CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
4658 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-P9FF-J98V-P435
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-20 21:31 – Updated: 2024-10-04 23:33Strapi v4.24.4 was discovered to contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the component /strapi.io/_next/image. This vulnerability allows attackers to scan for open ports or access sensitive information via a crafted GET request.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@strapi/strapi"
},
"versions": [
"4.24.4"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37818"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-04T23:33:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-20T19:15:50Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Strapi v4.24.4 was discovered to contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the component /strapi.io/_next/image. This vulnerability allows attackers to scan for open ports or access sensitive information via a crafted GET request.",
"id": "GHSA-p9ff-j98v-p435",
"modified": "2024-10-04T23:33:29Z",
"published": "2024-06-20T21:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37818"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/%40barkadevaibhav491/server-side-request-forgery-in-strapi-e02d5fe218ab"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://strapi.io"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Strapi Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)"
}
GHSA-P9QX-7MFF-GW6F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-19 06:30 – Updated: 2024-06-19 06:30The WordPress Picture / Portfolio / Media Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.1 via the 'file_get_contents' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5021"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-19T04:15:13Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The WordPress Picture / Portfolio / Media Gallery plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.1 via the \u0027file_get_contents\u0027 function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
"id": "GHSA-p9qx-7mff-gw6f",
"modified": "2024-06-19T06:30:35Z",
"published": "2024-06-19T06:30:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/nimble-portfolio/trunk/includes/prettyphoto/download-image.php#L17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/224a2d6d-7fdc-43a8-a8c9-26213b604433?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PC6F-259W-W3J6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-04 00:00 – Updated: 2024-09-27 21:17A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the Data Import module in Heartex - Label Studio Community Edition versions 1.5.0 and earlier allows an authenticated user to access arbitrary files on the system. Furthermore, self-registration is enabled by default in these versions of Label Studio enabling a remote attacker to create a new account and then exploit the SSRF. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "label-studio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-10-04T21:57:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-10-03T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the Data Import module in Heartex - Label Studio Community Edition versions 1.5.0 and earlier allows an authenticated user to access arbitrary files on the system. Furthermore, self-registration is enabled by default in these versions of Label Studio enabling a remote attacker to create a new account and then exploit the SSRF. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.",
"id": "GHSA-pc6f-259w-w3j6",
"modified": "2024-09-27T21:17:52Z",
"published": "2022-10-04T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio/pull/2840"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio/commit/501142cb815ac964b0c600c491885b67386870c2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio/releases/tag/1.6.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/label-studio/PYSEC-2022-300.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://heartex.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://labelstud.io"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/171548/Label-Studio-1.5.0-Server-Side-Request-Forgery.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Heartex - Label Studio Community Edition vulnerable to SSRF in the Data Import module"
}
GHSA-PC74-V89M-R259
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-05 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:36Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in aitool Ai Auto Tool Content Writing Assistant (Gemini Writer, ChatGPT ) All in One allows Server Side Request Forgery. This issue affects Ai Auto Tool Content Writing Assistant (Gemini Writer, ChatGPT ) All in One: from n/a through 2.2.6.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-58829"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-05T14:15:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in aitool Ai Auto Tool Content Writing Assistant (Gemini Writer, ChatGPT ) All in One allows Server Side Request Forgery. This issue affects Ai Auto Tool Content Writing Assistant (Gemini Writer, ChatGPT ) All in One: from n/a through 2.2.6.",
"id": "GHSA-pc74-v89m-r259",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:36:05Z",
"published": "2025-09-05T15:31:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58829"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/ai-auto-tool/vulnerability/wordpress-ai-auto-tool-content-writing-assistant-gemini-writer-chatgpt-all-in-one-plugin-2-2-6-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PC7X-R4C4-7QQW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-20 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-29 00:00In Recipes, versions 0.9.1 through 1.2.5 are vulnerable to Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), in the “Import Recipe” functionality. When an attacker enters the localhost URL, a low privileged attacker can access/read the internal file system to access sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-23071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-19T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Recipes, versions 0.9.1 through 1.2.5 are vulnerable to Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), in the \u201cImport Recipe\u201d functionality. When an attacker enters the localhost URL, a low privileged attacker can access/read the internal file system to access sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-pc7x-r4c4-7qqw",
"modified": "2022-06-29T00:00:28Z",
"published": "2022-06-20T00:00:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-23071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/TandoorRecipes/recipes/commit/d48fe26a3529cc1ee903ffb2758dfd8f7efaba8c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mend.io/vulnerability-database/CVE-2022-23071"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PCRP-7G2P-Q7PJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-07 18:31 – Updated: 2024-11-07 21:31An issue was discovered in Logpoint before 7.5.0. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) on SOAR can be used to leak Logpoint's API Token leading to authentication bypass.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-48951"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-07T17:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Logpoint before 7.5.0. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) on SOAR can be used to leak Logpoint\u0027s API Token leading to authentication bypass.",
"id": "GHSA-pcrp-7g2p-q7pj",
"modified": "2024-11-07T21:31:43Z",
"published": "2024-11-07T18:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48951"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.logpoint.com/docs/whats-new-in-logpoint/en/latest"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://servicedesk.logpoint.com/hc/en-us/articles/21968916591261-Server-Side-Request-Forgery-SSRF-on-SOAR-results-in-authentication-bypass"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://servicedesk.logpoint.com/hc/en-us/sections/7201103730845-Product-Security"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PCX4-V3RH-GQ5X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 09:30 – Updated: 2026-06-24 09:30The WP Meta SEO plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.18 via the 'new_link' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services. The HTTP response status from outbound requests is reflected back in the AJAX JSON response as status_code, providing an enumeration oracle usable for probing internal hosts and cloud metadata services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-11370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T07:16:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The WP Meta SEO plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 4.5.18 via the \u0027new_link\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services. The HTTP response status from outbound requests is reflected back in the AJAX JSON response as status_code, providing an enumeration oracle usable for probing internal hosts and cloud metadata services.",
"id": "GHSA-pcx4-v3rh-gq5x",
"modified": "2026-06-24T09:30:45Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T09:30:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-meta-seo/tags/4.5.18/inc/class.metaseo-admin.php#L4783"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-meta-seo/tags/4.5.18/inc/class.metaseo-broken-link-table.php#L1138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-meta-seo/tags/4.5.18/inc/class.metaseo-broken-link-table.php#L2013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2a6e37c1-aaac-4642-bace-234bbc4f6c38?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PF3H-QJGV-VCPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 21:51 – Updated: 2026-07-17 16:18Summary
A Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in download_bytes_from_url allows any actor who can control batch input JSON to make the vLLM batch runner issue arbitrary HTTP/HTTPS requests from the server, without any URL validation or domain restrictions.
This can be used to target internal services (e.g. cloud metadata endpoints or internal HTTP APIs) reachable from the vLLM host.
Details
Vulnerable component
The vulnerable logic is in the batch runner entrypoint vllm/entrypoints/openai/run_batch.py, function download_bytes_from_url:
# run_batch.py Lines 442-482
async def download_bytes_from_url(url: str) -> bytes:
"""
Download data from a URL or decode from a data URL.
Args:
url: Either an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a data URL (data:...;base64,...)
Returns:
Data as bytes
"""
parsed = urlparse(url)
# Handle data URLs (base64 encoded)
if parsed.scheme == "data":
# Format: data:...;base64,<base64_data>
if "," in url:
header, data = url.split(",", 1)
if "base64" in header:
return base64.b64decode(data)
else:
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported data URL encoding: {header}")
else:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid data URL format: {url}")
# Handle HTTP/HTTPS URLs
elif parsed.scheme in ("http", "https"):
async with (
aiohttp.ClientSession() as session,
session.get(url) as resp,
):
if resp.status != 200:
raise Exception(
f"Failed to download data from URL: {url}. Status: {resp.status}"
)
return await resp.read()
else:
raise ValueError(
f"Unsupported URL scheme: {parsed.scheme}. "
"Supported schemes: http, https, data"
)
Key properties:
- The function only parses the URL to dispatch on the scheme (
data,http,https). - For
http/https, it directly callssession.get(url)on the provided string. - There is no validation of:
- hostname or IP address,
- whether the target is internal or external,
- port number,
- path, query, or redirect target.
- This is in contrast to the multimodal media path (
MediaConnector), which implements an explicit domain allowlist.download_bytes_from_urldoes not reuse that protection.
URL controllability
The url argument is fully controlled by batch input JSON via the file_url field of BatchTranscriptionRequest / BatchTranslationRequest.
- Batch request body type:
# run_batch.py Line 67-80
class BatchTranscriptionRequest(TranscriptionRequest):
"""
Batch transcription request that uses file_url instead of file.
This class extends TranscriptionRequest but replaces the file field
with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.
"""
file_url: str = Field(
...,
description=(
"Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. "
),
)
# run_batch.py Line 98-111
class BatchTranslationRequest(TranslationRequest):
"""
Batch translation request that uses file_url instead of file.
This class extends TranslationRequest but replaces the file field
with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.
"""
file_url: str = Field(
...,
description=(
"Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. "
),
)
There is no restriction on the domain, IP, or port of file_url in these models.
- Batch input is parsed directly from the batch file:
# run_batch.py Line 139-179
class BatchRequestInput(OpenAIBaseModel):
...
url: str
body: BatchRequestInputBody
@field_validator("body", mode="plain")
@classmethod
def check_type_for_url(cls, value: Any, info: ValidationInfo):
url: str = info.data["url"]
...
if url == "/v1/audio/transcriptions":
return BatchTranscriptionRequest.model_validate(value)
if url == "/v1/audio/translations":
return BatchTranslationRequest.model_validate(value)
# run_batch.py Line 770-781
logger.info("Reading batch from %s...", args.input_file)
# Submit all requests in the file to the engine "concurrently".
response_futures: list[Awaitable[BatchRequestOutput]] = []
for request_json in (await read_file(args.input_file)).strip().split("\n"):
# Skip empty lines.
request_json = request_json.strip()
if not request_json:
continue
request = BatchRequestInput.model_validate_json(request_json)
The batch runner reads each line of the input file (args.input_file), parses it as JSON, and constructs a BatchTranscriptionRequest / BatchTranslationRequest. Whatever file_url appears in that JSON line becomes batch_request_body.file_url.
file_urlis passed directly intodownload_bytes_from_url:
# run_batch.py Line 610-623
def wrapper(handler_fn: Callable):
async def transcription_wrapper(
batch_request_body: (BatchTranscriptionRequest | BatchTranslationRequest),
) -> (
TranscriptionResponse
| TranscriptionResponseVerbose
| TranslationResponse
| TranslationResponseVerbose
| ErrorResponse
):
try:
# Download data from URL
audio_data = await download_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url)
So the data flow is:
- Attacker supplies JSON line in the batch input file with arbitrary
body.file_url. BatchRequestInput/BatchTranscriptionRequest/BatchTranslationRequestparse that JSON and storefile_urlverbatim.make_transcription_wrappercallsdownload_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url).download_bytes_from_url’s HTTP/HTTPS branch issuesaiohttp.ClientSession().get(url)to that attacker-controlled URL with no further validation.
This is a classic SSRF pattern: a server-side component makes arbitrary HTTP requests to a URL string taken from untrusted input.
Comparison with safer code
The project already contains a safer URL-handling path for multimodal media in vllm/multimodal/media/connector.py, which demonstrates the intent to mitigate SSRF via domain allowlists and URL normalization:
# connector.py Lines 169-189
def load_from_url(
self,
url: str,
media_io: MediaIO[_M],
*,
fetch_timeout: int | None = None,
) -> _M: # type: ignore[type-var]
url_spec = parse_url(url)
if url_spec.scheme and url_spec.scheme.startswith("http"):
self._assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(url_spec)
connection = self.connection
data = connection.get_bytes(
url_spec.url,
timeout=fetch_timeout,
allow_redirects=envs.VLLM_MEDIA_URL_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,
)
return media_io.load_bytes(data)
and:
# connector.py Lines 158-167
def _assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(self, url_spec: Url) -> None:
if (
self.allowed_media_domains
and url_spec.hostname not in self.allowed_media_domains
):
raise ValueError(
f"The URL must be from one of the allowed domains: "
f"{self.allowed_media_domains}. Input URL domain: "
f"{url_spec.hostname}"
)
download_bytes_from_url does not reuse this allowlist or any equivalent validation, even though it also fetches user-provided URLs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vllm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34753"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:51:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T16:16:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in `download_bytes_from_url` allows any actor who can control batch input JSON to make the vLLM batch runner issue arbitrary HTTP/HTTPS requests from the server, without any URL validation or domain restrictions.\n\nThis can be used to target internal services (e.g. cloud metadata endpoints or internal HTTP APIs) reachable from the vLLM host.\n\n------\n\n### Details\n\n#### Vulnerable component\n\nThe vulnerable logic is in the batch runner entrypoint `vllm/entrypoints/openai/run_batch.py`, function `download_bytes_from_url`:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Lines 442-482\nasync def download_bytes_from_url(url: str) -\u003e bytes:\n \"\"\"\n Download data from a URL or decode from a data URL.\n\n Args:\n url: Either an HTTP/HTTPS URL or a data URL (data:...;base64,...)\n\n Returns:\n Data as bytes\n \"\"\"\n parsed = urlparse(url)\n\n # Handle data URLs (base64 encoded)\n if parsed.scheme == \"data\":\n # Format: data:...;base64,\u003cbase64_data\u003e\n if \",\" in url:\n header, data = url.split(\",\", 1)\n if \"base64\" in header:\n return base64.b64decode(data)\n else:\n raise ValueError(f\"Unsupported data URL encoding: {header}\")\n else:\n raise ValueError(f\"Invalid data URL format: {url}\")\n\n # Handle HTTP/HTTPS URLs\n elif parsed.scheme in (\"http\", \"https\"):\n async with (\n aiohttp.ClientSession() as session,\n session.get(url) as resp,\n ):\n if resp.status != 200:\n raise Exception(\n f\"Failed to download data from URL: {url}. Status: {resp.status}\"\n )\n return await resp.read()\n\n else:\n raise ValueError(\n f\"Unsupported URL scheme: {parsed.scheme}. \"\n \"Supported schemes: http, https, data\"\n )\n```\n\nKey properties:\n\n- The function only parses the URL to dispatch on the scheme (`data`, `http`, `https`).\n- For `http` / `https`, it directly calls `session.get(url)` on the provided string.\n- There is no validation of:\n - hostname or IP address,\n - whether the target is internal or external,\n - port number,\n - path, query, or redirect target.\n- This is in contrast to the multimodal media path (`MediaConnector`), which implements an explicit domain allowlist. `download_bytes_from_url` does not reuse that protection.\n\n#### URL controllability\n\nThe `url` argument is fully controlled by batch input JSON via the `file_url` field of `BatchTranscriptionRequest` / `BatchTranslationRequest`.\n\n1. Batch request body type:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 67-80\nclass BatchTranscriptionRequest(TranscriptionRequest):\n \"\"\"\n Batch transcription request that uses file_url instead of file.\n\n This class extends TranscriptionRequest but replaces the file field\n with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.\n \"\"\"\n\n file_url: str = Field(\n ...,\n description=(\n \"Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. \"\n ),\n )\n```\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 98-111\nclass BatchTranslationRequest(TranslationRequest):\n \"\"\"\n Batch translation request that uses file_url instead of file.\n\n This class extends TranslationRequest but replaces the file field\n with file_url to support batch processing from audio files written in JSON format.\n \"\"\"\n\n file_url: str = Field(\n ...,\n description=(\n \"Either a URL of the audio or a data URL with base64 encoded audio data. \"\n ),\n )\n```\n\nThere is no restriction on the domain, IP, or port of `file_url` in these models.\n\n1. Batch input is parsed directly from the batch file:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 139-179\nclass BatchRequestInput(OpenAIBaseModel):\n ...\n url: str\n body: BatchRequestInputBody\n @field_validator(\"body\", mode=\"plain\")\n @classmethod\n def check_type_for_url(cls, value: Any, info: ValidationInfo):\n url: str = info.data[\"url\"]\n ...\n if url == \"/v1/audio/transcriptions\":\n return BatchTranscriptionRequest.model_validate(value)\n if url == \"/v1/audio/translations\":\n return BatchTranslationRequest.model_validate(value)\n```\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 770-781\n logger.info(\"Reading batch from %s...\", args.input_file)\n\n # Submit all requests in the file to the engine \"concurrently\".\n response_futures: list[Awaitable[BatchRequestOutput]] = []\n for request_json in (await read_file(args.input_file)).strip().split(\"\\n\"):\n # Skip empty lines.\n request_json = request_json.strip()\n if not request_json:\n continue\n\n request = BatchRequestInput.model_validate_json(request_json)\n```\n\nThe batch runner reads each line of the input file (`args.input_file`), parses it as JSON, and constructs a `BatchTranscriptionRequest` / `BatchTranslationRequest`. Whatever `file_url` appears in that JSON line becomes `batch_request_body.file_url`.