CWE-89
Weakness AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Improper
- Behavior-Type: Neutralization
- Input-Type: Special Elements
- Behavior-Type: Used
- Language-Type: SQL
- Other: Command
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Modes of introduction
REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.
This weakness typically appears in data-rich applications that save user inputs in a database.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.
Automated static analysis might not be able to recognize when proper input validation is being performed, leading to false positives - i.e., warnings that do not have any security consequences or do not require any code changes.
Automated static analysis might not be able to detect the usage of custom API functions or third-party libraries that indirectly invoke SQL commands, leading to false negatives - especially if the API/library code is not available for analysis.
This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.
Automated Dynamic Analysis
This weakness can be detected using dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the software using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The software's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Manual Analysis
Manual analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. This becomes difficult for weaknesses that must be considered for all inputs, since the attack surface can be too large.
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Database Scanners
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Relationship
SQL injection can be resultant from special character mismanagement, MAID, or denylist/allowlist problems. It can be primary to authentication errors.
Content history
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Time_of_Introduction
added/updated white box definitions
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Description
updated Observed_Examples
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Modes_of_Introduction, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Name, Related_Attack_Patterns
Improved the White_Box_Definition
updated Description, Name, White_Box_Definitions
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Name, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Common_Consequences
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Enabling_Factors_for_Exploitation, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships, White_Box_Definitions
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description
updated References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples
updated Alternate_Terms, Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, References
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, References
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Dimensions, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
30465 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-V5F5-M9WG-MCQ9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 09:31 – Updated: 2026-05-27 09:31An low privileged remote attacker can exploit an unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerability in the system_tag view due to improper neutralization of special elements in a SQL SELECT command. This can result in a total loss of confidentiality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40847"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T09:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An low privileged remote attacker can exploit an unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerability in the system_tag view due to improper neutralization of special elements in a SQL SELECT command. This can result in a total loss of confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-v5f5-m9wg-mcq9",
"modified": "2026-05-27T09:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-05-27T09:31:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-044"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V5FF-7W82-R6G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:55 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:56SQL injection vulnerability in the News Calendar (newscalendar) extension 1.0.7 and earlier for TYPO3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-3044"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-07-07T18:41:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in the News Calendar (newscalendar) extension 1.0.7 and earlier for TYPO3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-v5ff-7w82-r6g5",
"modified": "2025-04-09T03:56:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:55:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-3044"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/43485"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30885"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://typo3.org/teams/security/security-bulletins/typo3-20080701-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30056"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V5FQ-CF5M-VWV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 13:29 – Updated: 2026-11-05 21:42Summary
A SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the Third Party (Company) update functionality of Dolibarr ERP/CRM. The localtax1_value parameter (lt1) is concatenated
directly into an SQL UPDATE statement in societe/class/societe.class.php at line 1672 without any escaping, type casting, or parameterized query binding.
An authenticated user with standard "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission can extract any data from the database, including password hashes, API keys, and all business data.
Tested on Dolibarr v23.0.0 (latest stable), default installation via official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11. No custom modules, no modified configuration.
### Details
Vulnerable code (societe/class/societe.class.php, line 1672):
php
$sql .= ",localtax1_value =".$this->localtax1_value;
The value comes from GETPOST('lt1', 'alpha') (societe/card.php, line 1135). The only sanitization applied is trim() at line 1528 — no (float) cast, no
$db->escape().
The alpha input filter strips HTML tags and double quotes but does not strip single quotes, parentheses, commas, or SQL keywords. Since the injection point is
in a numeric SQL context (no quotes around the value), the attacker needs none of the filtered characters.
Why the WAF does not block this: Dolibarr's WAF (waf.inc.php) only checks SQL injection patterns in GET parameters, not POST. The POST-based lt1
parameter bypasses it entirely.
The same vulnerability exists for localtax2_value (parameter lt2) at line 1682.
Adjacent fields like localtax1_assuj are properly cast to (int), showing the developers were aware of injection risk but missed these fields.
### PoC
Steps to reproduce:
- Install Dolibarr v23.0.0 (tested with official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11)
- Log in with a user that has "Third Parties: Create/Edit" permission (standard user, not admin)
- Create or open any existing Third Party (company) record
- Click "Edit" on the company card to open the update form
- Intercept the POST request (e.g., Burp Suite) and add these parameters to the request body:
localtax1assuj_value=1lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)
- Submit the form (server responds with HTTP 302 Found — successful update)
- Navigate to the company's Notes tab — the admin's MD5 password hash is now visible in the "Private Note" field
Verification: echo -n "admin123" | md5sum → 0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500 (matches exfiltrated hash).
