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A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. A user with the delegated Instance Group Admin role on a container group can set a free-form pod specification override that is deep-merged, without filtering, into every job pod launched on that group. The only hardening applied is forcing automountServiceAccountToken to false, which does not remove an explicitly declared projected serviceAccountToken volume or secret volume mounts. A non-superuser can therefore cause the kubelet to mint a ServiceAccount token for the control-plane automation-controller service account into the job container and mount arbitrary secrets from the control-plane namespace, obtaining the control-plane service-account identity on the Kubernetes API and cleartext control-plane secrets (including the platform database password and Django SECRET_KEY), leading to full platform data compromise.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. A user with the delegated Instance Group Admin role on a container group can set a free-form pod specification override that is deep-merged, without filtering, into every job pod launched on that group. The only hardening applied is forcing automountServiceAccountToken to false, which does not remove an explicitly declared projected serviceAccountToken volume or secret volume mounts. A non-superuser can therefore cause the kubelet to mint a ServiceAccount token for the control-plane automation-controller service account into the job container and mount arbitrary secrets from the control-plane namespace, obtaining the control-plane service-account identity on the Kubernetes API and cleartext control-plane secrets (including the platform database password and Django SECRET_KEY), leading to full platform data compromise.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. A user with the delegated Instance Group Admin role on a container group can set a free-form pod specification override that is deep-merged, without filtering, into every job pod launched on that group. The only hardening applied is forcing automountServiceAccountToken to false, which does not remove an explicitly declared projected serviceAccountToken volume or secret volume mounts. A non-superuser can therefore cause the kubelet to mint a ServiceAccount token for the control-plane automation-controller service account into the job container and mount arbitrary secrets from the control-plane namespace, obtaining the control-plane service-account identity on the Kubernetes API and cleartext control-plane secrets (including the platform database password and Django SECRET_KEY), leading to full platform data compromise.

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. A user with the delegated Instance Group Admin role on a container group can set a free-form pod specification override that is deep-merged, without filtering, into every job pod launched on that group. The only hardening applied is forcing automountServiceAccountToken to false, which does not remove an explicitly declared projected serviceAccountToken volume or secret volume mounts. A non-superuser can therefore cause the kubelet to mint a ServiceAccount token for the control-plane automation-controller service account into the job container and mount arbitrary secrets from the control-plane namespace, obtaining the control-plane service-account identity on the Kubernetes API and cleartext control-plane secrets (including the platform database password and Django SECRET_KEY), leading to full platform data compromise.