CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
20038 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G7HV-G729-XQ68
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-23 09:33 – Updated: 2024-11-23 09:33The WPGYM - Wordpress Gym Management System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation due to a missing capability check on the MJ_gmgt_add_staff_member() function in all versions up to, and including, 67.1.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to create new user accounts with the administrator role.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9941"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-23T08:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The WPGYM - Wordpress Gym Management System plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation due to a missing capability check on the MJ_gmgt_add_staff_member() function in all versions up to, and including, 67.1.0. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to create new user accounts with the administrator role.",
"id": "GHSA-g7hv-g729-xq68",
"modified": "2024-11-23T09:33:45Z",
"published": "2024-11-23T09:33:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9941"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://codecanyon.net/item/-wpgym-wordpress-gym-management-system/13352964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/cbff92c1-8492-4d0d-bd90-8fd33625bf6f?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7P5-89MH-248H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:51 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:51Summary
Repo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemur
When ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False (an explicitly supported and documented configuration), POST /api/1/authorities with type=subca never verifies that the caller holds AuthorityPermission on the supplied parent authority. The parent field is resolved by AssociatedAuthoritySchema via a raw fetch_objects(Authority, data) lookup, then passed straight through service.create → mint → cryptography-issuer.create_authority, which loads options["parent"].authority_certificate.private_key and signs a brand-new intermediate CA on the caller's behalf.
Any authenticated non-read-only user can therefore mint a sub-CA chained to any internal root whose private key Lemur holds — including roots they hold no role on — attach a role they already belong to, and immediately issue or offline-sign trusted leaf certificates for arbitrary names.
Affected route
POST /api/1/authorities (with type=subca)
Affected code
lemur/authorities/views.py:231— gates only onAuthorityCreatorPermission()+StrictRolePermission(); noAuthorityPermissionondata['parent']lemur/authorities/schemas.py:58—parent = fields.Nested(AssociatedAuthoritySchema);validate_subcaonly checks presencelemur/schemas.py:107—AssociatedAuthoritySchema.get_object→fetch_objects(Authority, data)resolves any authority by id/name with no permission checklemur/plugins/lemur_cryptography/plugin.py:40—private_key = options["authority"].authority_certificate.private_key(set fromoptions["parent"]) signs the new intermediatelemur/auth/permissions.py:62—AuthorityCreatorPermissionbecomes always-allow whenADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=Falselemur/certificates/views.py:538—is_private_authority(true forcryptography-issuer) skipsUSER_DOMAIN_AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDERfor subsequent leaf issuance
Impact
In deployments that set ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False to enable self-service CA creation, any authenticated non-read-only user — with zero permission on a given internal root CA — can obtain a working intermediate CA chained to that root. They can then:
- Issue TLS certificates for arbitrary names trusted by every relying party that trusts the internal root, bypassing
LEMUR_ALLOWED_DOMAINS, sensitive-domain flags, and the per-user domain-authorization plugin. - Export the sub-CA private key and sign end-entity certificates entirely outside Lemur, defeating all in-product issuance controls.
This converts "can create a self-contained test CA" into "can mint trusted certs under any internal PKI root in the organisation". The ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION documentation does not warn operators of this consequence.
Root cause
AuthoritiesList.post evaluates AuthorityCreatorPermission (a global "may create authorities" flag) and StrictRolePermission, but never evaluates AuthorityPermission(parent.id, parent.roles) against the caller-supplied parent. AssociatedAuthoritySchema is a pure lookup schema with no authz hook, and neither authorities.service.create nor mint re-check before invoking issuer_plugin.create_authority(options). The bundled cryptography-issuer then uses the parent's stored private key directly.
Validated evidence
Static trace, confirmed by code inspection (validation status: CONFIRMED):
parentis loaded viaAssociatedAuthoritySchema(rawfetch_objects), passed unchecked throughviews.post → service.create → mint → plugin.create_authority → issue_certificate, where the parent authority's stored private key is read and used to sign the new intermediate.- No call to
AuthorityPermission(parent.id, ...)exists anywhere on this path. - Precondition
ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=Falseis an explicitly supported config (docs/administration.rst:517).
Proof of concept / reproducer
Status: reconstructed from source report (static control-flow trace; not executed against a live CA).
