CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
20038 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GMG8-3R2G-98X3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-14 00:33 – Updated: 2024-06-14 00:33Missing Authorization vulnerability in Bryan Lee Kingkong Board.This issue affects Kingkong Board: from n/a through 2.1.0.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-36694"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-14T00:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Bryan Lee Kingkong Board.This issue affects Kingkong Board: from n/a through 2.1.0.2.",
"id": "GHSA-gmg8-3r2g-98x3",
"modified": "2024-06-14T00:33:07Z",
"published": "2024-06-14T00:33:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-36694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/kingkong-board/wordpress-kingkong-board-plugin-2-1-0-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMH4-W5MW-QW74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-19 12:31 – Updated: 2024-11-19 12:31The Classified Listing – Classified ads & Business Directory Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data that can lead to privilege escalation due to a misconfigured check on the 'rtcl_import_settings' function in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.15.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update limited arbitrary options on the WordPress site. This can be leveraged to update the Subscriber role with Administrator-level capabilities to gain administrative user access to a vulnerable site. The vulnerability is limited in that the option updated must have a value that is an array.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-19T12:15:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Classified Listing \u2013 Classified ads \u0026 Business Directory Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data that can lead to privilege escalation due to a misconfigured check on the \u0027rtcl_import_settings\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.15.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update limited arbitrary options on the WordPress site. This can be leveraged to update the Subscriber role with Administrator-level capabilities to gain administrative user access to a vulnerable site. The vulnerability is limited in that the option updated must have a value that is an array.",
"id": "GHSA-gmh4-w5mw-qw74",
"modified": "2024-11-19T12:31:05Z",
"published": "2024-11-19T12:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/classified-listing/tags/3.1.12/app/Controllers/Ajax/Import.php#L309"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/classified-listing/tags/3.1.12/app/Controllers/Ajax/Import.php#L473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3189516"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/13d9a59f-1a1a-4936-a5ab-8a5e0c50303b?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMHF-37FX-C4Q8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-26 21:30 – Updated: 2023-02-03 20:40Missing permission checks in Jenkins Orka by MacStadium Plugin 1.31 and earlier allow attackers with Overall/Read permission to connect to an attacker-specified HTTP server using attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method, capturing credentials stored in Jenkins.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.jenkins.plugins:macstadium-orka"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-24433"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-27T01:26:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-26T21:18:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing permission checks in Jenkins Orka by MacStadium Plugin 1.31 and earlier allow attackers with Overall/Read permission to connect to an attacker-specified HTTP server using attacker-specified credentials IDs obtained through another method, capturing credentials stored in Jenkins.",
"id": "GHSA-gmhf-37fx-c4q8",
"modified": "2023-02-03T20:40:11Z",
"published": "2023-01-26T21:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-24433"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2023-01-24/#SECURITY-2772%20(2)"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Missing permission checks in Jenkins Orka Plugin allow capturing credentials"
}
GHSA-GMJ8-3PWF-6MRG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:47 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:38CompuLab Intense PC and MintBox 2 devices with BIOS before 2017-05-21 do not use the CloseMnf protection mechanism for write protection of flash memory regions, which allows local users to install a firmware rootkit by leveraging administrative privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-8083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-06T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "CompuLab Intense PC and MintBox 2 devices with BIOS before 2017-05-21 do not use the CloseMnf protection mechanism for write protection of flash memory regions, which allows local users to install a firmware rootkit by leveraging administrative privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-gmj8-3pwf-6mrg",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:38:30Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:47:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://watchmysys.com/blog/2017/06/cve-2017-8083-compulab-intensepc-lacks-bios-wp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2017/Jun/6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMMH-W4W2-6CQC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 21:31 – Updated: 2026-03-16 18:32Missing Authorization vulnerability in Cozy Vision SMS Alert Order Notifications sms-alert allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects SMS Alert Order Notifications: from n/a through <= 3.9.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32373"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-13T19:54:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Cozy Vision SMS Alert Order Notifications sms-alert allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects SMS Alert Order Notifications: from n/a through \u003c= 3.9.0.",
"id": "GHSA-gmmh-w4w2-6cqc",
"modified": "2026-03-16T18:32:03Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T21:31:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32373"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/sms-alert/vulnerability/wordpress-sms-alert-order-notifications-plugin-3-9-0-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMMV-4CC5-WR9R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:45Summary
SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs
POST /api/graph/getGraph, POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph, POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime, POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime, POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime, and POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock are registered with model.CheckAuth only, omitting both model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of <workspace>/conf/conf.json via model.Conf.Save(). Any caller whose JWT passes CheckAuth, including a publish-service RoleReader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a RoleEditor against a workspace where Editor.ReadOnly = true, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.
