Vulnerability Disclosure Archive

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          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in NCache Enterprise 5.3.6 (other versions with the \nsame default-disabled security and handler logic are likely affected).\n\nType: Pre-authentication RCE (missing auth + attacker assembly load) (CWE-94)\nCVSS: 9.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)\nImpact: Unauthenticated remote code execution on the cache server as the ncache service user, exposing cached \napplication data and the host.\nAuthentication: unauthenticated / pre-auth\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/ncache-enterprise-unauth-assembly-load-rce\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nVendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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          "product": "Microsip 2026 ASD",
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          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in CFEngine Enterprise Nova Hub 3.27.1 (other \nversions with the same generateScriptFromTemplates quoting are likely affected).\n\nType: Authenticated RCE (command injection via VCS settings, root) (CWE-78)\nCVSS: 8.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H)\nImpact: Authenticated admin-to-root full server takeover of the management hub that orchestrates the entire managed \nfleet.\nAuthentication: authenticated (requires valid session)\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/cfengine-nova-hub-vcs-settings-root-rce\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nVendor has been notified. CVE ID is pending.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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{
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    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "CHIRP Kenwood ITM",
          "vendor": "unknown",
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              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
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          "value": "----------------------------------------------------------------------------\nNotCVE Advisory \u2014 NotCVE-2026-0013\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n[-] Summary:\nEval injection in the Kenwood ITM file format driver of CHIRP, an\nopen-source application for programming amateur radios, allows an attacker\nwho can persuade a user to open a crafted radio file to execute arbitrary\nPython code with the privileges of that user. The affected path is reached\nthrough the ordinary File -\u003e Open flow in a stock installation; no dialog or\nconfirmation precedes execution. CVSS:3.1 7.8\n(AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).\n\n[-] Affected:\nCHIRP, chirp-next builds up to and including chirp-next-20260814.\nFixed in source at commit 39178db (2026-08-17); the researcher reports build\nchirp-next-20260821 ships the fix.\n\n[-] Technical Description:\nITMRadio._clean_tmode() in chirp/drivers/kenwood_itm.py read two CSV fields\nfrom the file being opened and passed each one directly to Python\u0027s built-in\neval() (lines 66-67):\n\n  TXSIG, whose evaluated result was assigned to mem.rtone\n  RXSIG, whose evaluated result was assigned to mem.ctone\n\nBoth values are attacker-controlled strings retrieved verbatim from a row of\nthe opened file via generic_csv.get_datum_by_header(). The driver expected a\nnumeric CTCSS tone, but no type check, allowlist, or parsing step\nconstrained the input, so any Python expression placed in either field was\nevaluated at file-load time. The commit message for the fix records the\nassumption plainly: the squelch fields \"were assumed to only be a float\".\n\nITMRadio is decorated with @directory.register and declares VENDOR =\n\"Kenwood\", MODEL = \"ITM\" and FILE_EXTENSION = \"itm\". The driver ships in the\nstock distribution; no non-standard setting, plugin, or developer mode is\nrequired.\n\nThe .itm extension is not offered by the Open dialog\u0027s default filter, so\nthat variant requires the victim to switch the filter to \"All Files\". The\nresearcher\u0027s second proof of concept carries the same CSV payload in a .img\nfile with a trailing CHIRP metadata blob naming vendor \"Kenwood\" and model\n\"ITM\"; directory.get_radio_by_image() selects a driver by comparing that\nembedded metadata against registered classes, which is consistent with a\n.img file routing to this driver under the default filter.\n\nThe code runs in the CHIRP process with the victim user\u0027s privileges, before\nany channel data is displayed. No elevation is involved; the impact is\nbounded by what that user can reach.\n\nThe fix removes both eval() calls and replaces them with\nkenwood_tone.parse_qtdqt() feeding chirp_common.split_tone_decode().\n\nWeaknesses:\nCWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code\n        (\u0027Eval Injection\u0027)\nCAPEC-35: Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files\nCAPEC-242: Code Injection\n\nProof-of-concept files for both delivery variants are published in the\nresearcher\u0027s repository (see References).\n\n[-] Timeline:\n[17/08/2026] - Reported to the CHIRP maintainer; fixed the same day\n               (39178db).\n[21/08/2026] - Build chirp-next-20260821 reported to ship the fix.\n[21/08/2026] - No CVE assigned; NotCVE ID reserved instead.\n[22/08/2026] - Published as NotCVE-2026-0013.\n\n[-] Credit:\nDiscovered by Christopher Duram\n(https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopherduram/).\n\n[-] Full Details and Updates:\nhttps://notcve.org/notcve/NotCVE-2026-0013\n\n[-] References:\nhttps://github.com/cduram/CHIRP-CodeExecution_via_Malicious_ImageFile\nhttps://github.com/kk7ds/chirp/commit/39178dbfc4fece083ab9ed20286d6ae3a91a718e\nhttps://github.com/kk7ds/chirp/blob/39178dbfc4fece083ab9ed20286d6ae3a91a718e~1/chirp/drivers/kenwood_itm.py\nhttps://github.com/kk7ds/chirp/blob/master/chirp/drivers/kenwood_itm.py\nhttps://github.com/kk7ds/chirp/blob/master/chirp/directory.py\n\n[-] About NotCVE:\nNotCVE (https://notcve.org) assigns public, timestamped NotCVE IDs to\nvulnerabilities not acknowledged by vendors. Vendor will not assign a CVE?\nRequest a NotCVE: https://notcve.org/form/ \u00b7 Contributors:\nhttps://notcve.org/hall/\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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          "product": "Escargot",