Preconditions: ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False; attacker is an authenticated Lemur user holding any role other than read-only; <PARENT_AUTHORITY_ID> is any internal cryptography-issuer root CA the attacker holds no role on; <ATTACKER_ROLE> is any role the attacker already belongs to.
curl -sS -X POST "<TARGET_BASE_URL>/api/1/authorities" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <AUTH_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "attacker-subca",
"owner": "attacker@example.com",
"description": "poc",
"type": "subca",
"parent": {"id": <PARENT_AUTHORITY_ID>},
"plugin": {"slug": "cryptography-issuer"},
"roles": [{"name": "<ATTACKER_ROLE>"}],
"commonName": "attacker-intermediate",
"validityYears": 1
}'
The response contains a new authority whose authority_certificate is signed by <PARENT_AUTHORITY_ID>'s private key. The caller is recorded as creator and holds <ATTACKER_ROLE> on it, so POST /api/1/certificates against the new authority succeeds (and skips allowed_issuance_for_domain because is_private_authority is true).
Static-trace validation command from the source report:
grep -n 'parent' lemur/authorities/schemas.py lemur/authorities/views.py lemur/authorities/service.py \
&& sed -n '37,55p' lemur/plugins/lemur_cryptography/plugin.py
Source artifact: audit/harnesses/public-repo-threat-model-harness/results/netflix-lemur-100run-mythos-20260627T051129Z/findings.jsonl (run_022, finding cluster lemur-subca-parent-authz, 5/100 runs).
Suggested fix
In AuthoritiesList.post (or authorities.service.create), when data.get('parent') is present, enforce AuthorityPermission(parent.id, [r.name for r in parent.roles]).can() before invoking the issuer plugin, regardless of ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION. Additionally, update the ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION documentation to state that disabling it currently grants every authenticated user the ability to chain sub-CAs off any internal root whose private key Lemur holds. Consider also requiring admin (or an explicit per-parent capability) for any type=subca creation independent of the global flag.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "lemur"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71317"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:51:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nRepo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemur\n\nWhen `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False` (an explicitly supported and documented configuration), `POST /api/1/authorities` with `type=subca` never verifies that the caller holds `AuthorityPermission` on the supplied `parent` authority. The `parent` field is resolved by `AssociatedAuthoritySchema` via a raw `fetch_objects(Authority, data)` lookup, then passed straight through `service.create \u2192 mint \u2192 cryptography-issuer.create_authority`, which loads `options[\"parent\"].authority_certificate.private_key` and signs a brand-new intermediate CA on the caller\u0027s behalf.\n\nAny authenticated non-read-only user can therefore mint a sub-CA chained to any internal root whose private key Lemur holds \u2014 including roots they hold no role on \u2014 attach a role they already belong to, and immediately issue or offline-sign trusted leaf certificates for arbitrary names.\n\n## Affected route\n\n`POST /api/1/authorities` (with `type=subca`)\n\n## Affected code\n\n- [`lemur/authorities/views.py:231`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/authorities/views.py#L231) \u2014 gates only on `AuthorityCreatorPermission()` + `StrictRolePermission()`; no `AuthorityPermission` on `data[\u0027parent\u0027]`\n- [`lemur/authorities/schemas.py:58`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/authorities/schemas.py#L58) \u2014 `parent = fields.Nested(AssociatedAuthoritySchema)`; `validate_subca` only checks presence\n- [`lemur/schemas.py:107`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/schemas.py#L107) \u2014 `AssociatedAuthoritySchema.get_object` \u2192 `fetch_objects(Authority, data)` resolves any authority by id/name with no permission check\n- [`lemur/plugins/lemur_cryptography/plugin.py:40`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/plugins/lemur_cryptography/plugin.py#L40) \u2014 `private_key = options[\"authority\"].authority_certificate.private_key` (set from `options[\"parent\"]`) signs the new intermediate\n- [`lemur/auth/permissions.py:62`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/auth/permissions.py#L62) \u2014 `AuthorityCreatorPermission` becomes always-allow when `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False`\n- [`lemur/certificates/views.py:538`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/certificates/views.py#L538) \u2014 `is_private_authority` (true for `cryptography-issuer`) skips `USER_DOMAIN_AUTHORIZATION_PROVIDER` for subsequent leaf issuance\n\n## Impact\n\nIn deployments that set `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False` to enable self-service CA creation, any authenticated non-read-only user \u2014 with zero permission on a given internal root CA \u2014 can obtain a working intermediate CA chained to that root. They can then:\n\n- Issue TLS certificates for arbitrary names trusted by every relying party that trusts the internal root, bypassing `LEMUR_ALLOWED_DOMAINS`, sensitive-domain flags, and the per-user domain-authorization plugin.\n- Export the sub-CA private key and sign end-entity certificates entirely outside Lemur, defeating all in-product issuance controls.\n\nThis converts \"can create a self-contained test CA\" into \"can mint trusted certs under any internal PKI root in the organisation\". The `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION` documentation does not warn operators of this consequence.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`AuthoritiesList.post` evaluates `AuthorityCreatorPermission` (a global \"may create authorities\" flag) and `StrictRolePermission`, but never evaluates `AuthorityPermission(parent.id, parent.roles)` against the caller-supplied `parent`. `AssociatedAuthoritySchema` is a pure lookup schema with no authz hook, and neither `authorities.service.create` nor `mint` re-check before invoking `issuer_plugin.create_authority(options)`. The bundled `cryptography-issuer` then uses the parent\u0027s stored private key directly.