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    1 vulnerability found for Abyss Web Server by Aprelium Technologies

    GCVE-1988-2026-0483

    Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
    VLAI
    Title
    [0day-rubbish] Abyss Web Server X1 2.16.22.0 first-run console credential takeover to configuration-write log-as-CGI command execution (7.5)
    Summary
    0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability chain in Abyss Web Server X1 2.16.22.0, the free edition of the closed-source Abyss web server from Aprelium (Tunisia), a product family that has shipped for more than twenty years. The release artefacts identify 2.16.22.0 as the vendor's current official release. Between first start and the moment an administrator sets a console password, any client admitted by the shipped console access rule can register that administrator with no credential at all, and three ordinary configuration forms afterwards convert the configuration plane into an execution plane: the host access log becomes a shell script inside CGI scope, and any anonymous request to the log path executes it. Type and root cause. CWE-306, missing authentication for a critical function, is primary, and CWE-78, OS command injection, is co-equal rather than subordinate. CWE-284, CWE-73, CWE-362, CWE-352, CWE-328 and CWE-250 contribute and are reported separately without raising any metric. The two primary classifications are co-equal because removing either one alone removes the chain while leaving every other weakness discussed here intact. It is worth stating what this finding is not, because the technique is the interesting part: there is no memory corruption, no deserialisation gadget and no file-upload primitive anywhere in it. The write primitive is the product's own supported configuration form, and the command enters the written file through a quote-context escape in a request header field. A fix that only adds authentication to the console leaves the log-as-interpreter collision in place; a fix that only filters the header leaves the unauthenticated credential creation in place. Neither half is sufficient on its own. The console authenticates with HTTP Basic on its default port 9999, binds `bindip` `*` by default, and issues no session cookie anywhere - every endpoint answers without `Set-Cookie`, including the endpoint that creates the administrator. On first start the generated `abyss.conf` carries a `<console>` node with no `<login>` and no `<password>` element, and the startup terminal prints a message telling the operator to browse `http://127.0.0.1:9999` to continue with the console access configuration. While that state holds, `GET /console/` answers a distinctive `302` and the bootstrap chain leads to `GET /console/credentials` answering `200` with a creation form plus a `$$xxvxd` page token; a credential-free `POST` to that endpoint installs the administrator. On an instance that has never been configured the redirect first passes through `/console/language`; on an instance whose language is already chosen it goes straight to `/console/credentials`. Both shapes are unauthenticated throughout. After the install the same endpoint answers `401` with `WWW-Authenticate: Basic Realm="Abyss Web Server Console"`, so the attacker's own POST is what closes the window. The three forms that follow are a direct serialisation of the configuration tree - each HTML control's `NAME` is the XML key path it writes - so what they accept is exactly what the configuration can hold. - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/paths/path@0/edit` takes `vpath=/` with `type=0` (CGI) and writes `<paths><path><vpath>/</vpath><type>0</type>...</path></paths>`. A `vpath` of `/` places the entire virtual path space of the host inside CGI scope, which includes files the server writes into the document root itself. There is no minimum-depth requirement and no warning about scope width. - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/log` takes an arbitrary absolute filesystem path in its `file` control and a `format` of `.combined`, writing `<log><file>(absolute path inside the document root)</file><denied/> <format>.combined</format></log>`. No whitelist, no restriction to a log directory, no rejection of a destination inside the document root, and no canonicalisation. The control renders with a `Browse` selector that walks the target's directory tree from the filesystem root downwards, so the document root does not have to be guessed. - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/interpreters/interpreter@0/edit` takes an arbitrary executable path with `interface=0`, `checkexists=yes` and `type=0`, and a second-step extensions sub-form then associates an arbitrary extension string. Submitting `/bin/sh` and `ext=log` writes `<interpreters><interpreter><file>/bin/sh</file>...<ext>log</ext> </interpreter></interpreters>`. `checkexists=yes` is satisfied because `/bin/sh` exists; nothing reasons about whether the extension names a content type rather than a destination type, whether the interpreter is a general-purpose shell, or whether the server itself writes files with that extension. `POST /` carrying `/restart=Restart` - the product's own restart button, with the main page showing "The configuration has changed. Press [Restart] to apply the modifications." and host status `Running(Updated)` - applies all three. The request-serving slave process bounces, and only the new generation writes into the newly configured log destination. The access log is now a shell script inside CGI scope. A request whose `User-Agent` is `zz"; (command); #` appends a `.combined` line in which that value lands inside the format's own double-quoted field, where the quote closes the field, the semicolon separates a statement and the trailing comment swallows the remainder. An anonymous `GET` on the log path then makes the product start the CGI child `/bin/sh (log file)`, and the shell reads the whole file line by line, executing the semicolon segment. Commands run as the identity of the server process. How confirmation works. The final trigger answers `500`, not `200`, and that is the appearance of success rather than