.
Fix: Include the user ID in the cache key:
def make_routine_api_date_sequence_display_cache_key(routine_id, user_id):
return f"routine-api-date-sequence-display-{user_id}-{routine_id}"
Or move self.get_object() before the cache lookup so ownership is always verified first.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "wger"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27838"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:15:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-26T23:16:34Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nFive routine detail action endpoints check a cache before calling `self.get_object()`. Cache keys are scoped only by `pk` \u2014 no user ID is included. When a victim has previously accessed their routine via the API, an attacker can retrieve the cached response for the same PK without any ownership check.\n\n### Details\n\n`wger/manager/api/views.py` \u2014 five actions follow this pattern (lines 134\u2013201):\n\n```python\n@action(detail=True)\ndef date_sequence_display_mode(self, request, pk=None):\n cache_key = make_routine_api_date_sequence_display_cache_key(pk)\n cached = cache.get(cache_key)\n if cached:\n return Response(cached) # returned WITHOUT calling self.get_object()\n # only reaches ownership check on cache miss\n routine = self.get_object()\n ...\n```\n\nCache key construction in `wger/utils/cache.py:89\u2013106`:\n\n```python\ndef make_routine_api_date_sequence_display_cache_key(routine_id):\n return f\"routine-api-date-sequence-display-{routine_id}\"\n # No user ID in key\n```\n\nCache TTL: 1 month (`4 * 604800` seconds, `settings_global.py:461`).\n\nAffected endpoints:\n```\nGET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/date-sequence-display/\nGET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/date-sequence-gym/\nGET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/structure/\nGET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/logs/\nGET /api/v2/routine/{pk}/stats/\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n1. Victim (user A) visits GET /api/v2/routine/5/structure/ \u2192 response cached under key \"routine-api-structure-5\"\n2. Attacker (user B) visits GET /api/v2/routine/5/structure/ \u2192 cache hit \u2192 returns user A\u0027s routine structure without any ownership check\n```\n\nRequires the victim to have previously accessed the endpoint (cache must be populated). Once populated, the cache entry is valid for 1 month.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with a registered account can retrieve another user\u0027s routine details \u2014 workout day sequences, exercise structure, training logs, and statistics \u2014 from cache without ownership verification.\n\n**Fix**: Include the user ID in the cache key:\n```python\ndef make_routine_api_date_sequence_display_cache_key(routine_id, user_id):\n return f\"routine-api-date-sequence-display-{user_id}-{routine_id}\"\n```\n\nOr move `self.get_object()` before the cache lookup so ownership is always verified first.",
"id": "GHSA-42cr-w2gr-m54q",
"modified": "2026-02-27T21:59:39Z",
"published": "2026-02-26T22:15:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-42cr-w2gr-m54q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27838"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger/commit/e964328784e2ee2830a1991d69fadbce86ac9fbf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wger-project/wger"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "wger: IDOR via user-unscoped cache keys on routine API actions exposes workout data"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.