Figure 1 — Notes tab before exploitation (Private Note field is empty):
Figure 2 — Burp Suite Repeater: full POST request headers and HTTP 302 Found response:
Figure 3 — Burp Suite Repeater: request body with injected localtax1assuj_value=1 and lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1):
Figure 4 — Notes tab after exploitation: Private Note now contains 0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500 (MD5 hash of admin password "admin123"):
curl PoC:
bash
curl -b cookies.txt \
--data-urlencode "action=update" \
--data-urlencode "token=CSRF_TOKEN" \
--data-urlencode "socid=1" \
--data-urlencode "name=TestCompany" \
--data-urlencode "status=1" \
--data-urlencode "localtax1assuj_value=1" \
--data-urlencode "lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)" \
--data-urlencode "client=1" \
--data-urlencode "typent_id=0" \
"http://TARGET/societe/card.php?socid=1"
Additional proof — arithmetic evaluation:
Sending lt1=3+4 results in localtax1_value=7.0000 stored in the database. The expression was evaluated by the SQL engine, confirming injection.
Additional proof — user count exfiltration:
Sending lt1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM llx_user) results in localtax1_value=1.0000.
### Impact
An attacker with basic "Third Party: Create/Edit" permission (standard user, not admin) can:
- Read any data from the database (password hashes, API keys, customer/supplier data, invoices, bank account details)
- Modify any database record via additional SET clauses in the UPDATE injection
- Escalate to admin by cracking MD5 password hashes (Dolibarr uses unsalted MD5 by default)
- Potentially achieve RCE via admin features (Website module PHP injection, ModuleBuilder) after privilege escalation
### Suggested Fix
```php // societe.class.php, line 1528 — add (float) cast: $this->localtax1_value = (float) price2num(trim($this->localtax1_value));
// societe.class.php, line 1672 — add (float) cast: $sql .= ",localtax1_value =".((float) $this->localtax1_value); ```
Apply same fix for localtax2_value (lines 1529, 1682).
### Credit
Please credit this finding to: Grzegorz Tworek (F3715H) sec4check (grzegorz.tworek@sec4check.pl)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "22.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "23.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "23.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33944"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T13:29:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n A SQL Injection vulnerability exists in the Third Party (Company) update functionality of Dolibarr ERP/CRM. The `localtax1_value` parameter (`lt1`) is concatenated\n directly into an SQL UPDATE statement in `societe/class/societe.class.php` at line 1672 without any escaping, type casting, or parameterized query binding.\n\n An authenticated user with standard \"Third Party: Create/Edit\" permission can extract any data from the database, including password hashes, API keys, and all\n business data.\n\n Tested on Dolibarr v23.0.0 (latest stable), default installation via official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11. No custom modules, no modified configuration.\n\n ### Details\n\n **Vulnerable code** (`societe/class/societe.class.php`, line 1672):\n ```php\n $sql .= \",localtax1_value =\".$this-\u003elocaltax1_value;\n ```\n\n The value comes from `GETPOST(\u0027lt1\u0027, \u0027alpha\u0027)` (`societe/card.php`, line 1135). The only sanitization applied is `trim()` at line 1528 \u2014 no `(float)` cast, no\n `$db-\u003eescape()`.\n\n The `alpha` input filter strips HTML tags and double quotes but does **not** strip single quotes, parentheses, commas, or SQL keywords. Since the injection point is\n in a numeric SQL context (no quotes around the value), the attacker needs none of the filtered characters.\n\n **Why the WAF does not block this:** Dolibarr\u0027s WAF (`waf.inc.php`) only checks SQL injection patterns in **GET** parameters, not POST. The POST-based `lt1`\n parameter bypasses it entirely.\n\n **The same vulnerability exists** for `localtax2_value` (parameter `lt2`) at line 1682.\n\n Adjacent fields like `localtax1_assuj` are properly cast to `(int)`, showing the developers were aware of injection risk but missed these fields.\n\n ### PoC\n\n **Steps to reproduce:**\n\n 1. Install Dolibarr v23.0.0 (tested with official Docker image, MariaDB 10.11)\n 2. Log in with a user that has \"Third Parties: Create/Edit\" permission (standard user, not admin)\n 3. Create or open any existing Third Party (company) record\n 4. Click \"Edit\" on the company card to open the update form\n 5. Intercept the POST request (e.g., Burp Suite) and add these parameters to the request body:\n - `localtax1assuj_value=1`\n - `lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)`\n 6. Submit the form (server responds with HTTP 302 Found \u2014 successful update)\n 7. Navigate to the company\u0027s Notes tab \u2014 the admin\u0027s MD5 password hash is now visible in the \"Private Note\" field\n\n **Verification:** `echo -n \"admin123\" | md5sum` \u2192 `0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500` (matches exfiltrated hash).\n\n**Figure 1 \u2014 Notes tab before exploitation (Private Note field is empty):**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1372\" height=\"822\" alt=\"Notes tab after exploitation \u2014 admin password hash exfiltrated\"\nsrc=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d39502c1-bee0-4eae-a82a-40a026299841\" /\u003e\n\n**Figure 2 \u2014 Burp Suite Repeater: full POST request headers and HTTP 302 Found response:**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1095\" height=\"732\" alt=\"22\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/86386423-bfa3-45fc-a2a9-9e2d1a1e1899\" /\u003e\n\n**Figure 3 \u2014 Burp Suite Repeater: request body with injected `localtax1assuj_value=1` and `lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)`:**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1095\" height=\"727\" alt=\"33\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e82e14fc-d8b4-46e7-a507-d11689e254d3\" /\u003e\n\n**Figure 4 \u2014 Notes tab after exploitation: Private Note now contains `0192023a7bbd73250516f069df18b500` (MD5 hash of admin password \"admin123\"):**\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1381\" height=\"819\" alt=\"1\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ca77a120-21b9-4574-b37f-4347930f27aa\" /\u003e\n\n\n **curl PoC:**\n ```bash\n curl -b cookies.txt \\\n --data-urlencode \"action=update\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"token=CSRF_TOKEN\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"socid=1\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"name=TestCompany\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"status=1\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"localtax1assuj_value=1\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"lt1=1,note_private=(SELECT pass_crypted FROM llx_user WHERE rowid=1)\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"client=1\" \\\n --data-urlencode \"typent_id=0\" \\\n \"http://TARGET/societe/card.php?socid=1\"\n ```\n\n **Additional proof \u2014 arithmetic evaluation:**\n Sending `lt1=3+4` results in `localtax1_value=7.0000` stored in the database. The expression was evaluated by the SQL engine, confirming injection.\n\n **Additional proof \u2014 user count exfiltration:**\n Sending `lt1=(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM llx_user)` results in `localtax1_value=1.0000`.\n\n ### Impact\n\n An attacker with basic \"Third Party: Create/Edit\" permission (standard user, not admin) can:\n\n - **Read** any data from the database (password hashes, API keys, customer/supplier data, invoices, bank account details)\n - **Modify** any database record via additional SET clauses in the UPDATE injection\n - **Escalate** to admin by cracking MD5 password hashes (Dolibarr uses unsalted MD5 by default)\n - **Potentially achieve RCE** via admin features (Website module PHP injection, ModuleBuilder) after privilege escalation\n\n ### Suggested Fix\n\n ```php\n // societe.class.php, line 1528 \u2014 add (float) cast:\n $this-\u003elocaltax1_value = (float) price2num(trim($this-\u003elocaltax1_value));\n\n // societe.class.php, line 1672 \u2014 add (float) cast:\n $sql .= \",localtax1_value =\".((float) $this-\u003elocaltax1_value);\n ```\n\n Apply same fix for `localtax2_value` (lines 1529, 1682).\n\n ### Credit\n\n Please credit this finding to: **Grzegorz Tworek (F3715H) sec4check** (grzegorz.tworek@sec4check.pl)",
"id": "GHSA-v5fq-cf5m-vwv7",
"modified": "2026-11-05T21:42:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T13:29:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/security/advisories/GHSA-v5fq-cf5m-vwv7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/a06b14b7dc39d33f8fa00c9b27f2913b494885cb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/c83c13305240c2c0a3779e678b57238b32d15e7c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/releases/tag/22.0.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/releases/tag/23.0.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sec4check.pl/blog/posts/cve-dolibarr-sql-injection-localtax-third-party.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Dolibarr has SQL Injection in societe/class/societe.class.php via localtax1_value parameter"
}
GHSA-V5G8-XVF6-QV6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:00 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:00SQL injection vulnerability in RADVISION iVIEW Suite before 7.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2011-1328"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-05-24T23:55:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in RADVISION iVIEW Suite before 7.5 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-v5g8-xvf6-qv6q",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:00:44Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:00:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-1328"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/67556"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN77697803/995139/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN77697803/index.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://jvndb.jvn.jp/jvndb/JVNDB-2011-000030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/44634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.osvdb.org/72410"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V5GG-G8C2-9JP8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:29 – Updated: 2022-05-01 18:29Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Computer Associates (CA) BrightStor Hierarchical Storage Manager (HSM) before r11.6 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via CsAgent service commands with opcodes (1) 0x07, (2) 0x08, (3) 0x09, (4) 0x1E, (5) 0x32, (6) 0x36, (7) 0x40, and possibly others.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2007-5084"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2007-10-01T20:17:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Computer Associates (CA) BrightStor Hierarchical Storage Manager (HSM) before r11.6 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via CsAgent service commands with opcodes (1) 0x07, (2) 0x08, (3) 0x09, (4) 0x1E, (5) 0x32, (6) 0x36, (7) 0x40, and possibly others.",
"id": "GHSA-v5gg-g8c2-9jp8",
"modified": "2022-05-01T18:29:52Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T18:29:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-5084"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/36828"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://dvlabs.tippingpoint.com/advisory/TPTI-07-17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/26914"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://securitytracker.com/id?1018747"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://supportconnectw.ca.com/public/bstorhsm/infodocs/bstorhsm-secnot.asp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ca.com/us/securityadvisor/vulninfo/vuln.aspx?id=35692"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/480808/100/0/threaded"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25823"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/3275"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V5GJ-FX3G-HCPW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-22 12:30 – Updated: 2023-11-30 15:51Apache Software Foundation Apache Submarine has an SQL injection vulnerability when a user logs in. This issue can result in unauthorized login.
Now we have fixed this issue and now user must have the correct login to access workbench. This issue affects Apache Submarine: from 0.7.0 before 0.8.0. We recommend that all submarine users with 0.7.0 upgrade to 0.8.0, which not only fixes the issue, supports the oidc authentication mode, but also removes the case of unauthenticated logins.
If using the version lower than 0.8.0 and not want to upgrade, you can try cherry-pick PR https://github.com/apache/submarine/pull/1037 https://github.com/apache/submarine/pull/1054 and rebuild the submarine-server image to fix this.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "apache-submarine"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-37924"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-22T20:58:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-22T10:15:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Apache Software Foundation Apache Submarine has an SQL injection vulnerability when a user logs in. This issue can result in unauthorized login.\n\nNow we have fixed this issue and now user must have the correct login to access workbench. This issue affects Apache Submarine: from 0.7.0 before 0.8.0.\u00a0We recommend that all submarine users with 0.7.0 upgrade to 0.8.0, which not only fixes the issue, supports the oidc authentication mode, but also removes the case of unauthenticated logins.\n\nIf using the version lower than 0.8.0 and not want to upgrade, you can try cherry-pick PR https://github.com/apache/submarine/pull/1037 https://github.com/apache/submarine/pull/1054 and rebuild the submarine-server image to fix this.",
"id": "GHSA-v5gj-fx3g-hcpw",
"modified": "2023-11-30T15:51:33Z",
"published": "2023-11-22T12:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-37924"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/submarine/pull/1037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/submarine/commit/4cd2af10499ac6dc4f82bda179d9f414a522abef"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/submarine"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/apache-submarine/PYSEC-2023-244.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SUBMARINE-1361"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/g99h773vd49n1wyghdq1llv2f83w1b3r"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SQL injection in Apache Submarine"
}
GHSA-V5GM-27GP-4F7W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-31 18:32The fix for CVE-2026-12045 in pgAdmin 4 9.16 required the LLM-supplied query passed to the AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool to parse, via sqlparse, as exactly one non-transaction-control statement before running it inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper. sqlparse's string-literal lexing can disagree with PostgreSQL's own parser: under standard_conforming_strings = on (PostgreSQL's default since 9.1), a backslash immediately before a quote is an ordinary character to PostgreSQL, but sqlparse treats it as escaping the quote. A payload such as SELECT '\';COMMIT;CREATE TABLE pwn(x int);SELECT 1 --' therefore parses as a single SELECT to sqlparse's validator, while PostgreSQL executes it as four statements: the smuggled COMMIT ends the wrapping read-only transaction, and the trailing ROLLBACK becomes a no-op. This reintroduces the same write/RCE bypass CVE-2026-12045 was meant to close, reachable via the same indirect prompt-injection delivery (an attacker plants the payload in any object the AI Assistant may read; the LLM emits it as a tool call).
An initial candidate fix ran the query with psycopg's execute(..., prepare=True), intending to force PostgreSQL's own Parse step (extended query protocol) to reject multi-statement text regardless of sqlparse's classification. This candidate fix does not work as submitted: psycopg3's PrepareManager silently ignores the prepare argument whenever the connection's prepare_threshold is None, which is pgAdmin's default for every server connection (the per-server "Prepare threshold" field is blank unless an administrator explicitly sets it) -- psycopg3 falls back to the simple query protocol, the same multi-statement-capable path the bypass exploits, so the candidate fix closes nothing on any real-world default configuration.
The corrected fix sets conn.prepare_threshold = 0 directly on the dedicated, single-use read-only connection the AI Assistant tool opens, structurally forcing the extended query protocol independent of any server-level configuration. Verified against a live PostgreSQL 18 instance: the payload executes successfully under the prepare_threshold=None (default) behavior, and is rejected with "cannot insert multiple commands into a prepared statement" once prepare_threshold=0 is set on that connection.
This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-17351"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-31T16:16:59Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The fix for CVE-2026-12045 in pgAdmin 4 9.16 required the LLM-supplied query passed to the AI Assistant\u0027s execute_sql_query tool to parse, via sqlparse, as exactly one non-transaction-control statement before running it inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper. sqlparse\u0027s string-literal lexing can disagree with PostgreSQL\u0027s own parser: under standard_conforming_strings = on (PostgreSQL\u0027s default since 9.1), a backslash immediately before a quote is an ordinary character to PostgreSQL, but sqlparse treats it as escaping the quote. A payload such as SELECT \u0027\\\u0027;COMMIT;CREATE TABLE pwn(x int);SELECT 1 --\u0027 therefore parses as a single SELECT to sqlparse\u0027s validator, while PostgreSQL executes it as four statements: the smuggled COMMIT ends the wrapping read-only transaction, and the trailing ROLLBACK becomes a no-op. This reintroduces the same write/RCE bypass CVE-2026-12045 was meant to close, reachable via the same indirect prompt-injection delivery (an attacker plants the payload in any object the AI Assistant may read; the LLM emits it as a tool call).\n\nAn initial candidate fix ran the query with psycopg\u0027s execute(..., prepare=True), intending to force PostgreSQL\u0027s own Parse step (extended query protocol) to reject multi-statement text regardless of sqlparse\u0027s classification. This candidate fix does not work as submitted: psycopg3\u0027s PrepareManager silently ignores the prepare argument whenever the connection\u0027s prepare_threshold is None, which is pgAdmin\u0027s default for every server connection (the per-server \"Prepare threshold\" field is blank unless an administrator explicitly sets it) -- psycopg3 falls back to the simple query protocol, the same multi-statement-capable path the bypass exploits, so the candidate fix closes nothing on any real-world default configuration.\n\nThe corrected fix sets conn.prepare_threshold = 0 directly on the dedicated, single-use read-only connection the AI Assistant tool opens, structurally forcing the extended query protocol independent of any server-level configuration. Verified against a live PostgreSQL 18 instance: the payload executes successfully under the prepare_threshold=None (default) behavior, and is rejected with \"cannot insert multiple commands into a prepared statement\" once prepare_threshold=0 is set on that connection.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.17.",
"id": "GHSA-v5gm-27gp-4f7w",
"modified": "2026-07-31T18:32:17Z",
"published": "2026-07-31T18:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17351"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10192"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/bf4792444446f0e7ab721d23cbd6bfe6afaa7a8b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ef76102bcd1cdb544eb9b4ef18d3382f22b76752"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-V5H4-MP28-FJ56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:36 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:36SQL injection vulnerability in index.php in OlyKit Swoopo Clone 2010 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter in a product action.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-4997"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2011-11-02T21:55:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "SQL injection vulnerability in index.php in OlyKit Swoopo Clone 2010 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the id parameter in a product action.",
"id": "GHSA-v5h4-mp28-fj56",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:36:48Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:36:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-4997"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/40360"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/14084"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-V5HH-JF5M-9H8Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:16 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:16An issue was discovered in BearAdmin 0.5. There is admin/admin_log/index.html?user_id= SQL injection because admin\controller\AdminLog.php constructs a MySQL query improperly.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-11414"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-05-24T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in BearAdmin 0.5. There is admin/admin_log/index.html?user_id= SQL injection because admin\\controller\\AdminLog.php constructs a MySQL query improperly.",
"id": "GHSA-v5hh-jf5m-9h8q",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:16:45Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:16:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-11414"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/yupoxiong/BearAdmin/issues/5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V5J2-WGV7-Q2CG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-17 21:31 – Updated: 2025-01-17 21:31A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Codezips Gym Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /dashboard/admin/edit_mem_submit.php. The manipulation of the argument uid leads to sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0535"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-17T19:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Codezips Gym Management System 1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /dashboard/admin/edit_mem_submit.php. The manipulation of the argument uid leads to sql injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-v5j2-wgv7-q2cg",
"modified": "2025-01-17T21:31:39Z",
"published": "2025-01-17T21:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0535"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lan041221/cve/blob/main/SQL_Injection_in_Gym_Management_System.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.292419"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.292419"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.479159"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since this may re-introduce the possibility of SQL injection. [REF-867]
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
- Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
- Specifically, follow the principle of least privilege when creating user accounts to a SQL database. The database users should only have the minimum privileges necessary to use their account. If the requirements of the system indicate that a user can read and modify their own data, then limit their privileges so they cannot read/write others' data. Use the strictest permissions possible on all database objects, such as execute-only for stored procedures.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
- While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
- Instead of building a new implementation, such features may be available in the database or programming language. For example, the Oracle DBMS_ASSERT package can check or enforce that parameters have certain properties that make them less vulnerable to SQL injection. For MySQL, the mysql_real_escape_string() API function is available in both C and PHP.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing SQL query strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing SQL injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent SQL injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, the name "O'Reilly" would likely pass the validation step, since it is a common last name in the English language. However, it cannot be directly inserted into the database because it contains the "'" apostrophe character, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the apostrophe might reduce the risk of SQL injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the wrong name would be recorded.
- When feasible, it may be safest to disallow meta-characters entirely, instead of escaping them. This will provide some defense in depth. After the data is entered into the database, later processes may neglect to escape meta-characters before use, and you may not have control over those processes.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of SQL Injection, error messages revealing the structure of a SQL query can help attackers tailor successful attack strings.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-109: Object Relational Mapping Injection
An attacker leverages a weakness present in the database access layer code generated with an Object Relational Mapping (ORM) tool or a weakness in the way that a developer used a persistence framework to inject their own SQL commands to be executed against the underlying database. The attack here is similar to plain SQL injection, except that the application does not use JDBC to directly talk to the database, but instead it uses a data access layer generated by an ORM tool or framework (e.g. Hibernate). While most of the time code generated by an ORM tool contains safe access methods that are immune to SQL injection, sometimes either due to some weakness in the generated code or due to the fact that the developer failed to use the generated access methods properly, SQL injection is still possible.
CAPEC-110: SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter Tampering
An attacker modifies the parameters of the SOAP message that is sent from the service consumer to the service provider to initiate a SQL injection attack. On the service provider side, the SOAP message is parsed and parameters are not properly validated before being used to access a database in a way that does not use parameter binding, thus enabling the attacker to control the structure of the executed SQL query. This pattern describes a SQL injection attack with the delivery mechanism being a SOAP message.
CAPEC-470: Expanding Control over the Operating System from the Database
An attacker is able to leverage access gained to the database to read / write data to the file system, compromise the operating system, create a tunnel for accessing the host machine, and use this access to potentially attack other machines on the same network as the database machine. Traditionally SQL injections attacks are viewed as a way to gain unauthorized read access to the data stored in the database, modify the data in the database, delete the data, etc. However, almost every data base management system (DBMS) system includes facilities that if compromised allow an attacker complete access to the file system, operating system, and full access to the host running the database. The attacker can then use this privileged access to launch subsequent attacks. These facilities include dropping into a command shell, creating user defined functions that can call system level libraries present on the host machine, stored procedures, etc.
CAPEC-66: SQL Injection
This attack exploits target software that constructs SQL statements based on user input. An attacker crafts input strings so that when the target software constructs SQL statements based on the input, the resulting SQL statement performs actions other than those the application intended. SQL Injection results from failure of the application to appropriately validate input.
CAPEC-7: Blind SQL Injection
Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.