CWE-88
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
551 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-JPWP-H56F-5V3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-13 21:30 – Updated: 2023-12-13 21:30An OS command injection vulnerability in the XML API of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated API user to disrupt system processes and potentially execute arbitrary code with limited privileges on the firewall.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6792"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-13T19:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability in the XML API of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated API user to disrupt system processes and potentially execute arbitrary code with limited privileges on the firewall.",
"id": "GHSA-jpwp-h56f-5v3g",
"modified": "2023-12-13T21:30:31Z",
"published": "2023-12-13T21:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2023-6792"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JRRP-WVGF-HMFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-16 21:30 – Updated: 2023-02-27 21:30A improper neutralization of argument delimiters in a command ('argument injection') in Fortinet FortiNAC versions 9.4.0, 9.2.0 through 9.2.5, 9.1.0 through 9.1.7, 8.8.0 through 8.8.11, 8.7.0 through 8.7.6, 8.6.0 through 8.6.5, 8.5.0 through 8.5.4, 8.3.7 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted input parameters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-40677"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-16T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A improper neutralization of argument delimiters in a command (\u0027argument injection\u0027) in Fortinet FortiNAC versions 9.4.0, 9.2.0 through 9.2.5, 9.1.0 through 9.1.7, 8.8.0 through 8.8.11, 8.7.0 through 8.7.6, 8.6.0 through 8.6.5, 8.5.0 through 8.5.4, 8.3.7 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted input parameters.",
"id": "GHSA-jrrp-wvgf-hmfr",
"modified": "2023-02-27T21:30:34Z",
"published": "2023-02-16T21:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-280"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JVPW-637P-H3PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:04 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:39[!NOTE] This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We're publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed.
For more information about tracking vulnerability issues related to the Command Execution features, check https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199.
Overview
The hook system in File Browser — which executes administrator-defined shell commands on file events such as upload, rename, and delete — is vulnerable to OS command injection. Variable substitution for values like $FILE and $USERNAME is performed via os.Expand without sanitization. An attacker with file write permission can craft a malicious filename containing shell metacharacters, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands when the hook fires. This results in Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Affected Location
- File:
runner/runner.go - Function:
Runner.exec
Technical Details
Runner.exec expands template variables inside hook command strings using os.Expand:
// runner/runner.go
envMapping := func(key string) string {
switch key {
case "FILE":
return path // attacker-controlled filename
case "USERNAME":
return username // attacker-controlled username
// ...
}
}
for i, arg := range command {
if i == 0 { continue }
command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // expands $FILE, $USERNAME, etc.
}
The expanded value is then passed as a shell argument string. os.Expand performs plain string substitution with no escaping. If an admin has configured a hook such as:
sh -c "echo created $FILE"
...and an attacker creates a file named ; id #, the variable expansion produces:
sh -c "echo created /path/to/; id #"
The ; terminates the echo command and the shell executes id with server privileges. The # character comments out the remainder, preventing syntax errors.
This pattern is exploitable across all hook events: before_upload, after_upload, before_rename, after_rename, before_delete, after_delete, etc.
Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps
- Admin configures an
after_uploadhook:sh -c "echo created $FILE". - The attacker (authenticated user with upload permission) uploads a file named
; id #. - The upload succeeds and the hook fires automatically.
- The server executes:
sh sh -c "echo created /uploads/; id #" - The
idcommand runs, confirming RCE.
Impact
Any authenticated user with file create, upload, or rename permissions can achieve arbitrary RCE on the server when shell-based hooks are configured. The attacker does not need to know the exact hook command — any hook that embeds $FILE in a shell string is exploitable by crafting the filename accordingly.
