GHSA-38C7-23HJ-2WGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-26 22:47 – Updated: 2026-02-26 22:47
VLAI?
Summary
n8n has Webhook Forgery on Zendesk Trigger Node
Details

Impact

An attacker who knows the webhook URL of a workflow using the ZendeskTrigger node could send unsigned POST requests and trigger the workflow with arbitrary data. The node does not verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature that Zendesk attaches to every outbound webhook, allowing any party to inject crafted payloads into the connected workflow.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.6.2 and 1.123.18. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Restrict network access to the n8n webhook endpoint to known Zendesk IP ranges.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.123.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "n8n"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T22:47:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\nAn attacker who knows the webhook URL of a workflow using the ZendeskTrigger node could send unsigned POST requests and trigger the workflow with arbitrary data. The node does not verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature that Zendesk attaches to every outbound webhook, allowing any party to inject crafted payloads into the connected workflow.\n\n## Patches\nThe issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.6.2 and 1.123.18. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.\n\n## Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:\n- Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only.\n- Restrict network access to the n8n webhook endpoint to known Zendesk IP ranges.\n\nThese workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.",
  "id": "GHSA-38c7-23hj-2wgq",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T22:47:06Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T22:47:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-38c7-23hj-2wgq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/3839e310bd4c3002c646c363d1411916fa195151"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/commit/c6520e4e87614fa60c9433e93019e211f19f65f9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "n8n has Webhook Forgery on Zendesk Trigger Node"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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