Details
Affected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD 96dfe0be).
The router in kernel/api/router.go registers each endpoint below with model.CheckAuth only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous:
kernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only
kernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only
# Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines:
kernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
kernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly
Per-handler evidence:
kernel/api/graph.go:53 getGraph. Despite the verb "get", the body unconditionally overwrites model.Conf.Graph.Global from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace conf.json:
graphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg)
...
global := conf.NewGlobalGraph()
gulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global)
model.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write
model.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json
kernel/api/graph.go:106 getLocalGraph. Same pattern on model.Conf.Graph.Local. Note the legitimate writers resetGraph (graph.go:29) and resetLocalGraph (graph.go:41) only set the struct to its constructor default (NewGlobalGraph() / NewLocalGraph()), whereas getGraph / getLocalGraph accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints.
kernel/api/sync.go:597 setSyncInterval. Calls model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval)) (kernel/model/sync.go:394) which writes Conf.Sync.Interval, persists Conf.Save(), and reschedules the sync goroutine via planSyncAfter. The model layer clamps the interval to [30, 43200], but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle).
kernel/api/search.go:287 updateEmbedBlock. Calls model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content) (kernel/model/search.go:198), which validates only that the block type is BlockQueryEmbed and then forwards to updateEmbedBlockContent (kernel/model/index.go:342). That helper rewrites the SQL blocks row's content column for the given embed-block ID via sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL content column is what fullTextSearchBlock and getEmbedBlock read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users.
kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317 updateRecentDocViewTime / updateRecentDocCloseTime / updateRecentDocOpenTime / batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under recentDocLock (kernel/model/storage.go:171,213 ...). A Reader can register any rootID (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin's recently-opened-documents UI and history.
The bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live master branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 (getTag writing Conf.Tag.Sort) and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x (renderSprig missing CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences "the same root-cause class" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass.
PoC
Source-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for GHSA-6r88 works here:
# 1. Authenticate as any role with CheckAuth (admin used here for convenience;
# a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently).
curl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"authCode":"audittest"}' >/dev/null
# 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"
# 3. setSyncInterval as Reader.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"interval":30}'
# 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"k":"","conf":{"minRefs":99,"maxBlocks":1,"d3":{"linkWidth":99}}}'
# 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{}' \
| python3 -c "import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf'];\
print('Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =',c['sync']['interval']);\
print('Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =',c['graph']['global']['minRefs'])"
docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"interval\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json
docker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE '\"minRefs\":[0-9]+' /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json
# 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID.
curl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"id":"<embed-block-id>","content":"poisoned"}'
Source-level proof, no privileged token involved:
$ grep -nE 'ginServer\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)' \
kernel/api/router.go \
| grep -vE 'CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly'
kernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
Standing up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories' fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g and GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 published 2026-05-08.
Impact
A publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a Editor.ReadOnly = true workspace can:
- Atomically rewrite
<workspace>/conf/conf.jsonviaConf.Save()fromsetSyncInterval,getGraph,getLocalGraph.Conf.Save()rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window. - Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the
[30, 43200]clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible "Sync enabled" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly. - Overwrite
Conf.Graph.GlobalandConf.Graph.Localwith a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extrememaxBlocks,minRefs,nodeSize, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting. - Poison the SQL
blocks.contentcolumn for any embed-block ID viaupdateEmbedBlock. Search functions that read the SQL index (fullTextSearchBlock,getEmbedBlock) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see. - Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four
updateRecentDoc*writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).