failure: `/bin/sh` writes no CGI headers, so the product cannot construct a valid CGI response and answers with its standard 348-byte error page while the CGI log records `Broken pipe` for that invocation. Proof is server-side and three-channel rather than client-observed. The product's own CGI error log names the child it spawned directly, `CGI: [/bin/sh x.log ] URI: /x.log`, interleaved with the shell's own diagnostics `x.log: line N: 127.0.0.1: command not found` - those are the log's ordinary leading fields being treated as command words, and they do not stop execution of later lines, which is why a noisy log prefix is harmless. The diagnostics incremented from two lines to four as the log grew between fires, which is causality visible in the log: each fire re-reads the whole file and re-executes every line. A marker file written by the injected command contained `uid=uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`, 43 bytes and root-owned; the doubled prefix is the injected command's own literal, not a product string, and the identity the server process ran under is `uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`. Neither HTTP status in the last two steps indicates failure - the smuggling request only has to be logged, and it was answered `404` with a 336-byte body on a nonexistent path precisely so it would have no other effect on the target. What was deliberately not reproduced. The published advisory reproduces the identity string and the product's own log lines; it does not publish the per-run marker token, the credential pair used in verification or any hostname from the run, because all three are artefacts of one execution rather than facts about the product. No credential was leaked, seeded or reused: the pair was chosen by the test operator at that moment, it is not a product default, and this post reproduces no credential. No reverse shell, no callback listener, no persistence mechanism and no destructive payload was exercised. Scoring. One score is published: 7.5 High, `CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`. That vector computes to 7.493264 raw - ISS 0.914816, Impact(S:U) 5.873119, Exploitability 1.620146 from weights AV 0.62, AC 0.44, PR 0.85, UI 0.85 - and is taken to 7.5 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth Roundup. No pre-existing numeric score was inherited: the sources behind this advisory carried no computed CVSS figure, so there was nothing to correct, and every number published here was computed from its vector. The Attack Vector is Adjacent, not Network, and the reason is an artefact rather than a judgement call. The console binds every interface by default and the shipped documentation presents that as the recommended setting, but its `ipcontrol` block permits loopback, all three RFC1918 IPv4 ranges (`10.0.0.1-10.255.255.254`, `172.16.0.1-172.31.255.254`, `192.168.0.1-192.168.255.254`) and IPv6 unique-local plus link-local, with no deny entries, and refuses public-internet sources. The check is evaluated on the connected socket peer and was measured not to be influenced by `X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`. Those same address-range literals appear as byte literals inside the stripped binaries. A default installation is therefore not internet-reachable, and no published score assumes that it is. The adjacent position is genuinely wide in practice - the whole office LAN, the whole home LAN, every tenant on a shared management VLAN, every container on a bridge network, every instance on a cloud VPC subnet - but it is adjacent, and the headline vector says so. The Attack Complexity is High because success requires arriving before the administrator arms the console. The endpoint answers `401` from the moment a credential exists, and that was measured in every verification round. The window's field duration is not established and is not estimated anywhere in this research; the advisory invents no figure for it. Two conditional readings are published alongside the primary, each labelled as conditional and neither quoted as the headline. - Conditional A, the window left open indefinitely: `CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.8 High (Exploitability 2.835255, base 8.708373). Applies where automation installs and never arms the console, where appliances are staged before deployment, or where containers and host images regenerate a pristine configuration on every restart, so the attacker polls an unauthenticated state rather than racing a person. - Conditional B, the console also exposed to a network: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 9.8 Critical (Exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161), and with the window contested `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.1 High (Exploitability 2.221167, base 8.094286). Applies where an operator publishes port 9999 through NAT or a port forward, binds it on a publicly addressed host, or relays through a same-host reverse proxy whose forwarded traffic presents a permitted socket peer. That proxy shape passes `ipcontrol` without any header logic being consulted at all. Both are conditional on a deployment change we did not test. One reading was rejected. Scope Changed was considered seriously and refused: `CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` computes to 8.4 (ISS 0.914816, Impact(S:C) 6.128026, Exploitability 1.620146, base 1.08 times 7.748172 = 8.368026) and is not published as the finding's score. Three reasons. Both listeners belong to one product and one process family - a CLI master and a `--slave --interactive` service process - so the console and the host plane are two doors into one authority, not two authorities, and applying configuration to the serving plane is the product's documented intended behaviour. The CGI child runs as the server process's own identity on the same host, in the same filesystem view, so no different security authority is crossed. And the operating-system consequences depend on how the deployment runs the server, which is established below as deployment-dependent; scoring Changed on the strength of a root deployment we could not
    Severity
    No CVSS data available.
