Find a vulnerability

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              "value": "\u003cb\u003eDescription\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWhen launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the\u003cbr\u003eentire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command\u003cbr\u003efile that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without\u003cbr\u003ere-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFor the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a\u003cbr\u003eprivilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,\u003cbr\u003e`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an\u003cbr\u003eattacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFor the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no\u003cbr\u003esource or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the\u003cbr\u003econtainer. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only\u003cbr\u003eagainst non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant\u0027s uid.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eMitigation\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,\u003cbr\u003eand where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology\u003cbr\u003esubmission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and\u003cbr\u003ereinstalled after upgrading.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eCredit\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm."
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        "references": [
          {
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/10"
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        ],
        "title": "CVE Program Container"
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            "cvssV3_1": {
              "attackComplexity": "LOW",
              "attackVector": "LOCAL",
              "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
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              "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
              "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
              "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
              "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
              "scope": "UNCHANGED",
              "userInteraction": "NONE",
              "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
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              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-82430",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
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                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-14T20:00:33.467479Z",
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          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.storm:storm-core",
          "product": "Apache Storm Worker Launcher",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
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          "type": "finder",
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              "value": "\u003cb\u003eDescription\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eWhen launching a Docker or OCI worker, the setuid-root `worker-launcher` first changes ownership of the\u003cbr\u003eentire worker directory to the untrusted topology user, and only afterwards reads and acts on the command\u003cbr\u003efile that the supervisor wrote into that same directory. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` and without\u003cbr\u003ere-verifying its owner, so between the ownership change and the read the tenant can replace its contents.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFor the Docker path the parsed command is executed with real uid 0, and the command sanitiser is not a\u003cbr\u003eprivilege boundary: it admits `-v` with an arbitrary source, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`,\u003cbr\u003e`--user` and `--net`, and copies positional arguments through verbatim. A rewritten file therefore yields an\u003cbr\u003eattacker-authored, root-equivalent container invocation with the host filesystem available.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eFor the OCI path the same rewrite window applies, and mount validation is structural only, with no\u003cbr\u003esource or destination allow-list, so arbitrary host paths can be bind-mounted read-write into the\u003cbr\u003econtainer. The `username` field of the command file is likewise attacker-settable and is checked only\u003cbr\u003eagainst non-root and minimum-uid rules, permitting execution as another tenant\u0027s uid.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eMitigation\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the command file is validated before the ownership change and re-verified on open,\u003cbr\u003eand where mount sources and destinations are constrained by configuration.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eUsers who cannot upgrade immediately should disable Docker and OCI worker isolation, or restrict topology\u003cbr\u003esubmission on affected supervisors to trusted principals. Note that the launcher must be rebuilt and\u003cbr\u003ereinstalled after upgrading.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cb\u003eCredit\u003c/b\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm."
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      "metrics": [
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          "other": {
            "content": {
              "text": "important"
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              "value": "GENERAL"
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            {
              "cweId": "CWE-367",
              "description": "CWE-367 Time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition",
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-14T14:15:58.744Z",
        "orgId": "f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09",
        "shortName": "apache"
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          "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/8d5pkn486p8vrz5klg6onk5r8k9sd9lv"
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      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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      "title": "Apache Storm Worker Launcher: Local Privilege Escalation to Root via Container Command Files Chowned to the Tenant",
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    "datePublished": "2026-09-14T14:15:58.744Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-29T10:18:19.828Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-14T20:00:53.152Z",
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