\n\n## Validated evidence\n\nStatic trace, confirmed by code inspection (validation status: `CONFIRMED`):\n\n- `parent` is loaded via `AssociatedAuthoritySchema` (raw `fetch_objects`), passed unchecked through `views.post \u2192 service.create \u2192 mint \u2192 plugin.create_authority \u2192 issue_certificate`, where the parent authority\u0027s stored private key is read and used to sign the new intermediate.\n- No call to `AuthorityPermission(parent.id, ...)` exists anywhere on this path.\n- Precondition `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False` is an explicitly supported config ([`docs/administration.rst:517`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/docs/administration.rst#L517)).\n\n## Proof of concept / reproducer\n\nStatus: reconstructed from source report (static control-flow trace; not executed against a live CA).\n\nPreconditions: `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION=False`; attacker is an authenticated Lemur user holding any role other than `read-only`; `\u003cPARENT_AUTHORITY_ID\u003e` is any internal `cryptography-issuer` root CA the attacker holds no role on; `\u003cATTACKER_ROLE\u003e` is any role the attacker already belongs to.\n\n```bash\ncurl -sS -X POST \"\u003cTARGET_BASE_URL\u003e/api/1/authorities\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cAUTH_TOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"name\": \"attacker-subca\",\n \"owner\": \"attacker@example.com\",\n \"description\": \"poc\",\n \"type\": \"subca\",\n \"parent\": {\"id\": \u003cPARENT_AUTHORITY_ID\u003e},\n \"plugin\": {\"slug\": \"cryptography-issuer\"},\n \"roles\": [{\"name\": \"\u003cATTACKER_ROLE\u003e\"}],\n \"commonName\": \"attacker-intermediate\",\n \"validityYears\": 1\n }\u0027\n```\n\nThe response contains a new authority whose `authority_certificate` is signed by `\u003cPARENT_AUTHORITY_ID\u003e`\u0027s private key. The caller is recorded as creator and holds `\u003cATTACKER_ROLE\u003e` on it, so `POST /api/1/certificates` against the new authority succeeds (and skips `allowed_issuance_for_domain` because `is_private_authority` is true).\n\nStatic-trace validation command from the source report:\n\n```bash\ngrep -n \u0027parent\u0027 lemur/authorities/schemas.py lemur/authorities/views.py lemur/authorities/service.py \\\n \u0026\u0026 sed -n \u002737,55p\u0027 lemur/plugins/lemur_cryptography/plugin.py\n```\n\nSource artifact: `audit/harnesses/public-repo-threat-model-harness/results/netflix-lemur-100run-mythos-20260627T051129Z/findings.jsonl` (run_022, finding cluster `lemur-subca-parent-authz`, 5/100 runs).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nIn `AuthoritiesList.post` (or `authorities.service.create`), when `data.get(\u0027parent\u0027)` is present, enforce `AuthorityPermission(parent.id, [r.name for r in parent.roles]).can()` before invoking the issuer plugin, regardless of `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION`. Additionally, update the `ADMIN_ONLY_AUTHORITY_CREATION` documentation to state that disabling it currently grants every authenticated user the ability to chain sub-CAs off any internal root whose private key Lemur holds. Consider also requiring admin (or an explicit per-parent capability) for any `type=subca` creation independent of the global flag.",
"id": "GHSA-g7p5-89mh-248h",
"modified": "2026-08-18T20:51:38Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T20:51:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-g7p5-89mh-248h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/8669011203ca3dd89d9e39bab9ef6850eca723f9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Lemur: Sub-CA creation never checks `AuthorityPermission` on the parent authority"
}
GHSA-G7PV-5FJQ-Q2XW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-07 12:30 – Updated: 2024-12-07 12:30The Simple Ecommerce Shopping Cart Plugin- Sell products through Paypal plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on the 'save_settings', 'export_csv', and 'simpleecommcart-action' actions in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to update the plugins settings and retrieve order and log data (which is also accessible to unauthenticated users).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12253"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-07T10:15:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Simple Ecommerce Shopping Cart Plugin- Sell products through Paypal plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on the \u0027save_settings\u0027, \u0027export_csv\u0027, and \u0027simpleecommcart-action\u0027 actions in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.2. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to update the plugins settings and retrieve order and log data (which is also accessible to unauthenticated users).",
"id": "GHSA-g7pv-5fjq-q2xw",
"modified": "2024-12-07T12:30:25Z",
"published": "2024-12-07T12:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12253"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/simple-e-commerce-shopping-cart/#developers"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1c6a1956-73aa-4ac3-ae1c-ef5f62bad718?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7VJ-553H-HJWX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-13 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35Missing Authorization vulnerability in Constant Contact Constant Contact Forms allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Constant Contact Forms: from n/a through 2.0.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-34387"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-13T15:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Constant Contact Constant Contact Forms allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Constant Contact Forms: from n/a through 2.0.3.",
"id": "GHSA-g7vj-553h-hjwx",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:23Z",