Proof of Concept
package runner
import (
"os"
"testing"
"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings"
)
func TestPoC_FileHookInjection(t *testing.T) {
// Simulate an admin-configured shell-based hook
r := &Runner{
Enabled: true,
Settings: &settings.Settings{
Shell: []string{"sh", "-c"},
Commands: map[string][]string{
"after_upload": {"echo Uploaded $FILE"},
},
},
}
// Malicious filename crafted by the attacker
maliciousFilename := "/tmp/safe; id #"
// Simulate the exec logic in runner/runner.go
raw := r.Commands["after_upload"][0]
command, _, _ := ParseCommand(r.Settings, raw)
envMapping := func(key string) string {
if key == "FILE" {
return maliciousFilename
}
return os.Getenv(key)
}
for i, arg := range command {
if i == 0 {
continue
}
// os.Expand substitutes $FILE with the attacker-controlled filename —
// no escaping is applied, so shell metacharacters pass through unchanged.
command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)
}
// The resulting command argument is the injected shell script:
// sh -c "echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #"
expectedArg := "echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #"
if command[2] != expectedArg {
t.Errorf("Expected command argument %q, got %q", expectedArg, command[2])
}
t.Logf("Confirmed: filename injection succeeded. Shell will execute: %v", command)
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.33.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35585"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:04:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T17:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "\u003e [!NOTE]\n\u003e **This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations**. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We\u0027re publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed.\n\u003e\n\u003e For more information about tracking vulnerability issues related to the Command Execution features, check https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe hook system in File Browser \u2014 which executes administrator-defined shell commands on file events such as upload, rename, and delete \u2014 is vulnerable to OS command injection. Variable substitution for values like `$FILE` and `$USERNAME` is performed via `os.Expand` without sanitization. An attacker with file write permission can craft a malicious filename containing shell metacharacters, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands when the hook fires. This results in **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**.\n\n## Affected Location\n\n- **File:** `runner/runner.go`\n- **Function:** `Runner.exec`\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`Runner.exec` expands template variables inside hook command strings using `os.Expand`:\n\n```go\n// runner/runner.go\nenvMapping := func(key string) string {\n switch key {\n case \"FILE\":\n return path // attacker-controlled filename\n case \"USERNAME\":\n return username // attacker-controlled username\n // ...\n }\n}\n\nfor i, arg := range command {\n if i == 0 { continue }\n command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // expands $FILE, $USERNAME, etc.\n}\n```\n\nThe expanded value is then passed as a shell argument string. `os.Expand` performs plain string substitution with no escaping. If an admin has configured a hook such as:\n\n```\nsh -c \"echo created $FILE\"\n```\n\n...and an attacker creates a file named `; id #`, the variable expansion produces:\n\n```\nsh -c \"echo created /path/to/; id #\"\n```\n\nThe `;` terminates the `echo` command and the shell executes `id` with server privileges. The `#` character comments out the remainder, preventing syntax errors.\n\nThis pattern is exploitable across all hook events: `before_upload`, `after_upload`, `before_rename`, `after_rename`, `before_delete`, `after_delete`, etc.\n\n## Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Admin configures an `after_upload` hook: `sh -c \"echo created $FILE\"`.\n2. The attacker (authenticated user with upload permission) uploads a file named `; id #`.\n3. The upload succeeds and the hook fires automatically.\n4. The server executes:\n ```sh\n sh -c \"echo created /uploads/; id #\"\n ```\n5. The `id` command runs, confirming RCE.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user with file create, upload, or rename permissions can achieve arbitrary RCE on the server when shell-based hooks are configured. The attacker does not need to know the exact hook command \u2014 any hook that embeds `$FILE` in a shell string is exploitable by crafting the filename accordingly.