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          "value": "An unauthenticated remote debugger vulnerability exists in Escargot\nv4.3.0-214-gfaee4437 when the application is compiled with ESCARGOT_DEBUGGER\nsupport and the debug server is enabled using --start-debug-server. The\ndebugger accepts client connections without authentication or authorization\nand provides access to privileged debugger functionality.\n\nAn attacker capable of reaching the debugger interface can establish a\ndebugger session and evaluate JavaScript expressions within the target\nruntime. Testing confirmed the vulnerability by executing\nread(\"/etc/passwd\") through the debugger and retrieving the contents of the\nlocal file.\n\nTechnical Details\n\nThe vulnerability occurs because Escargot exposes remote debugger\nHTTP/WebSocket endpoints without requiring authentication before\nestablishing a debugger session.\n\nThe exposed debugger routes include:\n\n/escargot-debugger\n/devtools/page/1\n/json\n/json/list\n/json/version\n\nRequests to the debugger WebSocket endpoints are routed to the WebSocket\nhandshake implementation. The handshake performs WebSocket protocol\nnegotiation but does not authenticate or authorize the connecting client\nbefore providing access to debugger functionality.\n\nOnce connected, the debugger accepts evaluation commands that execute\nJavaScript expressions within the target Escargot runtime.\n\nThe affected functionality is conditionally compiled with:\n\n#ifdef ESCARGOT_DEBUGGER\n\nand enabled at runtime using:\n\n--start-debug-server\n\nRoot CauseNo authentication protecting the remote debugger No authorization\ncheck before debugger access Network connectivity treated as sufficient\ntrust Privileged JavaScript evaluation exposed to debugger clients Debugger\nhelper functions expose local runtime resources\n\nImpact\n\nUnauthorized Debugger Access:\nAn unauthenticated client capable of reaching the debugger can\nestablish an interactive debugging session.\n\nArbitrary JavaScript Evaluation:\nThe connected client can submit JavaScript expressions for evaluation\nwithin the target Escargot runtime.\n\nLocal File Disclosure:\nFiles accessible through exposed runtime helper functions can be\nretrieved. Testing confirmed disclosure of /etc/passwd.\n\nRuntime State Exposure:\nAn attacker may inspect interpreter state and interact with other\nfunctionality exposed through the debugger.\n\nThe PoC demonstrates JavaScript evaluation and local file disclosure. It\ndoes not, by itself, establish arbitrary operating-system command execution\nor native code execution.\n\nProof of Concept\n\nStart a debugger-enabled Escargot build with the remote debugger enabled\nand connect using the debugger client.\n\nThe following debugger commands were used:\n\nb /tmp/rdf.js:2\nc\np read(\"/etc/passwd\")\nc\n\nOutput\n\nConnecting to: localhost:6516\nConnection created!!!\n\nStopped at /tmp/rdf.js:1\n\n(escargot-debugger) b /tmp/rdf.js:2\nBreakpoint 1 at /tmp/rdf.js:2\n\n(escargot-debugger) c\nStopped at breakpoint:1 /tmp/rdf.js:2\n\n(escargot-debugger) p read(\"/etc/passwd\")\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nbin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin\nsys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin\n...\nnobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin\nubuntu:x:1000:1000:Ubuntu:/home/ubuntu:/bin/bash\n\n(escargot-debugger) c\nPrint: debugger file read probe complete\nConnection closed.\n\nServer-side output confirmed that the debugger was listening and accepted\nthe connection:\n\nWaiting for client connection 0.0.0.0:6516\nConnected from: 127.0.0.1\n\ndebugger file read probe complete\n\nThe returned data matched the contents of /etc/passwd, confirming that the\ndebugger accepted an unauthenticated session, evaluated the supplied\nJavaScript expression, and returned local file contents to the debugger\nclient.\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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          "value": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the Escargot\nv4.3.0-214-gfaee4437 crash handler due to an executable/module path being\nincorporated into an addr2line shell command without quoting or escaping.\nThe resulting command is executed using system(), causing shell\nmetacharacters contained within the path to be interpreted as command\nsyntax.\n\nBy launching Escargot using a crafted executable path containing shell\nmetacharacters and subsequently triggering the crash handler, arbitrary\nshell commands can be executed with the privileges of the Escargot process.\n\nDynamic testing confirmed command execution by injecting a benign printf\ncommand into the executable filename. 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It does not independently\nestablish that a remote attacker can control the executable/module path in\na standard Escargot deployment.\n\nPoC Results\n======================================================================\n PoC: Shell Crash Handler Command Injection\n======================================================================\n\n[+] RESULT: VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED\n\n[+] Command injection successfully triggered through the crash-handler\n    executable path.\n\n[+] Injection Payload\n\nprintf${IFS}ESCARGOT_CMD_INJECTION_CONFIRMED\u003eescargot_cmd_injection_proof\n\n[+] Crafted Executable Path\n\n/tmp/escargot-poc-bin/escargot;printf${IFS}ESCARGOT_CMD_INJECTION_CONFIRMED\u003eescargot_cmd_injection_proof;#\n\n[+] Crash Trigger\n    Signal:      SIGABRT (6)\n    Return Code: -6\n    PID:         3988\n\n[+] Arbitrary Command Execution Evidence\n    Proof File:\n\n/work/escargot/security-poc/build-debugger-test/escargot_cmd_injection_proof\n\n    File Created: YES\n\n    File Contents:\n      ESCARGOT_CMD_INJECTION_CONFIRMED\n\n[+] Exploitation Chain\n    1. Escargot is executed from a path containing shell metacharacters.\n    2. A controlled crash triggers the crash/signal handler.\n    3. The handler incorporates the executable path into a shell command.\n    4. Shell metacharacters in the executable path are interpreted.\n    5. The injected printf command executes.\n    6. A proof file containing the expected marker is created.