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1 vulnerability found for SAPBleed Pre-Auth Memory by unknown
GCVE-1988-2026-0574
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-17 19:38 – Updated: 2026-11-17 19:38
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Memory Disclosure and RCE in SAP NetWeaver, Web Dispatcher and HANA XS (CVE-2026-76964, CVE-2026-89126)
Summary
nullFaktor Security Advisory < 2026-11-12 >
===========================================================
Title: SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Process Memory Leak and RCE
in SAP ICM and Web Dispatcher, including the
internal Web Dispatcher in SAP HANA XS
Vulnerability: Heap Buffer Overflow / Memory Leak / RCE
CVE (ICM): CVE-2026-76964
CVE (Web Disp): CVE-2026-89126
Impact: Critical
CVSS 3.0 Score: 10.0 (both CVEs)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Products: SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (ICM); SAP Web Dispatcher;
SAP HANA XS (internal Web Dispatcher)
Affected Versions: See SAP Security Notes 3778530 and 3778556
Vendor Homepage: https://www.sap.com
SAP Note (ICM): 3778530
SAP Note (Web Disp): 3778556
Date: 2026-11-12
Author: Raschin Tavakoli | nullFaktor GmbH
https://www.nullfaktor.com
office () nullfaktor com
https://x.com/r4yzor9
https://x.com/_nullfaktor
Blog: https://nullfaktor.com/
blog/cve-2026-76964-cve-2026-89126-sapbleed
Short Summary
=============
SAPBleed is a pre-authentication memory-disclosure and RCE
vulnerability affecting SAP ICM, SAP Web Dispatcher, and SAP HANA XS.
An Internet-facing SAP Web Dispatcher, acting as a reverse proxy,
can forward the attack to an ICM in a protected backend network
segment. The WebSocket connection becomes a path for leaking
memory from that internal component over the Internet. Attackers can
repeatedly read selected ICM memory, potentially exposing SSO tickets
and private TLS keys. ICM-accessible shared memory also contains code
addresses from separate ABAP dialog work processes (disp+work), even
though those processes are not directly exposed to the Internet.
The ICM can remain running during the memory disclosure. Traffic can
travel over TLS-protected WebSocket connections, concealing the leaked
payload from network sensors without TLS visibility. Pre-authentication
code execution has also been demonstrated in both ICM and Web
Dispatcher.
Vendor description
==================
SAP SE is an enterprise software company headquartered in Walldorf,
Germany. Its products include enterprise resource planning (ERP)
software and business applications.
Vulnerability
=============
SAPBleed is a pre-authentication heap buffer overflow in the WebSocket
processing of SAP Internet Communication Manager (ICM) and SAP Web
Dispatcher, including Web Dispatcher deployments used with SAP HANA XS.
The flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt WebSocket
connection state. Depending on how the corruption is exploited, the
affected process can disclose memory or be used for remote code
execution. The attack is carried over a WebSocket connection and can
reach affected services over HTTP or HTTPS, including TLS-encrypted
connections.
The memory disclosure occurs when corrupted connection state causes
the process to return heap contents beyond the data intended for its
response. A Web Dispatcher can be targeted directly, exposing memory
from its own process. Where affected traffic is forwarded to an ICM,
the ICM can also be targeted through the Web Dispatcher. Leaked process
memory may contain SSO tickets, cryptographic key material and process
addresses that enable a full ASLR bypass.
In our tested laboratory deployment, the research PoCs demonstrated:
- Direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher process memory, including its
own address information, enabling an ASLR bypass for that process.
- Repeatable reads of arbitrary ICM process memory, including when
the ICM was reached through a Web Dispatcher.
- Disclosure of ICM process addresses, enabling an ASLR bypass in
that process.
- Cross-process disclosure of code addresses belonging to separate
ABAP dialog work processes (DIA/disp+work), defeating their own
ASLR despite their separate process address spaces.
- Remote identification of the SAP kernel release, build and patch
level without SAP credentials.
- Extraction of the server's private TLS key from ICM memory.
- Extraction of a valid MYSAPSSO2 single sign-on ticket from active
authenticated traffic present in ICM memory.
The impact extends beyond the ICM: SAP shared memory visible to the ICM
contains code addresses from separate DIA work processes. Our PoC
recovered their module base addresses over the network before
authentication. This removes ASLR as a barrier for address-dependent
RCE flaws in those work processes as well.