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```go\npackage runner\n\nimport (\n \"os\"\n \"testing\"\n\n \"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoC_FileHookInjection(t *testing.T) {\n // Simulate an admin-configured shell-based hook\n r := \u0026Runner{\n Enabled: true,\n Settings: \u0026settings.Settings{\n Shell: []string{\"sh\", \"-c\"},\n Commands: map[string][]string{\n \"after_upload\": {\"echo Uploaded $FILE\"},\n },\n },\n }\n\n // Malicious filename crafted by the attacker\n maliciousFilename := \"/tmp/safe; id #\"\n\n // Simulate the exec logic in runner/runner.go\n raw := r.Commands[\"after_upload\"][0]\n command, _, _ := ParseCommand(r.Settings, raw)\n\n envMapping := func(key string) string {\n if key == \"FILE\" {\n return maliciousFilename\n }\n return os.Getenv(key)\n }\n\n for i, arg := range command {\n if i == 0 {\n continue\n }\n // os.Expand substitutes $FILE with the attacker-controlled filename \u2014\n // no escaping is applied, so shell metacharacters pass through unchanged.\n command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)\n }\n\n // The resulting command argument is the injected shell script:\n // sh -c \"echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #\"\n expectedArg := \"echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #\"\n if command[2] != expectedArg {\n t.Errorf(\"Expected command argument %q, got %q\", expectedArg, command[2])\n }\n\n t.Logf(\"Confirmed: filename injection succeeded. Shell will execute: %v\", command)\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-jvpw-637p-h3pw",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:39:58Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T00:04:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-jvpw-637p-h3pw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35585"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "File Browser has a Command Injection via Hook Runner"
}
GHSA-JVWQ-53JX-C5F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:06 – Updated: 2023-10-11 15:30When a user clicked on an FTP URL containing encoded newline characters (%0A and %0D), the newlines would have been interpreted as such and allowed arbitrary commands to be sent to the FTP server. This vulnerability affects Firefox ESR < 78.10, Thunderbird < 78.10, and Firefox < 88.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-24002"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-24T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "When a user clicked on an FTP URL containing encoded newline characters (%0A and %0D), the newlines would have been interpreted as such and allowed arbitrary commands to be sent to the FTP server. This vulnerability affects Firefox ESR \u003c 78.10, Thunderbird \u003c 78.10, and Firefox \u003c 88.",
"id": "GHSA-jvwq-53jx-c5f6",
"modified": "2023-10-11T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:06:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1702374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-15"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-16"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-JWPW-Q68H-R678
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:47 – Updated: 2023-10-05 17:32Duplicate advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-9324-jv53-9cc8. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
The dio package prior to 5.0.0 for Dart allows CRLF injection if the attacker controls the HTTP method string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2020-35669.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Pub",
"name": "dio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74",
"CWE-88",
"CWE-93"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-15T03:27:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-04-15T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Duplicate advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-9324-jv53-9cc8. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nThe dio package prior to 5.0.0 for Dart allows CRLF injection if the attacker controls the HTTP method string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2020-35669.",
"id": "GHSA-jwpw-q68h-r678",
"modified": "2023-10-05T17:32:48Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:47:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31402"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio/issues/1130"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio/commit/927f79e93ba39f3c3a12c190624a55653d577984"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/GHSA-jwpw-q68h-r678"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in dio",
"withdrawn": "2023-10-05T17:32:48Z"
}
GHSA-M27M-H5GJ-WWMG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-23 20:38 – Updated: 2024-12-23 20:38Impact
Unprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can read arbitrary files on the system. For instance, they could leak the configuration files that could contain database credentials ([database] *) and [security] SECRET_KEY. Attackers could also exfiltrate TLS certificates, other users' repositories, and the Gogs database when the SQLite driver is enabled.
Patches
Unintended Git options has been ignored for creating tags (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7872). Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev.
Workarounds
No viable workaround available, please only grant access to trusted users to your Gogs instance on affected versions.
