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    RUSTSEC-2026-0333 (GHSA-4XCC-23FX-W2WJ)

    Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2026-10-06 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-08 14:47 – Source website
    VLAI
    Summary
    Resource budgets not enforced on the typed deserialization path
    Details

    ParserConfig::max_events, max_nodes, max_total_scalar_bytes, max_merge_keys, alias_anchor_ratio and the alias jump factor were enforced only by the two Value loaders. A typed target with a default-shaped configuration is served by the streaming deserializer, which never read those fields, so tightening any of them had no effect on from_str::<T> for a struct target. The default document-length, depth and alias-count caps were enforced on every path, so no input was unbounded; the gap affects callers who tightened the other budgets for hostile input.

    Version 0.0.53 charges every budget on the streaming path as well and adds cross-path parity tests.

    Users who cannot upgrade can deserialize into noyalib::Value first and convert with from_value, or rely on max_document_length and max_depth, which were always applied on every path.

    References
    To clipboard 

    {
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "denial-of-service"
        ],
        "cvss": null,
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [
            "noyalib::from_reader",
            "noyalib::from_reader_with_config",
            "noyalib::from_slice",
            "noyalib::from_slice_with_config",
            "noyalib::from_str",
            "noyalib::from_str_with_config"
          ],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "noyalib",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/noyalib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.53"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "GHSA-4xcc-23fx-w2wj"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC-BY-4.0"
  },
  "details": "`ParserConfig::max_events`, `max_nodes`, `max_total_scalar_bytes`,\n`max_merge_keys`, `alias_anchor_ratio` and the alias jump factor were\nenforced only by the two `Value` loaders. A typed target with a\ndefault-shaped configuration is served by the streaming deserializer,\nwhich never read those fields, so tightening any of them had no effect\non `from_str::\u003cT\u003e` for a struct target. The default document-length,\ndepth and alias-count caps were enforced on every path, so no input was\nunbounded; the gap affects callers who tightened the other budgets for\nhostile input.\n\nVersion 0.0.53 charges every budget on the streaming path as well and\nadds cross-path parity tests.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade can deserialize into `noyalib::Value` first and\nconvert with `from_value`, or rely on `max_document_length` and\n`max_depth`, which were always applied on every path.",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2026-0333",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T14:47:14Z",
  "published": "2026-10-06T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/noyalib"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0333.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebastienrousseau/noyalib/pull/470"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Resource budgets not enforced on the typed deserialization path"
}