    Assigner
    VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
    GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
    Impacted products

    {
      "containers": {
        "cna": {
          "affected": [
            {
              "product": "Abyss Web Server",
              "vendor": "Aprelium Technologies",
              "versions": [
                {
                  "status": "affected",
                  "version": "unknown"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "credits": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "finder",
              "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
            }
          ],
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability chain in\nAbyss Web Server X1 2.16.22.0, the free edition of the closed-source Abyss\nweb server from Aprelium (Tunisia), a product family that has shipped for\nmore than twenty years. The release artefacts identify 2.16.22.0 as the\nvendor\u0027s current official release. Between first start and the moment an\nadministrator sets a console password, any client admitted by the shipped\nconsole access rule can register that administrator with no credential at\nall, and three ordinary configuration forms afterwards convert the\nconfiguration plane into an execution plane: the host access log becomes a\nshell script inside CGI scope, and any anonymous request to the log path\nexecutes it.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-306, missing authentication for a critical\nfunction, is primary, and CWE-78, OS command injection, is co-equal rather\nthan subordinate. CWE-284, CWE-73, CWE-362, CWE-352, CWE-328 and CWE-250\ncontribute and are reported separately without raising any metric. The two\nprimary classifications are co-equal because removing either one alone\nremoves the chain while leaving every other weakness discussed here intact.\nIt is worth stating what this finding is not, because the technique is the\ninteresting part: there is no memory corruption, no deserialisation gadget\nand no file-upload primitive anywhere in it. The write primitive is the\nproduct\u0027s own supported configuration form, and the command enters the\nwritten file through a quote-context escape in a request header field. A fix\nthat only adds authentication to the console leaves the log-as-interpreter\ncollision in place; a fix that only filters the header leaves the\nunauthenticated credential creation in place. Neither half is sufficient on\nits own.\n\nThe console authenticates with HTTP Basic on its default port 9999, binds\n`bindip` `*` by default, and issues no session cookie anywhere - every\nendpoint answers without `Set-Cookie`, including the endpoint that creates\nthe administrator. On first start the generated `abyss.conf` carries a\n`\u003cconsole\u003e` node with no `\u003clogin\u003e` and no `\u003cpassword\u003e` element, and the\nstartup terminal prints a message telling the operator to browse\n`http://127.0.0.1:9999` to continue with the console access configuration.\nWhile that state holds, `GET /console/` answers a distinctive `302` and the\nbootstrap chain leads to `GET /console/credentials` answering `200` with a\ncreation form plus a `$$xxvxd` page token; a credential-free `POST` to that\nendpoint installs the administrator. On an instance that has never been\nconfigured the redirect first passes through `/console/language`; on an\ninstance whose language is already chosen it goes straight to\n`/console/credentials`. Both shapes are unauthenticated throughout. After the\ninstall the same endpoint answers `401` with\n`WWW-Authenticate: Basic Realm=\"Abyss Web Server Console\"`, so the\nattacker\u0027s own POST is what closes the window.\n\nThe three forms that follow are a direct serialisation of the configuration\ntree - each HTML control\u0027s `NAME` is the XML key path it writes - so what\nthey accept is exactly what the configuration can hold.\n\n  - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/paths/path@0/edit` takes\n    `vpath=/` with `type=0` (CGI) and writes\n    `\u003cpaths\u003e\u003cpath\u003e\u003cvpath\u003e/\u003c/vpath\u003e\u003ctype\u003e0\u003c/type\u003e...\u003c/path\u003e\u003c/paths\u003e`. A\n    `vpath` of `/` places the entire virtual path space of the host inside\n    CGI scope, which includes files the server writes into the document root\n    itself. There is no minimum-depth requirement and no warning about scope\n    width.\n  - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/log` takes an arbitrary absolute filesystem\n    path in its `file` control and a `format` of `.combined`, writing\n    `\u003clog\u003e\u003cfile\u003e(absolute path inside the document root)\u003c/file\u003e\u003cdenied/\u003e\n    \u003cformat\u003e.combined\u003c/format\u003e\u003c/log\u003e`. No whitelist, no restriction to a log\n    directory, no rejection of a destination inside the document root, and no\n    canonicalisation. The control renders with a `Browse` selector that walks\n    the target\u0027s directory tree from the filesystem root downwards, so the\n    document root does not have to be guessed.