References
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39933
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.13.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39933"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-23T20:38:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nUnprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can read arbitrary files on the system. For instance, they could leak the configuration files that could contain database credentials (`[database] *`) and `[security] SECRET_KEY`. Attackers could also exfiltrate TLS certificates, other users\u0027 repositories, and the Gogs database when the SQLite driver is enabled.\n\n### Patches\n\nUnintended Git options has been ignored for creating tags (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7872). Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo viable workaround available, please only grant access to trusted users to your Gogs instance on affected versions.\n\n### References\n\nhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39933\n",
"id": "GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg",
"modified": "2024-12-23T20:38:12Z",
"published": "2024-12-23T20:38:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39933"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7872"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/76831d0d06c44c5cf46dc22b380440b7507c2f07"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/securing-developer-tools-unpatched-code-vulnerabilities-in-gogs-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AC:L/AV:N/A:N/C:H/I:N/PR:L/S:C/UI:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs allows argument Injection when tagging new releases"
}
GHSA-M74M-F2XH-459P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03A vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Modeling Labs could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the web application on the underlying operating system of an affected Cisco Modeling Labs server. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input to the web UI. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected server. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the web application, virl2, on the underlying operating system of the affected server. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid user credentials on the web UI.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1531"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-22T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Modeling Labs could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the web application on the underlying operating system of an affected Cisco Modeling Labs server. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input to the web UI. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted HTTP request to an affected server. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the web application, virl2, on the underlying operating system of the affected server. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid user credentials on the web UI.",
"id": "GHSA-m74m-f2xh-459p",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1531"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cml-cmd-inject-N4VYeQXB"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/163265/Cisco-Modeling-Labs-2.1.1-b19-Remote-Command-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M8QG-QJX9-MFV3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 18:33 – Updated: 2026-05-05 18:33A hidden console command is vulnerable to command injection flaw when control characters are passed to its second argument.
A third party researcher Eugene Lim had discovered vulnerability in the way console command passes to a popen function call. Attackers with authenticated access to SSH console of Crestron devices may use to run underlying OS commands.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-7865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T16:16:19Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A hidden console command is vulnerable to command injection\nflaw when control characters are passed to its second argument.\u00a0\n\nA third party researcher Eugene Lim had discovered vulnerability\nin the way console command passes to a popen function call. Attackers with\nauthenticated access to SSH console of Crestron devices may use to run\nunderlying OS commands.",
"id": "GHSA-m8qg-qjx9-mfv3",
"modified": "2026-05-05T18:33:26Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T18:33:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.crestron.com/Software-Firmware/Firmware/Touchpanels/TS-770-TS-1070-TSS-770-TSS-1070-TSW-570/3-003-0015-001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.crestron.com/release_notes/tsw-xx70_3.003.0015.001_release_notes.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M93H-4HW7-5QCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 19:32 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:32Overview
The Hook Authentication feature in File Browser allows administrators to delegate login verification to an external shell command. User-supplied credentials (username and password) are interpolated into this command string using os.Expand without sanitization. An unauthenticated remote attacker can inject shell metacharacters in the username or password field at the login screen, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands before any authentication takes place. This is a critical pre-authentication RCE.
Affected Location
- File:
auth/hook.go - Function:
HookAuth.RunCommand
CVSS v4.0
| Metric | Value | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable via the login endpoint over HTTP from any network |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | Single crafted HTTP request; no preparation needed |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None (N) | No race condition or special timing required |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No account required — pre-authentication attack |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | Fully automated; no victim action needed |
| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | High (H) | Full read access to server filesystem and env |
| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | High (H) | Arbitrary file write/modification |
| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | High (H) | Can kill processes, exhaust resources |
| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | None (N) | No direct impact on downstream systems assumed |
| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None (N) | — |
| Subsequent System Availability (SA) | None (N) | — |
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Base Score: 9.3 (Critical)
Note:
PR:Noneis the critical differentiator from vulnerabilities 01 and 02. Because the injection point is the unauthenticated login endpoint, no account or session is required. A single HTTP request to the login API is sufficient to achieve RCE.
