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    1 vulnerability found for LineEds by Circutor

    GCVE-1988-2026-0467

    Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
    VLAI
    Title
    [0day-rubbish] Circutor LineEds 24.11.14-r0 unauthenticated pwrstudio events.xml shellExecute command injection (9.8)
    Summary
    0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the pwrstudio daemon shipped in Circutor LineEds (Line Energy Data System) industrial energy gateway firmware 24.11.14-r0, engine variant pss0. Circutor S.A. is in Spain; the appliance sits between metering and power-quality instrumentation on one side and an energy-management or SCADA back office on the other. Type: operating-system command injection (CWE-78) reached without authentication (CWE-306). Those two are the classes recorded in the research; the advisory's own classification additionally maps CWE-285, because the permission gate fails open in two independent ways, and CWE-20, because the events document is accepted with no schema validation, as contributing weaknesses, with CWE-250/CWE-269 recorded as bearing on remediation priority rather than on the defect. Root cause: the daemon's event engine loads its configuration from events.xml, exposed at /services/user/events.xml over the management HTTP interface. An event may carry a shellExecute action whose command and parameter elements are concatenated by XCEventActionShellExecute::Execute (FUN_00548414) with the wide-string format "%ls %ls" stored at 0x7cc2d0, converted from wide to narrow, and passed to system() at call site 0x5484bc. Nothing between the socket and the sink neutralises shell metacharacters: no quoting, no filtering, no allowlist. The format string is the whole reason the injection works the way it does - two %ls conversions separated by a single space mean the sink performs concatenation rather than argument separation, so command and parameter become one shell word sequence with no quoting boundary between them; a payload needs only a statement separator, not a quote escape. The defect is at that concatenation rather than in the XML parser, which performs a pure element-to-field copy and is behaving correctly. Exploitation is two HTTP requests with no delivery precondition of any kind. Step one writes an event definition into /services/user/events.xml carrying an always-true condition so it enters the live set on every evaluation pass, a deliberately invalid command token so the first shell statement fails harmlessly, and a parameter of the form semicolon, command, semicolon, hash - yielding a shell line such as "x ;id >/tmp/circutor_eds_vuln_rce_marker;#". Step two requests the restart.xml route, which makes the engine reload the document through XCEventDriver::LoadXml (FUN_0020acac), build the action object, evaluate the condition and dispatch Execute. There is no race, no memory-layout dependency, no file to pre-place on the target and no dependence on another vulnerability, and because the intermediate state is a file the product itself persists, the two steps can be separated in time arbitrarily. The binary is compiled with CONFIG_NO_HASP, so no licence-dongle gate stands between a written event and the shell action. The image is a non-PIE EXEC, so every offset quoted is a fixed file-and-memory address reproducible against the same build with no relocation arithmetic. Unauthenticated classification, and it does not rest on a configuration assumption. The product implements authorization as a per-handler gate rather than as a dispatcher middleware stage: the gate is one function, FUN_001a93cc, invoked with a permission constant by whichever handler chooses to invoke it. A cross-reference census of that function in the shipped binary records 197 call sites, all individual action handlers, all inside the address range 0x1aexxx to 0x1bfxxx. Both handlers in this chain fall outside it: the restart handler FUN_001e3554 at 0x1e3554 and the events write handler FUN_0023ace0 at 0x23ace0. The gate is therefore structurally incapable of authorizing either, because it is never invoked on their paths. The restart handler's only guard is FUN_001a955c, a three-instruction predicate testing that the request-context fields at +0x34 and +0x4c are both non-null; those are the request and response object pointers installed unconditionally by the dispatcher's own setup routine FUN_001add40, which the route entry at 0x76a480 names at offset +0x0c, ahead of the handler at +0x10. It tests object presence, not credentials. One honest tension is published rather than smoothed over: the events write handler and its dispatcher contain no authorization call that we could find, yet the handler is recorded as capable of both 401 and 200 outcomes and we could not determine what selects the 401 branch - so a credential-required conditional score is carried alongside the primary rating precisely to account for that unresolved path. A second, configuration-independent defect is documented in the same advisory. The gate's own logic