\n  - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/interpreters/interpreter@0/edit`\n    takes an arbitrary executable path with `interface=0`, `checkexists=yes`\n    and `type=0`, and a second-step extensions sub-form then associates an\n    arbitrary extension string. Submitting `/bin/sh` and `ext=log` writes\n    `\u003cinterpreters\u003e\u003cinterpreter\u003e\u003cfile\u003e/bin/sh\u003c/file\u003e...\u003cext\u003elog\u003c/ext\u003e\n    \u003c/interpreter\u003e\u003c/interpreters\u003e`. `checkexists=yes` is satisfied because\n    `/bin/sh` exists; nothing reasons about whether the extension names a\n    content type rather than a destination type, whether the interpreter is a\n    general-purpose shell, or whether the server itself writes files with\n    that extension.\n\n`POST /` carrying `/restart=Restart` - the product\u0027s own restart button, with\nthe main page showing \"The configuration has changed. Press [Restart] to\napply the modifications.\" and host status `Running(Updated)` - applies all\nthree. The request-serving slave process bounces, and only the new\ngeneration writes into the newly configured log destination. The access log\nis now a shell script inside CGI scope. A request whose `User-Agent` is\n`zz\"; (command); #` appends a `.combined` line in which that value lands\ninside the format\u0027s own double-quoted field, where the quote closes the\nfield, the semicolon separates a statement and the trailing comment swallows\nthe remainder. An anonymous `GET` on the log path then makes the product\nstart the CGI child `/bin/sh (log file)`, and the shell reads the whole file\nline by line, executing the semicolon segment. Commands run as the identity\nof the server process.\n\nHow confirmation works. The final trigger answers `500`, not `200`, and that\nis the appearance of success rather than failure: `/bin/sh` writes no CGI\nheaders, so the product cannot construct a valid CGI response and answers\nwith its standard 348-byte error page while the CGI log records `Broken pipe`\nfor that invocation. Proof is server-side and three-channel rather than\nclient-observed. The product\u0027s own CGI error log names the child it spawned\ndirectly, `CGI: [/bin/sh x.log ]  URI: /x.log`, interleaved with the shell\u0027s\nown diagnostics `x.log: line N: 127.0.0.1: command not found` - those are the\nlog\u0027s ordinary leading fields being treated as command words, and they do not\nstop execution of later lines, which is why a noisy log prefix is harmless.\nThe diagnostics incremented from two lines to four as the log grew between\nfires, which is causality visible in the log: each fire re-reads the whole\nfile and re-executes every line. A marker file written by the injected\ncommand contained `uid=uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`, 43 bytes and\nroot-owned; the doubled prefix is the injected command\u0027s own literal, not a\nproduct string, and the identity the server process ran under is\n`uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`. Neither HTTP status in the last two\nsteps indicates failure - the smuggling request only has to be logged, and it\nwas answered `404` with a 336-byte body on a nonexistent path precisely so\nit would have no other effect on the target.\n\nWhat was deliberately not reproduced. The published advisory reproduces the\nidentity string and the product\u0027s own log lines; it does not publish the\nper-run marker token, the credential pair used in verification or any\nhostname from the run, because all three are artefacts of one execution\nrather than facts about the product. No credential was leaked, seeded or\nreused: the pair was chosen by the test operator at that moment, it is not a\nproduct default, and this post reproduces no credential. No reverse shell, no\ncallback listener, no persistence mechanism and no destructive payload was\nexercised.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 7.5 High,\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`. That vector computes to\n7.493264 raw - ISS 0.914816, Impact(S:U) 5.873119, Exploitability\n1.620146 from weights AV 0.62, AC 0.44, PR 0.85, UI 0.85 - and is taken to\n7.5 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth Roundup. No pre-existing numeric score was\ninherited: the sources behind this advisory carried no computed CVSS figure,\nso there was nothing to correct, and every number published here was computed\nfrom its vector.