"published": "2024-12-13T15:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34387"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/constant-contact-forms/vulnerability/wordpress-constant-contact-forms-plugin-1-14-0-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7VX-258P-5GCP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:35Missing Authorization vulnerability in wpWax Legal Pages allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Legal Pages: from n/a through 1.4.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48242"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-19T15:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in wpWax Legal Pages allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels. This issue affects Legal Pages: from n/a through 1.4.5.",
"id": "GHSA-g7vx-258p-5gcp",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:35:08Z",
"published": "2025-05-19T15:31:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48242"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/legal-pages/vulnerability/wordpress-legal-pages-1-4-5-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7X3-7HFG-28QJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-10-13 18:30A missing authorization vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM 7.5.0 may allow attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via Specially crafted HTTP requests
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-106176"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T18:17:15Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A missing authorization vulnerability in Fortinet FortiSIEM 7.5.0 may allow attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via Specially crafted HTTP requests",
"id": "GHSA-g7x3-7hfg-28qj",
"modified": "2026-10-13T18:30:57Z",
"published": "2026-10-13T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-106176"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-26-183"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G826-PJJX-854F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-07 12:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in Arraytics Booktics booktics allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Booktics: from n/a through 1.0.27.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-104390"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-07T10:17:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Arraytics Booktics booktics allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Booktics: from n/a through 1.0.27.",
"id": "GHSA-g826-pjjx-854f",
"modified": "2026-10-07T12:31:58Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T12:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104390"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/booktics/vulnerability/wordpress-booktics-plugin-1-0-27-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G82V-73F7-4W62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-09 15:31 – Updated: 2024-12-09 15:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in ProfilePress Membership Team ProfilePress.This issue affects ProfilePress: from n/a through 4.13.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41953"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-09T14:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in ProfilePress Membership Team ProfilePress.This issue affects ProfilePress: from n/a through 4.13.1.",
"id": "GHSA-g82v-73f7-4w62",
"modified": "2024-12-09T15:31:37Z",
"published": "2024-12-09T15:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41953"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-user-avatar/vulnerability/wordpress-profilepress-plugin-4-13-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G833-JPQM-6G28
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-12 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-12 15:32LogicalDOC Community Edition through 9.3 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in SoapDocumentService operations that allows authenticated users to access and modify unauthorized documents. Attackers can call copy, getExtractedText, deleteVersion, reindex, deleteLink, or restore via SOAP or /services/rest/document with sequential document IDs to disclose, delete, or tamper with documents.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-109201"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-12T14:17:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "LogicalDOC Community Edition through 9.3 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in SoapDocumentService operations that allows authenticated users to access and modify unauthorized documents. Attackers can call copy, getExtractedText, deleteVersion, reindex, deleteLink, or restore via SOAP or /services/rest/document with sequential document IDs to disclose, delete, or tamper with documents.",
"id": "GHSA-g833-jpqm-6g28",
"modified": "2026-10-12T15:32:17Z",
"published": "2026-10-12T15:32:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/logicaldoc/community/commit/648047ee0ec95c294bb983e511fed60dbc67977f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/logicaldoc/community"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/logicaldoc/community/blob/9.3/logicaldoc-webservice/src/main/java/com/logicaldoc/webservice/soap/endpoint/SoapDocumentService.java#L445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/logicaldoc/community/discussions/119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/logicaldoc-community-edition-through-9.3-missing-authorization-in-documentservice"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G839-VQMV-FC9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 03:30 – Updated: 2026-09-10 15:33Missing authorization in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 153.0.8010.36 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted Chrome extension. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-87441"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T01:17:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing authorization in Downloads in Google Chrome prior to 153.0.8010.36 allowed a remote attacker to bypass system access restrictions via a crafted Chrome extension. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-g839-vqmv-fc9g",
"modified": "2026-09-10T15:33:05Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T03:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0808145027.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/514556469"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.