CWE
| ID | Name | Role |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-78 | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') | Primary — attacker-supplied credentials embedded in shell command string via os.Expand |
| CWE-88 | Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') | Secondary — $USERNAME/$PASSWORD expansion injects additional shell commands |
| CWE-306 | Missing Authentication for Critical Function | Secondary — OS command execution is reachable before any authentication is verified |
Technical Details
HookAuth.RunCommand builds the authentication command and substitutes credential values using os.Expand:
// auth/hook.go
envMapping := func(key string) string {
switch key {
case "USERNAME":
return a.Cred.Username // directly from the HTTP login request body
case "PASSWORD":
return a.Cred.Password // directly from the HTTP login request body
default:
return os.Getenv(key)
}
}
for i, arg := range command {
if i == 0 { continue }
command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // no escaping applied
}
os.Expand performs plain text substitution. There is no escaping, quoting, or validation of the credential values before they are embedded into the command string.
If an admin has configured the hook authentication command as:
sh -c "test $USERNAME = 'admin'"
...and an attacker submits the username ; id # at the login screen, the expanded command becomes:
sh -c "test ; id # = 'admin'"
The ; terminates the test expression and the shell executes id. The # comments out the remainder, preventing a syntax error. The attacker's command runs with the privileges of the File Browser process — without needing a valid account or password.
Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps
- Admin enables Hook Authentication and sets the command to:
sh -c "test $USERNAME = 'admin'" - An unauthenticated attacker sends a login request (e.g., via
curlor the web UI) with: - Username:
; id # - Password: (any value)
- The server executes:
sh sh -c "test ; id # = 'admin'" - The
idcommand runs on the server, confirming pre-authentication RCE.
No account is needed. The attacker does not need to know any valid credentials. A single request is sufficient.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on the server under the privilege level of the File Browser process. This is the most severe class of vulnerability in this codebase:
- No authentication required — exposed to the entire internet if the service is public-facing.
- Single request — no setup, no enumeration, no prior foothold.
- Full server compromise: data exfiltration, persistent backdoor installation, lateral movement to internal networks.
Any internet-facing File Browser instance with Hook Authentication enabled is fully compromised by a single malformed login attempt.
Proof of Concept
package auth
import (
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func TestPoC_AuthHookInjection(t *testing.T) {
// Simulate the admin-configured hook authentication command.
// This represents a realistic configuration: verify the username via a shell expression.
a := &HookAuth{
Command: "sh -c $USERNAME",
Cred: hookCred{
// Attacker-supplied username from the login form.
// The password is irrelevant.
Username: "id ; echo injected",
Password: "anything",
},
}
// Simulate the RunCommand logic in auth/hook.go
command := strings.Split(a.Command, " ")
envMapping := func(key string) string {
if key == "USERNAME" {
return a.Cred.Username
}
return os.Getenv(key)
}
for i, arg := range command {
if i == 0 {
continue
}
// os.Expand substitutes $USERNAME with the attacker's input.
// The result is treated as a shell script — no escaping is applied.