returns success with no check of any kind when the permission constant is not 0x15, and returns success when enforcement is toggled off, so it fails open in two independent ways for the 197 handlers that do call it. This chain does not depend on that defect, and the advisory deliberately makes no claim that any specific other route is a second path to command execution; it is reported as a separate finding for vendor review. Two claims carried by the research record are deliberately NOT published as fact. First, that security enforcement is off by default: no shipped artifact supports the default value - nothing inside the image, no value read from the extracted root filesystem, not the contents of the engine.xml package, and no vendor documentation of the factory setting. The unauthenticated classification does not depend on it, because neither route in the chain invokes the gate at all; the default matters only for the alternative reloadCfg.xml trigger, whose reload action does call the gate with permission 0x15, and that variant is treated as conditional. Second, that pwrstudio runs as root on a device: the observed uid=0(root) is the privilege of the root-run emulation harness, and the device-side account is inferred from the daemon's ownership of the restart, reload and upgrade routes, since no init script or service unit was extracted. Neither caveat alters the impact metrics. Scoring. Four readings were priced and all four are published, two of them as not adopted: - PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - CONDITIONAL, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, applying where a deployment rejects anonymous configuration writes - enforcement enabled, or the events handler's unresolved 401 branch active - so that any valid operator credential suffices. Nothing else in the chain changes. - NOT ADOPTED, 10.0 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - the Scope Changed reading a reviewer who counts the appliance OS as a realm distinct from the management daemon would apply. We do not adopt it: the command executes inside the authority the vulnerable component already holds and no sandbox, container, virtualisation boundary or separate security realm is crossed. Published so the choice is visible and so the higher number is not mistaken for our claim. - NOT ADOPTED, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Attack Complexity raised despite the absence of any attacker-unsatisfiable precondition. A PR:H reading of 7.2 is not carried, because nothing indicates the configuration write or the restart route demands an administrator rather than any authenticated principal. On scoring accuracy: the research record carried 9.8 with that primary vector and recomputing it under the CVSS 3.1 base algorithm yields 9.8, so the recorded number is arithmetically correct. The reconciliation that matters is the grounding rather than the arithmetic: the record derived PR:N from an asserted factory default for the security toggle, for which no shipped artifact exists, whereas the advisory derives PR:N from the handler call census and the two handler decompilations, which are artifact evidence. The score is unchanged and the reason for it has been replaced with one that survives scrutiny. We note this because several earlier advisories in this repository carried recorded scores that did not compute for their recorded vectors. Impact: arbitrary command execution on an industrial energy gateway with the daemon's privileges. Confidentiality High - every measurement record, configuration item, credential, certificate and key on the appliance becomes readable, including whatever it holds to authenticate to the energy-management back office, and a compromised gateway is an ideal passive collection point because it sees the traffic it forwards. Integrity High - measurement data can be altered in transit or at rest before reaching the back office, so forged consumption, generation or power-quality figures propagate into reporting, settlement, alarm thresholds and control decisions while arriving through the legitimate path and are hard to distinguish from real data; event configuration can be rewritten and firmware pushed through the same management plane, since the upgrade route is served by the same daemon. Availability High - the attacker controls the very restart and reload primitives this chain uses, and can reboot on demand, stop measurement collection, drop configuration or wedge the engine, producing a data outage in the metering path. Persistence and lateral movement are High in practice on the inference below: a foothold inside the OT segment on a device that security tooling normally treats as trusted instrumentation. Verification boundary, stated plainly. Confirmation used the shipped binary extracted from the firmware package, run under qemu-arm-static USER-MODE emulation with gdb - no full-system emulation, so no kernel, device drivers, network stack or reverse-proxy front end were present. No physical device was used at any point: nothing was powered, connected, flashed or queried. The daemon's HTTP stack could not be started under emulation, for a specific reason: its serial initialisation thread loops on an open of a Freescale i.MX private serial device returning EACCES, the device does not exist under qemu-user and no device model is provided, so the engine-ready futex is never signalled and the worker thread that would accept connections is never scheduled. A listening socket on port 1500 does come up with an accept backlog, but nothing ever issues accept or poll against it, so no request can be delivered and no response produced. The real shipped sink function was therefore invoked directly under debugger control with the field values the documented XML schema produces, using a return-immediately instruction planted at the sub-object's vtable slot 2 - a bx lr gadget at 0x37510 - to neutralise the virtual copy so Execute could reach the concatenation and the system() call without a fully constructed engine. It returned 1 and wrote a 39-byte root-owned marker containing uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Two arithmetic checks corroborate rather than merely assert: the content line plus trailing newline is exactly 39 bytes, and the wide-conversion lengths independently confirm the payload loaded into the object - 1 for the single-character command, whose first wide character is 0x78, and 41 for the parameter, whose first three wide characters are 0x3b, 0x69 and 0x64, i.e. semicolon, i, d - proving the injection prefix survived the narrow-to-wide conversion intact rather than being encoded or escaped. A control run with a benign 25-character parameter reached the same sink, returned the same value and wrote nothing, which is what upgrades this from "we called a function and a file appeared" to "the file appeared because of the injected statement". END-TO-END HTTP EXPLOITATION WAS NOT PERFORMED, NO REQUEST WAS EVER DELIVERED TO pwrstudio, AND NO PHYSICAL DEVICE WAS USED. The unauthenticated write and the unauthenticated restart are proven statically, from the route table, the handler decompilations and the caller census; they are not
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    Assigner
    VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
    GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    Circutor LineEds Affected: unknown
    Create a notification for this product.

    {
      "containers": {
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "product": "LineEds",
              "vendor": "Circutor",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "unknown"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the pwrstudio\ndaemon shipped in Circutor LineEds (Line Energy Data System) industrial energy gateway\nfirmware 24.11.14-r0, engine variant pss0. Circutor S.A. is in Spain; the appliance sits\nbetween metering and power-quality instrumentation on one side and an energy-management\nor SCADA back office on the other.\n\nType: operating-system command injection (CWE-78) reached without authentication\n(CWE-306). Those two are the classes recorded in the research; the advisory\u0027s own\nclassification additionally maps CWE-285, because the permission gate fails open in two\nindependent ways, and CWE-20, because the events document is accepted with no schema\nvalidation, as contributing weaknesses, with CWE-250/CWE-269 recorded as bearing on\nremediation priority rather than on the defect.\n\nRoot cause: the daemon\u0027s event engine loads its configuration from events.xml, exposed at\n/services/user/events.xml over the management HTTP interface. An event may carry a\nshellExecute action whose command and parameter elements are concatenated by\nXCEventActionShellExecute::Execute (FUN_00548414) with the wide-string format \"%ls %ls\"\nstored at 0x7cc2d0, converted from wide to narrow, and passed to system() at call site\n0x5484bc. Nothing between the socket and the sink neutralises shell metacharacters: no\nquoting, no filtering, no allowlist. The format string is the whole reason the injection\nworks the way it does - two %ls conversions separated by a single space mean the sink\nperforms concatenation rather than argument separation, so command and parameter become one\nshell word sequence with no quoting boundary between them; a payload needs only a statement\nseparator, not a quote escape. The defect is at that concatenation rather than in the XML\nparser, which performs a pure element-to-field copy and is behaving correctly.