\n\n[+] Relevant Runtime Evidence\n\n    Waiting for client connection 0.0.0.0:6514\n    Connected from: 127.0.0.1\n\n    Assertion `false\u0027 failed.\n    Got signal 6, pid 3988\n\n    [bt] Execution path:\n    ...\n    addr2line: \u0027/tmp/escargot-poc-bin/escargot\u0027: No such file\n\n[+] Verification\n    Expected marker: ESCARGOT_CMD_INJECTION_CONFIRMED\n    Observed marker: ESCARGOT_CMD_INJECTION_CONFIRMED\n\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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          "value": "Escargot contains a remotely triggerable one-byte stack-based out-of-bounds\nwrite in the WebSocket message handling logic used by the debugger.\n\nWhen Escargot::DebuggerTcp::receive() receives a binary WebSocket payload\nthat completely fills the caller-provided stack buffer, the function\nsuccessfully copies the payload into the available buffer space but\nsubsequently appends an additional NUL byte without verifying that space\nremains for the terminator.\n\nA 125-byte binary WebSocket payload causes the debugger to write the\nterminating NUL byte to buffer[125], immediately beyond the end of the\n125-byte stack allocation.\n\nA proof-of-concept client establishes a valid WebSocket connection to the\nEscargot debugger endpoint and sends the boundary-sized binary frame.\nAddressSanitizer consistently detects the resulting stack-buffer overflow\ninside Escargot::DebuggerTcp::receive().\n\nThe vulnerability results in stack memory corruption and can remotely\nterminate an Escargot process exposing the debugger interface. The current\nproof of concept demonstrates reliable denial of service and memory\ncorruption but does not establish arbitrary code execution.\nVulnerable Code\n\nThe debugger decodes the incoming masked WebSocket payload directly into a\ncaller-provided buffer:\n\nconst uint8_t* source = mask_end;\nuint8_t* buffer_end = buffer + m_payloadLength;\n\nwhile (buffer \u003c buffer_end) {\n    *buffer++ = *source++ ^ *mask++;\n\n    if (mask \u003e= mask_end) {\n        mask -= 4;\n    }\n}\n\n*buffer_end = 0;\n\nThe payload copy itself does not exceed the destination when the payload\nlength exactly equals the destination capacity.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs immediately afterward:\n\n*buffer_end = 0;\n\nBecause buffer_end is calculated as:\n\nbuffer + m_payloadLength\n\na payload that completely fills the destination causes buffer_end to point\nexactly one byte beyond the allocated object.\n\nThe implementation does not receive or validate the destination buffer\ncapacity before performing this additional write.\nRoot Cause\n\nThe vulnerability is an off-by-one error caused by treating a fixed-size\nbinary buffer as though it always contains sufficient additional capacity\nfor a NUL terminator.\n\nThe affected caller uses a 125-byte stack buffer. With a 125-byte payload,\nthe copy operation occupies the complete valid range:\n\nbuffer[0] ... buffer[124]\n\nAfter the copy completes:\n\nbuffer_end == \u0026buffer[125];\n\nThe subsequent operation:\n\n*buffer_end = 0;\n\nis therefore equivalent to:\n\nbuffer[125] = \u0027\\0\u0027;\n\nFor a 125-byte allocation, index 125 is outside the object. Valid indexes\nare only 0 through 124.\n\nThis results in a one-byte stack-based out-of-bounds write.\nProof of Concept\n\nThe PoC was executed against an AddressSanitizer-instrumented Escargot\nbuild:\n\n[*] Target binary :\n    /work/escargot/security-poc/build-debugger-asan/escargot\n[*] Debugger URL :\n    ws://127.0.0.1:6611/escargot-debugger\n[*] Payload :\n    125-byte binary frame\n[*] Bug trigger :\n    DebuggerTcp::receive() writes NUL at buffer[payloadLength]\n\nThe client first performs a legitimate WebSocket handshake.\n\nThe Escargot debugger accepts the connection:\n\n[+] WebSocket handshake accepted\n\nHTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\nUpgrade: websocket\nConnection: Upgrade\nSec-WebSocket-Accept: voBbwZEm0j70WZ2O4Hx37ERFeqA=\n\nThis confirms that the PoC reaches the debugger through the expected\nWebSocket protocol rather than invoking the vulnerable function directly.\n\nThe client then sends the boundary-sized binary frame:\n\n[*] Sending binary frame:\n    opcode=0x2\n    payload_len=125\n\nThe test reports successful reproduction:\n\n[+] Confirmed: True[*] Process return code: -6\n\nThe -6 return code corresponds to process termination through SIGABRT. In\nthis test configuration, the important evidence is not the return code\nitself but the accompanying AddressSanitizer report identifying the invalid\nstack write.\nAddressSanitizer Evidence\n\nAddressSanitizer reports a stack-buffer overflow directly within the\nvulnerable receive function:\n\n[evidence] SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow\n(/work/escargot/security-poc/build-debugger-asan/escargot+0x4fe03c)\n(BuildId: 1545896c0ed347436f48a03cdab84e73c634fadd)\nin Escargot::DebuggerTcp::receive(unsigned char*, unsigned long\u0026)\n\nThe top of the stack trace identifies DebuggerTcp::receive() as the\nlocation of the invalid memory access:\n\n[evidence] #0 0xaaaadfd0e03c\nin Escargot::DebuggerTcp::receive(unsigned char*, unsigned long\u0026)\n(/work/escargot/security-poc/build-debugger-asan/escargot+0x4fe03c)\n[evidence] #1 0xaaaadfcfeb98\nin Escargot::DebuggerEscargot::processEvents(\n    Escargot::ExecutionState*,\n    Escargot::Optional\u003cEscargot::ByteCodeBlock*\u003e,\n    bool\n)\n/work/escargot/src/debugger/DebuggerEscargot.cpp:767\n\nMost importantly, AddressSanitizer identifies the precise stack object that\nis exceeded:\n\n[evidence] [800, 925) \u0027buffer\u0027 (line 762)\n           \u003c== Memory access at offset 925 overflows this variable\n\nThe buffer object occupies stack offsets:\n\n[800, 925)\n\nThis represents exactly:\n\n925 - 800 = 125 bytes\n\nThe first byte outside the allocation is offset 925.\n\nAddressSanitizer reports the invalid access at exactly that offset:\n\nMemory access at offset 925 overflows this variable\n\nThe runtime evidence therefore precisely matches the source-level defect.\n\nFor a 125-byte buffer:\n\nStack object:       [800, 925)\nBuffer size:        125 bytes\nValid offsets:      800 through 924\nInvalid write:      925\nOverflow distance:  1 byte\n\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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          "value": "Chronicle Wire permits YAML type tags supplied within serialized input to\ninfluence Java class selection and object instantiation during untyped\ndeserialization.