The fix is a one-token edit per registration: add model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly to each affected ginServer.Handle call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45371"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:33:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nSiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs\n\n`POST /api/graph/getGraph`, `POST /api/graph/getLocalGraph`, `POST /api/sync/setSyncInterval`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime`, `POST /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime`, `POST /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime`, and `POST /api/search/updateEmbedBlock` are registered with `model.CheckAuth` only, omitting both `model.CheckAdminRole` and `model.CheckReadonly`. Each of them writes server-side state, including atomic rewrites of `\u003cworkspace\u003e/conf/conf.json` via `model.Conf.Save()`. Any caller whose JWT passes `CheckAuth`, including a publish-service `RoleReader` (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors) and a `RoleEditor` against a workspace where `Editor.ReadOnly = true`, can hit them. This is the same root-cause class as the patched `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x`.\n\n### Details\n\nAffected: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan, all tags up to and including v3.6.5 (HEAD `96dfe0be`).\n\nThe router in `kernel/api/router.go` registers each endpoint below with `model.CheckAuth` only. Sibling endpoints in the same group are correctly gated, which makes the omission unambiguous:\n\n```bash\nkernel/api/router.go:87 /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:88 /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:89 /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:90 /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:188 /api/search/updateEmbedBlock CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:279 /api/sync/setSyncInterval CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:400 /api/graph/getGraph CheckAuth only\nkernel/api/router.go:401 /api/graph/getLocalGraph CheckAuth only\n\n# Compare the gated siblings on adjacent lines:\nkernel/api/router.go:278 /api/sync/setSyncEnable CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:280 /api/sync/setSyncPerception CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:281 /api/sync/setSyncGenerateConflictDoc CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:398 /api/graph/resetGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\nkernel/api/router.go:399 /api/graph/resetLocalGraph CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly\n```\n\nPer-handler evidence:\n\n`kernel/api/graph.go:53` `getGraph`. Despite the verb \"get\", the body unconditionally overwrites `model.Conf.Graph.Global` from caller-supplied JSON and persists the entire workspace `conf.json`:\n\n```\ngraphConf, err := gulu.JSON.MarshalJSON(confArg)\n...\nglobal := conf.NewGlobalGraph()\ngulu.JSON.UnmarshalJSON(graphConf, global)\nmodel.Conf.Graph.Global = global // attacker-controlled write\nmodel.Conf.Save() // atomic rewrite of conf.json\n```\n\n`kernel/api/graph.go:106` `getLocalGraph`. Same pattern on `model.Conf.Graph.Local`. Note the legitimate writers `resetGraph` (`graph.go:29`) and `resetLocalGraph` (`graph.go:41`) only set the struct to its constructor default (`NewGlobalGraph()` / `NewLocalGraph()`), whereas `getGraph` / `getLocalGraph` accept the entire struct from the caller, so the unauthorized surface is strictly larger than the gated reset endpoints.\n\n`kernel/api/sync.go:597` `setSyncInterval`. Calls `model.SetSyncInterval(int(interval))` (`kernel/model/sync.go:394`) which writes `Conf.Sync.Interval`, persists `Conf.Save()`, and reschedules the sync goroutine via `planSyncAfter`. The model layer clamps the interval to `[30, 43200]`, but a Reader can still pin sync to either bound (30 s for battery and bandwidth pressure on every connected client, or 12 h to effectively suspend cloud sync without changing the UI toggle).\n\n`kernel/api/search.go:287` `updateEmbedBlock`. Calls `model.UpdateEmbedBlock(id, content)` (`kernel/model/search.go:198`), which validates only that the block type is `BlockQueryEmbed` and then forwards to `updateEmbedBlockContent` (`kernel/model/index.go:342`). That helper rewrites the SQL `blocks` row\u0027s `content` column for the given embed-block ID via `sql.UpdateBlockContentQueue`. There is no publish-access check, so any embed block ID anywhere in the workspace is writable. The SQL `content` column is what `fullTextSearchBlock` and `getEmbedBlock` read from, so a Reader can poison search results visible to other users.\n\n`kernel/api/storage.go:251,295,273,317` `updateRecentDocViewTime` / `updateRecentDocCloseTime` / `updateRecentDocOpenTime` / `batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime`. Each rewrites the workspace recent-docs JSON file under `recentDocLock` (`kernel/model/storage.go:171,213` ...). A Reader can register any `rootID` (including IDs in publish-private notebooks) into the recent-docs list, manipulating the admin\u0027s recently-opened-documents UI and history.