\n\nExploitation is two HTTP requests with no delivery precondition of any kind. Step one\nwrites an event definition into /services/user/events.xml carrying an always-true\ncondition so it enters the live set on every evaluation pass, a deliberately invalid\ncommand token so the first shell statement fails harmlessly, and a parameter of the form\nsemicolon, command, semicolon, hash - yielding a shell line such as\n\"x ;id \u003e/tmp/circutor_eds_vuln_rce_marker;#\". Step two requests the restart.xml route,\nwhich makes the engine reload the document through XCEventDriver::LoadXml (FUN_0020acac),\nbuild the action object, evaluate the condition and dispatch Execute. There is no race, no\nmemory-layout dependency, no file to pre-place on the target and no dependence on another\nvulnerability, and because the intermediate state is a file the product itself persists,\nthe two steps can be separated in time arbitrarily. The binary is compiled with\nCONFIG_NO_HASP, so no licence-dongle gate stands between a written event and the shell\naction. The image is a non-PIE EXEC, so every offset quoted is a fixed file-and-memory\naddress reproducible against the same build with no relocation arithmetic.\n\nUnauthenticated classification, and it does not rest on a configuration assumption. The\nproduct implements authorization as a per-handler gate rather than as a dispatcher\nmiddleware stage: the gate is one function, FUN_001a93cc, invoked with a permission\nconstant by whichever handler chooses to invoke it. A cross-reference census of that\nfunction in the shipped binary records 197 call sites, all individual action handlers, all\ninside the address range 0x1aexxx to 0x1bfxxx. Both handlers in this chain fall outside it:\nthe restart handler FUN_001e3554 at 0x1e3554 and the events write handler FUN_0023ace0 at\n0x23ace0. The gate is therefore structurally incapable of authorizing either, because it is\nnever invoked on their paths. The restart handler\u0027s only guard is FUN_001a955c, a\nthree-instruction predicate testing that the request-context fields at +0x34 and +0x4c are\nboth non-null; those are the request and response object pointers installed\nunconditionally by the dispatcher\u0027s own setup routine FUN_001add40, which the route entry\nat 0x76a480 names at offset +0x0c, ahead of the handler at +0x10. It tests object presence,\nnot credentials. One honest tension is published rather than smoothed over: the events write\nhandler and its dispatcher contain no authorization call that we could find, yet the handler\nis recorded as capable of both 401 and 200 outcomes and we could not determine what selects\nthe 401 branch - so a credential-required conditional score is carried alongside the\nprimary rating precisely to account for that unresolved path.\n\nA second, configuration-independent defect is documented in the same advisory. The gate\u0027s\nown logic returns success with no check of any kind when the permission constant is not\n0x15, and returns success when enforcement is toggled off, so it fails open in two\nindependent ways for the 197 handlers that do call it. This chain does not depend on that\ndefect, and the advisory deliberately makes no claim that any specific other route is a\nsecond path to command execution; it is reported as a separate finding for vendor review.\n\nTwo claims carried by the research record are deliberately NOT published as fact. First,\nthat security enforcement is off by default: no shipped artifact supports the default value\n- nothing inside the image, no value read from the extracted root filesystem, not the\ncontents of the engine.xml package, and no vendor documentation of the factory setting. The\nunauthenticated classification does not depend on it, because neither route in the chain\ninvokes the gate at all; the default matters only for the alternative reloadCfg.xml\ntrigger, whose reload action does call the gate with permission 0x15, and that variant is\ntreated as conditional. Second, that pwrstudio runs as root on a device: the observed\nuid=0(root) is the privilege of the root-run emulation harness, and the device-side account\nis inferred from the daemon\u0027s ownership of the restart, reload and upgrade routes, since no\ninit script or service unit was extracted. Neither caveat alters the impact metrics.\n\nScoring. Four readings were priced and all four are published, two of them as not adopted:\n- PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n- CONDITIONAL, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, applying where a\n  deployment rejects anonymous configuration writes - enforcement enabled, or the events\n  handler\u0027s unresolved 401 branch active - so that any valid operator credential suffices.\n  Nothing else in the chain changes.\n- NOT ADOPTED, 10.0 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - the Scope\n  Changed reading a reviewer who counts the appliance OS as a realm distinct from the\n  management daemon would apply. We do not adopt it: the command executes inside the\n  authority the vulnerable component already holds and no sandbox, container,\n  virtualisation boundary or separate security realm is crossed. Published so the choice is\n  visible and so the higher number is not mistaken for our claim.\n- NOT ADOPTED, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Attack Complexity\n  raised despite the absence of any attacker-unsatisfiable precondition.\nA PR:H reading of 7.2 is not carried, because nothing indicates the configuration write or\nthe restart route demands an administrator rather than any authenticated principal.\n\nOn scoring accuracy: the research record carried 9.8 with that primary vector and\nrecomputing it under the CVSS 3.1 base algorithm yields 9.8, so the recorded number is\narithmetically correct. The reconciliation that matters is the grounding rather than the\narithmetic: the record derived PR:N from an asserted factory default for the security\ntoggle, for which no shipped artifact exists, whereas the advisory derives PR:N from the\nhandler call census and the two handler decompilations, which are artifact evidence. The\nscore is unchanged and the reason for it has been replaced with one that survives scrutiny.\nWe note this because several earlier advisories in this repository carried recorded scores\nthat did not compute for their recorded vectors.\n\nImpact: arbitrary command execution on an industrial energy gateway with the daemon\u0027s\nprivileges. Confidentiality High - every measurement record, configuration item, credential,\ncertificate and key on the appliance becomes readable, including whatever it holds to\nauthenticate to the energy-management back office, and a compromised gateway is an ideal\npassive collection point because it sees the traffic it forwards. Integrity High -\nmeasurement data can be altered in transit or at rest before reaching the back office, so\nforged consumption, generation or power-quality figures propagate into reporting,\nsettlement, alarm thresholds and control decisions while arriving through the legitimate\npath and are hard to distinguish from real data; event configuration can be rewritten and\nfirmware pushed through the same management plane, since the upgrade route is served by the\nsame daemon. Availability High - the attacker controls the very restart and reload\nprimitives this chain uses, and can reboot on demand, stop measurement collection, drop\nconfiguration or wedge the engine, producing a data outage in the metering path.\nPersistence and lateral movement are High in practice on the inference below: a foothold\ninside the OT segment on a device that security tooling normally treats as trusted\ninstrumentation.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. Confirmation used the shipped binary extracted from\nthe firmware package, run under qemu-arm-static USER-MODE emulation with gdb - no\nfull-system emulation, so no kernel, device drivers, network stack or reverse-proxy front\nend were present. No physical device was used at any point: nothing was powered, connected,\nflashed or queried. The daemon\u0027s HTTP stack could not be started under emulation, for a\nspecific reason: its serial initialisation thread loops on an open of a Freescale i.MX\nprivate serial device returning EACCES, the device does not exist under qemu-user and no\ndevice model is provided, so the engine-ready futex is never signalled and the worker thread\nthat would accept connections is never scheduled. A listening socket on port 1500 does come\nup with an accept backlog, but nothing ever issues accept or poll against it, so no request\ncan be delivered and no response produced.\n\nThe real shipped sink function was therefore invoked directly under debugger control with\nthe field values the documented XML schema produces, using a return-immediately instruction\nplanted at the sub-object\u0027s vtable slot 2 - a bx lr gadget at 0x37510 - to neutralise the\nvirtual copy so Execute could reach the concatenation and the system() call without a fully\nconstructed engine. It returned 1 and wrote a 39-byte root-owned marker containing\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Two arithmetic checks corroborate rather than\nmerely assert: the content line plus trailing newline is exactly 39 bytes, and the\nwide-conversion lengths independently confirm the payload loaded into the object - 1 for\nthe single-character command, whose first wide character is 0x78, and 41 for the parameter,\nwhose first three wide characters are 0x3b, 0x69 and 0x64, i.e. semicolon, i, d - proving\nthe injection prefix survived the narrow-to-wide conversion intact rather than being\nencoded or escaped. A control run with a benign 25-character parameter reached the same\nsink, returned the same value and wrote nothing, which is what upgrades this from \"we called\na function and a file appeared\" to \"the file appeared because of the injected statement\".\n\nEND-TO-END HTTP EXPLOITATION WAS NOT PERFORMED, NO REQUEST WAS EVER DELIVERED TO\npwrstudio, AND NO PHYSICAL DEVICE WAS USED. The unauthenticated write and the unauthenticated\nrestart are proven statically, from the route table, the handler decompilations and the\ncaller census; they are not"
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            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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          "title": "[0day-rubbish] Circutor LineEds 24.11.14-r0 unauthenticated pwrstudio events.xml shellExecute command injection (9.8)",
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