\n\nWhen applications deserialize attacker-controlled or otherwise untrusted\nYAML through APIs such as readObject() or object(Object.class), an\nexternally controlled YAML type tag can identify a Java class that\nChronicle Wire resolves through its configured ClassLookup.\n\nWhen the default permissive class lookup is used and the supplied class can\nbe resolved, the resulting class can propagate through Chronicle Wire\u0027s\ngeneric object deserialization path and ultimately reach\nObjectUtils.newInstance(clazz). Chronicle Wire can then invoke the selected\nclass\u0027s deserialization lifecycle, including readMarshallable() where\napplicable.\n\nThe security-sensitive behavior is therefore not limited to ordinary data\nbinding. Externally supplied serialized data can influence *which Java\nclass is instantiated during deserialization*.\n\nThe accompanying proof of concept confirms that:\n\n   - An externally controlled YAML type tag selects the Java class\n   instantiated by readObject().\n   - The selected class\u0027s constructor is executed.\n   - A selected class\u0027s readMarshallable() implementation is automatically\n   invoked during deserialization.\n   - An existing third-party class already present on the runtime classpath\n   can be instantiated using a YAML type tag.\n   - Configuring a restrictive ClassLookup prevents the demonstrated\n   arbitrary class selection.\n\nThe practical security impact depends on the classes available on the\ntarget application\u0027s classpath and whether untrusted YAML reaches an\naffected untyped deserialization API. The PoC establishes the arbitrary\nclass-selection and instantiation primitive but does not claim universal\narbitrary code execution.\nVulnerability Details\n\nChronicle Wire supports YAML type tags capable of identifying Java classes\nduring deserialization.\n\nFor example:\n\n!fully.qualified.ClassName\n\nThe parser does not treat this value solely as descriptive metadata. The\nsupplied class name is resolved using the wire\u0027s configured ClassLookup.\n\nThe default wire configuration initializes the lookup using the global\nalias pool:\n\nprotected ClassLookup classLookup =\n    ClassAliasPool.CLASS_ALIASES;\n\nWhen a YAML TAG token is encountered, the supplied type is resolved:\n\nClass\u003c?\u003e typePrefix() {\n    ...\n    return classLookup().forName(stringBuilder);\n}\n\nThe class represented by the serialized YAML can therefore influence the\nJava type selected during deserialization.\n\nIn affected object-reading paths, Chronicle Wire can subsequently\ninstantiate the resolved class:\n\nClass\u003c?\u003e clazz = typePrefix();\n\nif (clazz != object.getClass())\n    object = ObjectUtils.newInstance(clazz);\n\nThe externally selected type can also propagate into the generic object\ndeserialization path:\n\nObject o = typePrefixOrObject(clazz);\n\n...\n\nt = Wires.object2(..., (Class) o);\n\nWithin Wires.object2(), the type supplied by serialized input can replace\nthe caller\u0027s original type under several conditions:\n\nif (clazz == null\n        || clazz.isAssignableFrom(clazz2)\n        || ReadResolvable.class.isAssignableFrom(clazz2)\n        || !ObjectUtils.isConcreteClass(clazz))\n{\n    clazz = clazz2;\n}\n\nChronicle Wire can then instantiate the selected class:\n\nif (o == null)\n    o = ObjectUtils.newInstance(clazz);\n\nand continue the object\u0027s deserialization lifecycle:\n\nWires.readMarshallable(\n    clazz,\n    o,\n    in.wireIn(),\n    true);\n\nAs a result, when permissive class resolution is available, externally\ncontrolled YAML can influence both the class instantiated by Chronicle Wire\nand the class-specific deserialization logic subsequently executed.\nRoot Cause\n\nThe root cause is the use of serialized YAML type information to select\nJava classes during generic or untyped object deserialization without a\nmandatory deny-by-default class allow-list.\n\nChronicle Wire resolves externally supplied YAML type tags through its\nconfigured ClassLookup. When the default permissive lookup permits the\nrequested type, the resulting class can propagate into generic object\ndeserialization and reach ObjectUtils.newInstance().\n\nThe security boundary becomes particularly important when an application\nperforms operations such as:\n\nTextWire.from(untrustedYaml).readObject();\n\nor equivalent untyped deserialization.\n\nIn this situation, the application is not exclusively determining the Java\nclass being constructed. The serialized YAML participates in that decision.\n\nA restrictive ClassLookup can prevent arbitrary class resolution, but such\na restriction is not inherent to the demonstrated default deserialization\npath.\nProof of Concept Results\n\nThe security test suite successfully reproduced multiple independent paths\nin which serialized type information caused Chronicle Wire to instantiate\nclasses selected through the supplied Wire/YAML data.\n\nThe tests completed successfully with no failures or errors:\n\n[INFO] Running net.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest\n\n[INFO] Tests run: 13, Failures: 0, Errors: 0, Skipped: 0\n\n[INFO] BUILD SUCCESS\n\nDirect Tagged Class Instantiation\n\nThe PoC confirmed that Chronicle Wire resolves a supplied YAML type tag and\ninstantiates the corresponding Java class during deserialization.\n\nObserved result:\n\nWireObjectInput.readObject instantiated tagged class:\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$AdditionalTypedPathProbe\n\nThis confirms that the class encoded in serialized input is not merely\nparsed as metadata. The resolved type reaches object construction and\nresults in an instance of the tagged class.\nMap Value Type Instantiation\n\nThe same externally controlled type-selection behavior was reproduced while\ndeserializing a typed value contained within a map.\n\nObserved result:\n\nMap value read instantiated tagged class:\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$AdditionalTypedPathProbe\n\nThis demonstrates that the behavior is not limited to a single top-level\nreadObject() operation. Typed serialized values encountered within other\nobject-reading paths can also cause tagged classes to be instantiated.\nFile-Based Typed Deserialization\n\nThe PoC additionally confirmed arbitrary class instantiation when typed\nserialized data is loaded from a caller-controlled file.\n\nThe test file contained:\n\n!net.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$FilePathProbe {\n    marker: from-file\n}\n\nThe test output confirmed the exact payload written to the file:\n\nWireType.fromFile payload written BEGIN\n!net.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$FilePathProbe {\nmarker: from-file }\nWireType.fromFile payload written END\n\nChronicle Wire subsequently instantiated the class identified by the\nserialized type tag:\n\nWireType.fromFile instantiated tagged class:\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$FilePathProbe\n\nThis provides an additional concrete deserialization path where serialized\ntype information determines the Java class instantiated by Chronicle Wire.\nStream-Based File Deserialization\n\nThe same behavior was confirmed through the file-stream deserialization\npath.\n\nObserved result:\n\nWireType.streamFromFile instantiated tagged class:\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$AdditionalTypedPathProbe\n\nThis demonstrates that externally supplied type information can reach class\ninstantiation through more than one Chronicle Wire input API.\nConstructor and readMarshallable() Execution\n\nThe strongest lifecycle evidence was produced through a MethodReader typed\nargument.\n\nThe serialized argument selected the following class:\n\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$MethodReaderProbe\n\nThe test recorded both constructor and deserialization callback invocation:\n\nMethodReader typed argument instantiated class:\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$MethodReaderProbe\n\nMethodReader typed argument constructor calls: 1\nMethodReader typed argument readMarshallable calls: 1\n\nThis confirms that externally selected type information can result in more\nthan creation of an inert Java object.\n\nFor the selected class, Chronicle Wire caused:\n\n   -\n\n   the class to be resolved;\n   -\n\n   an instance to be constructed;\n   -\n\n   the constructor to execute; and\n   -\n\n   the class-specific readMarshallable() callback to execute.\n\nThe observed invocation counts were:\n\nConstructor calls:        1\nreadMarshallable calls:   1\n\nThis provides direct evidence that class-specific executable lifecycle\nbehavior is reached as a consequence of serialized type selection.\nConsolidated PoC Evidence\n\nThe test results demonstrate arbitrary class instantiation through several\nChronicle Wire deserialization paths:\n\n   -\n\n   WireObjectInput.readObject() instantiated an externally tagged class.\n   -\n\n   Map value deserialization instantiated an externally tagged class.\n   -\n\n   WireType.fromFile() instantiated the class identified by a YAML type tag\n   contained in a caller-controlled file.\n   -\n\n   WireType.streamFromFile() instantiated an externally tagged class.\n   -\n\n   MethodReader typed argument deserialization instantiated an externally\n   selected class.\n   -\n\n   Constructor execution was directly observed.\n   -\n\n   readMarshallable() execution was directly observed.\n   -\n\n   All 13 security tests completed without failure or error.\n\nThe most significant lifecycle result was:\n\nMethodReader typed argument instantiated class:\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$MethodReaderProbe\n\nMethodReader typed argument constructor calls: 1\nMethodReader typed argument readMarshallable calls: 1\n\nCombined with the direct readObject(), map-value, fromFile(), and\nstreamFromFile() results, the PoC demonstrates that externally supplied\ntype information can influence Java class selection and cause the selected\nclass to be instantiated across multiple Chronicle Wire deserialization\nsurfaces.\n\nThe PoC does not rely solely on inspecting the source code or confirming\nthat a class name was successfully resolved. It observes actual object\nconstruction and class-specific deserialization callback execution at\nruntime.\nPoC Conclusion\n\nThe test suite confirms the core security primitive described by this\nfinding: *serialized type information can control which Java class\nChronicle Wire instantiates during affected deserialization operations*.\n\nThe runtime evidence confirms both object construction and execution of\nclass-specific deserialization lifecycle behavior:\n\n[CONFIRMED] Externally supplied type selected Java class\n[CONFIRMED] Selected class instantiated\n[CONFIRMED] Constructor executed\n[CONFIRMED] readMarshallable() executed\n[CONFIRMED] Typed class instantiated through readObject()\n[CONFIRMED] Typed class instantiated through map value deserialization\n[CONFIRMED] Typed class instantiated through WireType.fromFile()\n[CONFIRMED] Typed class instantiated through WireType.streamFromFile()\n[CONFIRMED] 13 security tests completed with 0 failures and 0 errors\n\nThese results establish the *arbitrary class selection and instantiation\nprimitive*. The ultimate security impact remains dependent on the classes\navailable on the target application\u0027s classpath and the trust boundary\nthrough which serialized input reaches Chronicle Wire.\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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      "affected": [
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          "product": "Chronicle Wire",
          "vendor": "unknown",
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              "version": "unknown"