\n\nThe bugs have all existed since v3.6.5 (the active release tag) and the live `master` branch. Two adjacent advisories already patched the exact same shape: `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` (`getTag` writing `Conf.Tag.Sort`) and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x` (`renderSprig` missing `CheckAdminRole + CheckReadonly`). Both are listed by the maintainers as occurrences \"the same root-cause class\" that has to be patched per-occurrence, so this report enumerates the remaining occurrences in one pass.\n\n### PoC\n\nSource-level reproduction. The same Docker compose lab the maintainers used for `GHSA-6r88` works here:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Authenticate as any role with CheckAuth (admin used here for convenience;\n# a publish-mode Reader JWT works equivalently).\ncurl -s -c /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/loginAuth \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"authCode\":\"audittest\"}\u0027 \u003e/dev/null\n\n# 2. Read current Conf.Sync.Interval and Conf.Graph.Global from /api/system/getConf.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027conf\u0027];\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Sync.Interval BEFORE =\u0027,c[\u0027sync\u0027][\u0027interval\u0027]);\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs BEFORE =\u0027,c[\u0027graph\u0027][\u0027global\u0027][\u0027minRefs\u0027])\"\n\n# 3. setSyncInterval as Reader.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/sync/setSyncInterval \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{\"interval\":30}\u0027\n\n# 4. getGraph as Reader, supplying a custom graph config struct.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/graph/getGraph \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\",\"conf\":{\"minRefs\":99,\"maxBlocks\":1,\"d3\":{\"linkWidth\":99}}}\u0027\n\n# 5. Confirm in-memory and on-disk persistence.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/system/getConf \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 -d \u0027{}\u0027 \\\n | python3 -c \"import json,sys;c=json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027data\u0027][\u0027conf\u0027];\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Sync.Interval AFTER =\u0027,c[\u0027sync\u0027][\u0027interval\u0027]);\\\nprint(\u0027Conf.Graph.Global.minRefs AFTER =\u0027,c[\u0027graph\u0027][\u0027global\u0027][\u0027minRefs\u0027])\"\n\ndocker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE \u0027\\\"interval\\\":[0-9]+\u0027 /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json\ndocker exec siyuan-audit grep -oE \u0027\\\"minRefs\\\":[0-9]+\u0027 /siyuan/workspace/conf/conf.json\n\n# 6. updateEmbedBlock - rewrite SQL content for any embed block ID.\ncurl -s -b /tmp/sy.cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/search/updateEmbedBlock \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"id\":\"\u003cembed-block-id\u003e\",\"content\":\"poisoned\"}\u0027\n```\n\nSource-level proof, no privileged token involved:\n\n```bash\n$ grep -nE \u0027ginServer\\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)\u0027 \\\n kernel/api/router.go \\\n | grep -vE \u0027CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly\u0027\nkernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph\", model.CheckAuth, ...\nkernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph\", model.CheckAuth, ...\n```\n\nStanding up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories\u0027 fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for `GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g` and `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` published 2026-05-08.\n\n### Impact\n\nA publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a `Editor.ReadOnly = true` workspace can:\n\n1. Atomically rewrite `\u003cworkspace\u003e/conf/conf.json` via `Conf.Save()` from `setSyncInterval`, `getGraph`, `getLocalGraph`. `Conf.Save()` rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window.\n2. Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the `[30, 43200]` clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible \"Sync enabled\" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly.\n3. Overwrite `Conf.Graph.Global` and `Conf.Graph.Local` with a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extreme `maxBlocks`, `minRefs`, `nodeSize`, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting.\n4. Poison the SQL `blocks.content` column for any embed-block ID via `updateEmbedBlock`. Search functions that read the SQL index (`fullTextSearchBlock`, `getEmbedBlock`) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see.\n5. Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four `updateRecentDoc*` writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).\n\nThe fix is a one-token edit per registration: add `model.CheckAdminRole` and `model.CheckReadonly` to each affected `ginServer.Handle` call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for `GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2` and `GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x`.",
"id": "GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:43Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T15:33:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-gmmv-4cc5-wr9r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45371"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan publish-mode Reader can mutate Conf and SQL index via 8 ungated APIs"
}
