CVE-2026-61826 (GCVE-0-2026-61826)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-30 17:12 – Updated: 2026-10-30 17:12
VLAI
Title
Bazarr: Plex OAuth API namespace is entirely unauthenticated, allowing config tampering, integration takeover and server-side request forgery
Summary
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
Severity
10 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
  • CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
Assigner
GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 8088 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
morpheus65535 bazarr Affected: < 1.5.7-beta.14
guessed Create a notification for this product.
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          "value": "Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/\u003cpin_id\u003e/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account\u0027s token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review."
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          "url": "https://github.com/morpheus65535/bazarr/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-hh55-x3r4"
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        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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      "title": "Bazarr: Plex OAuth API namespace is entirely unauthenticated, allowing config tampering, integration takeover and server-side request forgery"
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-61826",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-30T17:12:43.384Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-10T20:17:57.993Z",
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            "value": "Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/\u003cpin_id\u003e/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account\u0027s token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-61826",
        "lastModified": "2026-10-30T19:39:14.897",
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}



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