command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)
}
// The shell will execute: sh -c "id ; echo injected"
expectedArg := "id ; echo injected"
if command[2] != expectedArg {
t.Errorf("Expected command argument %q, got %q", expectedArg, command[2])
}
t.Logf("Confirmed: malicious username was injected as a shell script. Executing: %v", command)
}
Remediation
Pass credentials exclusively as environment variables, not as shell string substitutions. This feature is undocumented, so removing it should not cause issues.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.63.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54088"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:32:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T19:16:40Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Overview\n\nThe Hook Authentication feature in File Browser allows administrators to delegate login verification to an external shell command. User-supplied credentials (username and password) are interpolated into this command string using `os.Expand` without sanitization. An **unauthenticated remote attacker** can inject shell metacharacters in the username or password field at the login screen, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands before any authentication takes place. This is a **critical pre-authentication RCE**.\n\n## Affected Location\n\n- **File:** `auth/hook.go`\n- **Function:** `HookAuth.RunCommand`\n\n## CVSS v4.0\n\n| Metric | Value | Rationale |\n|---|---|---|\n| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable via the login endpoint over HTTP from any network |\n| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | Single crafted HTTP request; no preparation needed |\n| Attack Requirements (AT) | None (N) | No race condition or special timing required |\n| Privileges Required (PR) | **None (N)** | **No account required \u2014 pre-authentication attack** |\n| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | Fully automated; no victim action needed |\n| Vulnerable System Confidentiality (VC) | High (H) | Full read access to server filesystem and env |\n| Vulnerable System Integrity (VI) | High (H) | Arbitrary file write/modification |\n| Vulnerable System Availability (VA) | High (H) | Can kill processes, exhaust resources |\n| Subsequent System Confidentiality (SC) | None (N) | No direct impact on downstream systems assumed |\n| Subsequent System Integrity (SI) | None (N) | \u2014 |\n| Subsequent System Availability (SA) | None (N) | \u2014 |\n\n**Vector String:** `CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N`\n**Base Score: 9.3 (Critical)**\n\n\u003e **Note:** `PR:None` is the critical differentiator from vulnerabilities 01 and 02. Because the injection point is the unauthenticated login endpoint, no account or session is required. A single HTTP request to the login API is sufficient to achieve RCE.\n\n## CWE\n\n| ID | Name | Role |\n|---|---|---|\n| [CWE-78](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/78.html) | Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) | Primary \u2014 attacker-supplied credentials embedded in shell command string via `os.Expand` |\n| [CWE-88](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/88.html) | Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (\u0027Argument Injection\u0027) | Secondary \u2014 `$USERNAME`/`$PASSWORD` expansion injects additional shell commands |\n| [CWE-306](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html) | Missing Authentication for Critical Function | Secondary \u2014 OS command execution is reachable before any authentication is verified |\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`HookAuth.RunCommand` builds the authentication command and substitutes credential values using `os.Expand`:\n\n```go\n// auth/hook.go\nenvMapping := func(key string) string {\n switch key {\n case \"USERNAME\":\n return a.Cred.Username // directly from the HTTP login request body\n case \"PASSWORD\":\n return a.Cred.Password // directly from the HTTP login request body\n default:\n return os.Getenv(key)\n }\n}\n\nfor i, arg := range command {\n if i == 0 { continue }\n command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // no escaping applied\n}\n```\n\n`os.Expand` performs plain text substitution. There is no escaping, quoting, or validation of the credential values before they are embedded into the command string.\n\nIf an admin has configured the hook authentication command as:\n\n```\nsh -c \"test $USERNAME = \u0027admin\u0027\"\n```\n\n...and an attacker submits the username `; id #` at the login screen, the expanded command becomes:\n\n```sh\nsh -c \"test ; id # = \u0027admin\u0027\"\n```\n\nThe `;` terminates the `test` expression and the shell executes `id`. The `#` comments out the remainder, preventing a syntax error. The attacker\u0027s command runs with the privileges of the File Browser process \u2014 **without needing a valid account or password**.\n\n## Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Admin enables Hook Authentication and sets the command to:\n ```\n sh -c \"test $USERNAME = \u0027admin\u0027\"\n ```\n2. An unauthenticated attacker sends a login request (e.g., via `curl` or the web UI) with:\n - **Username:** `; id #`\n - **Password:** (any value)\n3. The server executes:\n ```sh\n sh -c \"test ; id # = \u0027admin\u0027\"\n ```\n4. The `id` command runs on the server, confirming pre-authentication RCE.\n\nNo account is needed. The attacker does not need to know any valid credentials. A single request is sufficient.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote attacker can execute arbitrary OS commands on the server under the privilege level of the File Browser process. This is the most severe class of vulnerability in this codebase:\n\n- **No authentication required** \u2014 exposed to the entire internet if the service is public-facing.\n- **Single request** \u2014 no setup, no enumeration, no prior foothold.\n- Full server compromise: data exfiltration, persistent backdoor installation, lateral movement to internal networks.\n\nAny internet-facing File Browser instance with Hook Authentication enabled is fully compromised by a single malformed login attempt.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```go\npackage auth\n\nimport (\n \"os\"\n \"strings\"\n \"testing\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoC_AuthHookInjection(t *testing.T) {\n // Simulate the admin-configured hook authentication command.\n // This represents a realistic configuration: verify the username via a shell expression.\n a := \u0026HookAuth{\n Command: \"sh -c $USERNAME\",\n Cred: hookCred{\n // Attacker-supplied username from the login form.\n // The password is irrelevant.\n Username: \"id ; echo injected\",\n Password: \"anything\",\n },\n }\n\n // Simulate the RunCommand logic in auth/hook.go\n command := strings.Split(a.Command, \" \")\n\n envMapping := func(key string) string {\n if key == \"USERNAME\" {\n return a.Cred.Username\n }\n return os.Getenv(key)\n }\n\n for i, arg := range command {\n if i == 0 {\n continue\n }\n // os.Expand substitutes $USERNAME with the attacker\u0027s input.\n // The result is treated as a shell script \u2014 no escaping is applied.\n command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)\n }\n\n // The shell will execute: sh -c \"id ; echo injected\"\n expectedArg := \"id ; echo injected\"\n if command[2] != expectedArg {\n t.Errorf(\"Expected command argument %q, got %q\", expectedArg, command[2])\n }\n\n t.Logf(\"Confirmed: malicious username was injected as a shell script. Executing: %v\", command)\n}\n```\n\n## Remediation\n\nPass credentials exclusively as environment variables, not as shell string substitutions. This feature is undocumented, so removing it should not cause issues.",
"id": "GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm",
"modified": "2026-07-10T19:32:32Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T19:32:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-m93h-4hw7-5qcm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54088"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "File Browser: Command Injection via Authentication Hook Shell Substitution (Pre-Authentication RCE)"
}
GHSA-M9P2-FXP5-V3FP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 19:42 – Updated: 2026-05-19 19:42Diesel allows users to configure various options for PostgreSQL's COPY FROM and COPY TO statements. These configurations are partially provided as strings or characters.
Diesel did not check if any these user-provided options contain a quote character ', which can lead to the injection of additional options in the current COPY FROM/COPY TO statement.
This vulnerability affects any user of COPY FROM/COPY TO that passes user-provided input to any of the affected functions. It can result in modifications of options in the current statement, but it is not possible inject additional statements.
Mitigation
The preferred mitigation to the outlined problem is to update to Diesel version 2.3.8 or newer, which includes fixes for the problem.
Resolution
Diesel now correctly escapes any quotes contained in the provided arguments.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "diesel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T19:42:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Diesel allows users to configure various options for PostgreSQL\u0027s `COPY FROM` and `COPY TO` statements. These configurations are partially provided as strings or characters. \n\nDiesel did not check if any these user-provided options contain a quote character `\u0027`, which can lead to the injection of additional options in the current `COPY FROM`/`COPY TO` statement. \n\nThis vulnerability affects any user of `COPY FROM`/`COPY TO` that passes user-provided input to any of the affected functions. It can result in modifications of options in the current statement, but it is not possible inject additional statements.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nThe preferred mitigation to the outlined problem is to update to Diesel version 2.3.8 or newer, which includes fixes for the problem.\n\n## Resolution\n\nDiesel now correctly escapes any quotes contained in the provided arguments.",
"id": "GHSA-m9p2-fxp5-v3fp",
"modified": "2026-05-19T19:42:00Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T19:42:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/diesel-rs/diesel/pull/5042"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/diesel-rs/diesel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0136.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Diesel: Command injection in Diesel\u0027s implementation of `COPY FROM`/`COPY TO`"
}
Mitigation
Strategy: Parameterization
Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Mitigation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
- Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Mitigation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
Mitigation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Mitigation
Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection
An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.
CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection
An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.
CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.
CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.