GHSA-GMQM-6C6M-4GMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-19 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 15:32Missing Authorization vulnerability in WP ManageNinja LLC FluentCommunity fluent-community allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects FluentCommunity: from n/a through 2.11.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-111836"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T13:16:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in WP ManageNinja LLC FluentCommunity fluent-community allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects FluentCommunity: from n/a through 2.11.0.",
"id": "GHSA-gmqm-6c6m-4gmw",
"modified": "2026-10-19T15:32:37Z",
"published": "2026-10-19T15:32:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111836"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/fluent-community/vulnerability/wordpress-fluentcommunity-plugin-2-11-0-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMR5-R458-WW74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-24 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:34Missing Authorization vulnerability in LoginPress LoginPress Pro.This issue affects LoginPress Pro: from n/a through 2.5.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-32677"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-24T16:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in LoginPress LoginPress Pro.This issue affects LoginPress Pro: from n/a through 2.5.3.",
"id": "GHSA-gmr5-r458-ww74",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:34:56Z",
"published": "2024-04-24T18:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/loginpress-pro/wordpress-loginpress-pro-plugin-2-5-3-unauth-license-activation-deactivation-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GMR7-M73X-6C9Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-07-26 21:22 – Updated: 2021-07-26 21:11Lack of authorization controls in REST API functions in TeamPass through 2.1.27.36 allows any TeamPass user with a valid API token to become a TeamPass administrator and read/modify all passwords via authenticated api/index.php REST API calls. NOTE: the API is not available by default.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "nilsteampassnet/teampass"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "2.1.27.36"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-11671"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-26T21:11:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-05-04T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Lack of authorization controls in REST API functions in TeamPass through 2.1.27.36 allows any TeamPass user with a valid API token to become a TeamPass administrator and read/modify all passwords via authenticated api/index.php REST API calls. NOTE: the API is not available by default.",
"id": "GHSA-gmr7-m73x-6c9q",
"modified": "2021-07-26T21:11:19Z",
"published": "2021-07-26T21:22:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11671"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nilsteampassnet/TeamPass/issues/2765"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Missing Authorization in TeamPass"
}
GHSA-GMRM-QQ98-M6XV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-18 18:31The Post SMTP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the handle_office365_oauth_redirect() function in all versions up to, and including, 3.8.0. This is due to the function being hooked to admin_init without any current_user_can() check or nonce verification. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the site's Office 365 OAuth mail configuration (access token, refresh token, and user email) via a crafted URL. The configuration option is used during wizard setup of Microsoft365 SMTP, only available in the Pro option of the plugin. This could cause an Administrator to believe an attacker-controlled Azure app is their own, and lead them to connect the plugin to the attacker's account during configuration after upgrading to Pro.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2559"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T16:16:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Post SMTP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the `handle_office365_oauth_redirect()` function in all versions up to, and including, 3.8.0. This is due to the function being hooked to `admin_init` without any `current_user_can()` check or nonce verification. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to overwrite the site\u0027s Office 365 OAuth mail configuration (access token, refresh token, and user email) via a crafted URL. The configuration option is used during wizard setup of Microsoft365 SMTP, only available in the Pro option of the plugin. This could cause an Administrator to believe an attacker-controlled Azure app is their own, and lead them to connect the plugin to the attacker\u0027s account during configuration after upgrading to Pro.",
"id": "GHSA-gmrm-qq98-m6xv",
"modified": "2026-03-18T18:31:16Z",
"published": "2026-03-18T18:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/post-smtp/trunk/Postman/Wizard/NewWizard.php#L104"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/post-smtp/trunk/Postman/Wizard/NewWizard.php#L2109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3484515"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/323436b5-fbfe-4923-8b08-93c1fcabc016?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.