A leaked SSO ticket may allow impersonation of its user while the
ticket remains valid. Exposure of a TLS private key compromises the
server's key material; the effect on past traffic depends on the TLS
configuration. Other secrets held in ICM memory may also be exposed,
depending on the system's workload and the data present at the time of
an attack.
SAPBleed is particularly critical because it exposes process memory
over the Internet before authentication. The disclosed process
addresses defeat ASLR in the affected processes. This can make other
memory-corruption flaws in those same processes exploitable when their
remote code execution path requires an otherwise unknown address.
Our SAP Overpass advisory (CVE-2026-44756), published September 10,
2026, illustrates this: its RCE proof required an independently
obtained module base address. SAPBleed can supply that address where
both issues affect the same ICM and can expose the corresponding
address for a DIA work process.
See:
https://nullfaktor.com/blog/cve-2026-44756-sap-netweaver-pre-auth-rce
Our research also established pre-authentication remote code execution
(RCE) in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. We engineered the ICM
memory-extraction path to restore a consistent execution state after
each read. In repeated laboratory runs, it extracted data reliably
without crashing the ICM or dialog work processes, including when
traffic passed through a Web Dispatcher. The services remained
available during those runs.
Further exploitation details are withheld from this version.
Tested Environment
==================
The issue was reproduced in a laboratory deployment of SAP NetWeaver AS
ABAP and SAP Web Dispatcher. Full build details are omitted from this
version.
Attack Scenario
===============
Any affected SAP system that exposes the vulnerable WebSocket path to
the Internet can be attacked before authentication. Placing a Web
Dispatcher in front of the ICM does not shield that backend: our lab
demonstrated that attack traffic can pass through the Internet-facing
proxy and disclose ICM process memory even when the ICM is not directly
reachable from the Internet. The Web Dispatcher can also be attacked
directly. No SAP credentials, prior session, or user interaction are
required.
Mitigation
==========
Install the corrections in SAP Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556
(Web Dispatcher) at the fixed patch levels for each installed release.
As a temporary measure, disable WebSocket HTTP upgrades in the relevant
ICM and Web Dispatcher profiles with
icm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE and restart the components.
This can disrupt functions that require WebSocket. SAP FAQ Note 3778788
provides further guidance on temporary workarounds. Until updates are
applied, restrict network access to affected systems.
Proof of Concept
================
The following excerpts are from our laboratory tests. All
attacks reach the target before authentication. SIDs and OS
user names have been redacted, and line wrapping has been
adjusted for readability.
SAPBleed Integrated Tool
-------------------------
The SAPBleed tool automates the full chain from initial memory
disclosure through ASLR bypass to secret extraction without attacker
credentials or a prior attacker session. The SSO test below uses
concurrent authenticated traffic from a separate lab client.
TLS private-key extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint,
TLS key recovery in one session):
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 tls
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> TLS key
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:08
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:25
[3/3] Extracting the TLS private key
[OK] TLS private key extracted 00:28
Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/tls_private_key.pem
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:04
SSO ticket extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, and
recovery of a MYSAPSSO2 ticket from concurrent victim traffic):
In one terminal, a victim sends authenticated HTTPS requests:
$> python3 victim_sim.py secure-bank 50001
Victim simulator: secure-bank:50001 every 0.3s
Ticket: ~/.sapbleed/victim_ticket.b64 (1164 characters)
Press Ctrl+C to stop.
[1] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
[2] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
[3] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)
With that traffic running, the unauthenticated client extracts the
victim's sso ticket in another terminal:
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 sso
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint -> SSO ticket
Loot: ~/.sapbleed/loot
SSO traffic: on non-productive systems, use victim_sim.py
to simulate SSO traffic
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:20
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level (icman)
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:13
[3/3] Extracting an SSO ticket
[OK] SSO ticket extracted 00:29
Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:04
Artifacts:
~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64
Benchmark: ~/.sapbleed/loot/benchmark.json
Cross-process ASLR bypass (ICM PIE leak extended to DIA
work-process addresses via SAP shared memory):
$> python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 dia
SAPBleed Lab Demo
Target: secure-bank:50001
Authentication: none (pre-auth)
Operations: ICM PIE -> Kernel fingerprint
-> disp+work PIE
[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01
[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base
[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:22
[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level
[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101
(read from the kernel patch table) 00:25
[3/3] Leaking the disp+work PIE base via shared memory
[OK] disp+work PIE: 0x*** 00:23
RESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded
TOTAL TIME: 01:12
1. Internet Communication Manager (ICM)
=======================================
1.1 Memory Disclosure (ICM Heap Leak)
---------------------------------------
The standalone pre-authentication heap-leak PoC returns a 16 KiB
WebSocket binary frame containing uninitialised ICM heap data. This
is one response, not a limit on the total disclosure: the ICM PoC tool
uses a ROP-based reader to read selected ICM memory
addresses over subsequent WebSocket connections. The ICM survives;
no PIE base or heap address is needed as input for the initial leak:
$> python3 poc-icm-websocket-heapleak.py secure-bank 50001
icman pre-auth wire-only heap leak
target: secure-bank:50001
(WebSocket connection)
[*] warming the allocator
(churning freed pointer-bearing chunks)...
