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    4 vulnerabilities found for @strapi/plugin-users-permissions by strapi

    CVE-2026-22706 (GCVE-0-2026-22706)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-05-14 18:38 – Updated: 2026-05-15 14:52
    VLAI
    Title
    Strapi: Password Reset Does Not Revoke Existing Refresh Sessions
    Summary
    Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied `deviceId`. When a password change or reset request did not include a `deviceId`, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active. An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure. The patch in version 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a `deviceId` is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
    CWE
    • CWE-613 - Insufficient Session Expiration
    Assigner
    References
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2025-64526 (GCVE-0-2025-64526)

    Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-05-14 18:32 – Updated: 2026-05-16 00:49
    VLAI
    Title
    Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying
    Summary
    Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
    CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
    CWE
    • CWE-307 - Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
    Assigner
    Impacted products
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2026-22706 (GCVE-0-2026-22706)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-14 18:38 – Updated: 2026-05-15 14:52
    VLAI
    Title
    Strapi: Password Reset Does Not Revoke Existing Refresh Sessions
    Summary
    Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied `deviceId`. When a password change or reset request did not include a `deviceId`, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active. An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure. The patch in version 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a `deviceId` is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
    CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
    CWE
    • CWE-613 - Insufficient Session Expiration
    Assigner
    References
    Show details on NVD website

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    CVE-2025-64526 (GCVE-0-2025-64526)

    Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-14 18:32 – Updated: 2026-05-16 00:49
    VLAI
    Title
    Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying
    Summary
    Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.
    SSVC
    Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
    CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)
    CWE
    • CWE-307 - Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
    Assigner
    Impacted products
    Show details on NVD website

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            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled."
            }
          ],
          "metrics": [
            {
              "cvssV4_0": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackRequirements": "NONE",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "baseScore": 6.9,
                "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
                "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
                "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
                "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
                "version": "4.0",
                "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "LOW",
                "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
                "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE"
              }
            }
          ],
          "problemTypes": [
            {
              "descriptions": [
                {
                  "cweId": "CWE-307",
                  "description": "CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts",
                  "lang": "en",
                  "type": "CWE"
                }
              ]
            }
          ],
          "providerMetadata": {
            "dateUpdated": "2026-05-14T18:33:56.463Z",
            "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
            "shortName": "GitHub_M"
          },
          "references": [
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw",
              "tags": [
                "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818",
              "tags": [
                "x_refsource_MISC"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/pull/24818"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db",
              "tags": [
                "x_refsource_MISC"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/commit/5e0d243cba9830e6f791de6a94798bcde51468db"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0",
              "tags": [
                "x_refsource_MISC"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/releases/tag/v5.45.0"
            }
          ],
          "source": {
            "advisory": "GHSA-7mqx-wwh4-f9fw",
            "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
          },
          "title": "Strapi has a rate limit bypass on users-permissions plugin via attacker-controlled email keying"
        }
      },
      "cveMetadata": {
        "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
        "cveId": "CVE-2025-64526",
        "datePublished": "2026-05-14T18:32:01.998Z",
        "dateReserved": "2025-11-05T21:15:39.401Z",
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-16T00:49:25.996Z",
        "state": "PUBLISHED"
      },
      "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
      "dataVersion": "5.2"
    }