\n\n1. `file_url` is passed directly into `download_bytes_from_url`:\n\n```\n# run_batch.py Line 610-623\ndef wrapper(handler_fn: Callable):\n async def transcription_wrapper(\n batch_request_body: (BatchTranscriptionRequest | BatchTranslationRequest),\n ) -\u003e (\n TranscriptionResponse\n | TranscriptionResponseVerbose\n | TranslationResponse\n | TranslationResponseVerbose\n | ErrorResponse\n ):\n try:\n # Download data from URL\n audio_data = await download_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url)\n```\n\nSo the data flow is:\n\n1. Attacker supplies JSON line in the batch input file with arbitrary `body.file_url`.\n2. `BatchRequestInput` / `BatchTranscriptionRequest` / `BatchTranslationRequest` parse that JSON and store `file_url` verbatim.\n3. `make_transcription_wrapper` calls `download_bytes_from_url(batch_request_body.file_url)`.\n4. `download_bytes_from_url`\u2019s HTTP/HTTPS branch issues `aiohttp.ClientSession().get(url)` to that attacker-controlled URL with no further validation.\n\nThis is a classic SSRF pattern: a server-side component makes arbitrary HTTP requests to a URL string taken from untrusted input.\n\n#### Comparison with safer code\n\nThe project already contains a safer URL-handling path for multimodal media in `vllm/multimodal/media/connector.py`, which demonstrates the intent to mitigate SSRF via domain allowlists and URL normalization:\n\n```\n# connector.py Lines 169-189\n def load_from_url(\n self,\n url: str,\n media_io: MediaIO[_M],\n *,\n fetch_timeout: int | None = None,\n ) -\u003e _M: # type: ignore[type-var]\n url_spec = parse_url(url)\n\n if url_spec.scheme and url_spec.scheme.startswith(\"http\"):\n self._assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(url_spec)\n\n connection = self.connection\n data = connection.get_bytes(\n url_spec.url,\n timeout=fetch_timeout,\n allow_redirects=envs.VLLM_MEDIA_URL_ALLOW_REDIRECTS,\n )\n\n return media_io.load_bytes(data)\n```\n\nand:\n\n```\n# connector.py Lines 158-167\n def _assert_url_in_allowed_media_domains(self, url_spec: Url) -\u003e None:\n if (\n self.allowed_media_domains\n and url_spec.hostname not in self.allowed_media_domains\n ):\n raise ValueError(\n f\"The URL must be from one of the allowed domains: \"\n f\"{self.allowed_media_domains}. Input URL domain: \"\n f\"{url_spec.hostname}\"\n )\n```\n\n`download_bytes_from_url` does not reuse this allowlist or any equivalent validation, even though it also fetches user-provided URLs.",
"id": "GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr",
"modified": "2026-07-17T16:18:19Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T21:51:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34753"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/38482"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/57861ae48d3493fa48b4d7d830b7ec9f995783e7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pf3h-qjgv-vcpr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vllm/PYSEC-2026-3410.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/vllm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "vLLM: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in `download_bytes_from_url `"
}
GHSA-PF5R-4CPX-XCXM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03IBM Jazz Foundation and IBM Engineering products are vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 194596.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-02T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "IBM Jazz Foundation and IBM Engineering products are vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 194596.",
"id": "GHSA-pf5r-4cpx-xcxm",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/194596"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6457739"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-PF6P-25R2-FX45
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-12 21:03Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository dompdf/dompdf prior to 2.0.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dompdf/dompdf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0085"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-05T22:12:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-28T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in GitHub repository dompdf/dompdf prior to 2.0.0.",
"id": "GHSA-pf6p-25r2-fx45",
"modified": "2022-08-12T21:03:44Z",
"published": "2022-06-29T00:00:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0085"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf/commit/bb1ef65011a14730b7cfbe73506b4bb8a03704bd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/dompdf/dompdf/CVE-2022-0085.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dompdf/dompdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/73dbcc78-5ba9-492f-9133-13bbc9f31236"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in dompdf/dompdf"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.