[*] attempt 1/3
[+] WebSocket upgraded
[+] crafted frames altered connection state
[+] received 16390 bytes from icman
RESULT: OVER-READ FIRED - 16390 bytes of an
uninitialised icman heap buffer leaked to
the client (icman survives; pre-auth;
wire-only; no PIE/heap base
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SAPBleed Pre-Auth Memory |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0574 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-44756
- related CVE-2026-76964
- related CVE-2026-89126
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"vendor": "unknown",
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Raschin Tavakoli via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "nullFaktor Security Advisory \u003c 2026-11-12 \u003e\n===========================================================\nTitle: SAPBleed: Pre-Auth Process Memory Leak and RCE\n in SAP ICM and Web Dispatcher, including the\n internal Web Dispatcher in SAP HANA XS\n\nVulnerability: Heap Buffer Overflow / Memory Leak / RCE\n\nCVE (ICM): CVE-2026-76964\nCVE (Web Disp): CVE-2026-89126\nImpact: Critical\nCVSS 3.0 Score: 10.0 (both CVEs)\nCVSS Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nProducts: SAP NetWeaver AS ABAP (ICM); SAP Web Dispatcher;\n SAP HANA XS (internal Web Dispatcher)\nAffected Versions: See SAP Security Notes 3778530 and 3778556\nVendor Homepage: https://www.sap.com\n\nSAP Note (ICM): 3778530\nSAP Note (Web Disp): 3778556\nDate: 2026-11-12\nAuthor: Raschin Tavakoli | nullFaktor GmbH\n https://www.nullfaktor.com\n office () nullfaktor com\n https://x.com/r4yzor9\n https://x.com/_nullfaktor\nBlog: https://nullfaktor.com/\n blog/cve-2026-76964-cve-2026-89126-sapbleed\n\nShort Summary\n=============\n\nSAPBleed is a pre-authentication memory-disclosure and RCE\nvulnerability affecting SAP ICM, SAP Web Dispatcher, and SAP HANA XS.\nAn Internet-facing SAP Web Dispatcher, acting as a reverse proxy,\ncan forward the attack to an ICM in a protected backend network\nsegment. The WebSocket connection becomes a path for leaking\nmemory from that internal component over the Internet. Attackers can\nrepeatedly read selected ICM memory, potentially exposing SSO tickets\nand private TLS keys. ICM-accessible shared memory also contains code\naddresses from separate ABAP dialog work processes (disp+work), even\nthough those processes are not directly exposed to the Internet.\n\nThe ICM can remain running during the memory disclosure. Traffic can\ntravel over TLS-protected WebSocket connections, concealing the leaked\npayload from network sensors without TLS visibility. Pre-authentication\ncode execution has also been demonstrated in both ICM and Web\nDispatcher.\n\nVendor description\n==================\nSAP SE is an enterprise software company headquartered in Walldorf,\nGermany. Its products include enterprise resource planning (ERP)\nsoftware and business applications.\n\nVulnerability\n=============\nSAPBleed is a pre-authentication heap buffer overflow in the WebSocket\nprocessing of SAP Internet Communication Manager (ICM) and SAP Web\nDispatcher, including Web Dispatcher deployments used with SAP HANA XS.\nThe flaw allows an unauthenticated attacker to corrupt WebSocket\nconnection state. Depending on how the corruption is exploited, the\naffected process can disclose memory or be used for remote code\nexecution. The attack is carried over a WebSocket connection and can\nreach affected services over HTTP or HTTPS, including TLS-encrypted\nconnections.\n\nThe memory disclosure occurs when corrupted connection state causes\nthe process to return heap contents beyond the data intended for its\nresponse. A Web Dispatcher can be targeted directly, exposing memory\nfrom its own process. Where affected traffic is forwarded to an ICM,\nthe ICM can also be targeted through the Web Dispatcher. Leaked process\nmemory may contain SSO tickets, cryptographic key material and process\naddresses that enable a full ASLR bypass.\n\nIn our tested laboratory deployment, the research PoCs demonstrated:\n\n - Direct disclosure of Web Dispatcher process memory, including its\n own address information, enabling an ASLR bypass for that process.\n\n - Repeatable reads of arbitrary ICM process memory, including when\n the ICM was reached through a Web Dispatcher.\n\n - Disclosure of ICM process addresses, enabling an ASLR bypass in\n that process.\n\n - Cross-process disclosure of code addresses belonging to separate\n ABAP dialog work processes (DIA/disp+work), defeating their own\n ASLR despite their separate process address spaces.\n\n - Remote identification of the SAP kernel release, build and patch\n level without SAP credentials.\n\n - Extraction of the server\u0027s private TLS key from ICM memory.\n\n - Extraction of a valid MYSAPSSO2 single sign-on ticket from active\n authenticated traffic present in ICM memory.\n\nThe impact extends beyond the ICM: SAP shared memory visible to the ICM\ncontains code addresses from separate DIA work processes. Our PoC\nrecovered their module base addresses over the network before\nauthentication. This removes ASLR as a barrier for address-dependent\nRCE flaws in those work processes as well.\n\nA leaked SSO ticket may allow impersonation of its user while the\nticket remains valid. Exposure of a TLS private key compromises the\nserver\u0027s key material; the effect on past traffic depends on the TLS\nconfiguration. Other secrets held in ICM memory may also be exposed,\ndepending on the system\u0027s workload and the data present at the time of\nan attack.\n\nSAPBleed is particularly critical because it exposes process memory\nover the Internet before authentication. The disclosed process\naddresses defeat ASLR in the affected processes. This can make other\nmemory-corruption flaws in those same processes exploitable when their\nremote code execution path requires an otherwise unknown address.\n\nOur SAP Overpass advisory (CVE-2026-44756), published September 10,\n2026, illustrates this: its RCE proof required an independently\nobtained module base address. SAPBleed can supply that address where\nboth issues affect the same ICM and can expose the corresponding\naddress for a DIA work process.\nSee:\nhttps://nullfaktor.com/blog/cve-2026-44756-sap-netweaver-pre-auth-rce\n\nOur research also established pre-authentication remote code execution\n(RCE) in both ICM and Web Dispatcher. We engineered the ICM\nmemory-extraction path to restore a consistent execution state after\neach read. In repeated laboratory runs, it extracted data reliably\nwithout crashing the ICM or dialog work processes, including when\ntraffic passed through a Web Dispatcher. The services remained\navailable during those runs.\n\nFurther exploitation details are withheld from this version.\n\nTested Environment\n==================\nThe issue was reproduced in a laboratory deployment of SAP NetWeaver AS\nABAP and SAP Web Dispatcher. Full build details are omitted from this\nversion.\n\nAttack Scenario\n===============\nAny affected SAP system that exposes the vulnerable WebSocket path to\nthe Internet can be attacked before authentication. Placing a Web\nDispatcher in front of the ICM does not shield that backend: our lab\ndemonstrated that attack traffic can pass through the Internet-facing\nproxy and disclose ICM process memory even when the ICM is not directly\nreachable from the Internet. The Web Dispatcher can also be attacked\ndirectly. No SAP credentials, prior session, or user interaction are\nrequired.\n\nMitigation\n==========\nInstall the corrections in SAP Security Notes 3778530 (ICM) and 3778556\n(Web Dispatcher) at the fixed patch levels for each installed release.\nAs a temporary measure, disable WebSocket HTTP upgrades in the relevant\nICM and Web Dispatcher profiles with\nicm/HTTP/support_websocket_upgrade=FALSE and restart the components.\nThis can disrupt functions that require WebSocket. SAP FAQ Note 3778788\nprovides further guidance on temporary workarounds. Until updates are\napplied, restrict network access to affected systems.\n\nProof of Concept\n================\n\nThe following excerpts are from our laboratory tests. All\nattacks reach the target before authentication. SIDs and OS\nuser names have been redacted, and line wrapping has been\nadjusted for readability.\n\n\nSAPBleed Integrated Tool\n-------------------------\n\nThe SAPBleed tool automates the full chain from initial memory\ndisclosure through ASLR bypass to secret extraction without attacker\ncredentials or a prior attacker session. The SSO test below uses\nconcurrent authenticated traffic from a separate lab client.