\n\nThe Attack Vector is Adjacent, not Network, and the reason is an artefact\nrather than a judgement call. The console binds every interface by default\nand the shipped documentation presents that as the recommended setting, but\nits `ipcontrol` block permits loopback, all three RFC1918 IPv4 ranges\n(`10.0.0.1-10.255.255.254`, `172.16.0.1-172.31.255.254`,\n`192.168.0.1-192.168.255.254`) and IPv6 unique-local plus link-local, with no\ndeny entries, and refuses public-internet sources. The check is evaluated on\nthe connected socket peer and was measured not to be influenced by\n`X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`. Those same address-range literals appear as\nbyte literals inside the stripped binaries. A default installation is\ntherefore not internet-reachable, and no published score assumes that it is.\nThe adjacent position is genuinely wide in practice - the whole office LAN,\nthe whole home LAN, every tenant on a shared management VLAN, every container\non a bridge network, every instance on a cloud VPC subnet - but it is\nadjacent, and the headline vector says so.\n\nThe Attack Complexity is High because success requires arriving before the\nadministrator arms the console. The endpoint answers `401` from the moment a\ncredential exists, and that was measured in every verification round. The\nwindow\u0027s field duration is not established and is not estimated anywhere in\nthis research; the advisory invents no figure for it.\n\nTwo conditional readings are published alongside the primary, each labelled\nas conditional and neither quoted as the headline.\n\n  - Conditional A, the window left open indefinitely:\n    `CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.8 High\n    (Exploitability 2.835255, base 8.708373). Applies where automation\n    installs and never arms the console, where appliances are staged before\n    deployment, or where containers and host images regenerate a pristine\n    configuration on every restart, so the attacker polls an unauthenticated\n    state rather than racing a person.\n  - Conditional B, the console also exposed to a network:\n    `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 9.8 Critical\n    (Exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161), and with the window contested\n    `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.1 High\n    (Exploitability 2.221167, base 8.094286). Applies where an operator\n    publishes port 9999 through NAT or a port forward, binds it on a publicly\n    addressed host, or relays through a same-host reverse proxy whose\n    forwarded traffic presents a permitted socket peer. That proxy shape\n    passes `ipcontrol` without any header logic being consulted at all. Both\n    are conditional on a deployment change we did not test.\n\nOne reading was rejected. Scope Changed was considered seriously and refused:\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` computes to 8.4 (ISS\n0.914816, Impact(S:C) 6.128026, Exploitability 1.620146, base 1.08 times\n7.748172 = 8.368026) and is not published as the finding\u0027s score. Three\nreasons. Both listeners belong to one product and one process family - a CLI\nmaster and a `--slave --interactive` service process - so the console and the\nhost plane are two doors into one authority, not two authorities, and\napplying configuration to the serving plane is the product\u0027s documented\nintended behaviour. The CGI child runs as the server process\u0027s own identity\non the same host, in the same filesystem view, so no different security\nauthority is crossed. And the operating-system consequences depend on how the\ndeployment runs the server, which is established below as\ndeployment-dependent; scoring Changed on the strength of a root deployment we\ncould not"
            }
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                  "type": "CWE"
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                {
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            "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
            "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
            "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
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            },
            {
              "url": "http://127.0.0.1:9999`"
            },
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            {
              "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
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          "source": {
            "defect": [
              "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/12"
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            "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
          },
          "title": "[0day-rubbish] Abyss Web Server X1 2.16.22.0 first-run console credential takeover to configuration-write log-as-CGI command execution (7.5)",
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      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
        "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED",
        "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0483"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }