Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

4759 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-8W7Q-Q5JP-JVGX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:27 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:55
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass in `validate_url`
Details

Summary

In the open-webui project, a parsing difference between the urlparse and requests libraries led to an SSRF bypass vulnerability.

Details

In the current project, URL validation is performed using the function validate_url.

QQ20260322-202854-22-1

The current checking logic uses urlparse to parse the hostname part of the URL for verification.

QQ20260322-203014-22-2

However, there are actually differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in files.py, validate_url is used first for URL validation, and then requests.get is used to send the request.

QQ20260322-203122-22-3

The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:

  • urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as 1.1.1.1 (public)
  • requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to 127.0.0.1 (internal)

Below is a test code I wrote following the open-webui code.

from __future__ import annotations

import ipaddress
import logging
import os
import socket
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
from typing import Optional, Sequence, Union
import requests

log = logging.getLogger(__name__)

# Same text as open_webui.constants.ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL
INVALID_URL = (
    "Oops! The URL you provided is invalid. Please double-check and try again."
)

# Same semantics as open_webui.config (ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST)
ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH = (
    os.getenv("ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH", "False").lower() == "true"
)

_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = [
    "!169.254.169.254",
    "!fd00:ec2::254",
    "!metadata.google.internal",
    "!metadata.azure.com",
    "!100.100.100.200",
]
_web_fetch_filter_env = os.getenv("WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST", "")
if _web_fetch_filter_env == "":
    _web_fetch_filter_env_list: list[str] = []
else:
    _web_fetch_filter_env_list = [
        item.strip()
        for item in _web_fetch_filter_env.split(",")
        if item.strip()
    ]
WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = list(
    set(_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST + _web_fetch_filter_env_list)
)


def get_allow_block_lists(filter_list):
    allow_list = []
    block_list = []

    if filter_list:
        for d in filter_list:
            if d.startswith("!"):
                block_list.append(d[1:].strip())
            else:
                allow_list.append(d.strip())

    return allow_list, block_list


def is_string_allowed(
    string: Union[str, Sequence[str]], filter_list: Optional[list[str]] = None
) -> bool:
    if not filter_list:
        return True

    allow_list, block_list = get_allow_block_lists(filter_list)
    strings = [string] if isinstance(string, str) else list(string)

    if allow_list:
        if not any(s.endswith(allowed) for s in strings for allowed in allow_list):
            return False

    if any(s.endswith(blocked) for s in strings for blocked in block_list):
        return False

    return True


def resolve_hostname(hostname):
    # Get address information
    addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)

    # Extract IP addresses from address information
    ipv4_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET]
    ipv6_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET6]

    return ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses


def _validators_url_accept(url: str) -> bool:
    """
    Stand-in for python-validators url(): True if string looks like http(s) URL with host.
    """
    try:
        u = url.strip()
        if not u:
            return False
        p = urllib.parse.urlparse(u)
        if p.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
            return False
        if not p.netloc:
            return False
        return True
    except Exception:
        return False


def _ipv4_private(ip: str) -> bool:
    try:
        a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
        return a.version == 4 and a.is_private
    except ValueError:
        return False


def _ipv6_private(ip: str) -> bool:
    try:
        a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
        return a.version == 6 and a.is_private
    except ValueError:
        return False


def validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]):
    if isinstance(url, str):
        if not _validators_url_accept(url):
            raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)

        parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)

        # Protocol validation - only allow http/https
        if parsed_url.scheme not in ["http", "https"]:
            log.warning(
                f"Blocked non-HTTP(S) protocol: {parsed_url.scheme} in URL: {url}"
            )
            raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)

        # Blocklist check using unified filtering logic
        if WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST:
            if not is_string_allowed(url, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST):
                log.warning(f"URL blocked by filter list: {url}")
                raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)

        if not ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH:
            # Local web fetch is disabled, filter out any URLs that resolve to private IP addresses
            parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
            # Get IPv4 and IPv6 addresses
            ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses = resolve_hostname(parsed_url.hostname)
            # Check if any of the resolved addresses are private
            # This is technically still vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks, as we don't control WebBaseLoader
            for ip in ipv4_addresses:
                if _ipv4_private(ip):
                    raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)
            for ip in ipv6_addresses:
                if _ipv6_private(ip):
                    raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)
        return True
    elif isinstance(url, Sequence):
        return all(validate_url(u) for u in url)
    else:
        return False

if __name__ == "__main__":
    logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
    # url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
    url = "https://127.0.0.1:6666"
    validate_url(url)
    response = requests.get(url)
    print(response.text)

As you can see, the current check on 127.0.0.1:6666 successfully identified it as an internal network IP and blocked it.

QQ20260322-203503-22-4

However, for https://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1/, the hostname extracted by validate_url is 1.1.1.1, which is considered a public IP address and therefore passes validation. In reality, this URL is being used to request the internal IP address 127.0.0.1:6666, resulting in an SSRF bypass.

QQ20260322-203750-22-5

PoC

http://127.0.0.1:6666\@baidu.com

Impact

SSRF

Severity
8.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45400"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:27:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T21:16:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn the open-webui project, a parsing difference between the urlparse and requests libraries led to an SSRF bypass vulnerability.\n\n### Details\nIn the current project, URL validation is performed using the function validate_url.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1323\" height=\"1145\" alt=\"QQ20260322-202854-22-1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/896d19f2-c7c3-499a-9052-12aea756ac47\" /\u003e\n\nThe current checking logic uses urlparse to parse the hostname part of the URL for verification.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1122\" height=\"429\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203014-22-2\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/653520e9-e311-4a5e-8345-a2446e217d88\" /\u003e\n\nHowever, there are actually differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in files.py, validate_url is used first for URL validation, and then requests.get is used to send the request.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1269\" height=\"915\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203122-22-3\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f200aa06-9190-425e-9659-1ecaf95f806b\" /\u003e\n\nThe core issue: `urlparse()` and `requests` disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\\@1.1.1.1` points to:\n\n- `urlparse()` treats `\\` as a regular character and `@` as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public)\n- `requests` treats `\\` as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal)\n\nBelow is a test code I wrote following the open-webui code.\n```\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport ipaddress\nimport logging\nimport os\nimport socket\nimport urllib.parse\nimport urllib.request\nfrom typing import Optional, Sequence, Union\nimport requests\n\nlog = logging.getLogger(__name__)\n\n# Same text as open_webui.constants.ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_URL\nINVALID_URL = (\n    \"Oops! The URL you provided is invalid. Please double-check and try again.\"\n)\n\n# Same semantics as open_webui.config (ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH / WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST)\nENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH = (\n    os.getenv(\"ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH\", \"False\").lower() == \"true\"\n)\n\n_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = [\n    \"!169.254.169.254\",\n    \"!fd00:ec2::254\",\n    \"!metadata.google.internal\",\n    \"!metadata.azure.com\",\n    \"!100.100.100.200\",\n]\n_web_fetch_filter_env = os.getenv(\"WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST\", \"\")\nif _web_fetch_filter_env == \"\":\n    _web_fetch_filter_env_list: list[str] = []\nelse:\n    _web_fetch_filter_env_list = [\n        item.strip()\n        for item in _web_fetch_filter_env.split(\",\")\n        if item.strip()\n    ]\nWEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST = list(\n    set(_DEFAULT_WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST + _web_fetch_filter_env_list)\n)\n\n\ndef get_allow_block_lists(filter_list):\n    allow_list = []\n    block_list = []\n\n    if filter_list:\n        for d in filter_list:\n            if d.startswith(\"!\"):\n                block_list.append(d[1:].strip())\n            else:\n                allow_list.append(d.strip())\n\n    return allow_list, block_list\n\n\ndef is_string_allowed(\n    string: Union[str, Sequence[str]], filter_list: Optional[list[str]] = None\n) -\u003e bool:\n    if not filter_list:\n        return True\n\n    allow_list, block_list = get_allow_block_lists(filter_list)\n    strings = [string] if isinstance(string, str) else list(string)\n\n    if allow_list:\n        if not any(s.endswith(allowed) for s in strings for allowed in allow_list):\n            return False\n\n    if any(s.endswith(blocked) for s in strings for blocked in block_list):\n        return False\n\n    return True\n\n\ndef resolve_hostname(hostname):\n    # Get address information\n    addr_info = socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None)\n\n    # Extract IP addresses from address information\n    ipv4_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET]\n    ipv6_addresses = [info[4][0] for info in addr_info if info[0] == socket.AF_INET6]\n\n    return ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses\n\n\ndef _validators_url_accept(url: str) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"\n    Stand-in for python-validators url(): True if string looks like http(s) URL with host.\n    \"\"\"\n    try:\n        u = url.strip()\n        if not u:\n            return False\n        p = urllib.parse.urlparse(u)\n        if p.scheme not in (\"http\", \"https\"):\n            return False\n        if not p.netloc:\n            return False\n        return True\n    except Exception:\n        return False\n\n\ndef _ipv4_private(ip: str) -\u003e bool:\n    try:\n        a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\n        return a.version == 4 and a.is_private\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n\n\ndef _ipv6_private(ip: str) -\u003e bool:\n    try:\n        a = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)\n        return a.version == 6 and a.is_private\n    except ValueError:\n        return False\n\n\ndef validate_url(url: Union[str, Sequence[str]]):\n    if isinstance(url, str):\n        if not _validators_url_accept(url):\n            raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n\n        parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)\n\n        # Protocol validation - only allow http/https\n        if parsed_url.scheme not in [\"http\", \"https\"]:\n            log.warning(\n                f\"Blocked non-HTTP(S) protocol: {parsed_url.scheme} in URL: {url}\"\n            )\n            raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n\n        # Blocklist check using unified filtering logic\n        if WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST:\n            if not is_string_allowed(url, WEB_FETCH_FILTER_LIST):\n                log.warning(f\"URL blocked by filter list: {url}\")\n                raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n\n        if not ENABLE_RAG_LOCAL_WEB_FETCH:\n            # Local web fetch is disabled, filter out any URLs that resolve to private IP addresses\n            parsed_url = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)\n            # Get IPv4 and IPv6 addresses\n            ipv4_addresses, ipv6_addresses = resolve_hostname(parsed_url.hostname)\n            # Check if any of the resolved addresses are private\n            # This is technically still vulnerable to DNS rebinding attacks, as we don\u0027t control WebBaseLoader\n            for ip in ipv4_addresses:\n                if _ipv4_private(ip):\n                    raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n            for ip in ipv6_addresses:\n                if _ipv6_private(ip):\n                    raise ValueError(INVALID_URL)\n        return True\n    elif isinstance(url, Sequence):\n        return all(validate_url(u) for u in url)\n    else:\n        return False\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)\n    # url = \"https://127.0.0.1:6666\\@1.1.1.1\"\n    url = \"https://127.0.0.1:6666\"\n    validate_url(url)\n    response = requests.get(url)\n    print(response.text)\n\n```\nAs you can see, the current check on 127.0.0.1:6666 successfully identified it as an internal network IP and blocked it.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1428\" height=\"273\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203503-22-4\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cf29b639-d4fe-409e-a516-2424d608739f\" /\u003e\n\nHowever, for https://127.0.0.1:6666\\@1.1.1.1/, the hostname extracted by validate_url is 1.1.1.1, which is considered a public IP address and therefore passes validation. In reality, this URL is being used to request the internal IP address 127.0.0.1:6666, resulting in an SSRF bypass.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"2255\" height=\"786\" alt=\"QQ20260322-203750-22-5\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/050bc6a4-760f-4d7a-8b52-056778097cd1\" /\u003e\n\n### PoC\n```\nhttp://127.0.0.1:6666\\@baidu.com\n```\n\n### Impact\nSSRF",
  "id": "GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:55:29Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T20:27:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45400"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass in `validate_url`"
}

GHSA-8W86-M9H8-HVQG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-16 20:05 – Updated: 2026-07-16 20:05
VLAI
Summary
ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users
Details

Impact

The SQL IMPORT DATABASE statement did not require administrative privileges and passed its source URL to the importer without validation. Any authenticated user with SQL command access (not only root/administrators) could therefore:

  • Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918): cause the server to issue HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations, including cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. 169.254.169.254) and internal-only services, and ingest the responses as queryable records.
  • Arbitrary local file read (CWE-22): read local files reachable by the server process (e.g. /etc/passwd, credential files) by importing file:// paths, exposing their contents as records.

The server administration endpoint (/api/v1/server) was already restricted to the root user and was not affected; the exposure was through the database SQL command/query endpoints (/api/v1/command, /api/v1/query).

A related lower-severity hardening gap (CWE-776): the XML importer did not disable DTD processing, leaving entity-expansion (Billion Laughs) possible.

Affected component

integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java (no host allow-list for http(s); no path validation for file://), reached from engine/.../query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java.

Patches

  • IMPORT DATABASE now requires the administrative updateSecurity permission (no-op in embedded mode).
  • Import sources are validated in SourceDiscovery: HTTP(S) hosts resolving to loopback / link-local / private (site-local) / wildcard / multicast addresses are blocked by default (arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks, default true), and an optional local-path allow-list (arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths) restricts file:// reads.
  • The XML importer now disables DTD processing and external entities.

Fixed in commit referenced by pull request #4422.

Workarounds

Restrict SQL command/query access to trusted administrative users; do not grant query access to untrusted users on servers that can reach sensitive networks or hold sensitive local files. Upgrading is strongly recommended.

Credit

Reported by Bin Luo (luob87709@gmail.com).

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "26.6.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-54077"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-776",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe SQL `IMPORT DATABASE` statement did not require administrative privileges and passed its source URL to the importer without validation. Any authenticated user with SQL command access (not only `root`/administrators) could therefore:\n\n- **Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918):** cause the server to issue HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations, including cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) and internal-only services, and ingest the responses as queryable records.\n- **Arbitrary local file read (CWE-22):** read local files reachable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, credential files) by importing `file://` paths, exposing their contents as records.\n\nThe server administration endpoint (`/api/v1/server`) was already restricted to the `root` user and was **not** affected; the exposure was through the database SQL command/query endpoints (`/api/v1/command`, `/api/v1/query`).\n\nA related lower-severity hardening gap (CWE-776): the XML importer did not disable DTD processing, leaving entity-expansion (Billion Laughs) possible.\n\n### Affected component\n\n`integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java` (no host allow-list for http(s); no path validation for `file://`), reached from `engine/.../query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java`.\n\n### Patches\n\n- `IMPORT DATABASE` now requires the administrative `updateSecurity` permission (no-op in embedded mode).\n- Import sources are validated in `SourceDiscovery`: HTTP(S) hosts resolving to loopback / link-local / private (site-local) / wildcard / multicast addresses are blocked by default (`arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks`, default `true`), and an optional local-path allow-list (`arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths`) restricts `file://` reads.\n- The XML importer now disables DTD processing and external entities.\n\nFixed in commit referenced by pull request [#4422](https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/pull/4422).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict SQL command/query access to trusted administrative users; do not grant query access to untrusted users on servers that can reach sensitive networks or hold sensitive local files. Upgrading is strongly recommended.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Bin Luo (luob87709@gmail.com).",
  "id": "GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg",
  "modified": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
  "published": "2026-07-16T20:05:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/releases/tag/26.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users"
}

GHSA-8WG4-H2WP-63R5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-04 18:31 – Updated: 2025-04-04 18:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in xujiangfei admintwo 1.0. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /resource/add. The manipulation of the argument description leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3254"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-04T16:15:40Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in xujiangfei admintwo 1.0. It has been classified as critical. Affected is an unknown function of the file /resource/add. The manipulation of the argument description leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wg4-h2wp-63r5",
  "modified": "2025-04-04T18:31:07Z",
  "published": "2025-04-04T18:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/caigo8/CVE-md/blob/main/admintwo/SSRF.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.303324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.303324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.548979"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8WMW-PRW8-2GGM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:03
VLAI
Summary
Craftql vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery
Details

Craftql v1.3.7 and before is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the vendor/markhuot/craftql/src/Listeners/GetAssetsFieldSchema.php file.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "markhuot/craftql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.3.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31317"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-18T01:03:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T14:16:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Craftql v1.3.7 and before is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) which allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the vendor/markhuot/craftql/src/Listeners/GetAssetsFieldSchema.php file.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wmw-prw8-2ggm",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T21:03:56Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T15:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31317"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/markhuot/craftql"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stormmmg/craftql_ssrf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/stormmmg/craftql_ssrf/blob/master/craftql-ssrf-en/README_detail.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Craftql vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery"
}

GHSA-8WX4-4FR5-G6R8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-03 18:30 – Updated: 2025-06-03 18:30
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability classified as critical was found in quequnlong shiyi-blog up to 1.2.1. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /app/sys/article/optimize. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5510"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-03T17:15:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability classified as critical was found in quequnlong shiyi-blog up to 1.2.1. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file /app/sys/article/optimize. The manipulation of the argument url leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-8wx4-4fr5-g6r8",
  "modified": "2025-06-03T18:30:41Z",
  "published": "2025-06-03T18:30:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5510"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/shiyi-blog.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/uglory-gll/javasec/blob/main/shiyi-blog.md#2ssrf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.310924"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.310924"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.584489"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8XMV-482H-9XQG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:09 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:09
VLAI
Details

IBM Jazz Foundation products are vulnerable to server side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 192434.

Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-4974"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-28T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Jazz Foundation products are vulnerable to server side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.  IBM X-Force ID:  192434.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xmv-482h-9xqg",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:09:17Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:09:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4974"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/192434"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6475919"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-8XPW-Q9JP-X2C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-15 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-22 00:00
VLAI
Details

Best Practical RT for Incident Response (RTIR) before 4.0.3 and 5.x before 5.0.3 allows SSRF via the whois lookup tool.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25800"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-14T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Best Practical RT for Incident Response (RTIR) before 4.0.3 and 5.x before 5.0.3 allows SSRF via the whois lookup tool.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xpw-q9jp-x2c7",
  "modified": "2022-07-22T00:00:33Z",
  "published": "2022-07-15T00:00:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25800"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.bestpractical.com/release-notes/rtir/4.0.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.bestpractical.com/release-notes/rtir/5.0.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.bestpractical.com/release-notes/rtir/index.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8XQ3-W9FX-74RV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-28 16:41 – Updated: 2025-08-01 18:36
VLAI
Summary
webfinger.js Blind SSRF Vulnerability
Details

Description

The lookup function takes a user address for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per the ActivityPub spec (https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-considerations), on the security considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while running in production. The library does not prevent Localhost access (neither does it prevent LAN addresses such as 192.168.x.x) , thus is not safe for use in production by ActivityPub applications. The only check for localhost is done for selecting between HTTP and HTTPS protocols, and it is done by testing for a host that starts with the string “localhost” and ends with a port. Anything else (such as “127.0.0.1” or “localhost:1234/abc”) would not be considered localhost for this test.

In addition, the way that the function determines the host, makes it possible to access any path in the host, not only “/.well-known/...” paths:

if (address.indexOf('://') > -1) {
  // other uri format
  host = address.replace(/ /g,'').split('/')[2];
} else {
  // useraddress
  host = address.replace(/ /g,'').split('@')[1];
}

var uri_index = 0; // track which URIS we've tried already
var protocol = 'https'; // we use https by default

if (self.__isLocalhost(host)) {
  protocol = 'http';
}

function __buildURL() {
  var uri = '';
  if (! address.split('://')[1]) {
  // the URI has not been defined, default to acct
    uri = 'acct:';
  }
  return protocol + '://' + host + '/.well-known/' +URIS[uri_index] + '?resource=' + uri + address;
}

If the address is in the format of a user address (user@host.com), the host will be anything after the first found @ symbol. Since no other test is done, an adversary may pass a specially crafted address such as user@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page? and reach pages that would normally be out of reach. In this example, the code would treat localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page? as the host, and the created URL would be https://localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:use r@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?. A server listening on localhost:7000 will then parse the request as a GET request for the page /admin/restricted_page with the query string /.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:user@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?.

PoC and Steps to reproduce

This PoC assumes that there is a server on the machine listening on port 3000, which receives requests for WebFinger lookups on the address /api/v1/search_user, and then calls the lookup function in webfinger.js with the user passed as an argument. For the sake of the example we assume that the server configured webfinger.js with tls_only=false.

  1. Activate a local HTTP server listening to port 1234 with a “secret.txt” file:
python3 -m http.server 1234
  1. Run the following command:
curl
"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/search_user?search=user@localhost:1234/secret.txt
?"
  1. View the console of the Python’s HTTP server and see that a request for a “secret.txt?/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:user@localhost:1234/secret.txt ?” file was performed. This proves that we can redirect the URL to any domain and path we choose, including localhost and the internal LAN.

Impact

Due to this issue, any user can cause a server using the library to send GET requests with controlled host, path and port in an attempt to query services running on the instance’s host or local network, and attempt to execute a Blind-SSRF gadget in hope of targeting a known vulnerable local service running on the victim’s machine.

References

The vulnerability was discovered by Ori Hollander of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "webfinger.js"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54590"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-28T16:41:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-01T18:15:55Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Description\nThe lookup function takes a user address for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per\nthe ActivityPub spec (https://www.w3.org/TR/activitypub/#security-considerations), on the\nsecurity considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while\nrunning in production. The library does not prevent Localhost access (neither does it prevent\nLAN addresses such as 192.168.x.x) , thus is not safe for use in production by ActivityPub\napplications. The only check for localhost is done for selecting between HTTP and HTTPS\nprotocols, and it is done by testing for a host that starts with the string \u201clocalhost\u201d and ends with\na port. Anything else (such as \u201c127.0.0.1\u201d or \u201clocalhost:1234/abc\u201d) would not be considered\nlocalhost for this test.\n\nIn addition, the way that the function determines the host, makes it possible to access any path\nin the host, not only \u201c/.well-known/...\u201d paths:\n\n```javascript\nif (address.indexOf(\u0027://\u0027) \u003e -1) {\n  // other uri format\n  host = address.replace(/ /g,\u0027\u0027).split(\u0027/\u0027)[2];\n} else {\n  // useraddress\n  host = address.replace(/ /g,\u0027\u0027).split(\u0027@\u0027)[1];\n}\n\nvar uri_index = 0; // track which URIS we\u0027ve tried already\nvar protocol = \u0027https\u0027; // we use https by default\n\nif (self.__isLocalhost(host)) {\n  protocol = \u0027http\u0027;\n}\n\nfunction __buildURL() {\n  var uri = \u0027\u0027;\n  if (! address.split(\u0027://\u0027)[1]) {\n  // the URI has not been defined, default to acct\n    uri = \u0027acct:\u0027;\n  }\n  return protocol + \u0027://\u0027 + host + \u0027/.well-known/\u0027 +URIS[uri_index] + \u0027?resource=\u0027 + uri + address;\n}\n```\n\nIf the address is in the format of a user address (user@host.com), the host will be anything\nafter the first found @ symbol. Since no other test is done, an adversary may pass a specially\ncrafted address such as user@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page? and reach pages that\nwould normally be out of reach. In this example, the code would treat\nlocalhost:7000/admin/restricted_page? as the host, and the created URL would be\nhttps://localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:use\nr@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?. A server listening on localhost:7000 will then\nparse the request as a GET request for the page /admin/restricted_page with the query string\n/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:user@localhost:7000/admin/restricted_page?.\n\n### PoC and Steps to reproduce\nThis PoC assumes that there is a server on the machine listening on port 3000, which receives\nrequests for WebFinger lookups on the address /api/v1/search_user, and then calls the lookup\nfunction in webfinger.js with the user passed as an argument. For the sake of the example we\nassume that the server configured webfinger.js with tls_only=false.\n\n\n1. Activate a local HTTP server listening to port 1234 with a \u201csecret.txt\u201d file:\n\n```\npython3 -m http.server 1234\n```\n\n2. Run the following command:\n\n```\ncurl\n\"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/search_user?search=user@localhost:1234/secret.txt\n?\"\n```\n\n3. View the console of the Python\u2019s HTTP server and see that a request for a\n\u201csecret.txt?/.well-known/webfinger?resource=acct:user@localhost:1234/secret.txt\n?\u201d file was performed.\nThis proves that we can redirect the URL to any domain and path we choose, including\nlocalhost and the internal LAN.\n\n\n### Impact\nDue to this issue, any user can cause a server using the library to send GET requests with\ncontrolled host, path and port in an attempt to query services running on the instance\u2019s host or\nlocal network, and attempt to execute a Blind-SSRF gadget in hope of targeting a known\nvulnerable local service running on the victim\u2019s machine.\n\n\n### References\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Ori Hollander of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xq3-w9fx-74rv",
  "modified": "2025-08-01T18:36:22Z",
  "published": "2025-07-28T16:41:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js/security/advisories/GHSA-8xq3-w9fx-74rv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54590"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js/commit/b5f2f2c957297d25f4d76072963fccaee2e3095a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/silverbucket/webfinger.js/releases/tag/v2.8.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "webfinger.js Blind SSRF Vulnerability"
}

GHSA-8XQM-6FJ2-HFGF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-11 17:01
VLAI
Summary
PowerJob has a server-side request forgery vulnerability in PingPongUtils.java
Details

A vulnerability was identified in PowerJob up to 5.1.2. This vulnerability affects the function checkConnectivity of the file src/main/java/tech/powerjob/common/utils/net/PingPongUtils.java of the component Network Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument targetIp/targetPort leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "tech.powerjob:powerjob-common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14518"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-11T17:01:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T15:15:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was identified in PowerJob up to 5.1.2. This vulnerability affects the function checkConnectivity of the file src/main/java/tech/powerjob/common/utils/net/PingPongUtils.java of the component Network Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument targetIp/targetPort leads to server-side request forgery. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xqm-6fj2-hfgf",
  "modified": "2025-12-11T17:01:45Z",
  "published": "2025-12-11T15:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14518"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PowerJob/PowerJob/issues/1144"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PowerJob/PowerJob/issues/1144#issue-3673393002"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/PowerJob/PowerJob"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.335856"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.335856"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.702896"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": " PowerJob has a server-side request forgery vulnerability in PingPongUtils.java"
}

GHSA-8XWC-6H6P-HH69

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:29
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in GitLab Community and Enterprise Edition before 11.1.7, 11.2.x before 11.2.4, and 11.3.x before 11.3.1. There is Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via a loopback address to the validate_localhost function in url_blocker.rb.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-17452"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-04-15T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in GitLab Community and Enterprise Edition before 11.1.7, 11.2.x before 11.2.4, and 11.3.x before 11.3.1. There is Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via a loopback address to the validate_localhost function in url_blocker.rb.",
  "id": "GHSA-8xwc-6h6p-hh69",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:29:31Z",
  "published": "2023-04-16T00:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-17452"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/blog/categories/releases"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2018/10/01/security-release-gitlab-11-dot-3-dot-1-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

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