\n\nTLS private-key extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint,\nTLS key recovery in one session):\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 tls\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget: secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations: ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint -\u003e TLS key\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:08\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level\n[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n (read from the kernel patch table) 00:25\n\n[3/3] Extracting the TLS private key\n[OK] TLS private key extracted 00:28\n Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/tls_private_key.pem\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:04\n\nSSO ticket extraction (ICM PIE leak, kernel fingerprint, and\nrecovery of a MYSAPSSO2 ticket from concurrent victim traffic):\n\nIn one terminal, a victim sends authenticated HTTPS requests:\n\n$\u003e python3 victim_sim.py secure-bank 50001\n\nVictim simulator: secure-bank:50001 every 0.3s\nTicket: ~/.sapbleed/victim_ticket.b64 (1164 characters)\nPress Ctrl+C to stop.\n\n[1] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n[2] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n[3] HTTP 200 (14259 bytes) AUTHENTICATED (ticket valid)\n\nWith that traffic running, the unauthenticated client extracts the\nvictim\u0027s sso ticket in another terminal:\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 sso\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget: secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations: ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint -\u003e SSO ticket\nLoot: ~/.sapbleed/loot\nSSO traffic: on non-productive systems, use victim_sim.py\n to simulate SSO traffic\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:20\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level (icman)\n[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n (read from the kernel patch table) 00:13\n\n[3/3] Extracting an SSO ticket\n[OK] SSO ticket extracted 00:29\n Saved to: ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:04\n\nArtifacts:\n ~/.sapbleed/loot/mysapsso2_ticket.b64\n\nBenchmark: ~/.sapbleed/loot/benchmark.json\n\nCross-process ASLR bypass (ICM PIE leak extended to DIA\nwork-process addresses via SAP shared memory):\n\n$\u003e python3 sapbleed.py secure-bank 50001 dia\n\nSAPBleed Lab Demo\nTarget: secure-bank:50001\nAuthentication: none (pre-auth)\nOperations: ICM PIE -\u003e Kernel fingerprint\n -\u003e disp+work PIE\n\n[CHECK] Connecting to ICM ... OK 00:01\n\n[1/3] Leaking the ICM PIE base\n[OK] ICM PIE: 0x*** 00:22\n\n[2/3] Identifying the kernel build and patch level\n[OK] ICM kernel 793, patch level 101\n (read from the kernel patch table) 00:25\n\n[3/3] Leaking the disp+work PIE base via shared memory\n[OK] disp+work PIE: 0x*** 00:23\n\nRESULT: 3/3 operations succeeded\nTOTAL TIME: 01:12\n\n\n1. Internet Communication Manager (ICM)\n=======================================\n\n1.1 Memory Disclosure (ICM Heap Leak)\n---------------------------------------\n\nThe standalone pre-authentication heap-leak PoC returns a 16 KiB\nWebSocket binary frame containing uninitialised ICM heap data. This\nis one response, not a limit on the total disclosure: the ICM PoC tool\nuses a ROP-based reader to read selected ICM memory\naddresses over subsequent WebSocket connections. The ICM survives;\nno PIE base or heap address is needed as input for the initial leak:\n\n$\u003e python3 poc-icm-websocket-heapleak.py secure-bank 50001\n\nicman pre-auth wire-only heap leak\ntarget: secure-bank:50001\n (WebSocket connection)\n[*] warming the allocator\n (churning freed pointer-bearing chunks)...\n[*] attempt 1/3\n[+] WebSocket upgraded\n[+] crafted frames altered connection state\n[+] received 16390 bytes from icman\n\nRESULT: OVER-READ FIRED - 16390 bytes of an\n uninitialised icman heap buffer leaked to\n the client (icman survives; pre-auth;\n wire-only; no PIE/heap base"
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"datePublished": "2026-11-17T19:38:27Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-17T19:38:27Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0574"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}