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          "value": "Chronicle Wire\u0027s MethodReader implements message dispatch by dynamically\nmapping serialized wire events to Java handler methods. During\ninitialization, the framework discovers public methods exposed by the\nregistered handler interfaces and registers those methods as callable wire\nevents.\n\nWhen a message is processed, the event name supplied within the wire data\ndetermines which registered handler method is selected. Method arguments\nare then deserialized from the corresponding message content, and Chronicle\nWire invokes the selected method using Java Reflection.\n\nAs a result, when untrusted wire data reaches a MethodReader, externally\ncontrolled input can determine both the handler method selected for\ninvocation and the arguments supplied to that method.\n\nThe dispatch surface is derived automatically from the handler\u0027s public\ninterface rather than from an explicit list of individually registered\noperations. Public methods added to a registered handler interface can\ntherefore become dispatchable wire events without separate method-level\nregistration.\n\nThis behavior becomes security-sensitive when a handler interface contains\nprivileged or security-sensitive operations and its MethodReader processes\ndata from an untrusted source. In such deployments, methods intended for\nfile access, network operations, key management, maintenance,\nadministrative functionality, or other privileged actions may become\nreachable through externally controlled event names.\nVulnerability Details\n\nVanillaMethodReader constructs its dispatch surface from the handlers\nsupplied by the application:\n\naddParsersForComponents(handler);\n\nDuring initialization, Chronicle Wire enumerates the public methods\nassociated with the handler:\n\nfor (Method method : handlerClass.getMethods()) {\n    addParseletForMethod(method);\n}\n\nEligible methods are subsequently registered for wire-event dispatch.\n\nThe method name and parameter types are used to construct the corresponding\nwire key:\n\nMethodWireKey key =\n    new MethodWireKey(\n        method.getName(),\n        parameterTypes);\n\nThis means the set of methods callable through the wire protocol is derived\nfrom the public methods exposed by the registered handler interface.\n\nWhen incoming wire data is processed, the supplied event name is matched\nagainst the registered method dispatch table. The corresponding argument\nvalues are then deserialized according to the selected method\u0027s declared\nparameter types:\n\narguments[i] =\n    valueIn.object(parameterTypes[i]);\n\nAfter argument deserialization, the selected Java method is invoked\nreflectively:\n\nmethod.invoke(target, arguments);\n\nConsequently, externally controlled wire data participates directly in two\nsecurity-sensitive decisions: selecting which registered handler method is\nexecuted and supplying the arguments passed to that method.\n\nThe dispatch mechanism itself does not introduce a method-level\nauthorization decision between event selection and invocation. The\neffective security boundary is therefore determined by which interfaces are\nregistered with MethodReader, which public methods those interfaces expose,\nand whether the application permits untrusted data to reach the reader.\nRoot Cause\n\nThe security issue arises from automatically deriving the externally\ndispatchable method surface from public methods exposed by registered\nhandler interfaces.\n\nChronicle Wire:\n\n   -\n\n   Discovers public methods associated with registered handlers.\n   -\n\n   Registers eligible methods as wire-event handlers.\n   -\n\n   Resolves incoming event names to those methods.\n   -\n\n   Deserializes method parameters from the corresponding wire input.\n   -\n\n   Invokes the selected methods using Java Reflection.\n\nThe dispatch model does not require each callable operation to be\nindependently exported or registered at the method level. Consequently, the\nsecurity boundary of a MethodReader can expand when additional public\nmethods are introduced into an interface already used for wire dispatch.\n\nThis creates a risk in applications where the registered handler interface\ncontains operations that should not be reachable by the party controlling\nthe wire input.\n\nThe issue is particularly significant when interfaces evolve over time.\nAdding a new public operation to an existing MethodReader-facing interface\ncan simultaneously add that operation to the wire dispatch surface without\na separate dispatch registration step.\nImpact\n\nWhen untrusted input reaches a MethodReader, an attacker can select among\nthe public operations exposed through the registered handler interface and\nprovide serialized arguments for the selected operation.\n\nThe resulting security impact depends on the functionality implemented by\nthose handlers.\n\nSecurity-sensitive methods may include:\n\n   -\n\n   file access and file modification;\n   -\n\n   outbound network communication;\n   -\n\n   administrative operations;\n   -\n\n   key rotation or key-management operations;\n   -\n\n   configuration changes;\n   -\n\n   maintenance functionality;\n   -\n\n   state-changing business operations; and\n   -\n\n   other privileged application functionality.\n\nIf such operations are exposed through a registered handler interface,\nexternally controlled event names can cause those methods to be invoked\nwith externally supplied arguments.\n\nThe attack surface can also change as the application evolves. A public\nmethod added to an interface already participating in MethodReader dispatch\nmay become a new wire operation without requiring separate registration of\nthat individual method.\n\nMethods accepting broad or polymorphic argument types introduce an\nadditional concern. Arguments are processed through Chronicle Wire\u0027s object\ndeserialization mechanisms:\n\narguments[i] =\n    valueIn.object(parameterTypes[i]);\n\nWhere the declared parameter type permits serialized type information to\ninfluence runtime object selection, externally controlled input may affect\nboth the *method selected for invocation* and the *runtime object\ninstantiated as its argument*.\n\nThe resulting vulnerability therefore combines an externally controlled\nmethod-dispatch surface with attacker-controlled argument deserialization.\nThe ultimate impact depends on the operations exposed by the registered\nhandler and the trust boundary through which wire messages are received.\n\nProof of Concept\n\nThe proof of concept demonstrates that Chronicle Wire\u0027s MethodReader allows\nserialized event names to select public methods exposed by a registered\nhandler and supplies those methods with arguments deserialized from the\ncorresponding wire message.\n\nThe tests exercise several handler operations to demonstrate method\nselection, privileged-operation reachability, automatic expansion of the\ndispatch surface, and typed argument deserialization.\nAdministrative Method Invocation\n\nThe registered handler exposes an administrative demonstration method named\ndeleteAll.\n\nThe following wire event was supplied:\n\ndeleteAll: pwned-method-invocation\n\nObserved output:\n\nMethodReader invoked event-selected method:\ndeleteAll:pwned-method-invocation\n\nThis confirms that the event name supplied in the wire message selected the\ncorresponding public handler method and that the attacker-controlled\nargument was delivered to that method.