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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/platform-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "22.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "22.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/platform-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "21.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "21.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/platform-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "20.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "20.3.33"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@angular/platform-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "19.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-111754"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T14:35:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An open redirect vulnerability was identified in `@angular/platform-server` when Server-Side Rendering (SSR) is enabled.\n\nWhen Angular SSR renders an incoming request, URL resolution and platform navigation are managed by `ServerPlatformLocation` using `resolveUrl` (or `parseUrl` in v20). While `resolveUrl` rejected protocol-relative URLs whose raw string directly started with `//`, this check ran *prior* to WHATWG URL normalization.\n\nWhen a request URL includes a popping dot-segment followed by multiple slashes (such as `/.//evil.test` or serialized from router route shapes like `/.;/(//evil.test)`), the input bypassed the initial `urlStr.startsWith(\u0027//\u0027)` check. Subsequent WHATWG URL parsing resolved the dot-segments and resulted in a `pathname` starting with `//` (`//evil.test`).\n\nConsequently, `ServerPlatformLocation` stored `pathname = \u0027//evil.test\u0027`. When `@angular/ssr` detected a mismatch between the rendered URL and the router\u0027s final location state, it emitted the unnormalized pathname into the HTTP `Location` response header, producing an HTTP 302 redirect with `Location: //evil.test`, which browsers resolve as a protocol-relative navigation off-origin.\n\n### Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to craft URLs that trick Angular SSR into redirecting users to an arbitrary external domain.\n\n* **Bypasses Application-Level Guards:** Common application-level validation routines (such as checking `!returnUrl.startsWith(\u0027//\u0027)` before invoking `router.navigateByUrl`) accept `/.//evil.test` or `/.;/(//evil.test)` as a safe relative path, allowing attackers to bypass redirect allowlists.\n* **Client-side SPAs Unaffected:** Pure client-side Angular applications (Single Page Applications without SSR) are **not** vulnerable, as `ServerPlatformLocation` is only utilized in server-side execution environments.\n\n### Attack Preconditions \u0026 Vulnerable Configurations\n\nAn application is affected if the following conditions are met:\n\n* **SSR Enabled:** The application runs in a Server-Side Rendering environment using `@angular/platform-server` and `@angular/ssr`.\n* **Parameter Route Shapes:** The router contains parameter routes with wildcard or child segments (e.g. `/:tenant` matching `.` and serializing secondary outlet groups `(//evil.test)` to `/.//evil.test`), or passes user-provided navigation targets (e.g. `returnUrl`).\n* **Reverse Proxy Passthrough:** Upstream reverse proxies (Nginx, Cloudflare, ALB) pass semicolons (`;`) or dot-segments without stripping or normalizing them.\n\n#### Exploit Payload Example\n\nAn attacker sends a request targeting a route with parameters and child segments:\n\n```http\nGET /.;/(//evil.test) HTTP/1.1\nHost: example.com\n```\n\n**Response:**\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nLocation: //evil.test\n```\n\nThe client browser resolves `//evil.test` protocol-relatively and redirects the user away from `example.com` to `evil.test`.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is resolved by updating `resolveUrl` (and `parseUrl` in v20) in `@angular/platform-server` to verify that the normalized URL pathname does not start with `//` when `allowProtocolRelative` is `false`.\n\n* `22.2.1`\n* `21.2.25`\n* `20.3.33`\n\n### Workarounds \u0026 Mitigations\n\nIf you cannot immediately upgrade to a patched version, apply one of the following mitigations at your edge reverse proxy or WAF:\n\n1. **Reject Paths with Dot-Segments Followed by Slashes:**\n   Configure your reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Cloudflare, AWS WAF) to block requests containing `/.//`, `/..//`, or `/.;/`:\n   ```nginx\n   # Nginx example: reject suspicious path normalization sequences\n   if ($request_uri ~* \"(\\n/\\.\\/|\\/\\.\\;)\") {\n       return 400;\n   }\n   ```\n2. **Sanitize Redirect Headers:**\n   Ensure edge proxies or API gateways rewrite or disallow protocol-relative (`//`) `Location` response headers originating from the SSR upstream.",
  "id": "GHSA-w739-gvwx-grc3",
  "modified": "2026-10-20T14:35:49Z",
  "published": "2026-10-20T14:35:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/security/advisories/GHSA-w739-gvwx-grc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/71077"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/71078"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/71079"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/450af9c813c7660b9bd91e5635f705ee3ed7b32a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/83944fc8c50e86be90e8ec4184cd15002b5af262"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/928dcfd2582152655b5559509d057bf6a5a19521"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/commit/d7d81e189d227108c3b9d39178dbb7389f6f970d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v20.3.33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v21.2.25"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/angular/angular/releases/tag/v22.2.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@angular/platform-server: Open Redirect via Protocol-Relative URLs in Server-Side Rendering (SSR)"
}