\n\nThe demonstration method does not perform destructive deletion. Its purpose\nis to establish that an operation exposed by the registered handler can be\nselected directly through the incoming event name.\nFile-Reading Method Invocation\n\nThe handler additionally exposes a demonstration method that reads a\ncaller-specified system file.\n\nThe supplied event was:\n\nreadSystemFile: /etc/hosts\n\nObserved invocation:\n\nMethodReader invoked file-reading method:\nreadSystemFile:/etc/hosts\n\nThe handler successfully accessed the supplied file and recorded:\n\nMethodReader file-read evidence:\n/etc/hosts:bytes=279:first-line=##\n\nThe test therefore demonstrates more than method-name resolution. The\nexternally supplied event selected a file-access operation and the\nexternally supplied argument controlled the path processed by that\noperation.\nAutomatic Exposure of Newly Added Handler Methods\n\nA new public method was added to the registered handler interface:\n\nvoid pingLocalhost(int port);\n\nNo individual MethodReader registration was added for pingLocalhost.\n\nThe following wire event was then supplied:\n\npingLocalhost: 61866\n\nObserved output:\n\nMethodReader invoked loopback ping method:\npingLocalhost:61866\n\nThe test additionally recorded the resulting loopback interaction:\n\nMethodReader loopback ping evidence:\npingLocalhost:127.0.0.1:61866\n\nThis confirms that adding the method to the registered handler interface\nwas sufficient for the operation to become part of the MethodReader\ndispatch surface.\n\nThe test is significant because it demonstrates that the callable surface\ncan expand as the handler interface evolves. A newly introduced public\nhandler operation does not require separate method-level registration\nbefore it can be selected by a corresponding wire event.\nProcess-Execution Demonstration\n\nThe automatic dispatch behavior was further tested with a deliberately\nintroduced handler method containing a process-execution operation:\n\nvoid runtimeExecEcho(String command);\n\nThe following event was supplied:\n\nruntimeExecEcho: pwned-runtime-exec\n\nObserved invocation:\n\nMethodReader invoked Runtime.exec method:\nruntimeExecEcho:pwned-runtime-exec\n\nThe test recorded successful process execution:\n\nMethodReader Runtime.exec evidence:\ncommand=/bin/echo pwned-runtime-exec, exit=0\n\nProcess output:\n\npwned-runtime-exec\n\nThis test does not establish that Chronicle Wire itself contains a built-in\ncommand-execution method or universal RCE gadget. The runtimeExecEcho\nmethod was intentionally introduced as a controlled demonstration of the\nsecurity consequence when a privileged operation exists on a registered\nhandler interface.\n\nThe result confirms the underlying dispatch property: once the public\nmethod was present on the handler interface, the corresponding wire event\ncould select and invoke it without separate method-level registration.\nTyped Object Argument Deserialization\n\nThe PoC additionally demonstrates that MethodReader dispatch can interact\nwith Chronicle Wire\u0027s typed object deserialization when a handler accepts a\nsufficiently broad parameter type.\n\nThe supplied event contained a tagged object:\n\nacceptObject:\n  !net.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$MethodReaderProbe {\n      marker: proof\n  }\n\nObserved output:\n\nMethodReader typed argument instantiated class:\nnet.openhft.chronicle.wire.SecurityAdditionalPoCTest$MethodReaderProbe\n\nMethodReader typed argument constructor calls: 1\n\nMethodReader typed argument readMarshallable calls: 1\n\nThis confirms that MethodReader did not simply pass a textual\nrepresentation of the supplied argument to the handler.\n\nThe argument entered Chronicle Wire\u0027s object deserialization path, the\nclass identified by the serialized type information was instantiated, its\nconstructor executed, and its readMarshallable() callback was invoked.\n\nFor handler methods accepting broad or polymorphic parameter types,\nexternally controlled wire input may therefore influence both the handler\noperation selected for invocation and the runtime object created as its\nargument.\nPoC Results\n\nThe runtime evidence confirms the following MethodReader behaviors:\n\n[CONFIRMED] Wire event selected deleteAll handler method\n[CONFIRMED] Attacker-controlled argument delivered to selected method\n\n[CONFIRMED] Wire event selected readSystemFile handler method\n[CONFIRMED] Supplied /etc/hosts path processed by handler\n[CONFIRMED] File contents successfully read\n\n[CONFIRMED] Newly added pingLocalhost method became dispatchable\n[CONFIRMED] No separate method-level registration was required\n[CONFIRMED] Loopback network interaction occurred\n\n[CONFIRMED] Newly added runtimeExecEcho method became dispatchable\n[CONFIRMED] Demonstration process executed successfully\n[CONFIRMED] /bin/echo exited with status 0\n"
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          "value": "Chronicle Wire\u0027s FileMarshallableOut follows symbolic links when writing\nfiles in append mode. When ?append=true is enabled, the implementation\nopens the supplied output path directly using FileOutputStream(path, true)\nwithout preventing symbolic-link resolution.\n\nIf an attacker can create or replace the expected output file with a\nsymbolic link before the append operation occurs, the operating system\nresolves the link and Chronicle Wire writes to the link target using the\nprivileges of the application process.\n\nThis can redirect application-generated output from its intended\ndestination to another file writable by the application.\n\nThe proof of concept confirms that an append operation directed at a\nsymbolic-link path modifies the underlying target file. A separate boundary\ntest confirms that non-append overwrite mode does not exhibit the same\nbehavior: the symbolic-link path is replaced while the original target\nremains unchanged.\n\nThe vulnerability is therefore specifically limited to the append-mode\nfile-opening path.\nVulnerability Details\n\nFileMarshallableOut determines the destination used for file output based\non whether append mode is enabled:\n\nfinal String path = url.getPath();\nfinal String path0 = options.append ? path : (path + \".tmp\");\n\nWhen append mode is disabled, Chronicle Wire writes through a temporary\npath.\n\nWhen append mode is enabled, however, path0 directly references the\nsupplied destination:\n\npath0 = path;\n\nThe resulting file is opened using:\n\ntry (FileOutputStream out =\n         new FileOutputStream(path0, options.append)) {\n\n    final Bytes\u003cbyte[]\u003e bytes =\n        Jvm.uncheckedCast(wire.bytes());\n\n    out.write(\n        bytes.underlyingObject(),\n        0,\n        (int) bytes.readLimit());\n}\n\nIn append mode, the effective operation is therefore:\n\nnew FileOutputStream(path, true);\n\nNo protection against symbolic-link resolution is applied when this file is\nopened.\n\nIf path identifies a symbolic link, normal filesystem resolution causes the\nunderlying target to be opened and modified.\n\nThe existing path validation does not prevent this condition:\n\nString path = url.getPath();\n\nif (path == null ||\n    path.isEmpty() ||\n    path.contains(\"..\"))\n    throw new IllegalArgumentException(\n        \"Invalid file path: \" + path);\n\nThis prevents certain malformed or traversal-style paths but does not\nprotect the final destination from symbolic-link substitution.\nRoot Cause\n\nThe append implementation opens the destination using a filesystem\noperation that follows symbolic links without enforcing a no-follow policy.\n\nThe vulnerability does not require .. traversal or an unusual path syntax.\nThe apparent destination itself can be a valid filesystem path while\nreferencing a symbolic link created or substituted by another user or\nprocess.\n\nThis creates a security issue when there is a privilege or trust-boundary\ndifference between the process performing the append operation and the\nparty capable of manipulating the destination filesystem entry.\n\nFor example, a less-privileged attacker may be able to create or replace a\npredictable output file within a shared or attacker-writable directory. If\na more privileged application subsequently performs a FileMarshallableOut\nappend against that path, the resulting write can be redirected to a\ndifferent file accessible to the application.\nSecurity Impact\n\nAn attacker capable of manipulating the filesystem entry used as an append\ndestination may redirect Chronicle Wire output to another file writable by\nthe application\u0027s privileges.\n\nPotential consequences depend on the target application\u0027s filesystem\npermissions and the contents being written.\n\nAffected deployment patterns may include applications writing to:\n\n   - shared writable directories;\n   - predictable temporary locations;\n   - application export directories;\n   - CI/CD workspaces;\n   - shared container volumes;\n   - cache or working directories;\n   - plugin-controlled filesystem locations; or\n   - other locations where a less-privileged party can manipulate\n   destination entries.\n\nThe confirmed security primitive is *file write redirection through\nsymbolic-link following*.\n\nThe proof of concept does not establish arbitrary file overwrite because\nthe affected operation uses append semantics. The attacker-selected target\nmust also be writable by the application process.\nProof of Concept\n\nThe proof of concept creates an ordinary target file containing:\n\nbefore\n\nA symbolic link named:\n\nsafe-looking-output.yaml\n\nis then created pointing to:\n\ntarget.txt\n\nChronicle Wire is instructed to write to safe-looking-output.yaml with\nappend mode enabled.\n\nThe apparent destination is therefore the symbolic-link path, while the\nactual filesystem object modified by the operation is target.txt.\nObserved Results\n\nThe test confirmed the symbolic-link destination and target:\n\nFileMarshallableOut append followed symlink:\n/.../safe-looking-output.yaml\n\nFileMarshallableOut symlink target:\n/.../target.txt\n\nBefore the Chronicle Wire operation, the target contained:\n\nFileMarshallableOut symlink content before BEGIN\nbefore\nFileMarshallableOut symlink content before END\n\nThe value supplied to FileMarshallableOut was:\n\nFileMarshallableOut symlink value written:\nmessage=symlink-append-proof\n\nAfter the append operation, the target contained:\n\nFileMarshallableOut symlink content after BEGIN\nbefore\nmessage: symlink-append-proof\n...\nFileMarshallableOut symlink content after END\n\nThe original contents remained and the Chronicle Wire output was appended\ndirectly to the symbolic-link target.\n\nThis confirms that FileMarshallableOut followed the symbolic link during\nthe append operation.\nBoundary Validation\n\nNon-append mode was tested separately to determine whether the behavior\naffected all FileMarshallableOut file writes.\n\nThe original target contained:\n\nbefore\n\nAfter performing the non-append operation through the symbolic-link path,\nthe original target still contained:\n\nbefore\n\nThe test confirmed that non-append processing replaced the symbolic-link\npath rather than following the link and modifying its original target.\n\nThe demonstrated vulnerability is therefore specifically associated with:\n\n?append=true\n\nand the corresponding:\n\nnew FileOutputStream(path, true);\n\nfile-opening path.\nPoC Results\n\nThe security test confirmed the following behavior:\n\n[CONFIRMED] Append destination was a symbolic link[CONFIRMED] Symbolic\nlink referenced a separate target file[CONFIRMED] Chronicle Wire\nopened the apparent destination in append mode[CONFIRMED] Output was\nwritten to the symbolic-link target[CONFIRMED] Original target\ncontents remained intact[CONFIRMED] Chronicle Wire data was appended\nto the target[CONFIRMED] Non-append mode did not modify the original\nsymlink target\n\nThe runtime evidence demonstrates that append-mode output can cross the\napparent filesystem boundary established by the supplied destination path.\n\nRon Edgerson\nVulnerability Researcher \u0026 Exploit Developer\n\nCVE Research | Binary Exploitation | Application \u0026 Systems Security\nResponsible Disclosure \u2022 Proof-of-Concept Development\n\n\ud83c\udf10 https://github.com/ob1sec\n\ud83d\udd17 https://www.linkedin.com/in/ronedgerson1\n\u003chttps://linkedin.com/in/yourhandle\u003e\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "Chronicle Wire v2026.8 FileMarshallableOut Append Operations Follow Symbolic Links and Allow File Write Redirection",
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